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ABSTRACT
The past decade witnessed the emergence in the European Union of a
comprehensive legal framework aimed at countering money laundering. The aim
of the thesis is to place these measures in context, by examining their evolution in
the light of parallel developments in the fields of international relations and crime
prevention and control. Through the employment of an interdisciplinary approach,
it is demonstrated that the development of money laundering counter-measures in
the European Union is inextricably linked with the reconceptualisation of security
in the international arena, now extending beyond the narrow state/military realm
and including threats such as organised crime and, related to that, money
laundering. Money laundering counter-measures are thus legitimated as emergency
measures deemed as necessary to address these newly perceived threats. In this
context, and following international political pressure for the adoption of a global
anti-money laundering framework, the European Union counter-measures
constitute a new paradigm of security governance, achieved through three
principal methods: criminalisation, consisting in the emergence of a new criminal
offence of money laundering; responsibilisation, consisting in the mobilisation of
the private sector to co-operate with the authorities in the fight against money
laundering; and the emphasis on the administration of knowledge, through the
establishment of new institutions, the financial intelligence units, with extensive
powers to administer a wide range of information provided by the private sector.
All three methods pose significant challenges to fundamental legal principles and
ultimately, to well-established social transactions and bonds. The analysis will
focus on these challenges, which become more acute in the light of the constant
evolution of these measures. An attempt will thus be made to demonstrate that a
'securitised' anti-money laundering paradigm, which may serve as a mould for
subsequent initiatives in the field of organised crime, has the potential to
undermine the very essence of fundamental legal principles and rights. This is
particularly the case in the European Union as the latter's ambitious position as an
international security actor putting forward a security paradigm in the field of
money laundering is not accompanied by analogous powers to protect fundamental
1
rights. In view of these dangers, a call will be made for the 'de-securitisation' of
money laundering counter-measures, through attempts towards a realistic and well-
founded estimation of the actual threat and the promotion of legal certainty and
respect of fundamental legal principles in the drafting of new measures. At the
same time, the imposition of security measures by the European Union must be
accompanied by the constitutionalisation at the EU level of the protection of
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The past fifteen years have witnessed an unprecedented mobilisation in the
international policy arena aimed at the adoption of measures to counter a
phenomenon newly meriting attention: money laundering. International
organisations such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe, supranational
bodies such as the European Union, and ad hoc bodies established for that purpose,
such as the Financial Action Task Force, produced a series of detailed binding and
'soft' legal rules in the field. Such world-wide mobilisation has led to the global
application of money laundering counter-measures and to their constant evolution.
At the same time, it has led to an intense academic interest which has produced a
wide range of legal, criminological and economic analyses of the phenomenon and
its counter-measures.
The aim of the thesis is to go beyond such analyses and place the evolution of
money laundering counter-measures in context. Through the employment of an
interdisciplinary approach, and on the basis, along with secondary literature, of a
wide range of primary documentation, money laundering counter-measures will be
examined in the context of parallel developments in the fields of international
relations and crime prevention and control. It will be argued that their evolution is
inextricably associated with the emerging reconceptualisation of security to include
new categories of threats which are said to justify emergency measures to counter
them. Money laundering counter-measures are thus viewed as security measures,
which, due to their emergency character, have the potential to undermine
fundamental legal principles and, ultimately, well-established social relations.
The analysis will focus on the evolution of money laundering counter-measures
in the European Union. This choice is justified, apart from the character of the EU
as a supranational institution imposing legislation directly on fifteen member
states, primarily by the fact that it is the first organisation at the international level
which provided a comprehensive, legally binding paradigm of money laundering
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counter-measures, ranging from regulatory to criminal law and law enforcement
ones. Starting from the cornerstone of EC legislation in the field, which is the
imposition of duties on credit and financial institutions including their duty to co¬
operate with national anti-money laundering authorities, the analysis will extend to
the pre-requisite of such co-operation, which is the establishment of a money
laundering offence, and its consequence, which is the establishment and
functioning of these authorities.
The evolution of money laundering counter-measures in the European Union
will be examined in the light of prior, and parallel, international developments in
the field in order to demonstrate the interrelation between the various initiatives in
an attempt to establish a global anti-money laundering framework. The focus in
this respect will be placed on the legal rules per se, without extending to an
assessment of the role of various national and international 'players' in the making
of these instruments. Such an attempt would extend beyond the scope of the
analysis, which is to demonstrate that the EU counter-measures form part of a
global effort to counter money laundering and to assess them taking such
developments into consideration.
The analysis will then focus on the EC money laundering directive, which
constitutes the cornerstone of the EU anti-money laundering framework. The
extensive analysis of its content will be coupled with an overview of the history
and controversies behind its adoption and an overview of the implementation of
the provisions in the member states. The evolutionary character of the measures
will be demonstrated by an overview of subsequent developments in the European
Union and internationally, focusing on the recently proposed amendments to the
directive. The most extensive part of the analysis will focus on the examination of
the challenges posed to fundamental legal principles by the three parameters of the
EU anti-money laundering model. The analysis will be based on both the content
and implementation of the measures, focusing on selected issues of importance
which have arisen in the member states. This will be particularly the case in the
2
examination of the national competent authorities, where very little has been done
at the EU level.
The thesis however will begin by providing the theoretical framework placing
this analysis in context. The basis of this framework will be an overview of the
reconceptualisation of security in the international arena, in order to include a wide
range of new threats. The impact of such reconceptualisation on the legal field will
then be examined, both at national and international/EU level, focusing on
measures aimed at countering the perceived security threat of organised crime and
the challenges they pose for the law. Due to the close link of these measures with
money laundering counter-measures, the analysis will serve as a general
conceptual framework in order to assess the evolution of money laundering
counter-measures in the European Union. In this context, the thesis is neither an
attempt to 'measure' the threats of organised crime or money laundering, nor an
assessment of whether such phenomena amount to real or merely imaginary
threats, consciously refraining thus from using a 'moral panic' approach as its focal
point. This choice is dictated in particular by the lack of concrete empirical data in
the field. Following a similar rationale, the thesis will not attempt to provide an in-
depth political analysis of the policy reasons behind this 'securitisation' process.
In ascertaining this 'securitisation' through legal texts, the thesis will rather focus
on examining the impact of this process at the legal level, on the nature and content
of EU money laundering counter-measures.
3
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The reconceptualisation of security in the international arena




'...no place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture
of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving and removing such things as require
much force, no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death;
And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short'2
The classical Hobbessian account of the ramifications of a security deficit has
been reconstructed in several ways, and the absolute value of security qualified.
However, its conceptual validity retains its vigour in a multitude of contemporary
security theorisations: security is still perceived in negative terms.4 Its value lies in
its antithesis with 'no society', danger and the 'continual feare' they entail. The
quest for security is thus inextricably linked with contrary perceptions of insecurity,
constructing an (insecurity nexus, which permeates a significant strand of
contemporary international relations theory. For Michael Dillon, it is encapsulated
in the classical Greek concept of security as a-sphaleia,5 bringing into the forefront
discourses of danger and fear.6 Security thus becomes a specific way of framing an
issue:7 any discourse of security, according to Dillon, 'must always, already,
simultaneously and in a plurality of ways, be a discourse of danger too. For
1 Term Borrowed from M. Dillon (1996), Politics ofSecurity. Towards a Political Philosophy of
Continental Thought, Routledge, London and New York.
2 T.Hobbes (1651), The Leviathan, Part I, ch. XIII, cited in R.H. Ullman (1983), 'Redefining
Security' in International Security, vol.8, no.l, p.130.
3 See Ullmann, op. cit.
4 On the negative perception of security, see also S.Dalby (1992), Security, Modernity, Ecology:
The Dilemmas of Post- Cold War Security Discourse, in Alternatives, vol.17, pp.97 et seq.
3 Dillon goes into the hermeneutics of the term in the classical Greek context. He notes: 'Asphaleia
is the privative of the verb sphallo- i.e. a-sphaleia. Sphallo means to err, to cause to fall or fail, to
bring down, trip-up (as in wrestling), to overthrow, defeat, baffle, disappoint or frustrate (for
example, in respect of an oracle), or to make something or someone reel or stagger (as when drunk).
It is translated into latin as fallo- to fall. In the noun form, it is a fault, failing or error,a false step, or
mistake. Hence the privative asphaleia is to avoid falling, error, failure, or mistake. It is to make
something stand, steadfastness, assured from danger, safe, steady, fortified, to be furnished with a
firm foundation, to be certain, or sure'. Dillon , op. cit., p. 124.
6 Ibid., p.33.
7 See O. Waever (1996), 'European Security Identities', in Journal of Common Market Studies,
vol.34, no.l, p. 106.
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example, because security is engendered by fear (fundamentally aroused by the
uncanny, uncertain, different, awesome and uncalculable) it must also teach us
what to fear when the secure is being pursued'.8
The emphasis on the discursive elements in the construction of security, led to its
recent theorisation by a leading school of thought as a self-referential practice: it is
thus argued that 'it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue- not
necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented
as such a threat'. 9 This 'securitisation' process10 goes hand in hand with the
specification of the fear which engenders it.11 Central thus in the security discourse
is the position of the threat. This is eloquently expressed in one of the leading
international relations analyses of security, where it is asserted that 'in the case of
12
security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat', which is
further analysed into 'what is perceived as 'hostile' forces of change'.13 In this Self
/ Other dichotomisation, the perceived threat calls for emergency action to counter
it, and thus preserve the Self identity which is constructed through this process.
Emergency measures appear in the 'security drama' as justified due to the absolute
prioritisation of the issue.14 Along with the construction of threats, security seeks to
'proscribe, sanction, punish, overcome- that is to say, in its turn endanger that
8
Dillon, op. cit., pp. 120-21.
9 B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde (1998), Security. A New Frameworkfor Analysis, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, p. 124. See also Waever, op. cit.
10 On the establishment of the term see O. Waever (1995), 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in
R.D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 46-86.
11
Dillon, op. cit., p. 121.
12 B. Buzan (1991 i) People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the
Post- Cold War Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Brighton, pp. 18-19, cited also in J. Huysmans (1995)
'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of 'Securitizing' Societal Issues' in R.Miles and D.
Thranhardt (eds.) Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion,
Pinter, London, p.54. In a similar context J. Der Derian, referring to the genealogy of the concept,
offers an understanding of security as a condition of 'being protected, free from danger, safety'
((1993)'The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard' in D. Campbell and M.
Dillon (eds.) The Political Subject of Violence, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New
York, p.97).
13 B. Buzan (1991 ii), 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty- First Century', in
International Affairs, vol.67, no.3, p.432.
14 On the 'security drama' construct, see Huysmans, op. cit., p.54. See also Waever, op. cit., p. 106.
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which it says threatens us'.15 In this process, the perceived imminence of the need
to adopt emergency measures provides legitimacy for the breaking of pre-exisitng
rules and principles in order to counter what is deemed to be a threat in each case.16
In the assessment of the symbiotic relationship between perceived threats and
emergency measures in the (in)security nexus, a fundamental question arises:
17
'whose security'? In one of the first major reconceptualisations of security in the
context of the international system reference is made to 'the ability of states and
18societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity'.
This approach has been challenged on a number of grounds, centred on: the
inadequacy of the state and the ambiguity of 'society' as analytical tools; and the
general, catch-all reference to identity maintenance. In assessing the validity of
these challenges, it is important to highlight the critique put forward regarding the
failure of this scheme to distinguish between the concepts of actor and referent
object in the security discourse.19 This distinction is of vital importance in the
understanding of the reconceptualised challenges in the security triangular scheme,
read now as one of: threat - emergency measures - (securitising) actor / referent
object.




16 Buzan et al. argue in this respect that 'securitization is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which
can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of
existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.' Op. cit., p.25.
17 See Dalby, op. cit., p. 103.
18 Buzan in Huysmans, op. cit.
19
Waever, op. cit., pp. 107 et seq. Emphasis added. This distinction has been refined in the recent
book by Buzan et al. to include: referent objects, i.e. things that are seen to be existentially
threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival; securitising actors, i.e. actors who securitise
issues by declaring something- a referent object- existentially threatened; and functional actors, i.e.
actors who affect the dynamics of a sector, in influencing significantly distinctions in the field of
security. Op. cit., p.36.
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Already in the beginning of the 1980's, academic writings began to question the
traditional conception of security based solely on military threats at the state level.
In 1983, R. Ullman attempted to redefine security, proceeding 'from the
assumption that defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military
terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality'.20 This assumption was later
justified by rapid changes in the international arena, vis - a- vis increasing
globalisation and economic interpenetration and the metamorphosis of the post -
Cold War political landscape. In the beginning of the nineties, that the classical
21
post- second World War security dilemma posed by Herz, has been replaced by a
series of new 'security dilemmas' was widely acknowledged,22 along with their
construction through a series of new threats and enemies.23
These new threats range from encompassing 'resource, environmental and
demographic issues',24 to Walker's assertion of the possibility of defining the
meaning of security in relation to 'social, cultural, economic and ecological
processes, as well as to geopolitical threats from foreign powers'. The shift from
the exclusively military conception of threat towards what has been deemed as a
'horizontal extension' of the security concept,26 has been epitomised in the analysis
of Buzan, who, in 1991, constructed a five-sector model of security, aiming to
embrace the emerging diversity of perceived threats. According to Buzan's model,
security can be distinguished into: military, concerning the 'two - level interplay of
the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and state's perceptions of
each other's intentions'; political, concerning the 'organizational stability of states,
20
Ullman, op. cit., p. 129.
21 See J. H. Herz (1950), 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma' in World Politics,
vol.2, no.2, p. 157.
22 See Dalby, op. cit., where the new 'security dilemma' discourse forms the very title of the article.
23 As R. C. Johansen notes, 'a more comprehensive concept of security begins to incorporate non-
military threats, the concept of 'enemy' also changes': (1991) 'Real Security is Democratic
Security' in Alternatives, vol. 16, p.213.
24 J. Tuchman Mathews (1989), 'Redefining Security' in Foreign Affairs, vol.68, no.2, p.162. On
the securitisation of environmental issues see Dalby, op. cit.
25 R.B.J. Walker (1990), 'Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics' in
Alternatives, vol.15, p.4.
26 E. Rotschild (1995), 'What is Security?' in Daedalus, vol.124, no.3, p.55.
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systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy'; economic,
concerning 'access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain
acceptable levels of welfare and state power'; societal, concerning 'the ability of
societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association,
and religious and national identity and custom within acceptable conditions for
evolution', and environmental, concerning 'the maintenance of the local and the
planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human
enterprises depend'.27
This model is central in the reframing of the security debate, as one of the first
attempts to place the emerging 'new' security conceptualisations into a systematic
analytical framework. Its significance is enhanced by Buzan's acknowledgement
of the close interconnection between the different 'security' sectors, which 'do not
operate in isolation from each other', being all 'woven together in a strong web of
linkages',28 which has been highly influential for subsequent security
theorisations. A clear illustration is the work of Anderson et al. in the context of
EU policing, asserting that the redefinition of security threats 'illustrates a partial
merger between the domains of internal and external security',29 using this merging
as an analytical tool. Such changes are now commonly acknowledged within
international fora. A recent article by the Chairman-in-Office of the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe is indicative:
'Fortunately, the military threat is no longer dominant. But the risks and challenges have
taken on new dimensions. These include historically based mistrust and friction between
ethnic, religious or national groupings, aggressive nationalism, social disruption and
uncertainty in light of fundamental economic reforms, illegal migration, drug trafficking
27 Buzan (ii), op. cit., p.433.
28 Buzan (ii), op. cit.
29 See characteristically Anderson et al. (1995), Policing the European Union, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, chapter 5, pp.156 et seq.
9
and organised crime, and environmental and ecological threats evolving from years of
exploitation of natural resources and uncontrolled industrialisation'.30
However, the model was not immune from criticism. One of its main attacks has
been put forward by Walker, who, while acknowledging that 'Buzan undoubtedly
offers a persuasive critique of the fetishisation of the military postures and
capabilities of states understood within a broader context, as part of some kind of
31interstate order', attacks Buzan's model on the grounds that he 'is left with no
option but to rearrange and revalorise categories which gave rise to the problems
he is trying to resolve',32 since his model is still based solely on state security. A
significant attempt to surpass the narrow state-security model has been put forward
by Walker, who, on the premise of the assertion that 'demands are issued for a
broader understanding of whose security is at stake for an effective account of the
33
security of people in general, not just for the inhabitants of particular states',"
formulated the concept of world security, encompassing forms of (in)security such
as ethnic conflict, terrorism, human rights, maldevelopment, famine and
environmental degradation. In this manner, the security field is simultaneously
opened to individual and global security concerns which 'all stimulate far-reaching
debates about who we are' .34
Notwithstanding its apparent friendliness to international developments leading
to the increased weakening of the state as an international actor/object of security,
Walker's analytical shift caused considerable concern because of its generous
extension of the security field. The dangers of such extension have been most
recently raised by Freedman, who has stated his concern that 'once anything that
30 N. H. Petersen (1997), 'Towards a European Security Model for the 21st Century' in NATO
Review, Nov.-Dec., p.4.
31 R.B.J. Walker (1993), Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge
University Press,p. 139.,
32 Walker (1993), op. cit., p. 140.
33 Ibid, at p.2. Emphasis added.
34 Walker (1990), op. cit., pp.23-24. On Walker's model of world security, see also L.Hansen
(1997), 'R.B.J. Walker and International Relations: Deconstructing a Discipline' in I.B. Neumann
and O.Waever (eds.), The Future of International Relations. Masters in the Making?, Routledge,
London, New York, pp.316-336.
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generates anxiety or threatens the quality of life in some respect becomes labeled a
'security problem', the field risks losing all focus'.35 This concern has also been
reflected in the writings of Weaver who acknowledged that 'if one departs from the
'middle level'- the state - it is paradoxically quite easy to move simultaneously all
the way up and all the way down'. He thus raised an analytical and political case
for the development of 'an inbetween concept of security, somewhere between the
narrow (always state, only military) and the wide (everything people worry
37
about)'. In this context, Waever elaborated the concept of societal security,
concerning 'the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under
changing conditions and possible or actual threats', embracing in this manner
o o
'situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms'. The extension of
threats is thus accomodated only having as a referent object what was deemed as
'identity - based communities'.39 In elaborating this framework, of what has been
otherwise called 'pluralistic security communities',40 Waever recently clarified that
societal security must not be perceived as one of the five Buzan's sectors, arguing
in favour of two kinds of security: state security and societal, or identity security.41
A major critique on Waever's theoretical directions towards an identity security
has been put into the fore by Bigo.42 Starting from the premise that the merging of
internal and external security by no means corresponds to an increase in threats in
35 L. Freedman (1998), 'International Security: Changing Targets' in Foreign Policy, Spring 1998,
p.53.
30
Waever, op. cit., p. 104.
37
Ibid., p. 106.
38 Waever et al. (1993), Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Pinter,
London, p.23. Emphasis added. Also Waever, op. cit., p.l 13.
39 Waever , op. cit., p.l 13.
40 See Adler, arguing that 'the concept of pluralistic security communities, coupled with a
constructivist approach, offers a way to reorder our thinking about international security in the post -
Cold War period, shifting the focus of security studies away from states and towards transnational
social, political, economic, ecological and moral forces' and characterising security communities as
'transnational cognitive regions whose people possess collective identities, and share other
normative and regulatory structures'. In E. Adler (1997), 'Imagined (Security) Communities:
Cognitive Regions in International Relations' in Millennium: Journal of International Studies,
vol.26, no.2, p.276.
41 O.Waever (1998), 'Insecurite, Identite: Une Dialectique Sans Fin' in A.M. Le Gloannec (dir.),
Entre Union et Nations. L'Etat en Europe, Presses de Sciences Politiques, Paris, p.98.
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the contemporary era, Bigo argues that it is rather the case of lowering the level of
acceptance of the Other; or else, the 'insecuritisation' of everyday life by security
professionals and a rise in power of a policing logic.43 This approach may share
Waever's framing of security as an identity issue, but distances itself from it in two
respects. First, in highlighting the centrality of the production of (in)security
perceptions. And second, in shifting the security construct focus from the
assessment of threats to the adoption of emergency measures to counter them; an
aspect which is marginal in international relations reconceptualisations of security.
The emphasis on emergency measures is shared by Anderson et al., whose
landmark publication on EU policing expressly includes in the security construct
notions of 'control', 'law enforcement', or 'public policy', embracing both the
level and form of military control or policing, as well as the raison d' etre of
control.44
The tensions within the threat - control nexus are highlighted when placed within
the context of the 'risk society' discourse. According to the creator of the term,
Ulrich Beck, risk society defines a phase of evolution of modern society, in which
social, political, ecological and individual risks, engendered by the dynamics of
renovation, shift more and more at instances of control and security of industrial
society.45 This happens through a selection process. Risks are always based on
decisions, existing because insecurity and dangers are transformed into decisions -
and demand decisions which in their turn produce risks.46 In this process, the light
is cast on the future.47 The 'not - yet - event' becomes a stimulus to action, as in the
42 D. Bigo (1998), 'L'Europe de la Securite Interieure: Penser Autrement la Securite' in Le
Gloannec, op. cit., p.55.
43 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
44 Anderson et al., op. cit., p. 158.
45 U. Beck (1994), 'D' une Theorie Crtique de la Societe vers la Theorie d' une Autocritique
Sociale' in Deviance et Societe, vol. 18, no.3, p. 333.
46 Beck, op. cit., p.335. Emphasis added.
47 'Risk seems to look forward: it is used to assess the dangers ahead': M. Douglas (1990), 'Risk as
a Forensic Resource' in Daedalus, vol.119, no.4, p.5.
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'catastrophic' risk society, risks are connected with 'anticipation, with destruction
that has not yet happened but is threatening'.48
This climate of anticipation leads to the need for what Beck terms a 'promise of
security', which grows with the risks and destruction and must be 'reaffirmed over
and over again to an alert and critical public through cosmetic or real interventions
in the techno - economic development'.49 It is in this context that reconceptualised
threats - which have become risks constituting a 'kind of virtual, yet real, reality'50
- meet a necessity for reconceptualised measures to counter them. Such measures
are geared primarily towards future, anticipated risks, aiming at changing social
reality in order to prevent them:51 along with the 'securitisation' of discourses of
control thus comes prevention as a key concept in the regulation of security in
risk society. No locus is more illustrative of this mechanism than the security nexus
of one of the most frequently evoked 'new' threats: that of transnational
criminality.
3. THE SECURITISATION OF ORGANISED CRIME : THE THREAT AND
THE MEASURES TO COUNTER IT
I THE THREAT
A clear illustration of the emergence of organised criminality as a perceived threat
in the new security landscape can be encountered in the opening article of an
academic journal specifically focused on - and entitled - 'transnational organised
crime'. The author argues that:
48 U. Beck (1992) Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London, p.33. On the
'catastrophic' term, ibid., p.24.
49 Beck (1992), op. cit., p.20.
50 U. Beck (1998), 'Politics of Risk Society' in J. Franklin (ed.), The Politics of Risk Society,
Polity Press (published in association with the Institute for Public Policy), p.l 1.
51 Beck (1998), op. cit. noting that: 'the greater the threat (or to be more precise, the social
definition and construction of the threat), the greater the obligation and power to change current
events'.
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' In the new world order the nationally constituted state is not about to disappear or
diminish radically in importance... Rather, with the growth of various supranational
institutions (e.g. global capitalism and the global media system) and the technologies of
rapid communication and travel, the boundaries between societies have become quite
porous. Internal societal affairs are increasingly oriented to the outside world by various
factors including the internationalization of national economies as well as by the greater
consciousness of the globe as such. The 'official' line between domestic and foreign affairs
has been disappearing. Nowhere has this been truer (but least recognized) than in the fields
of crime and criminal justice, especially since World War II'.53
The inclusion of transnational criminal organizations in the changing security
landscape marked the departure from narrow military threats. The securitisation
process now refers to threats broad enough to undermine the 'effective functioning
of society'.54 Such theorisation of security is inextricably linked with discourses on
organised criminality, facilitated by the addition of the 'transnational' element, as a
threat to the very fabric of society. Extending simultaneously up and down, the
threat is perceived in a three-fold manner: against the individual, the state and the
international system of states.55
The 'securitisation' of transnational organised crime was systematised at the
United Nations level in the 1995 Conference on the matter. In the conference report
it is opined that 'threats to international security in the 1990s are less direct and
apocalyptic than they were during the Cold War'56 and also 'more diffuse and
insidious'.57 The Report further acknowledges that 'one of the most serious of
52 P. O'Malley (1992), 'Risk, Power and Crime Prevention' in Economy and Society, vol.21, no.3,
p.254.
53 W.F.McDonald (1995), 'The Globalization of Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier' in
Transnational Organized Crime, vol.1, no.l, pp.6-7.
54 P. Williams (1994), 'Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security' in
Survival, vol.36, no.l, p. 107.
55 Ibid.
56 P. Williams and E. Savona (1996), The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime,
Frank Cass, London, p. VII
57 Ibid.
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these threats is that posed by transnational organized crime'.58 This 'insidious,
pervasive and multifaceted threat' is further analysed as a threat to: sovereignty,
which, due to the permeability of national borders loses much of its real
significance; societies, whose fabric is undermined by activities such as drug
abuse, organized crime and corruption; individuals, who are deprived of a safe
environment without fear of violence or intimidation; national stability and state
control, creating a rival authority structure or a 'state within the state' based on a
parallel or black market economy; financial institutions through their infiltration
with criminal money and objectives; democratization and privatization in countries
in transition; development, through the diversion of resources in response to
criminal activities, corruption and deprivation of the poor members of society; and
global regimes and codes of conduct, through various alliances of convenience
between transnational criminal organisations and 'rogue or pariah states'.59
It is evident that this all-encompassing conception of security is marked by the
inclusion of a wide range of security referent objects, reflecting at the same time
the merging of internal with external security. The perceived threat of organised
criminality is geared against interests as diverse and uneven as the survival of
individuals, social institutions, states and the very functioning of the international
system; thus bringing to the fore and challenging simultaneously the limits of
'societal security' as an analytical tool. Its securitisation and the emergency
measures it entails challenge in a significant manner fundamental legal principles.
The evolution of these challenges obtains a further dimension, due to the
transnationalisation of organised crime, which is linked with the globalisation of
both securitisation processes and subsequently adopted emergency measures.
II. EMERGENCY MEASURES IN THE PREVENTION STATE
58 Ibid, p.32.
59 Ibid., pp. 32-39. Emphasis added.
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A. Increasing criminalisation and displacement in punishment
The broad securitisation of transnational organised crime poses significant
challenges at the legislative level. These challenges become even more acute
within the logic of risk society, marked by the emergence of what has been deemed
as the 'prevention state',60 According to Baratta and Wagner, the 'prevention
state' is characterised by a tendency towards normative production and by decision
mechanisms which are incessantly being reorganised to form a reaction in a state
of structural emergency.61 In this manner, the perceived threats are placed within a
'normalisation' process, primarily through an augmenting recourse to a criminal
law logic and production.62 As Pavarini notes, criminal law is transformed into 'an
internal element of social conflicts', with the definition and distribution of
criminality being now only a 'risk' of social competence, as an 'inevitable
consequence of the hypertrophic process of social control'. 63 In this manner,
according to Albrecht, '...the universal political promise of security seems equally
guaranteed in front of modern progress risks which lose their anonymous and
threatening character and their high variability degree, being identified and
somehow englobed in the known form of 'the criminal". 4
Such demonstration of 'political capacity'65 is primarily expressed through an
increasing recourse to a juridification process'66 reflected in the creation of a
60 Term introduced by E. Denninger (1988), 'Der Praventions-Staat' in Kritische Justiz, vol. XXI,
p.l. The prevention state discourse has recently been adopted by the then French prime Minister A.
Juppe, speaking about the 'social regulatory state, baptised as ..prevention state'('l'Etat regulateur
social, baptise il y a encore peu 'Etat providence'); A. Juppe (1997), 'La Securite Interieure
Aujourd'hui' in La Lettre. Informations sur les Activites de I' IHESI, no.16, Janvier, p.3.
61 A. Baratta and H. Wagner (1994), 'Debat: Societe du Risque et Controle Social. Risque, Securite
et Democratic' in Deviance et Societe, vol.18, no.3, p.332. Emphasis added.
62 In a very recent article, Baratta talks about the emergence of 'a new form of criminal law of
emergency', where the criminal law and justice system becomes from ultima ratio, prima ratio. A.
Baratta (1999), 'Droits de 1' .Homme et Politique Criminelle' in Deviance et Societe, vol.23, no.3,
p.246.
63 M. Pavarini (1994), 'Primera Conferencia. A Donde Vamos?' in Capitulo Criminologico, no.22,
p.ll.
64 P.-A. Albrecht (1997), 'La Politique Criminelle dans l'Etat de Prevention', in Deviance et
Societe, vol.21, no.2, p. 129.
65 Ibid.
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series of new offences. This process is coupled with what has been described under
the French term 'judicialisation', consisting in an increasing appeal to criminal law
and the criminal justice system in order to protect interests protected by law (biens
jurid.iqu.es), which in their turn are transformed more and more into collective
interests, such as the environment, trust in the financial system, consumer safety or
public order.67 The broadening of interests demanding legal protection is
inextricably linked with the extension of perceived threats so far analysed. In the
case of transnational organised crime, it is a variety of interests such as individual
well being, financial stability, development and the maintenance of the 'social
fabric' that are deemed to deserve protection. By calling for legislative measures,
notably in the criminal law sphere, in order to face the threat, the political
responsibility to curb social issues is transferred to the legal, and more specifically
to the criminal justice system.68
In a number of writings, this transfer has been associated with the phenomenon
of the 'dynamisation' of interests protected by law.69 According to Baratta, this
dynamisation entails the following consequences: first of all, a deplacement in the
relations between state and society, regarding the production and protection of
interests protected by law. In contrast with the classical liberal model of the state of
legal certainty,70 where the real supports of these interests are produced within civil
society, in the 'prevention' state, the interests to be protected by law are
increasingly produced by the state itself, relative to the infrastructures,
organisations and functions having a link to the activity of the state and public
institutions.71 The dynamisation of interests protected by law is further
encountered in the development of techniques of imputation of criminal
66 On the term see J.A.E.Vervaele (1997), 'Regulation et Repression au Sein de l'Etat Providence.
La Fonction 'Bouclier' et la Fonction 'Epee' du Droit Penal en Desequilibre' in Deviance et
Societe, vol.21, no.2, p. 121.
67 Ibid.
68 On this prcess see A. Baratta (1991), 'Les Fonctions Instrumentales et les Fonctions Symboliques
du Droit Penal' in Deviance et Societe, vol.15, no.l, p.9.
69
'Dynamisation' des biens juridiques'. See Baratta, op. cit., p.9, citing Denninger, op. cit.
70 'securite de droit'
71
Baratta, op. cit. p. 11.
17
responsibility, which deplace progressively the punitive level72 towards phases
prior to the act, thus prior to the attack of the interest under protection.73 This trend
is an offspring of the link between the increasing juridification and the widening of
protected interests.
A clear illustration of this tendency is the appearance in the criminal law of what
N. Abrams called in 1989 the 'new ancillary offences'.74 These fall into a category
which departs in a number of respects from the traditional model, under which a
crime is committed when a person, acting with the requisite mental state, causes an
identifiable harm either to a person or to a property interest. This 'primary' or
'substantive' crime model is complemented by a model of offences characterised
'by group activity or conduct leading up to, or involved generally in, the
7c
commission of substantive offences'. ' Going beyond Baratta's assertion, Abrams
also refers to the criminalisation of 'conduct practiced in the aftermath of a primary
harm crime'.76
After offering a classification of the new ancillaries,77 Abrams places emphasis
on their common characteristics stating that: ' they are defined in terms that make
them applicable in connection with many different kinds of criminal conduct. For
many of these offenses the actus reus, viewed from afar, is innocent; in such cases,
the principal index of criminality is the mental state of the offender. Some of them
also can be used to prosecute conduct that is on the border between criminal
72 'seuil de punissabilite'
73 Ibid.




77 Abrams distinguishes between: derivative offences, or crimes 'an element of which involves
proof that a primary harm offense was committed or intended to be committed'; enforcement and
information - gathering offences, that 'either are committed in the course of a law enforcement
investigation that may be directed toward primary harm crimes or involve a failure to provide
required information that may be useful as a lead to a criminal investigation of such offenses'; and
catchall crimes, such as mail and wire fraud. The derivative offences are further distinguished
between after-the-fact crimes such as money laundering offences and organisational crimes, or
conspiracy-like offences. Bank Secrecy Act violations and the False statement offence are cited as
examples of enforcement and information gathering offences. Abrams, op. cit., pp.5-27.
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conduct, on the one hand, and merely unethical, unprofessional conduct, on the
other. For the most part they are treated as serious crimes, carrying very heavy
penalties'.78 In view of these characteristics, Abrams warns, these offences can
cause 'a number of harmful systemic effects'.79 More specifically, he claims that
their overuse 'can erode the traditional concept of crime both by shifting attention
from the primary harms that historically have been the core of the criminal law and
by giving more emphasis to the mental element of crime, arguably reflecting a
80
'dangerous person' rather than a dangerous offense philosophy'.
Abram's concerns do justice to the assertion by Tamar Pitch that 'criminalisation
does not mean simply the addition of some new forms of behaviour to the already
existing list of crimes; it also means that certain activities and situations undergo
conceptual and cognitive revision, which in turn implies the creation of a new
knowledge around those activities and situations'.81 This new knowledge emanates
from a securitised discourse aimed at protecting an ever - expanding category of
'legal goods'. In marginalising individual protection in the classical liberal sense
through the adoption of measures aimed at protecting abstractions such as the
'social fabric', the criminal law increasingly controls mental elements, and
subsequently what Baratta has deemed as 'the fidelity of the subject to the system
and the state'.82
The perception and regulation of organised crime provides strong backing for this
assertion. Securitising the organised crime groups, Williams and Savona view their
existence as a threat per se.s?l This threat is perceived as 'self-contained, because a
criminal group is established with a view to committing any activity worth being
78
Abrams, op. cit., pp.3-4.
79
Abrams, op. cit., p.4.
80 Ibid.
81 T. Pitch (1995), Limited Responsibilities: Social Movements and Criminal Justice, London,
Routledge, p.72. Emphasis added.
82
Baratta, op. cit., p. 12.
83 Williams and Savona, op. cit., p. 129.
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exploited, striving to build it up and exercising the power that goes with it'.84 This
highly moralised and subjective evaluation is reflected in the legislative crusade
against organised crime. The European Union Extradition Convention,85 is
indicative in this respect, by calling the Member State to make extraditable
'the behaviour of any person which contributes to the commission by a group of persons in
the field of terrorism..., drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime or other acts of
violence against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a person, or creating a collective
danger for persons, punishable by deprivation of liberty or detention order of a maximum
of at least 12 months, even where that person does not take part in the actual execution of
the offence or offences concerned '
The securitisation of the phenomenon with the subjectivity it entails, brings
07
into consideration the Foucauldian discourse on the 'dangerous individual', and
signals the departure from a criminal law 'oriented towards the citizen' to an
• RR
authoritarian conception of criminal law oriented towards the enemy'.
B. The responsibilisation strategy
89Within this specific 'horizon of perception', the 'prevention state', rather than
civil society, is in charge of the production and distribution of interests protected
84 Ibid.
85 OJC 313, 23.6.1997, p.12
86 Article 3(4), emphasis added. A similar logic is reflected in the EU Joint Action on making it a
criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European
Union, OJ L351, 29.12.1998, p.l. Article 2(l)(a) for instance criminalises conduct under certain
conditions even where that person does not take part in the actual execution of the offences
concerned and even where these offences are not actually committed. For further analysis, see
chapters 3 and 4.
87 In his writing on the dangerous individual, Foucault ends as follows: 'when a man comes before
his judges with nothing but his crimes, when he has nothing else to say but 'this is what I have
done', when he has nothing to say about himself, when he does not do the tribunal the favor of
confiding to them something like the secret of his own being, then the judicial machine ceases to
function', in 'The Dangerous Individual' in L.D.Kritzman (ed.) (1988), Michel Foucault. Politics,
Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, Routledge, New York and London,
p.151.
88 Ibid., citing G. Jakobs (1985), 'Kriminalisierung im Vorfeld einer Rechtsguterverletzung' in
Zeitschriftfiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol.XCVII, p.775.
89
Albrecht, op. cit., p. 129.
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by law. However, and most significantly, the prevention state becomes in charge of
the administration of risks associated with their production.90 In the effort to
control risks through the 'normalisation' of everyday social activities,91 the state
chooses not to assume exclusive responsibility: the rejection of political
responsibility through the recourse to what has been called the 'criminal law of
Q9
prevention', is thus coupled with a displacement of responsibility with regard to
the control of risks. In the field of crime prevention and control, such displacement
is theorised in the context of what has been called 'the erosion of the myth of
sovereign crime control', i.e., that the sovereign state is capable of providing
• t cn
security, law and order, and crime control within its territorial boundaries. '
Apart from their impact on the internationalisation of measures against crime,94
such developments give rise to the phenomenon of 'internalisation' in crime
prevention and control.95 Following what has elsewhere been classified as a
'responsibilization strategy',96 the state acts in an indirect manner, seeking to
activate non-state agencies and organisations in the fight against crime. The
recurring message of this approach is that the state alone 'is not, and cannot be
responsible for preventing and controlling crime'.97 What Ericson and Haggerty
have deemed as 'the decline of innocence' in the private sector, is accompanied by
a rise in individual responsibility in the field of crime control, implying that 'each
individual must be reflexive with respect to his or her actions to ensure that he or
no
she does not increase the risk of loss'. In this manner, security becomes
increasingly 'a matter for the private, or rather the non-institutional, non-public
90
Baratta, op. cit. citing Denninger, op. cit.
91 Term used by D. Garland (1996), 'The Limits of the Sovereign State. Strategies of Crime Control
in Contemporary Society' in British Journal ofCriminology, vol.36, no.4, p.450.
92
Albrecht, op. cit., p. 128.
93
Garland, op. cit., p.448.
94 See also the relevant analysis on globalisation further in this chapter. On the 'internationalisation'
term, see Anderson et al., op. cit.
95 Ibid.
96 Garland, op. cit., pp. 452-455. For an extensive analysis in the context ofmoney laundering
counter-measures, see chapters 3 and 6.
97
Garland, op. cit., p.452.
98 R.V. Ericson and K. D. Haggerty (1997), Policing the Risk Society, University of Toronto Press,
Toronto and Buffalo, p.52.
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sphere'.99 This predicament is vividly reflected in the United Nations Action Plan
against transnational organised crime, where it is asserted that 'owing to the
inherent characteristics of organized crime, which is simultaneously engaged in
providing illegal services and goods and infiltrating the legitimate economy, the
criminal justice alone cannot successfully fight it'.100
C. The centrality of knowledge
In this context, the United Nations has called for a combination of policies of
prevention and control to counter transnational organised crime. While the latter
are intended 'to control the crimes committed by organized crime groups'
preventive policies 'are designed to reduce the opportunities for criminal activity
and to minimize the vulnerability of legitimate business to the infiltration of
organized crime'.101 In this quest, it is explicitly stated that 'one of the most
important commodities in the efforts to deal with transnational criminal
organizations is information'. 102 The acknowledgement of the centrality of
information in policies of crime prevention and control in the framework of risk
society, has been clearly demarcated by Ericson and Haggerty, stating that: 'in risk
society, policing is not just a matter of repressive, punitive, deterrent measures to
control those who are morally wrong. It is also a matter of surveillance, of
producing knowledge of populations that is useful for administering them'.103 The
emphasis on surveillance, they continue, 'redirects the law, the police, and risk
99 M. Pavarini (1997), 'Controlling Social Panic: Questions and Answers about Security in Italy at
the End of the Millennium' in R.Bergalli and C. Sumner (eds.), Social Control and Political Order.
European Perspectives at the End of the Century, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p.79.
100 Williams and Savona, op. cit., p.44.
101 Williams and Savona, op. cit., p.123.
102 Williams and Savona, op. cit., p.92. Emphasis added.
103 Ericson and Haggerty, op. cit., p.41. Emphasis added. On a similar analysis and the rejection of
the distinction between information and knowledge, see R.V.Ericson (1995), 'Promoting Security:
The Division of Expert Knowledge Policing' in K. Miyazawa and S. Miyazawa (eds.), Crime
Prevention in the Urban Community, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston, pp.
27-29.
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institutions to continually invent new ways of accessing and distributing
knowledge'.104
The centrality of accession to and distribution of knowledge in risk society is
inextricably linked with increasing regulation. Asserting that 'risk society is a
regulatory society', Ericson and Haggerty argue that 'there has been an expansion
of regulatory systems within a compliance model of law enforcement'.105 With
compliance perceived as 'not merely the decision to refrain from an act but the
doing of something positive to ameliorate the condition or state of affairs and to
reach a negotiated standard',106 it is evident that this model encompasses both
Abrams' new ancillaries, and Garland's responsibilisation strategy.
The change in the actors of crime prevention and control is, according to recent
criminological theory, associated with changes in the goals and perceptions of
criminal policy. A crucial role in this new framework is played by the emergence of
107what has been called 'the criminologies of everyday life'. According to Garland,
these criminologies reflect with the development of 'the criminogenic situation',
which 'poses difficulties for government because it generally has a commercial or
social value of its own which sets limits upon crime control. Precisely because
crime occurs in the course of routine social and economic transactions, any crime-
reducing intervention must seek to preserve 'normal life' and 'business as usual'.
108 This leads not only to the shift towards 'responsibilising' individuals aiming at
making them 'active parties in the business of security and crime control',109 but
bears significant consequences for the character of knowledge administration and
law enforcement., geared now towards administering every day activities. The
104 Ibid.
105 Ericson and Haggerty, op. cit., p.48, talking about 'regulatory law'.
106 Ericson and Haggerty, op. cit., p.49.
107 Garland, op. cit. Also D. Garland (1997i), 'Governmentality' and the Problem of Crime:
Foucault, Criminology, Sociology' in Theoretical Criminology, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 173-214.
108 Garland, 1997i, p.187. For an analysis of the 'criminologies of every day life', see also D.
Garland (1997ii) ,'The Punitive Society: Penology, Criminology and the History of the Present' in
Edinburgh Law Review, vol. 1, pp. 188 et seq.
109 Ibid.
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compliance-based law enforcement suggested by Ericson and Haggerty differs thus
substantially from deterrent law enforcement under criminal law, 'for it addresses
undesirable organizational activity that takes the form of conditions or states of
affairs (such as pollution of the environment) rather than 'individual acts".110
In this context, and in a parallel process with the shift from the criminalisation of
the act to the control of behaviour or 'dangerousness', the nature and context of
law enforcement changes dramatically, with the collection of information being
geared at 'repressive action before even the commission of the offence'.111 As Bigo
notes, this leads to a 'coercive virtual dimension', new in crime prevention:
'before' and 'after' crime is substituted by 'before' and 'after' a signal that a crime
could be committed'.112 'We are', he continues, 'in a time of perceptions, of
virtuality, rather than in a time of the commission of deeds, of reality'.113
4. THE CHALLENGES OF 'SECURITISED' MEASURES AGAINST
ORGANISED CRIME TO FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
I. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE CRIMINAL LAW
The juridification/judicialisation process adopted to respond to the threat of
organised crime has resulted in the adoption of measures which are marked by two
main features: the emergence of a variety of 'collective goods' deserving
protection, with individual rights increasingly being replaced by collective needs of
110 Ericson and Haggerty, op. cit.
111 D. Bigo (1997), 'La Recherche Proactive et la Gestion du Risque' in Deviance et Societe,
vol.21, no. 4, p.423.
112 Ibid. Emphasis added.
113
Bigo, op. cit., p.424.
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protection 'supposedly menaced by organised interventions'.114; and, through the
'judicialisation' process, by the movement from the punishment of the act towards
punishing behaviour. The tension of such developments with well-established
principles of the criminal law will be examined here through insights offered by the
Italian legislation to counter organised criminality and academic reactions to it.115
Analysing the Italian legislative framework against organised crime, Moccia
argues that the juridification/judicialisation phenomenon results in the distance
between the criminalised behaviour and the protected interest, since the behaviour
which is criminalised is 'greatly distanced from the effective realisation of
harm'.116 This tendency marks what Moccia characterises as 'regressive aspects of
the Italian penal system', analysed further in regression from a series of
fundamental principles of Italian criminal law: the principle of determinatezza,
concerning the precise and punctual character of the incrimination norm, and the
principles of materialita and ojfensivita, enshrined in the necessity of a material
117and perceptible attack on an interest protected by law.
In this context, the theorisation of the concept of 'interest protected by law' is
essential. Beginning with the principle that the start of the penal interest lies in
objects of the external world with their natural and social properties, on which law
118
departs to form its values in a 'concise and realistic manner', the recourse to all-
embracing collective interests appears problematic. Moccia, in his examination of
the offence of the 'association des malfaiteurs' in the Italian legal order, asserts
that 'it is difficult to find an autonomous protected interest which founds the
114
Albrecht, op. cit., p. 124, noting that 'while in the previous penal theories the individual had the
status of the subject, (s)he is now substituted for the social system'.
115 From the abundant literature, see in particular S. Moccia (1997), 'Aspects Regressifs du
Systeme Penal Italien' in Deviance et Societe, vol.21, no.2, p.137; F. Palazzo (1995), 'La
Legislation Italienne en Matiere de Criminalite Organisee' in Revue de Science Criminelle, no.4,
p.711; M. Papa (1993), 'La Nouvelle Legislation Italienne en Matiere de Criminalite Organisee' in
Revue de Science Criminelle, no.4, p.725.
116
Moccia, op. cit., p. 143.
117
Moccia, op. cit., p. 138.
118 I. Manoledakis (1989), Criminal Law (in Greek), 2nd ed., Sakkoulas editions, Thessaloniki,
p.96.
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category'.119 To the views that support the need for protection of collective goods
such as state personality or public order, Moccia's reaction is to view such interests
not as a real object, but rather as a ratio of protection.120
Such theorisation serves as a weapon against the danger of infiltrating the
objectivity of legal goods with abstract values, leading to the formulation of what
has been deemed as a 'duty of fidelity' to the state and transposing the protection
offered by criminal law into a metaphysical dimension.121 As Manoledakis notes,
the replacement of objectively defined interests with ideals of that kind and the
infiltration of the concept with values which are not capable of being personified
into outer world objects or their natural or social properties, but are conceived
straightly in the abstract sphere of ideological constructs, undermine any value of
122the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle. This is the case since the
criminal context, as 'described' in these cases, is fluid, with no possibility of
objective specification; such 'description becomes a mockery, lacking any
guaranteeing function, which, in the view of Manoledakis is prevalent in the
protection of interests protected by law and the ideological function of criminal
law.123
Such over-extension of the ambit of protected interests, in the framework of the
judicialisation process, constitutes a further challenge to the fundamental principle
119
Moccia, op. cit., p. 141. On the different aspects of organised crime and the difficulties
surrounding its definition, the following analysis is enlightening: 'it may be viewed as a set of
different crimes, which, because of the context in which they occur, are perceived as 'organized
crime'. Certain crimes are aimed directly at 'organization' and 'combination' for criminal purposes:
association de malfaiteurs or associazione di tipo mafioso, for example. Other crimes are typically
committed by organized crime groups: trafficking in drugs, weapons, human beings, vehicles,
nuclear material, art and cultural objects, for example, or bribery, subsidy fraud, money laundering,
certain antitrust offences, fiscal offences, etc. Ohter offenses are 'common crimes' such as theft,
murder, or kidnapping, which are sometimes utilized by organized crime, or committed pursuant to
a criminal organization's interests.' C.L. Blakesley (1997), 'The Criminal Justice Systems Facing




Manoledakis, op. cit., p.96.
122 Ibid.
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Manoledakis, op. cit., p.20.
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of nullum crimen sine actu. A clear example is the 'dangerousness' prominent in
the conception of various types of the organised crime offence. Going further ,
Moccia observes that beyond the evanescence of interests protected by law that
such laws entail, it is even more preoccupying that the emphasis is placed upon the
simple agreement, even stable and organised, while 'it is the interests in question
that in reality constitute the goal of the association and the object of the anticipated
penal protection'.124 In this manner, one witnesses the establishment of what
Moccia calls 'suspicion offences' ('delits de soupgon'), which are marked by a
strong symbolic connotation and to which the judge makes recourse when there is
125
no proof of crimes committed by the association. According to Moccia,
however, 'these incriminations do not seem capable of realising this repressive
finality, because the proof of the association (for which there is no effective interest
protected by law) becomes extremely difficult to ascertain since the proof of the
commission of other crimes (delits) is lacking'.126
n. THE CHALLENGE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
The juridification/judicialisation phenomenon is coupled with fundamental
changes in policing in risk society. As noted above, the central element is that of
knowledge; a multitude of information, to a great extent related to commonplace
activities are increasingly communicated by 'responsibilised' private parties to an
expanding network of traditional and newly created enforcement agencies. The
quantity and quality of the information provided, which, in many instances is
distantly, if at all, connected with the commission of an offence, along with the
extension of law enforcement powers and the creation of new instances of policing,
raise a series of issues of legitimacy, elevated in many instances to the
constitutional level. The extensive doctrinal discussion in Germany, a country with
124 Moccia, op. cit., p. 140.
125 What Moccia calls 'reati-scopo'. Ibid.
126 Ibid. Emphasis added.
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traditional constitutional sensitivities, is illustrative of the debate, largely centred
on the definition and content of security as a constitutional principle.
Justifications for the expansion of 'security' measures are founded to a great
extent on considerations of internal peace, as one of the primary functions of the
modern state. According to Pitschas:
'
'Security' constructs in that sense, that is as the protection of interests protected by law
and integrity of individuals from interventions of other citizens, a decisive component of a
social contract, founding the political power on which society is organised within the state
and thus embodying a basic normative element (Grundbestand), which is given to
guarantee the legal enjoyment of 'internal peace'.'127
Internal security is thus viewed as a fundamental constitutional value in need of
protection128. Its scope encompasses state security as a constitutional peace and
order power, and also the peoples security, both being considered as inalienable
129
(unverzichtbare) constitutional values. These values are 'in the same rank' as
others, leading to the assertion that security as a constitutional principle is not
130
directly capable of being subsumed. '
Following a similar line of argumentation, another German commentator, Joseph
Isensee, asserts the existence of a 'the fundamental right to security'. 1 On the
basis of Montesquieu's classical locus that 'political freedom consists in security or
127 'Sicherheit' bildet in diesem Sinne, namlich als Rechtsguter- and Integritdtsschutz der einzelnen
vor Beeintrachtigungen durch andere Burger einen massgeblichen Bestandteil jenes
Gesellschaftsvertrags, der die politische Herrschaft in der sich als Staat organisierenden
Gesellschaft aufRecht grundet und hierbei einen Grundbestand an Normen verankert, der den
'Inneren Frieden' unter den Rechtsgenossen zu gewahrleisten aufgibt'. R. Pitschas (1993), 'Innere
Sicherheit und internationale Verbrechensbekampfung als Verantwortung des demokratischen






131 J. Isensee (1983), Das Grundrecht aufSicherheit. Zu den Schutzpflichten des freiheitlichen
Verfassungsstaates, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York.
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132in the opinion of being secure' ' , he begins from a similar theoretical premise as
Pitschas, considering security and freedom as inextricably linked, deeming
security as 'status positivus lihertatis', protecting citizens from the other's
attack.133 This protection, which is viewed to emanate from fundamental rights,134
is further analysed in a two-fold manner: Isensee links the state/rule of law concept
of security with the police concept of 'public security' ('offentliche Sicherheit'),
adding that:
'both have meaning above all in their use in favour of the individual interests protected by
law, that is on the fundamental protected interests. 'Public security', founded in policing,
also entails the - beyond the individual (level) - interests of 'internal' security, that is the
objective legal order, the institutions and organisations of the state and its overall
sovereignty'.1 5
Following this extensive interpretation, security is further analysed as freedom
from compulsion on the one hand, and freedom from fear on the other.136 The
analysis here is slightly different from Pitschas, who rejects the distinction between
an objective state of security and an existing subjective feeling of insecurity, since
'security is no objective category' but is rather perceived through a communication
I "37
process. Isensee, however, commences with a distinction between fear and
security, accepting that the topos is capable of manipulation, since fear is linked
primarily with a feeling and an existential inner moment, with a pure subjectivity
which is not associated with the rule of law principle.138 He goes on to include in
his model of security not fear per se, but the objective grounds for a justified fear
132 'La liberte politique consiste dans la surete ou du moins dans l'opinion que l'on a de sa surete'
(De I' Esprit des Lois, Livre XII, 2): Isensee, op. cit., p.22.
133 Isensee, op. cit., p.21.
134
Isensee, op. cit., p.22.
135 'Beide stimmen iiberein in ihrer Anwendung auf die Individualrechtsguter, also auf die
grundrechtlich geschiitzen Interessen. Die 'offentliche Sicherheit', die den Polizeigesetzen
zugrundeliegt, erfasst auch uberindividuelle Belange der 'inneren' Sicherheit, also die objective
Rechtsordnung, die Einrichtungen und Veranstaltungen des Staates sowie der sonstigen
Hoheitstrager'. Isensee, op. cit., pp.22-23.
136 Isensee, op. cit., pp.24-25.
137
Pitschas, op. cit., p.859.
138
Isensee, op. cit., p.26.
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139translated into danger or its absence. In this context, the writer elaborates a
fundamental right to security, consisting in the ensemble of fundamental rights
duties of protection and entailing not only negative, but also positive action.140
The perception of a legal right to security in this context causes a series of
concerns, notably related to the theorisation and attempted definition of the concept
of security per se. It is interesting to note that, in the same year as Isensee, in one of
the first attempts to reconceptualise security in international relations, Buzan
asserted the ambiguity of the term by stating that 'dictionary definitions give the
flavour of this ambiguity with their reference to notions like being protected from
danger, feeling safe, and being free from doubt. The referent threats (danger and
doubt) are very vague, and the subjective feeling of safety has no necessary
connection with actually being safe'.Hl Buzan then goes on to highlight the need
'to discuss security in relation to specific threats'. 142
At the legal level, it is exactly this specificity that both Pitschas and Isensee fail
to provide. Notwithstanding the latter's quest for an 'objective' theorisation of
danger, his framework of analysis is devoid of any analytical tool aiding in the
'objectification' of the threat. Pitschas on the other hand, while emphasising the
discursive process of securitisation, proceeds to a catch-all abstraction, by
including any insecurity feeling as a factor justifying legal intervention. In both
cases the determination of specific 'collective interests' to be protected, and the
further specification of their content, is avoided, and even undermined, through the
unqualified association of security with state organisation and state sovereignty.
Furthermore, the accomodation of the analysis at the constitutional level to the
139 Ibid.
140 On the 'Grundrecht aufSicherheit', see Isensee, op. cit., p.33 et seq. On developments in
Germany and the role of the Constitutional Court, see P.J. Cullen (1997), Crime and Policing in
Germany in the 1990's, The University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies, Discussion
Papers in German Studies, No. IGS 97/13, p.20.
141 B.Buzan has already remarked this in the first edition of 'People, States and Fear': B. Buzan
(1983), People, States and Fear: the National Security Problem in International Relations,
Harvester Books, Brighton, p. 19.
142 Ibid.
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individual and the state excludes the trickier question of security for the 'social
fabric' and the issues of 'fidelity in society' it entails.
This ambiguity entails the danger of what Lisken calls 'the turn from law to
security considerations'.143 This phenomenon, according to Lisken, is particularly
likely through interpretation, rather than through constitutional amendment.144
Both Pitschas and Isensee provide interpretations which embody such potential.
Balancing fundamental rights guarantees under an ambiguous, catch-all 'right to
security', offers ample legitimacy for political - appelative- rather than rule of law-
argumentative- positions.145 Security appears as a 'symbolic notion',146
transforming the protection of fundamental rights within its ambivalent logic.
Cautious of this process, one is reminded of the words of Hassemer, calling for the
promotion of 'the surpassed traditional understanding of fundamental rights that lie
in the realm of internal security as defence rights against state encroachment, rather
than being obstacles in normal police work'.147
5. THE EMERGENCE OF A TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY FIELD IN
ORGANISED CRIME: NEW ACTORS AND GLOBAL MEASURES
I. GENERAL
Further challenges to an answer to the 'whose security' question are posed by
changes in the conception of security actors. This redefinition is linked with what
has been called the 'internationalisation' or 'globalisation' of crime'148. Offspring
of a series of intrernational developments in technology and communication,
143
'Wendung von Rechts-zum SicherheitsdenkenH.Lisken (1994), "Sicherheit' durch
'Kriminalitatsbekampfung', in Zeitschrift fiir Rechtspolitik, 27.Jahre, Februar, p.50.
144 Ibid. Emphasis added.
145 Ibid.
146 Albrecht, op. cit., p. 124.
147 W.Hassemer (1993), 'Innere Sicherheit im Rechtstaat' in Strafverteidiger, vol.12/93, p.669.
148 See for instance T.Sherman (1994), 'The Internationalisation of Crime and the World
Community's Response' in Action Against Transnational Criminality: Papers from the 1993
Oxford Conference on International and White Collar Crime, London, p. 1(10).; McDonald, op. cit.
31
increasing financial interdependence and mobility, the evolution of a 'global
village' has been viewed as beneficial for criminal organisations, endowed now
according to the United Nations with 'unprecedented opportunities'.149 In the quest
for effective control of such opportunities, the concept of transnational crime
emerged. An early definitional attempt included the following two constitutive
elements in the concept:
'1. The crossing ofa border either by people (criminals; fugitives or on the way to commit
a crime; or victims-such as in the case of traffics in human beings); or by things (firearms,
such as when terrorists put arms on a plane before takeoff; money techniques of money-
laundering; objects used in the commission of a crime, such as drugs on carriers or in
containers); or even by criminal will (computer fraud, when an order given from Country A
is transmitted to Country B).
2. International recognition ofa crime: at national level, according to the principle 'nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege' (no offense, no sanction without law), an anti-social conduct
can be considered as a crime only if there is a legal text providing for it; at international
level, if the fact is considered a criminal offense by at least two states. This recognition
may result from international conventions, extradition treaties or concordant national
laws.'150
The introduction of the concept is linked with the 'securitisation' of transnational
criminality which, as seen above, is largely perceived as a multifaceted security
threat. In turn, these changes in the perceptions of security, within what has been
described as a 'social space transcending the internal/external,
national/international distinction',151 transform the 'security logic' permeating the
phenomenon of transnational criminality, into an emerging 'transnational security
logic'}52 In this manner, the eroded myth of 'sovereign crime control'153 is
149 Williams and Savona, op. cit., p.8 (also on the 'global village' terminology). On the
globalisation factors, see also Williams, op. cit.; Sherman, op. cit;
150 A.Bossard (1990), Transnational Crime and Criminal Law, The Office of International
Criminal Justice, The University of Illinois at Chicago, p.5.
11
'espace social': D.Bigo (1996), Polices en Reseaux, L' Experience Europeenne, Presses des
Sciences Politiques, Paris, p.49.
152 W. de Lemos Capeller (1997), 'La Transnationalisation du Champ Penal: Reflexions sur les
Mutations du Crime et du Controle' in Droit et Societe, vol.35, p.64. Emphasis added.
153 Garland, 1996., p.448.
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replaced by the internationalisation154, or transnationalisation of the penal field:155
consequently the state as sole guarantor of penal protection, is increasingly
influenced by this transnational security logic, and gradually gives up its place to a
series of international bodies that, as security actors, aim to achieve global
standards in the measures adopted to counter the criminal threat. 156
Assessing the emergence of a transnational penal field, Wanda de Lemos
Capeller uses two interrelated concepts proposed by social theory, examining crime
control strategies in the context of 'globalised localism' on the one hand, and
'localised globalism' on the other. 157 Using the example of France, she attributes
to the 'localised globalism' strategy the following characteristics: 'the development
of a legislation which, within the framework of the globalisation process, appears
as an ensemble of local policies on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the
158
opening of France towards the transnationalisation of control'. While here it is
still the state that remains a security actor, it is placed within the transnational
realm, acting in accordance with its imperatives. In the case of France, numerous
examples of legislative action are offered, regarding drug use and trafficking, and
money laundering.159 This process is linked with that of 'localised globalism',
where a series of international, regional or ad hoc bodies assume, in lieu of the
state, the role of security actors, aiming to produce a 'global' legislative and
regulatory framework aiming to counter transnational criminality. In this manner,
the state has to comply with 'international' standards and obligations.
154 Anderson et ai, op. cit., p.. 159
155 de Lemos Capeller, op. cit. Emphasis added.
156 The evolution ofmoney laundering counter-measures form within this rationale, 'a global
strategy for a global problem': Williams and Savona, op. cit., p. 167.
157 de Lemos Capeller, op. cit., p.62, citing B. de Sousa Santos (1995), Toward a New Common
Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition, Routledge, New York, London,
pp. 265 et seq.
15 de Lemos Capeller, op. cit., p.69.
159 de Lemos Capeller, op. cit., pp.69-72.
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Such developments have given rise to the development of what has been called
an 'international criminal law', or 'transnational criminal law'.160 Along with that,
and in accordance with the developments in methods of the administration of
knowledge and control, such criminal law standards have been accompanied by the
birth of 'transnational policing'.161 Both the domains of criminal law and policing
are of high sensitivity. Farmer begins his book on 'crime and the genius of Scots
law' as follows: 'the need to talk about and establish boundaries is perhaps stronger
in relation to the criminal law than any other area of law. The field of criminal law
marks itself out by its history of preoccupation with limits- of the law, of the
sanction, of criminalisation. These images of space and landscape continue with
descriptions of the contours of liability, the field of punishment, the frontiers of
1 ft9
criminality, or the territory of the law'. On the other hand, according to
Sheptycki, 'policing is intimately bound up with the imposition of the nation-state
system and the state is thus 'the most powerful reference point for our present
163
understanding of the wider political relevance of policing institutions". '
In view of such sensitivities, the imposition of 'global' standards to counter
transnational crime, albeit with the state's participation in their formulation,
encounters significant national barriers regarding their implementation. Along with
issues related to national socio-economic particularities and diverging legal
cultures, fundamental problems arise when posing the key question of 'whose
security' at the transnational level. Is it possible to define 'global interests'
protected by the establishment of transnational criminal offences? And, at a further
160 For a discussion on the emergence of the terms see R. S. Clark (1998), 'Countering
Transnational and International Crime: Defining the Agenda', in P.J. Cullen and W.C. Gilmore
(eds.), Crime Sans Frontieres: International and European Legal Approaches, Edinburgh
University Press, Edinburgh,
161 From the abundant literature on the topic, see J.W.E. Sheptycki (1995), 'Transnational Policing
and the Makings of a Postmodern State' in British Journal ofCriminology, vol.35, no.4, p.613.
Note also the recent analysis of B.Hebenton and T.Thomas (1998), 'Transnational Policing
Networks' in International Journal ofRisk, Security and Crime Prevention, vol.3, no.2, p.99.
162 L. Farmer (1997), Criminal law, Tradition and Legal Order. Crime and the Genius ofScots
Law, 1747 to the Present, Cambridge University Press, p.l.
163
Sheptycki, op. cit., p.615, citing N. Walker (1994), 'European Integration and European
Policing: A Complex Relationship' in M. Anderson and M. den Boer (eds.), Policing Across
Transnational Boundaries, Pinter, London.
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stage, is there a transnational framework of constitutional or fundamental rights,
balancing the increasingly invasive measures against transnational criminality? In
view of its continuous integration process, these questions become more acute in
the case of the supranational framework of the European Union.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR
On 7 of March 1991, Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission,
delivered the Alastair Buchan memorial Lecture in London, on the theme of
European integration and security.164 Following an expansive conceptualisation of
the notion, Delors spoke of security as 'an all-embracing concept'165 and as 'a
problem of society',166 including in its realm issues such as the environment and
migratory flows. Going further, Delors focused specifically on the Community
dynamic of security, linking it with the developing process of European integration
and the establishment of an internal market. He noted:
'One thing leads to another. This has been a feature of the Community, which is constantly
being taken into new areas. One of these new areas is closely linked to the overall concept
of security. I am referring, of course, to the consequences of free movement for individuals
and the need for joint action, or at the very least close co-ordination, to combat the various
threats to personal security: organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism...Political
initiatives in this security-related area are another expression of solidarity, a leitmotifof the
European pact'. 167
These concerns were reflected in the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union,
whose so-called 'third pillar' (Title VI) contained a series of provisions on
cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs. The cornerstone of this
framework, Article K.l, provided that 'for the purposes of achieving the objectives
of the Union, in particular the free movement of persons' Member States shall
164 J. Delors (1991), 'European Integration and Security' in Survival, vol.XXXIII, pp.99 -110.
165
Delors, op. cit., p. 100.
166 Delors, op. cit., p.101.
167 Delors, op. cit., p.103.
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regard the following areas as matters of common interest: asylum policy; rules on
the crossing of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of
controls thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third
countries; combating drug addiction; combating fraud on an international scale;
judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
customs cooperation; and police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of
international crime, in connection with the organisation of a Union-wide system
for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol).
Notwithstanding the fact that the third pillar provisions fall outside European
Community competence, establishing co-operation at the intergovernmental rather
than at the supranational level directly binding the Member States168, the
importance of the introduction of such provisions in the EU framework is pivotal,
as the first constitutional expression of the transnational security logic at the EU
level. The European Union, as a supranational security actor, defines its security
threats, stretching them to include matters of common interest as diverse as
asylum, immigration, and forms of international criminality, along with police
cooperation to counter them. Such formulation has been repeatedly attacked as
leading to the construction of a 'security continuum',169 'linking terrorism, drugs,
organised crime, mafia,..., illegal immigrants, immigration and asylum seekers,
transferring the illegitimacy of the former to the latter'.170
From a legal perspective, the choice of the third pillar mechanisms has also been
criticised. Bearing in mind the controversy regarding the EC criminal law
168 On an analysis of the legal character of the Maastricht Third Pillar, see P.C. Muller-Graf (1994),
'The Legal Bases of the Third Pillar and its Position in the Framework of the Union Treaty' in
Common Market Law Review, vol.31, pp.493-510.
169 'continuum de menaces': Bigo, op. cit., p.263. On the subsequent use of the term see Anderson
et al., op. cit., pp.164 et seq.; M. den Boer (1996), 'The Hermeneutics of Justice and Home Affairs
Cooperation' in F. Tulkens and H. D. Bosly (dir.) La Justice Penale et I'Europe, Bruylant, Brussels,




competence, nowhere expressly mentioned in the EC Treaty, and the ambivalence
surrounding the protection of human rights at the EC level, the choice of a level of
co-operation with significant consequences for these matters but without clearly
demarcated guarantees of legitimacy and accountability at the EC/EU level has
caused a series of reactions; the debate lies in ascertaining whether the creation of a
European 'security space' is accompanied by a sufficient degree of integration,
allowing the European Union to provide analogous guarantees to the state at the
legal level. A clear example is the creation of Europol, whose competences, limits
171and control remain a matter of controversy.
Notwithstanding such controversies, the years following the entry into force of
the Maastricht Treaty witnessed the adoption of a series of far-reaching third pillar
measures. In the context of organised crime, a pivotal legal instrument adopted
172
under Title VI of the Treaty is the Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime,
which contains a series of Recommendations for a wide range of measures to be
adopted by member states under tight deadlines. The adoption of such measures
was deemed necessary in order to combat organised crime, which, in accordance
with prior international policy discourses, is perceived as a multifaceted threat. In
this spirit, the introduction of the Action Plan reads as follows:
'Organized crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we know it and want to
preserve it. Criminal behaviour no longer is the domain of individuals only, but also of
organizations that pervade the various structures of civil society, and indeed society as a
whole. Crime is increasingly organizing itself across national borders, also taking
advantage of the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons. Technological
innovations such as Internet and electronic banking turn out to be extremely convenient
vehicles either for committing crimes or for transferring the resulting profits into seemingly
licit activities. Fraud and corruption take on massive proportions, defrauding citizens and
civic institutions alike'.
171 On issues related to the lack of democratic control in Europol, see inter alia A. H. Klip (1997),
'Europol, Who is Watching You?' in H. Meijers et al., Democracy, Migrants and Police in the
European Union: the 1996 IGC and Beyond, FORUM, Institute for Multi-cultural Dedelopment,
Utrecht, p.61.
172 OJ C251, 15.8.1997, p.l.
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The adoption of measures to counter this threat was deemed to be necessary
especially in order to achieve the objective of the European Union as an area of
I -70
'freedom, security and justice'. This has been one of the primary objectives of
the Treaty of Amsterdam, which crystallised the evolution of the European Union
as a security community. Security has expressly been constitutionalised in the EU
framework, constituting an objective for the European Union. 174 This development
has been accompanied by structural rearrangements within the Treaty: the
Maastricht third pillar has been decoupled, with a series of matters such as
immigration and asylum entering the Community pillar , whose new Title Ilia on
'visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free movement of
persons' also contains a provision empowering the Council to adopt 'measures in
the field of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters aimed at a high
level of security by preventing and combating crime within the Union in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union' (Article
73i(e)); on the other hand, the Amsterdam third pillar has been enriched inter alia
by the inclusion within its ambit of wide provisions on forms of organised crime
and the 'approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the
Member States' (Article 29 in fine (ex K. 1)); the extension of police co-operation
to 'operational co-operation between the competent authorities', and matters as
specific as 'the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant
information, including information held by law enforcement agencies of reports on
suspicious financial transactions, in particular through Europol, subject to
appropriate provisions on the protection of personal data' (Article 30 (a), (b) (ex
K.2)); and the adoption of a new legal instrument, framework decisions, 'for the
purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States
(Article 34 (2) (b) (ex K.6)).
173 Ibid.
174 H. Labayle (1997), 'Un Espace de Liberte, de Securite et de Justice' in Revue Trimestrielle de
Droit Europeen, vol.33, no.4, p.820 et seq.
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The link between measures against transnational organised crime and the
evolution of the European Union as an area of security was reflected in the clearest
manner in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan175 and, very recently, in the Presidency
Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999.176
Paragraph 40 of the Conclusions calls for a 'Unionwide fight against crime' and
reads as follows:
'The European Council is deeply committed to reinforcing the fight against serious
organised and transnational crime. The high level of safety in the area of freedom, security
and justice presupposes an efficient and comprehensive approach in the fight against all
forms of crime. A balanced development of unionwide measures against crime should be
achieved while protecting the freedom and legal rights of individuals and economic
operators'.
What is most significant in such developments is that the concept of security
appears as a legitimate objective in both the EC and EU framework, possibly
offering to the latter the legitimacy required as a supranational security actor
formulating and sustaining a European right to security. However, there are plenty
of issues that remain contested: for instance, it is always security forming an
exception to the Treaty provisions: Article 731 of the 'free movement' Title,
provides that the latter 'shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order
and the safeguarding of internal security'; Moreover, the role of EC institutions
such as the European Court of Justice in controlling the 'security' provisions
remains, if not limited, contested, and issues of legitimacy and accountability
remain open, especially in view of the constitutionalisation of terms as vague as
'security' and, in spite of the annex to the protocol attempting to define it, the
175 Action Plan on the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the
Treaty ofAmsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, text adopted by the Justice and
Home Affairs Council of 3 December 1998, OJ C19, 23.1.1999, p.l.
176 Text downloaded from: http://europa.eu.int/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm
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'Schengen acquis'. In this manner, the extent the European Union can replace
the state in answering the 'whose security' question remains open As Neil Walker
notes:
' the fact that Europe is increasingly becoming a referent object of security, not only in an
internal sense but also in an external sense-as an actor on the world stage-suggests that we
are beginning to invest the idea of Europe with many of the characteristics and attributes
previously attributed to the state. However, this is uncharted territory and the next stage of
the journey is not clear'.178
6. MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTER-MEASURES AS SECURITY
MEASURES : THE RELEVANCE OF THE DISCUSSION FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EU ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FRAMEWORK
It is submitted that the analysis of the reconceptualisation of security at the global
level can serve as an analytical framework in whose context the evolution of
money laundering counter-measures can be placed and assessed. Following the
schematic structure of the aforementioned discussion, the analysis will focus on:
-. the emergence of the money laundering phenomenon as a threat. After analysing
the nature of the phenomenon, emphasis will be placed on policy discourses
viewing money laundering as a multi-level threat, closely connected, and at times
177 On a first analysis of the complexities of the Amsterdam treaty in the matter, see M. den Boer
(1997), 'Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation in the Treaty on European Union: More Complexity
Despite Communautarization' in Maastricht Journal ofEuropean and Comparative Law, vol.4,
pp.310-316; M. den Boer,.(1997) 'Step by Step Progress: An Update on the Free Movement of
Persons and Internal Security' in EIPASCOPE, pp.8-11; N.Walker (1998), 'Current Developments:
EC Law-Justice and Home Affairs' in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.47, no. 1,
pp.231-238; Labayle, op. cit.; On a first overview of the issues related to the incorporation of the
Schengen acquis to the Amsterdam Treaty, see J. Monar (1997), 'Schengen and Flexibility in the
Treaty of Amsterdam: Opportunities and Risks of Differentiated Integration in EU Justice and
Home Affairs' in M. den Boer (ed.), Schengen, Judicial Cooperation and Policy Coordination,
European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, pp.9-28; D. Curtin (1997), 'The Schengen
Protocol: Attractive Model or Poisoned Chalice?' in Statewatch, vol.7, no.3, pp.18-19; and J.J.E.
Schutte (1998), 'The Incorporation of the Schengen Acquis in the European Union' in Cullen and
Gilmore, op. cit., pp. 124-132.
178 N. Walker (1998), 'European Policing and the Politics of Regulation' in Cullen and Gilmore,
op. cit., p. 141.
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identified, with that of transnational criminality. The particular characteristics of
the money laundering process will be examined, in order to cast light on the
validity of the threat assessment, with emphasis placed on the tenacity of its link
with actual transnational criminal activities.
the emergence of money laundering counter-measures per se. As a novel,
constantly developing phenomenon, money laundering countermeasures will be
examined as an answer to the threat discourse. The aforementioned analysis will be
accommodated, as the anti- money laundering framework is characterised by:
a. the creation of a new, money laundering criminal offence. The nature of the
offence as a derivative one will be examined in relation to traditional criminal law
principles.
b. the adoption of a series of 'responsibilisation' measures, calling at citizens to co¬
operate with the authorities in the fight against crime.
c. the emergence of a multifaceted policing framework. As knowledge of every day
transactions is fundamental in the fight against money laundering, citizens have to
co-operate with an increasing number of policing institutions. Apart from
traditional law enforcement agencies, many of them are new, ad hoc agencies
created to aid the fight against money laundering.
The focus of the analysis will be the European Union anti-money laundering
framework. Placing the European Union within the framework of the multiple
international, regional and ad hoc global actors in the securitisation of the money
laundering phenomenon, the emergence of an EU anti-money laundering
framework will be examined in the light of the challenges it poses to fundamental
legal principles, notably principles of criminal law and human rights. Following the
structure set out in this chapter, the analysis will focus respectively on:
-. the 'securitisation' of money laundering and the emergence of countermeasures
in the international arena.
-. the influence of these developments on the European Union policies, with
emphasis on the emergence of the EC money laundering directive, and its analysis,
particularly in relation to other international initiatives; also on the Justice and
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Home Affairs provisions related to the policing aspect of money laundering.
Specific issues within the countermeasures, related to:
a. money laundering as a criminal offence in the European Community and the
European Union
b. EC-wide prevention strategies, focusing on the responsibilisation of citizens
c. the policing aspect, examining the administration of knowledge both at national
and EU level.
-. the 'balancing act' between money laundering counter-measures and the
safeguarding of the legal principles they challenge. In this analysis the position of
the European Union as a security actor, imposing emergency measures to defend
inter alia itself as a referent object plays a central part. Money laundering counter-
measures will be assessed in the light of the stage of European integration, in order
to assert whether the legitimacy of the European Union in imposing security
standards is accompanied by the power to protect fundamental legal principles and
rights effectively. This will lead to a conclusion on the position of money
laundering counter-measures as a new paradigm of governance in the evolution of
the European Union as a 'security community'.
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The securitisation of money laundering: the phenomenon, the




'It is like a stone thrown into a pond. As it begins to sink, the water ripples and for a few
moments, you can still find the spot where the stone hit. But, as the stone sinks deeper, the
ripples fade. By the time the stone reaches the bottom, any traces of it are long gone and
the stone itself may be impossible to find. That's exactly what happens to laundered
money'.1
Robinson's eloquent metaphor serves to illustrate the evolution of the money
laundering phenomenon. The route of laundered money from the surface of the
financial system to its depths, where all criminal traces are lost, is accomplished by
a series of steps. As has been eloquently noted, 'money laundering is a process,
often a highly complex one, rather than a single act'.2 This process consists of
concealing the criminal origin of assets and investments or the illegal nature of a
financial transaction.3 It can be of varying degrees of complexity, depending on
variables such as: the degree of complexity of the organisational structure of the
criminal organisation; the type of criminal activities in the illegal markets and their
infiltration into legitimate industries; and the volume of the income produced and
1 J. Robinson (1995), The Laundrymen, Pocketbooks, London, p.30.
2 W.C.Gilmore (1999), Dirty Money: The Evolution ofMoney Laundering Counter-Measures, 2nd
edition, Council of Europe Publishing, p.29. Emphasis added.
3 E.U.Savona and M.A.De Feo (1997), 'International Money Laundering Trends and
Prevention/Control Policies' in E.U.Savona, Responding to Money Laundering. International
Perspectives, Harwood Academic Publishers, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,
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the opportunities provided by the collusive relationships between criminal
organisations and administrative, banking and financial institutions.4
On the basis of these parameters, and the inherent imagery in the money
laundering terminology, Savona has categorised the various money laundering
typologies in the following manner:
Hand Wash. When a criminal organisation uses the money (generally a small
amount) to buy goods and services for the organisations.
-. 'Family' Washing Machine. When each criminal organisation or family launders
its money according to 'family' goals and collusion with banks or financial
institutions. 'Washing programs' can consist of the short cycle, such as opening a
deposit account in a bank in the name of a given person and depositing the money
there; the long cycle, which involves terms such as prewash, wash, rinse and
drying to describe the different passages from cleaning the money to its investment
in legitimate activities.
-. 'Condominium' Washing Machine. When several 'families', belonging to the
same criminal syndicate, such as the Mafia, organise a laundering enterprise with
the complicity of someone in a bank or financial institution.
-. Launderette. When a criminal organisation offers criminals and criminal
syndicates a money laundering service with different cycles: the short cycle for
cleaning the money only, or the long cycle which includes all the activities from
laundering to investment.5
This analysis is further systematised by Savona and De Feo, who recently offered
a distinction between money laundering schemes, methods and mechanisms. Using
Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, United
Kingdom, p. 10.
4 E.U.Savona (1993), 'Mafia Money Laundering versus Italian Legislation', in European Journal of
Criminal Policy and Research, vol.1, no.3, p.35.
5 Ihid. For a detailed and constantly updated analysis of money laundering typologies, see the
relevant reports by the Financial Action Task Force, which can be downloaded from
www.oecd.org/fatf/
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the case of 'smurfing', the authors refer to the scheme being the plan to launder the
proceeds of crime and structure the transaction; the method being smurfing;6 and
the mechanisms being the banks and brokerage houses.7 Once more the variability
of the process is stressed, with the authors noting that 'a scheme could be simple,
as in the example, or more complex when more and different methods and
mechanisms are involved, and an overall conception or practice of combining or
selecting schemes according to organizational goals could properly be called a
o
money laundering strategy'. The variability in the complexity of money laundering
schemes has been clearly illustrated by Beare, who has classified them under the
following headings:
-. Simple-Limited. These schemes are limited to straightforward financial
manipulations accommodating a relatively small amount of illicit proceeds, and are
marked thus by a 'ceiling' or a limit on the laundering potential.
-. Simple-Unlimited. These schemes resemble the 'simple' ones of the former
category in the sense that the manipulation is straightforward and involves few
transactions. They are called 'unlimited' because the ceiling is very high and
becomes even more 'unlimited' by 'the ambiguous, specialized and big-budgeted
businesses' used.
-. Serial-Domestic. These schemes function through numerous financial
transactions, with the potential to create 'an impossible paper trail'. Launderers
take advantage of loopholes in the regulatory and law enforcement system by using
a number of different transactions and professions.
6 The term 'smurfing' was born in the United States, to describe the exploitation by money
launderers of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, which required financial institutions to file a Currency
Transaction Report for transactions exceeding $10,000. To avoid the report, it has been noted that
'a single currency transaction would often be structured into multiple transactions of less than
$10,000 each', with individuals known as 'smurfs' providing the structuring service by engaging in
multiple banking transactions of less than this sum. J.Gurule (1995), 'The Money laundering
Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an
Alternative Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?' in American Criminal Law Review,
vol.32, p.825.
7 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., p.22.
8 Ibid.
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Serial-International. In the most sophisticated money laundering scheme, the
aforementioned network of transactions is executed in more than one jurisdiction.
Involving large amounts of illicit proceeds, these laundering schemes may use
offshore jurisdictions, shell corporations, legitimate businesses, smuggling, wire
transfers, loan scams or invoice manipulations.9
The complexity and variability of the money laundering phenomenon is captured
by its classical conception as a series of stages, seen either as a continuum or
alone.10 The process can be epitomised in a classical three -stage process, described
as such in leading academic works" and adopted by the Financial Action Task
Force12 and recent United Nations documents.13 The stages are distinguished as
follows:
-. Placement. Where cash derived directly from criminal activity (e.g. from sales of
drugs) is first placed either in a financial institution or used to purchase an asset.
Principal methods used in this stage, prior or after the enactment of anti-money
laundering legislation, are:
9 M.E. Beare (1996), Criminal Conspiracies. Organized Crime in Canada, Nelson Canada,
Toronto, Albany, Bonn, Boston, Cincinnati, Detroit, London, Madrid, Melbourne, Mexico City,
New York, Pacific Grove, Paris, San Francisco, Singapore, Tokyo, Washington, pp. 102-104.
10 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., p.23.
11 See Gilmore, op. cit., p.29, referring to J.Drage, (1992), 'Countering Money Laundering', Bank
of England Quarterly Bulletin, November, p.420. The analysis of the stages, prior to the methods, is
based on this. Also Savona and De Feo, op. cit., pp.22-28. The same stages approach, albeit with
different titles, is adopted by Hinterseer, distinguishing between the three stages of sorting and
refining, laundering and reintegration. K. Hinterseer (1997), 'Laundering and Tracing of Assets', in
B. Rider (ed.), International Tracing ofAssets, CCH Editions, Bicester, pp. 13-16. A recent study by
the United Nations puts forward a similar, albeit differentiated view, which perceives money
laundering as a three-stage process requiring: firstly, moving the funds from direct association with
the crime; secondly, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and, thirdly, making the money available to
the criminal once again with its occupational and geographic origins hidden from view. United
Nations, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (1998), Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy
and Money-Laundering, New York, p.4.
12 The Financial Action Task Force Report of 6.2.1990 refers to the following key stages for the
detection ofmoney laundering operations: where cash enters into the domestic financial system,
either formally or informally; where it is sent abroad to be integrated into the financial systems of
regulatory havens; and where it is repatriated in the form of transfers of legitimate appearance. Text
reproduced in W.C. Gilmore (ed.) (1992), International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering,
Grotius Publications Ltd., Cambridge.
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i. Physical disposal of bulk cash proceeds - because large volumes of cash may
draw attention to their illegal source and carry a continuous risk of theft or
seizure, criminals are motivated to exchange small denomination bills for larger
bills, to deposit cash and buy financial instruments or otherwise dispose of bulk
cash promptly.
ii. Structuring/'Smurfing' - of cash transactions (deposits, monetary instrument
purchases), to evade the common regulatory requirement that transactions which
exceed a certain amount be recorded and sometimes reported.
iii. Bank complicity - money laundering is facilitated when bank personnel are
corrupted, intimidated or controlled.
iv. Misuse of exemptions - the unsupervised unilateral ability of a financial
institution to exempt itself or its customer from a reporting or recording regimen
can offer money launderers a way in which to avoid an audit trail of their cash
transactions.
v. Commingling of licit and illicit funds - commingling of funds and establishing
front companies is a way to take advantage of these circumstances by obscuring
illicit proceeds in a forest of licit transactions (commingling) or masking them
with the appearance of legitimate receipts of a largely cash business activity
(front companies).
vi. Assets purchased with cash - large scale purchases can support a luxurious life
style; change the form of the proceeds from conspicuous bulk cash to some
equally valuable but less conspicuous form; or obtain major assets which will be
used to further the criminal enterprise.
vii. Currency smuggling - the cross-border smuggling of currency and monetary
instruments by various methods accomplishes the desired physical transfer
without leaving an audit trail.14
-. Layering. The stage at which there is the first attempt at concealment or disguise
of the source of the ownership of the funds. This is achieved by the creation of one
13 See the United Nations International Drug Control Programme Fact Sheet No.5 for the General
Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem, New York, 8-10 June 1998.
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or more layers of financial transactions designed to interrupt any audit trail.15
Principal methods are:
i. The creation of a false paper trail - the intentional production of false
documentary evidence to disguise the true source, ownership, location, purpose
of or control over the funds.
ii. Cash converted into monetary instruments - once illicit proceeds have been
placed into a bank or a non-bank financial institution, they can then be
converted into monetary instruments such as traveller's checks, letters of credit,
money orders, cashiers checks, bonds or stocks. Conversion into monetary
instruments allows the proceeds to be more readily transported out of the
country without detection, to be deposited into other domestic financial
institution accounts, pledged for loans, etc.
iii. Tangible assets purchased with cash and converted - two benefits offset
transaction costs: the identity of the parties may be obscured by untraceable
transactions, and the assets become difficult to locate and seize.
iv. Electronic funds (or wire) transfers - possibly the most cost effective layering
method available to money launderers. They offer criminals speed, distance,
minimal audit trail, and virtual anonymity amid the enormous daily volume of
electronic fund transfers, all at minimal cost.16
-. Integration. The stage at which the money is integrated into the legitimate
economic and financial system and is assimilated with all other assets in the
system. Principal methods are:
i. Real estate transactions - property can be bought by a shell corporation using
illicit proceeds. The property can then be sold and the proceeds appear as
legitimate sales proceeds. A reduced price can be declared and partial payment
made in cash to the seller, guaranteeing a paper profit when the property is
resold at the market value. Inflated prices can be established by a series of
14 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., pp.23-24.
15 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., p.26.
16 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., pp.26-27.
49
trades, enabling the last seller to show a legitimate source for a substantial,
although fictitious, profit, or providing justification for inflated loan
transactions.
ii. Front companies and sham loans - in this way the owner can pay his foreign
laundering subsidiary interest on the loan and deduct it as a business expense,
thereby reducing his tax liability.
iii. Foreign bank complicity - money laundering using accomplice foreign banks
represents a higher order of criminal sophistication and presents a very difficult
problem both at the technical and political levels. Such a bank can conceal many
incriminating details relating to persons and transactions and provide sham
loans secured by criminal proceeds, while guaranteeing immunity from law
enforcement scrutiny due to the protective banking laws and regulations of
another sovereign government.
iv. False import/export invoicing - ficticious transactions, overevaluation of entry
documents and/or the overevaluation of exports serve to justify funds transfers
involving criminal proceeds.17
While there are instances where all three stages are clearly discernible, the
variability and complexity of the money laundering process can result in cases
where only a number of these stages occurs, or they occur simultaneously or
overlap.18 This has led to a number of alternative models to the three-stage one. A
systematic overview is provided by Katharina Oswald, who groups the classical
model with:
-. The two-phases model, distinguishing between: money laundering of first degree,
concerning the laundering of money stemming directly from illegal acts; and
second degree laundering, indicating mid- and long term operations, through
17 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., pp.27-28. For a series of examples ofmoney laundering schemes,




which the laundered money appears as legal income and is restructured in the
legitimate financial system (recycling);
The 'circulation' model, based on the cycle of water and divided into eleven
19
stages;
The four-sector model, in which each sector contains a refinement process; and
The destination/teleological model, based on the diverse money laundering
20
targets (e.g. integration, investment, tax evasion, financing of organised crime).
Notwithstanding the plurality in money laundering conceptualisations, it ought to
be emphasised that in any type or stage of the money laundering process, the goal
remains one: to conceal the true ownership and origin of criminal proceeds and to
change their form by constantly maintaining control.21 The element of concealment
or disguise is integral to the conceptualisation of the money laundering
phenomenon, and essential to distinguish it from the simple hiding of illicit
proceeds.22 This should be born in mind in attempting to assess the development of
strategies leading to the evolution of money laundering counter-measures.
2. THE STRATEGY
19
Schematically the cycle goes as follows: Rain (insertion of cash) - insertion of water in the soil
(first wash) - creation of undercurrent waters (creation of reserves) - creation of uderground seas
through drainage (preparation and transportation abroad) -recollection in underground seas
(preparation for legitimation) - water pumping station (entrance to the legitimate financial system) -
biological cleansing installations (second wash) - consumption/use (transportation and investment) -
evaporation (legal re-introduction to the country of origin) - new rain (new insertion of cash from
criminal activities). Model put forward by A. Zund (1990), 'Geldwascherei: Motiven - Formen -
Abwehr' in Der Schweizer Treuhander, vol. 9, as described in S. A. Katsios (1998), Money
Laundering. The Geopolitics of the International Credit and Financial System: The Phenomenon of
Legalisation ofProceeds from Criminal Activities (in Greek), Sakkoulas editions, Thessaloniki,
p.78, note 5. Katsios distinguishes between the 'cycles' models, the Angloamerican 'stages' models,
and the teleological/destination model (pp.77-87).
20 K. Oswald (1997), Die Implementation gesetzlicher Massnahmen zur Bekampfung der
Geldwasche in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine empirische Untersuchung des para.261
StGB i.V.m. dem Geldwaschegesetz, edition Iuscrim, Freiburg i. Br. See pp. 8-15 on criminological
definitions of money laundering and further references.
21
Gilmore, op. cit.
22 See also United Nations, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, op. cit.
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'From the point of view of the criminal, it is no use making a large profit out of criminal
activity if that profit cannot be put to use...Putting the proceeds to use is not as simple as it
may sound. Although a proportion of the proceeds of crime will be kept as capital for
further criminal ventures, the sophisticated offender will wish to use the rest for other
purposes...If this is to be done without running an unacceptable risk of detection, the
money which represents the proceeds of the original crime must be 'laundered'; put into a
state in which it appears to have an entirely respectable provenance'.23
This much-cited statement by McClean epitomises the rationale underlying the
evolution of money laundering counter-measures: not only is money laundering
deemed as sustaining a major incentive of criminal activity, i.e. the accumulation
of profit, but also, through this accumulation, it helps sustain the very existence of
criminal organisations. Extending this point, such a profit-making process, largely
accomplished through the channels of the financial system, endangers the very
function of the system, through its infiltration with 'dirty' money. In view of such
perils, money laundering counter-measures were deemed necessary to pursue a
two-fold goal:
-. attacking criminal activities and disrupting criminal organisations; and
-. defending the transparency of the economic/financial system.24
9 S
The first goal, an active one, seeks, according to Savona and De Feo, 'to
discourage criminal activities by increasing 'law enforcement risk', a
comprehensive term meaning both the risk of being arrested and convicted and the
risk that the proceeds of crime will be forfeited'." While the authors consider the
23 J.D.McClean (1992), International Judicial Assistance, Oxford University Press, p. 184, cited in
Gilmore, op. cit., p.27. Also in W.C.Gilmore (1993), 'Money Laundering:The International Aspect'
in H. MacQueen (ed.), Money Laundering, Hume Papers on Public Policy, Edinburgh University
Press, Edinburgh, p. 1.
24 E.Savona (1996), 'Money Laundering, the Developed Countries and Drug Control: The New
Agenda' in N.Dorn, J.Jepsen and E.Savona (eds.), European Drug Policies and Enforcement,
Macmillan, London, p.217. Savona and De Feo, op. cit., pp.46-47.
25
Savona, op. cit.
26 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., p.46. See also Savona, op. cit. In a similar manner a note by the
United Nations Secretary General states that 'following the money trail could constitute a more
effective and efficient alternative' in the fight against organised crime,as 'money -laundering
investigations and the confiscation of proceeds from criminal activities undermine the ability of a
criminal organization to perform its main task, the production of wealth'. United Nations, Economic
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apprehension risk more easily controllable by criminals, they place emphasis on
forfeiture risk, which is viewed as a 'less easily managed threat to the ultimate
organizational motivation, the criminal proceeds themselves'.27 They go on by
asserting that 'making it more difficult for criminals to keep the proceeds of their
crime, and making the enjoyment of those proceeds more dangerous, provide a
classic economic disincentive to incurring the apprehension risk necessary to
generate those proceeds'.28
The second goal is a defensive one.29 Domestic and international financial
systems need to be defended from being 'polluted' by the flow of 'dirty' money.
Not only is criminal wealth deemed to create unfair competitive advantages over
legitimate investors 'whose money has been earned at a lower profit margin than is
30
possible in illegal enterprises and on which taxes must be paid',' but criminal
money is viewed as creating an additional risk to political and economic systems
31
through corruption."
Such theorisation of the anti- money laundering strategy entails important
consequences regarding the view of money laundering as a two-fold threat in the
emerging transnational security landscape. One imperative of money laundering
confrontation is connected with 'pure' criminal policy justifications, with the fight
against money laundering being equated with the fight against transnational
organised crime: not only are money laundering counter-measures intended to
increase the law enforcement risk of criminals, but they also serve to provide a
and Social Council, Strengthening Existing International Cooperation in Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, including Technical Cooperation in Developing Countries, with Special Emphasis
in Combating Organized Crime, Note by the Secretary-General, Addendum: Money Laundering and
Associated Issues: The Need for International Cooperation, DOC. E/CN. 15/1992/4/Add.5, 23
March 1992, p.3.
27 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., p.47.
28 Ibid. In a negative formulation, the minimisation of risk is deemed as one of the launderers'
objectives. See M.-C. Dupuis (1998), Finance Criminelle. Comment le Crime Organise Blanchit
I'Argent Sale, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, pp.3-4.
29 Ibid. See also Savona, op. cit.
30 Savona and De Feo, op. cit.
31 Ibid. Also Savona, op. cit., p.218.
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major disincentive for the expansion of transnational organised crime, by depriving
criminals of their profits. In this continuum, the thread linking money laundering
counter-measures with the variety and breadth of referent objects under the
perceived threat of transnational organised crime - ranging form state stability and
sovereignty to the social fabric per se32- remains highly contested, with the
following questions being brought to the fore: is money laundering per se to be
equated as a threat with that of transnational organised crime? Or is it rather to be
considered as a facilitating factor for criminals, with their link being further
distanced?33 In approaching these issues, it is essential to place emphasis on the
official policy discourses on the adoption of money laundering counter-measures,
marked by the use of an abstract, catch-all vocabulary projecting money laundering
as a security issue.
Such discourses also emphasise the threat of money laundering for the integrity
and 'cleanliness' of the financial system. In this case, the threat is specified and
analysed within a causal link between the flow of 'dirty' money and the
malfunctioning of the financial system. This perception is relatively novel, and still
highly contested.34 Even more novel is its transliteration into legal and regulatory
32 See chapter 1.
33 On the link between money laundering and harm to society in the context of RICO, the U.S.
statute against organised crime, see the thought-provoking analysis of G.E.Lynch (1987), 'RICO:
The Crime of Being Criminal, Parts I and II', in Columbia Law Review, vol.87, no.4, pp.689-690.
34 The view of Lynch is interesting here. He argues that 'putting aside for a moment the acquisition
of a business interest through direct criminal action, the act of acquisition is morally neutral, or even
beneficial - 'black money' is fungible with the ordinary green stuff with respect to its economic
function as a source of capital for socially productive businesses'. Lynch, op. cit., p.689. It is
interesting to note here that a definitive view on the macroeconomic implications of money
laundering is not yet substantiated. In its recent report, the Commission of the European
Communities, answering a relevant question by the European Parliament, referred to two papers of
the International Monetary Fund, i.e. 'Money Laundering and the International Financial System',
by Vito Tanzi, Working paper No 96/55, and 'Macroeconomic Implications ofMoney Laundering'
by Peter J. Quirk, Working Paper No 96/66. The Commission further noted that in its presentation
to the FATF Plenary, the IMF summarised the potential macroeconomic consequences ofmoney
laundering as follows: changes in the demand for money that seem unrelated to measured changes in
fundamentals; volatility in exchange rates and interest rates due to unanticipated cross-border
transfers of funds; increased instability of liabilities and heightened risks for asset quality for
financial institutions, creating systemic risks for the stability of the financial sector and for monetary
developments generally; adverse effects on tax collection and the allocation of public expenditures
due to misreporting of income and wealth; contamination effects on legal transactions as transactors
become concerned about possible criminal involvement; and other country-specific distributional
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terms, bearing in mind that similar phenomena such as tax evasion remain largely
unregulated in a number of jurisdictions." At a further level, and similar to the
'criminal' logic of money laundering counter-measures, the balance between a
threat - should it be considered as such- to the financial system and the adoption of
broad invasive legal and regulatory measures to counter it remains to be assessed.
These issues become more acute in the light of the assertion by Savona and De
Feo that 'both goals of penal deterrence/control and protection of financial
transparency/integrity are closely connected, even if the first is centred more on
or
criminal legislation and the second on the exercise of regulatory powers'." In this
'merging' of objectives the limits are far from clear. As the authors assert,
'frequently there is a cross-over phenomenon, in which criminal penalties are
applied to reinforce transparency/integrity of the financial system and regulatory
policies are used to identify or deter criminal conduct'. 7 The issues become more
accentuated when this merging of objectives meets the inherent complexity and
ambivalence of the money laundering phenomenon. Prior to focusing on specific
anti-money laundering discourses and their link with the adoption of money
effects or asset price bubbles due to disposition of 'black money'. Commission of the European
Communities (1998), Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on
the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, COM (1998)401 final, Brussels, 1.7.1998,
pp. 18-19. On secondary literature, see the contributions in Savona, 1997.
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According to a recent study by the United Nations, money laundering and tax evasion involve in
fact quite opposite processes: tax evasion involves taking legally earned income and hiding its
existence or disguising its nature, thus turning legal into illegal income. On the other hand, money
laundering aims at disguising the origin of illegal proceeds and making them appear legal. United
Nations, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, op. cit., p.5. This distinction is closely
related with the distinction between 'dirty' and 'hot' money. While 'dirty' money form the interest
and goal ofmoney laundering counter-measures because they are derived from a criminal activity
that is considered morally wrong, 'hot' money represent proceeds that are either legal and misused,
such as tax evasion, or illegal, but serving a series of purposes which are considered politically
legitimate. This renders the legislative choice of what is included- and, more interestingly, what is
excluded- from the definition of 'dirty' money in money laundering counter-measures rather
artificial in many instances. On a compelling view on 'hot' money and their difference to 'dirty'
money see B.A.K. Rider (1996), 'Taking the Profit Out of Crime' in B. Rider and M. Ashe (eds.),
Money Laundering Control, Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, Dublin, pp.2-3; see also B.A.K.
Rider (1996), 'The Practical and Legal Aspects of Interdicting the Flow ofDirty Money' in Journal
ofFinancial Crime, vol.3, no.3, pp.234-253. For an extensive analysis of the global flow of 'hot
money' and its link to international debt crises see R.T. Naylor (1994), Hot Money and the Politics
ofDebt, Black Rose Books, Montreal, New York, London.
36 Savona and De Feo, op. cit. Also Savona, op. cit.
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laundering counter-measures, it is essential to cast light on this ambivalence and
the discursive mechanisms adopted to overcome it.
3. THE BLURRING OF BOUNDARIES AND THE 'NORMALISATION'
DISCOURSE
In putting forward a comprehensive anti-money laundering framework, one of the
greatest challenges emanates from the fact that the money laundering process
occurs in the context of commonplace commercial activity. As has been pointed
out, money laundering as behaviour 'may be perceptually indistinguishable from
normal commercial activity of law-abiding persons depositing, transferring and
using funds for lawful purposes'.38 In the same spirit, Savona and De Feo note in
the same work that the development of money laundering activities 'was not an
anomalous aberration, but simply the dark side of modern economic and social
development, in which illegal as well as legal enterpreneurs have learned to exploit
global markets, economies of scale and lack of harmonization among national
preventive and control policies'.39 In this manner, the seemingly different worlds of
'dirty' money, 'black' markets and organised criminals are associated without
inhibition with those of 'clean' financial systems, 'decent' bankers and the
innocent public. As these worlds intermingle, their boundaries become blurred: the
more 'dirty' money gets 'cleansed', the more 'contaminated' the financial system
becomes. And the more the criminal is perceived as a commonplace customer, the
greater the opportunity for the system to act 'dirty'.
The blurring of boundaries in the laundering of money through commonplace,
everyday transactions constitutes a vivid illustration of what recent criminological
writings have characterised as 'the criminogenic situation', whose governance, as
37 Savona and De Feo, op. cit.
38 M.Levi (1997), 'Money Laundering and Regulatory Policies', in Savona, op. cit., p.259.
39 Savona and De Feo, op. cit., p. 10.
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seen above, lies in a shift of emphasis from action upon deviant individuals to one
designed to govern social and economic routines.40 The difficulty in regulating this
case lies in the inherent value of such routines, which constitute the 'criminogenic
situation' and which have to be maintained and preserved. In balancing the goals of
crime prevention and control and the preservation of everyday values it is crucial to
'align the actors objectives with those of the authorities'.41 This is mainly achieved
through the responsibilisation strategy, calling on the private sector to co-operate
with the authorities in the fight against crime.42
In the evolution of the crusade against money laundering this has been
attempted through recourse to a 'moralistic' justificatory framework. One of its
main targets has been the so called 'myth of amoral business'.43 Actors in the
financial system, thus far justified to operate to a great extent under the laws of the
market, are now called to take part in the fight against money laundering. In this
mobilisation attempt, financial institutions are viewed with a combination of
sympathy- being targets of organised crime- and reproach- accused of exactly
assisting its operations. The 1988 Statement of the Basle Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices is illustrative in this respect, stating that:
'Public confidence in banks, and hence their stability, can be undermined by adverse
publicity as a result of inadvertent association by banks with criminals. In addition, banks
may lay themselves open to direct losses from fraud, either through negligence in screening
undesirable customers or where the integrity of their own officers has been undermined
through association with criminals'.44
40 See the extensive analysis and bibliographical references in chapter 1. A similar term which ahs
been put forward is that of 'crimogenic' profit oriented organisations: see C. Stanley (1996),
'Speculations on the Conflict of Discourses: Finance, Crime and Regulation' in Journal of
Financial Regulation and Compliance, vol.4, no.3, pp.239-254.
4iD. Garland (1997), "Governmentality' and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, Criminology,
Sociology' in Theoretical Criminology, vol.1, no.2, p. 186.
42 For a detailed analysis, see chapters 1 and 5.
43 R. De George (1990), Business Ethics, Macmillan, New York, p.3.
44
Text reproduced in Gilmore (ed.), op. cit. Emphasis added.
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Banks are thus viewed not only as potential victims, but also as actors, be it
through inadvertent or conscious association with criminals. In the fight against the
perceived threat of money laundering, neither of the two is acceptable. The myth of
amoral business cannot be sustained in the quest for responsibilised actors in the
fight against crime. Antithetically, through a recourse to notions of community and
responsibility,45 the amoral becomes immoral.
The moral overtones justifying this need for change, extend to the very heart of
the financial world: the concept of money, viewed by the classical utilitarian
approach as 'the most abstract and impersonal element in human life'.46 Money is
perceived as 'the absolute negation of quality', exclusively determined by
quantity.47Viewed as the fitting neutral intermediary of a rational, impersonal
market, money is thus objectified, expressing 'the economic relations between
objects...in abstract quantitative terms without itself entering into those
relations'.48 The negation of any quality determining money is clearly reflected in
the philosophy of Georg Simmel, according to whom 'the inhibiting notion that
certain amounts of money may be 'stained with blood' or be under a curse are
sentimentalities that lose their significance completely with the growing
indifference of money' 49
It is striking to note that these sentimentalities regain their vigour in the anti-
money laundering discourse, reflecting the view that the perception of the
neutrality of money serves as an abetting factor for organised criminality.50 A
45 See the extensive analysis in chapter 5.
46 M.Weber (1971), 'Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions' in Gerth and Wright
Mills (eds.), From Max Weber.Essays in Sociology, cited in V.Zelizer (1989), 'The Social Meaning
ofMoney: 'Special Monies" in American Journal ofSociology, vol.95, p.345.
47 Ibid.
48 G. Simmel (1978), The Philosophy ofMoney, cited in Zelizer, op. cit.
49 Ibid.
50 On the smell ofmoney, see the arguments ofW.Hetzer (1993), 'Der Geruch des Geldes - Ziel,
Inhalt und Wirkung der Gesetze gegen Geldwasche' in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Heft 51,
p.3298. He argues that the 'pecunia non-olet' (money does not smell) principle stands as a 'cynical
remark', and focuses on the 'mental predisposition' (Untergrund) supporting the neutrality of
money as helpful for organised crime.
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recourse to the strongly emotive and symbolically charged imagery of 'dirty',
'stained' or 'black' money stemming from crime is essential to reshape well-
established notions of liberal economic life. Such reshaping is inextricably linked
with the representation of money laundering as a multifaceted threat. From an
anthropological perspective, fruitful insights on the use of terms such as 'dirty
money' are provided by Mary Douglas, who, stating that 'dirt offends against
order', goes on to assess that 'eliminating it is not a negative moment, but a
positive effort to organize the environment'.51 The utilisation and function of
concepts of 'dirt' in the security landscape is further elaborated by David
Campbell, whose analysis is worth quoting at length:
'One might suggest that it is the extent to which we want to organize the environment - the
extent to which we want to purify our domain - that determines how likely it is that we
represent danger in terms of dirt or disease. Tightly defined order and strictly enforced
stability, undergirded by notions of purity, are not a priori conditions of existence; some
order and some stability might be required for existence as we know it...,but it is the
degree of tightness, the measure of strictness, and the extent of the desire for purity which
constitutes danger as dirt or disease'.52
These considerations are reflected in the development of the 'money laundering'
terminology. Initially coined by U.S. law enforcement officials and entering
ci
popular usage during the Watergate inquiry in the mid-70's, the term gained
momentum during the securitisation of the money laundering phenomenon
justifying national and international initiatives to counter it. In a very short time-
span, not before the end of the 1980's, what is deemed as 'a useful shorthand
phrase for a complex process',54 pervaded policy analyses and discourses, finally
being unanimously adopted as a legal term. Prior to the analysis of such
51
M.Douglas (1966), Purity and Danger, p.2, cited in D. Campbell (1992), Writing Security.




53 Gilmore, 1993, op. cit., citing P.Vallance, 'Money laundering: The Situation in the United
Kingdom', paper presented to the Council of Europe Money laundering Conference, Strasbourg,
France, 18-30.9.1992, typescript, p.l.
54 Savona and De Feo, op. cit.
59
developments in the international arena, it is valuable to begin with the example of
the United States, whose anti-money laundering policy has been highly influential
for subsequent international initiatives.
4. MONEY LAUNDERING AS A THREAT AND MEASURES TO COUNTER
IT: THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES
The concern regarding money laundering and organised crime in the United States
can be discerned as early as 1970, when the Congress enacted three laws which
reflected the government's recognition of the organised crime threat and the need
to combat it.55 These laws were: the Organized Crime Control Act 1970;56 the
Bank Secrecy Act;57 and the Drug Control Act 1970.58 Of these enactments, the
cornerstone for subsequent anti-money laundering initiatives has been the Bank
Secrecy Act, whose stated purpose is 'to require certain reports or records where
they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations
or proceedings'.59 The statute, rather than imposing itself reporting and recording
requirements, serves as 'an enabling statute that explicitly authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to fashion appropriate regulatory measures to meet the ends it sets
forth'.60 The most significant provisions emanating from the Act are the mandatory
reporting scheme through the completion of Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs)
55 See J.Arrastia (1996), 'Money laundering - A U.S. Perspective' in B.Rider and M.Ashe (eds.), op.
cit., p.231.
56 Title IX of Pub.L. No. 91-452, para. 901 (a), 84 Stat. 922 (197), codified at 18 U.S.C. para. 1961
et seq.
57 Pub. L. No. 91-508, para. 221-223, 84 Stat. 1122 (1970), codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. paras.
5313(a); C.F.R. para. 102.1 (b) (1970).
58 Pub. L. No. 91-513 (1970). All references in Arrastia, op. cit.
59 31 U.S.C. para. 5311(1995). See also M.S.Morgan (1996), Money Laundering: The U.S. Law and
its Global Influence, Studies in International Financial and Economic Law, The International
Finance and Tax Law Unit, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield
College and The London Centre for International Banking Studies in The London Institute of
International Banking, Finance and Development Law, p.8.
60
Morgan, op. cit., pp.8-9.
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and Reports of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments
(CMIRs).61
Notwithstanding its early inception, the effectiveness of the Bank Secrecy Act
until the mid-1980's was rather limited, both due to drawbacks regarding the
reporting of transactions and the tenuous link with organised crime, and limited
attention towards compliance and enforcement. The subsequent quest for
amendment and expansion of the legislation became inextricably linked with the
escalation in the 'war on drugs', which dominated the U.S. policy in the 1980's.
According to the authors of 'Drug War Politics. The Price of Denial', 'nineteen
eighty-one marked a watershed in the war of drugs'. In the following passage, they
place emphasis on the central role of the Reagan discourse to this end:
'Brilliantly employing the power of the executive bully pulpit to galvanize public attention,
the president used speeches, radio addresses, and special events to bring his declaration of
war to the halls of Congress and directly into American homes. Pledging in October 1982
'to do what is necessary to end the drug menace', the president announced a 'legislative
offensive' to make it easier to convict those involved with drugs and to keep them behind
bars longer. In his 1983 State of the Union address, Reagan confirmed, 'It is high time that
we make our cities safe again. The administration hereby declares an all-out war on big-
time organized crime and the drug racketeers who are poisoning our young people'.62
The insertion of the 'war on drugs' as a key concept in U.S. internal -and foreign
- policy,63 has led to an increasing policy focus on money laundering, viewed as
part of the financial side of drug trafficking. As Nadelmann notes, the fight against
it 'was perceived as essential both to identifying and prosecuting the higher-level
drug traffickers who rarely if ever came into contact with their illicit goods, and to
tracing, seizing, and forfeiting their assets'.64
61 For an overview of these and other provisions, see Morgan, op. cit., pp.9-10.
62 E. Bertram, M. Blachman, K. Sharpe and P.Andreas (1996), Drug War Politics. The Price of
Denial, University of California Press, Berkley, Los Angeles, London, p.l 13.
63 On the 'war on drugs' in relation to U.S. foreign policy, see the analysis of Campbell, op. cit.
64 E. A. Nadelmann (1993), Cops Across Borders. The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law
Enforcement, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, p.388.
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The need to strengthen the anti-money laundering framework was expressed
through the securitisation of the phenomenon and its identification with organised
crime. This link was emphasised in the 1984 Report of the President's
Commission on Organized Crime, which contains the following passage worth
quoting at length:
'The existence of modern, sophisticated, often international services of financial
institutions has contributed to the frightening financial successes of organized crime in
recent years, particularly the narcotics trade. Without the means to launder money, thereby
making cash generated by a criminal enterprise appear to come from a legitimate source,
organized crime could not flourish as it now does. The need to launder money has led
organized crime to avail itself of the full range of banking services normally associated
with legitimate, multinational businesses'.65
In the Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the
Judiciary one year later, the Treasury's Assistant Secretary in Enforcement and
Operations, followed the familiar, two-track road: he viewed money laundering as
'a serious challenge to law enforcement and a clear danger to the soundness and
integrity of our financial system', adding that 'our free society and our diverse
economy, wit its ready access to international financial networks, provide the
setting for the money launderer's operations'.66 He then went on to add that 'we
could never hope to control drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime in
our society unless we continue to go after the money that is at the heart of every
criminal activity'.67
65 President's Commission on Organized Crime (1984), The Cash Connection: Organized Crime,
Financial Institutions and Money Laundering (Interim Report to the President and the Attorney
General), October 1984, introduction.
66 Statement of J.M.Walker Jr., Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations), U.S. Department
of the Treasury, in Current Problem ofMoney Laundering, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session,
12.9.1985, Washington, 1987, pp.3-4. Emphasis added.
67 Walker Jr., op. cit., p.4.
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Through recourse to a highly emotive vocabulary, marked by the Us/Them
dichotomy, money laundering is thus securitised and perceived as a threat for both
the financial system and society as a whole. This tone continued to prevail in
Walker's call for additional measures against money laundering, placing the
emphasis on financial institutions. Commenting on the Bank Secrecy Act, he
stated:
'...as a society, it is essential that we set a higher goal: if we are to strike a telling blow
against drugs and crime, we must go further, and strive to deny criminals access to our
financial system. This, of course, is a task that law enforcement cannot accomplish alone.
Banks and other financial institutions must do more to ensure that their employees do not
become, wittingly or unwittingly, the prey of the criminal operations with cash to
launder'.68
Such political impetus for the adoption of extensive money laundering counter-
measures was expressed by calls for tougher law enforcement action, largely
supported at the time by mass media representations. The most striking example is
that of the Bank of Boston case, where the bank was found guilty of currency
reporting violations. In a recent contribution, the case is examined under the
spectre of 'landmark narratives', playing a 'crucial, but largely unrecognized role in
generating new categories of problems and accompanying warrants for
claimsmakers' preferred policies'.69 It is noted that with the Bank of Boston case,
the references to money laundering in the mass media rose to unprecedented
heights compared to previous years, with the media adopting a 'rhetoric of
70
uniqueness' both generating scandal and distinguishing the case. In explaining
this 'logic of selection', it is argued that, apart from serving basic organisational
goals of law enforcement and the mass media, the case:
' 1. appeared at an opportune moment for law enforcement;
68 Walker Jr., op. cit., pp.9-10.
69 L.T.Nichols (1997), 'Social Problems as Landmark Narratives: Bank of Boston, Mass Media and
'Money Laundering', in Social Problems, vol.44, no.3, p.324.
70
Nichols, op. cit., pp. 327 et seq.
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2. sent a symbolic message that could not have been conveyed by prosecuting
banks in notorious drug trafficking areas; and
3. provided what newsworkers perceived as an exceptional story opportunity,
because
a. it combined three problems (currency-reporting violations, organized crime,
drugs); and
b. also involved an alleged corporate cover-up.'71
In other words, it has been argued that 'although the construction of the case as a
landmark narrative was in a sense arbitrary, the particulars of the case were well
72suited to presumed interests of major claimsmaker groups'.
The outcome of the resulting political climate, notwithstanding strong reactions
by civil liberties groups,73 was the enactment of Subtitle H of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, otherwise known as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.74
The core provision is Section 1956, the content of which has been as follows:
'First, Section 1956(a)(1) takes aim at money laundering activities involving financial
transactions (much like Section 5313 of the BSA's CTR and CTRC reporting
requirements). Second, Section 1956(a)(2) criminalizes the actual or attempted movement
of monetary instruments into or out of the United States in connection with unlawful
activities (similar to the emphasis of Section 5316 of the BSA). Third, Section 1956(a)(3)
specifically addresses criminal sting operations directed at money laundering, making it a
crime to attempt to promote unlawful activity with, conceal the origin of, or avoid a
71
Nichols, op. cit., p.333.
72 Ibid. The influence of the Bank of Boston case is also highlighted by Morgan, stating that 'the
public hullaballoo ( sparked in large measure by the ambitiousness of the American press in
reporting the shortcomings of the banking industry) piqued the interest of U.S. lawmakers: op. cit.,
pll.
73
Jerry J. Berman, speaking as Chief Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union,
raised before the Commission of the Judiciary concerns related to the evisceration of 'the modest
protection afforded to customer bank records in the Right to Financial Privacy Act'; He also raised
the Union's concerns about the breadth of conduct made criminal under the Act, which reaches
'conduct which is traditionally prosecuted under state and local law', or would make prosecutable
'conduct which may and should be left legal'. In Current Problem ofMoney Laundering, op. cit.,
pp.373-374.
74 Pub. L.. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.3207 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. paras. 1956-1957, 31
U.S.C. paras. 324-326).
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transactional reporting requirement under state or federal law involving monies held out by
law enforcement officials to be criminally derived'.75
Thus four years after the first judicial use of the term, 'money laundering',76
instead of the already adopted term of 'recycling',77 takes its place in U.S.
legislative history. Leaving the symbolic level, it is also evident that the 1986 Act
provides an unprecedented comprehensive framework of anti-laundering
measures, covering many facets of the phenomenon which were influential for
subsequent international initiatives. The new provisions are the outcome of the
effort to amend drawbacks of previous legislation. Thus, apart from Sections 1956
and 1957-which criminalises the knowing acceptance of proceeds form crime-, the
Act took effective measures to highlight the 'nexus' between money laundering
7R
and organised crime, by amending Section 1961 of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 'to include violations of the money laundering
statutes within the definition of 'racketeering'.79 Furthermore, the Act contains a
series of anti-structuring and forfeiture provisions.80 Its scope was expanded by the
1988 amendments to the BSA, which broaden the Treasury's authority and impose
o 1
additional duties to financial institutions.
5. THE 'SECURITISATION' OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA: CRIMINALISATION AND CONFISCATION
75
Morgan, op. cit., p. 12.
76 The term was first used in the case of US v. $4,255,625.39 (1982)551 F Supp 314. Gilmore,
1993, p.l.
77 See the term 'Riciclaggio', in Italy, which, due to the Mafia presence, has been one of the
pioneering countries in establishing anti-money laundering legislation. For an overview see inter
alia G.Nanula (1992), La Lotta Alia Mafia. Strumenti Giuridici. Strutture di Coordinamento.
Legislazione Vigente, Giuffre editore, pp.94 et seq.
78 On the expression see Gurule, op. cit., p.824.
19
Morgan, op. cit., p.12 at note 31.
80 For an overview, see Morgan, op. cit., pp. 19-24.
81
Morgan, op. cit., pp.24-26.
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I. THE UNITED NATIONS
From the beginning of the 1980's, United Nations action reflected the concern of
Governments with the deteriorating situation regarding drug abuse. This concern
has been reflected inter alia in: General Assembly Resolution 35/195 of 15
December 1980, whose third Preamble paragraph refers to 'the growing threat
caused by the spread of drug abuse, its serious impact on human health, its adverse
effect on social development (social disintegration, increasing criminality),
economic advancement and national security in a number of countries'; General
Assembly Resolution 36/168 of 16 December 1981, going further to refer to 'the
scourge of drug abuse' having reached 'epidemic proportions in many parts of the
world', urging further national and international action; Resolutions 37/168 and
37/168 of 17 and 18 December 1982, where similar calls for international action
were made; Resolution 38/93 of 1983, concerning 'measures to improve co¬
ordination and co-operation in the international struggle against illegal production
of drugs, illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse' and in parallel recommending a
number of measures taken by organisations of the United Nations system; and
Resolution 38/122 of 16 December 1983, expressing the Assembly's appreciation
of certain regional and interregional initiatives against drug trafficking and
requesting inter alia to the Secretary-General to convene an interregional meeting
of law enforcement agencies responsible for applying their countries' legislation
concerning narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.82
The increasing concern regarding drug abuse and trafficking, viewed as major
threats in the international arena, led to the General Assembly Resolution 39/141
of 14 December 1984, entitled 'Draft Convention against Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities'. In its paragraph 2, the
Assembly requested
82 United Nations, Draft Report of the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking, Chapter II: Historical Background of the Conference, Rapporteur-General: P.O.Emafo,
DOC: A/CONF.133/L.2, 24 June 1987, LIMITED, pp.2-3.
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'the Economic and Social Council, taking into consideration Article 62, paragraph 3, and
Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and Council Resolution 9(1)
of 16 February 1946, to request the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to initiate at its thirty-
first session, to be held in February 1985, as a matter ofpriority, the preparation of a draft
convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs which considers the various aspects of the
problem as a whole and, in particular, those not envisaged in existing international
instruments'.83
A draft convention text was annexed to the resolution as a working paper.
Moreover, the Assembly adopted on the same date Resolution 39/142, its annex
containing a 'Declaration on the Control of Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse',
which characterised both as an international criminal activity, and Resolution
39/143, entitled 'International campaign against traffic in drugs', which 'once
again refers to the evils of the illicit production, marketing, distribution and use of
drugs and inter alia urges that 'highest priority' should be given to measures
• • 84
against these illicit activities'.
The 'securitisation' of drug abuse and trafficking, through their
conceptualisation as a threat and the prioritisation of the adoption of counter-
measures, resulted in calls for a specialised conference to deal with the fight
against drug trafficking. In 1985, the then UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de
Cuellar, called for 'a world conference at the ministerial level to deal with all
aspects of drug abuse to be held in 1987'.85 Adopting a similar 'securitising'
discourse, de Cuellar stated that existing resources were inadequate to deal with
the drugs plague, which was 'contaminating, corrupting and weakening the very
o/r
fabric of society'. This initiative, and vocabulary, were reflected in the two
83 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Implementation and Development of International
Instruments on the Control ofNarcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Preparation of a draft
convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, Report of the
Secretary-General, DOC. E/CN.7/1987/2, 17 June 1986, p.2. Emphasis added.




General Assembly Resolutions of 13 December 1985. Resolution 40/121 in its
Preamble characterises the activities of transnational criminal organisations
engaged in drug trafficking as a 'threat to the well-being of peoples, the stability of
democratic institutions and the sovereignty of States', and calls in its second
paragraph for 'maximum priority' to the fight against drug production, demand
and traffic and related international criminal activities.87 Resolution 40/122 on the
other hand, expressed such concerns through the decision to convene the
Conference in 1987 at the ministerial level
'...as an expression of the political will of nations to combat the drug menace,...at the
national, regional and international levels and to adopt a comprehensive multidisciplinary
outline of future activities which focuses on concrete and substantive issues directly
relevant to the problems of drug abuse and illicit trafficking...'.88
The 1987 Conference resulted in major commitments at international level, which
were reflected in two adopted documents, namely the Comprehensive
Multidisciplinary Outline of Future Activities in Drug Abuse Control and the
on
Declaration on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. The impetus created by these
global commitments led to a great extent to the adoption, in 1988, of the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.90 Its Preamble reflects the UN anti-drugs discourse and provides
important insights on the link bewtween drug offences, organised crime and money
laundering as threats in the emerging security landscape. Hence, the Preamble
expresses the concern of the Parties to the Convention caused by 'the magnitude of
and increasing trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious threat to the health and
welfare of human beings and adversely affect the economic, cultural and political
87 Ibid.
88 United Nations, op. cit., p.4.
89 The decisions of the conference are reproduced in (1987) International Legal Materials, vol.26,
pp.1637-1724.
90 Text reproduced in Gilmore (ed.), op. cit.
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foundations of society'. 91 This wide, all-encompassing threat is further extended
through the recognition of 'the links between illicit traffic and other related
organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and
92threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States'. The threat is also
attenuated through the recognition of drug trafficking as an international criminal
93
activity, requiring urgent suppression measures; ' and, last but not least, through
the acknowledgement that 'illicit traffic generates large financial profits which
enable transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt
the structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and
society at all its levels'.94 This acknowledgement is associated with the parties'
determination 'to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their
criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing'.95
This broad security rationale resulted in the perception of a need for strong,
extended and international emergency action. This has led to a Convention with a
multitude of provisions, whose object has been 'to establish a strong, relatively
uniform application of criminal justice in respect of drug-related offences that
would enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation in this field'.96
Deemed to be 'one of the most detailed and far reaching instruments ever adopted
in the field of international criminal law'97, the Convention covers a wide range of
issues extending from criminalisation of specific activities to juridical matters such
98
as legal mutual assistance, confiscation and extradition.
91 Recital 1. Emphasis added.
92 Recital 3. Emphasis added.
93 Recital 4.
94 Recital 5. Emphasis added.
95 Recital 6.
96
D.W.Sproule and P. St-Denis (1989), 'The United Nations Drug Trafficking Convention: An
Ambitious Step' in Canadian Yearbook of International Law, p.271.
97 D. Stewart (1990), 'Internationalising the War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances' in Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy, vol.18, no.3, p.388.
98 It must be noted here that, although the Convention does not expressly include any preventative
money laundering counter-measures, it contains relevant pioneering provisions in its treatment of
the control of precursor chemicals in Article 12, in particular paragraphs (9)-(12). Article 12(9)(a)
calls for instance for the establishment and maintenance by the Parties to the Convention of a system
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Central to the building of this framework is Article 3, which provides for the
establishment of a series of offences. While Article 3(2) establishes a series of
personal consumption offences, Article 3(1 )(a) imposes a strict obligation on the
participating states to criminalise a wide range of activities, from drug production,
possession and cultivation (i-iv) to the organisation, management and financing of
such activities (v). Furthermore, Article 3(1 )(b) requires state parties to criminalise:
- the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from
any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph a. of this
paragraph, or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, for the
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting
any person who is involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to
evade the legal consequences of his actions; and
- the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with
subparagraph a of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence
or offences.
In this manner the Convention introduces, though not by the use of the
actual term, the offence of drug-related money laundering. The provision is
enriched by the criminalisation, subject to the constitutional principles and the
basic concepts of their legal systems, of the acquisition, possession or use of
property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from a
drug trafficking offence within the scope of Article 3(1 )(a) and participation in,
association or conspiracy to commit, attempts, and aiding, abetting facilitating, and
concealing the commission of drug trafficking offences including money
laundering (Article 3(c) (iv)). The third paragraph of Article 3 determines the
to monitor international trade of these substances 'in order to facilitate the identification of
suspicious transactions'.
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burden of proof in relation to such offences, providing that knowledge, intent or
purpose 'may be inferred from objective factual circumstances'.
The significance of Article 3 for international co-operation in money laundering
matters has been hailed. It has been noted that 'by requiring its criminalisation and
treating it as a serious offence the drafters [of the Convention] have ensured that
co-operation in respect of confiscation, mutual legal assistance and extradition will
be forthcoming'.99
One of the central elements of the Convention is also the obligation
imposed on participating countries to enable the confiscation of the proceeds
derived from, and the substances, materials, equipment and other instruments used
in drug trafficking (Article 5 (1)). The third paragraph of Article 5 obliges the
parties to the convention to empower their courts or other competent authorities to
order that bank, financial or commercial records be made available or seized. In the
same paragraph it is specifically provided that parties shall not decline to act 'on
the ground of bank secrecy'. Apart from the confiscation dimension that the
erosion of bank secrecy as an indispensable step against money laundering is also
reflected in the Convention in matters of mutual legal assistance in investigations,
prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to drug trafficking offences
(Article 7). Paragraph five of the Article explicitly provides that 'a Party [to the
Convention] shall not decline to render mutual legal assistance... on the ground of
bank secrecy'.
II. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
The first attempt by the Council of Europe to counter the money laundering
phenomenon, has been formulated as early as in the beginning of the 1980s.
Considering inter alia that 'the transfer of funds of criminal origin from one
99 W.C.Gilmore (1992), 'International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering' in Commonwealth
Law Bulletin, July, p. 1132.
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country to another and the process by which they are laundered through insertion in
the economic system give rise to serious problems, encourage the perpetration of
further criminal acts and this course the phenomenon to spread nationally and
internationally', the Council adopted in 1980 Recommendation No R(80)10 on
Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin.100
The Recommendation calls on the Member States inter alia: to establish close
national and international co-operation between banks and the appropriate
authorities in exchanging information about the circulation of banknotes which
have been used in connection with criminal offences and in following the
movement thereof (point b); and to arrange that their banking system conducts
identity checks on customers whenever an account or a securities deposit is
opened, safe deposits are rented, cash transactions involving sums of a certain
magnitude are effected and inter-bank transfers involving sums of a certain
magnitude are made in both cases bearing in mind the possibility of transactions in
several parts (point a i). As will be seen further below, the Recommendation fully
embraces the philosophy of prevention so central to the programme of counter
measures subsequently adopted by the Financial Action Task Force.101
However, the recommended measures were not generally implemented
then, leading one commentator to characterise the Council of Europe as 'probably
1 07
ahead of its time'. The right time for a comprehensive action against money
laundering under the auspices of the Council of Europe came in the second half of
the 1980's. In line with the United Nations concerns at the time, the European
Ministers of Justice, at their 15th Conference in Oslo, from 17 to 19 June 1986,
discussed 'the penal aspects of drug abuse by smashing the drugs market, which
was often linked with organized crime and even terrorism, e.g. by freezing and
100 Text reproduced in Gilmore (ed.), op. cit.
101
Gilmore, 1999, p. 123.
102 H.G.Nilsson (1991), 'The Council of Europe Laundering Convention: A Recent Example of a
Developing International Criminal Law in Criminal Law Forum, vol.2, no.3, p.423 (419-441).
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confiscating the proceeds from drug trafficking'. ~ The discussion resulted in the
adoption of Resolution No.l, where it was recommended that the European
Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) should examine 'the formulation, in the
light inter alia of the work of the United Nations, of international norms and
standards to guarantee effective international co-operation between judicial (and
where necessary police) authorities as regards the detection, freezing and forfeiture
of the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking'.104
This initiative, along with the work of the Pompidou Group, led to the proposal
by the CDPC in June 1987 to establish a Select Committee of Experts on
international co-operation as regards search, seizure and confiscation of the
proceeds from crime (PC-R-SC), which was authorised by the Committee of
Ministers in September of the same year.105 The terms of reference of the Select
Committee were 'to examine the applicability of the European Penal law
Conventions to search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds from crime - and
consider this question, in the light of the on-going work of the Pompidou Group
and the United Nations, in particular as regards the financial assets of drug
traffickers'.106 The Committee should prepare, if deemed necessary, 'an
appropriate European legal instrument in this field'.107
This led to the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering Search,
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime which aims to provide a
complete set of rules applicable to all stages in proceedings, starting with the initial
inquires into a laundering offence and continuing until the enforcement of a
confiscation decision given abroad.108 The Convention , which entered into force in
103 Council of Europe (1995), Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the





108 P.Csonka (1998), 'Organised Crime: An Overview of the Relevant Council of Europe Activities'
in P.J.Cullen and W.C.Gilmore (eds.), Crime Sans Frontieres: International and European Legal
Approaches, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, p.96.
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1993, has been aimed at a wide range of states including non-European ones,
something that explains the non use of the word European in its title.109
Furthermore, one of its basic aims was to maintain the standards introduced by the
UN 1988 Convention. As has been pointed out in the official Explanatory Report:
the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention were constantly taken into
consideration: on the one hand, the experts tried as far as possible to use the terminology
and the systematic approach of that convention unless changes were felt necessary for
improving different solutions; on the other hand, the experts also explored the possibilities
of introducing in the Council of Europe instrument stricter obligations than those of the
United Nations Convention on the understanding that the new Convention - in spit of the
fact that it is open to other states than the Member States of the Council of Europe will
operate in the context of a smaller community of like-minded states'.110
The rationale of the Convention has also been similar with the one of the United
Nations. Notwithstanding its departure from strictly drug related offences to
embrace criminal activity in general, the Preamble links, in a similar manner with
the Vienna Convention, serious crime and money laundering, both perceived as
broad and multi-faceted threats. The Parties to the Convention declare their
conviction of 'the need to pursue a common criminal policy aimed at the protection
of society'.111 This protection is to be achieved through the fight against serious
crime, by the use of 'modern and effective methods on an international scale';112
one of these methods, the Preamble continues, 'consists in depriving criminals of
113the proceeds of crime'.
To this end, Article 6 of the Convention, designating the laundering offence, is
based on the terminology utilised in Article 3 of the 1988 Convention. However,
the provision extends beyond the UN Convention: not only by differences in
wording such as 'laundering' in the title of the Article and the non-inclusion of the
109
Nilsson, op. cit., p.423.




element of participation,114 but most significantly by imposing an obligation, albeit
qualified (see Article 6(4)), on participating states to criminalise money laundering
on an 'all crimes' basis. This choice, decoupling money laundering from the strict
ambit of drug trafficking, has been adopted by an increasing number of states and
international bodies., such as the Financial Action Task Force. The widening of the
money laundering offence is accompanied by an extension of the definition of
proceeds including 'any economic advantage from criminal offences' (article la),
and by an extension of criminalisation of certain acts, including negligent
laundering which under Article 6(3) is permitted but not required.
Flowever, this not the only innovation of the Council of Europe
Convention. A substantial step forward has been made with regard to jurisdiction
issues in cases where the predicted offence was committed extraterritorially. In this
respect, the second paragraph of Article 6 provides inter alia that 'it shall not
matter whether the predicate offence was subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the
Party' (6(2)(a)). This is an important step for international co-operation 'given the
transnational nature of sophisticated money laundering operations'.115
A further illustration of the willingness to extend the scope of the Council
of Europe Convention appears in the formulation of measures related to domestic
confiscation. Article 2(1) provides that 'each Party shall adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to enable it to confiscate instrumentalities and
proceeds or property value of which corresponds to such proceeds'. The provision,
which was drafted in acknowledgement of the lack of sufficient legislation in




Explanatory Report, point 3.
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Gilmore, 1999, p. 127.
116
Explanatory Report, point 25, cited in W.C. Gilmore (1997), 'International and Regional
Initiatives' in Rider, op. cit., p.l 1.
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The second paragraph of Article 2 sets a limit on this extension, by
allowing the possibility of reservations by the participating states. The latter may,
through the form of a declaration, limit the scope of Article 24 only to a series of
specified offences or categories of offences. In acknowledgement of the uneasy
symbiosis of such flexibility with the expansive aim of the Convention, the
Committee of experts agreed that 'such states should review their legislation
periodically and expand the applicability of confiscation measures, in order to be
able to restrict the reservations subsequently as much as possible. [The Committee]
also agreed that such measures should at least be made applicable to serious
criminality and to offences that generate huge profits'.1 7 Moreover, the mere fact
that a party may enter a reservation as regards a specific offence is not synonymous
with a refusal of a request within the framework of international co-operation in
confiscation matters. Article 18 of the Convention states only optional grounds for
refusal.
6. THE 'SECURITISATION' OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA: PREVENTION
I. THE BASLE COMMITTEE
The evolution of an international framework of money laundering control has been
accompanied by the emergence of policies of prevention. Those policies focus
primarily on the role of the financial system in the fight against money laundering.
This rationale is reflected in the formulation of the first comprehensive preventive
effort at international level, set forth by the Basle Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices.118 Acknowledging the role that banks can
play in money laundering, the Committee issued in 1988 what they deemed as 'a
general statement of ethical principles which encourages banks' management to put
117
Explanatory Report, point 27.
118 On a general overview of the history, nature and work of the Basle Committee, see L.L. Lee
(1998), 'The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision' in
Virginia Journal of International Law, vol.39, no.l, pp.1-40.
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in place effective procedures to ensure that all persons conducting business with
their institutions are properly identified; that transactions that do not appear
legitimate are discouraged; and that co-operation with law enforcement agencies is
achieved'."9 The main points of the Statement, which is not legally binding, are:
Customer identification; banks are called to determine the 'true identity' of all
customers, with emphasis placed on ownership identification and accounts using
safe-custody facilities. Banks are inter alia called to adopt an 'explicit policy that
significant business transactions will not be conducted with customers who fail to
120
provide evidence of their identity'.
-. Compliance with laws', banks are called upon to ensure that 'business is
conducted in conformity with high ethical standards and that laws and regulations
pertaining to financial transactions are adhered to': While acknowledging the
difficulty of the task, it is stated that they 'should not set out to offer services or
provide active assistance in transactions which they have good reason to suppose
121
are associated with money laundering activities'.
-. Co-operation with law enforcement authorities - within the limits of customer
confidentiality, banks are called in a negative manner to avoid providing support or
assistance to customers 'seeking to deceive law enforcement agencies through the
provision of altered, incomplete or misleading information'; banks are at the same
time to assist in a positive manner to take measures such as denying assistance,
severing relations with the customer and closing or freezing of accounts should
they be led to a 'reasonable presumption' that the money in question stems from a
criminal activity or that the transactions are criminal in purpose.122
E. THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE
119
Preamble, recital 6. Text reproduced in Gilmore (ed.), op. cit.
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The preventive role of the financial system has since been substantially enhanced
through the initiatives of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental and multidisciplinary group convened by the 1989 Paris Summit
Meeting of the Group of Seven (G7) with the mandate 'to assess the results of co¬
operation already undertaken in order to prevent the utilisation of the banking
system and financial institutions for the purpose of money laundering, and to
1 9^
consider additional preventive efforts in this field'. ~ With its membership having
expanded to include 26 OECD jurisdictions (including all 15 EU Member States),
the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council, FATF is 'the only
international body which specialise in and concentrates solely upon the fight
against money laundering'.124
One of the major contributions of the FATF in the fight against money
laundering has been the formulation in the 1990 Report of the so-called 40
19S
Recommendations. According to Noble,
'the Recommendations are designed to provide a blueprint for action against money
laundering covering: The criminal justice system and law enforcement; the financial system
and its regulation; and international co-operation. We recognise that there can be
significant differences between the legal systems, financial systems and, indeed, the money
laundering situations of different countries. So the Recommendations allow considerable
flexibility in how they are applied and concentrate on laying down the general principles
for combating money laundering rather than proscribing in great detail what should be
done. This means that they can have a global application.'126
123 G7 Economic Declaration of 16 July 1989, point 53, reproduced in Gilmore, 1992, p.3.
124 T. Sherman (1993), 'International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Role of the
Financial Action Task Force' in MacQueen, op. cit., p.20. The FATF has recently decided to
expand its membership, on the basis of a series of political, strategic and legal criteria, 'to a limited
number of strategically important countries which could play a major role in their regions in the
process of combating money laundering': FATF , Annual Report 1998-1999, paragraph 149.
125 Text reproduced in Gilmore (ed.), op. cit.
126 R. Noble, 'The Financial Action Task Force Recommendations and Their Implementation',
unpublished paper presented in the International Conference on Preventing and Controlling Money
Laundering and The Use of The Proceeds of Crime: A Global Approach, Courmayeur, Mont Blanc,
Italy, 17-21 June 1994, point 5.
78
The first part of the Recommendations, setting out their general framework,
justifies their adoption on the grounds of 'the need for rapid and tough actions' and
'the need for practical measures'.127 In this context, the Recommendations refer to
'the growing dimension and increasing awareness of the problem of money
laundering' which would justify a reinforcement of the Vienna Convention
provisions in the field; furthermore, to avoid the risk of discrepancies between
national measures, a call is made to build upon and enhance the Basle Statement of
Principles and to proceed towards harmonisation of practical aspects not covered
by it.128
The second part of the Recommendations is thus devoted to the 'improvement of
national legal systems to combat money laundering'.129 A definition of the criminal
offence of money laundering is attempted, with Recommendation 5 calling for an
extension of the scope of the offence to 'any other crimes for which there is a link
to narcotics', or, alternatively, to criminalise money laundering based on 'all
serious offenses, and/or on all serious offenses that generate a significnat amount
of proceeds, or on certain serious offenses'. Recommendation 7 goes further to
suggest the attribution of corporate criminal liability in money laundering cases.
Complementing this framework, Recommendation 8, largely based on the Vienna
Convention, covers provisional measures and confiscation.
The third part, constituting the cornerstone of the FATF initiative, aims at the
'enhancement of the role of the financial system',130 their scope extending to bank
and non-bank financial institutions.131 The institutions concerned are called upon
to comply with a series of duties related to:
-. Customer identification and record keeping rules - financial institutions are







and identify their customers on the basis of reliable documentation; to obtain
information regarding beneficial ownership of accounts; and to maintain, for at
132least five years, transaction records.
Increased diligence - financial institutions are called inter alia to pay special
attention to complex or unusual transactions, whose background and purpose must
be examined; furthermore, they are permitted or required to promptly report to the
competent authorities of their money laundering suspicions, and calls are made for
legal provisions to protect financial institutions and their employees from criminal
or civil liability for breach of any disclosure of information if they report in good
faith, even if they have not known precisely what the underlying criminal activity
was, and regardless of whether it actually occured; financial institutions are called
on not to warn their customers about these reports, to comply with instructions
from the competent authorities, and to develop programmes against money
133
laundering.
Further Recommendations in this part deal with: measures to cope with
countries with no or insufficient anti-money laundering measures, calling on
financial institutions inter alia to give special attention to transactions stemming
from these countries, and apply equivalent principles to their branches and majority
owned subsidiaries located abroad; 134other measures to avoid currency
laundering;135 and implementation and role of regulatory and other administrative
authorities.136 The Recommendations are complemented with part four, aiming at
137
strengthening international cooperation.
The pivotal contribution of the Recommendations lies in the extension and
systematisation of the ethical principles put forward by the Basle Committee. The







to co-operate with the competent authorities against the problem of money
laundering, complements the extensive international initiatives in the field, calling
138for wide emergency measures to counter it.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Within less than a decade, a global legislative and regulatory framework has been
initiated in order to fight a phenomenon previously in the shadow and now in the
limelight: money laundering. A multitude of international 'hard' and 'soft' laws,
have established a series of measures stemming from the insertion of the money
laundering phenomenon in a security logic: normative production, especially
criminalisation through the creation of a new criminal offence, responsibilisation,
through the call to private parties to help the authorities counter the perceived
threat, and new instances of policing, as the outcome of such cooperation. In this
manner, important steps have been taken towards the construction of a 'global
139
prohibition regime' regarding money laundering.
137 Recommendations 30-40.
138 It is important to note here that the FATF has since assumed an active role in the implementation
of the Recommendations. The latter have been reviewed in a major 'stocktaking' review in 1996.
William Gilmore summarises the amendments as follows: extension of the money laundering
predicate offences from drug offences to serious offences determined as such by each country
(Recommendation 4); application of appropriate measures to the conduct of financial activities by
non-financial businesses or professions (Recommendation 9); application of appropriate measures
to non-bank financial institutions even those which are not subject to a formal prudential
supervisory regime in all countries (Recommendation 8); mandatory reporting of suspicious
transactions (Recommendation 15); consideration of further measures in respect to shell
corporations, acknowledging their abuse potential (Recommendation 25); expansion of the
recommendations dealing with customer identification (in particular Recommendations 10 and 13);
in the same context, proactive consideration of new technology developments, acknowledging
money laundering threats inherent in new or developing technologies that might favour anonimity
(Recommendation 13); strengthening of measures in respect of bureaux de change
(Recommendation 8); introduction of measures relating to cross-border currency movements
(Recommendation 22); and utilisation of controlled delivery operations in a money laundering
context (Recommendation 36).Gilmore, 1997, p.7. On the necessity and impact of these
amendments, see chapter 3.
139 On the term, see E.A.Nadelmann (1990), 'Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms
in International Society' in International Organization, vol. 44, no.4, pp.479-526. Nadelmann
validly predicted then the transfer ofmoney laundering into the fourth, and strongest, stage of global
prohibition regimes, i.e. when 'the activity becomes the subject of criminal laws and police action
81
The consensus towards the adoption of these new and highly invasive
measures140 is inextricably linked with the securitisation of the money laundering
phenomenon. As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the fight against
money laundering has been constantly justified by policy-making discourses on its
association with the universal threat of drug abuse, trafficking and subsequently
organised crime. What is still not clear, however, apart from evaluations
concerning the perception of transnational criminality as a security threat, is
whether money laundering per se is equated to such threat, or whether it merely
constitutes a means to an end, or, in other words, the counter-measures are needed
not to counter the threat of money laundering, but that of transnational crime. This
is not a purely theoretical issue, as it has significant consequences both for the
evaluation of the money laundering offence - for instance, what is protected by it? -
and the balancing of invasive measures to the individual sphere, established
through reporting financial information to the authorities, with constitutional
principles, human rights and civil liberties.
The two-fold justification of the strategy to combat money laundering, far from
enlightening, further complicates the discussion. This is vividly reflected in the
case of the European Community, which, through its Member States and as an
organisation, took an active part in the building of such initiatives. In the further
call for specific EC money laundering counter- measures, the peculiar and uneven
coexistence of protection from crime with the protection of the financial system,
throughout much of the world, and international institutions and conventions emerge to play a
coordinating role'-p.485. Apart from the aforementioned initiatives, a number of international and
regional bodies have included in their mandate, or were created for the purpose, to put forward anti-
money laundering measures. On an overview see V. Mitsilegas (1999),'International and Regional
Initiatives' in B. Rider and Ch.Nakajima (eds.), And Money Laundering Guide, CCH editions Ltd.,
Bicester.
140 It is important to note here that, in November 1999, 153 states were parties to the Vienna
Convention, including all EU member states. The Council of Europe Convention on the other hand
has been ratified by and entered into force in 27 countries, including 14 EU member states. The
remaining one, which is Luxembourg, belongs to the group of 9 states which have signed but not yet
ratified the Convention. Sources: United Nations Drug Control Programme, Monthly Status of
Treaty Adherence, 3.11.1999, downloaded from http://imolin.org; andCouncil of Europe, European
Treaties, Signatures and Ratifications, 14.12.1999, downloaded from http://www.coe.fr
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was transformed into an uneasy relationship, touching upon matters of competence,
legitimacy and national sovereignty. It is essential to examine such issues in detail,
prior to casting light on the context of the EC anti-money laundering initiative.
83
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Money laundering counter-measures in the European Union:
history, content and evolution
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1. THE HISTORY OF THE EC MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE
I. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND DRUGS
The concern of the European Community regarding the expansion of drug abuse
and trafficking can already be discerned in a group of five Resolutions which were
adopted by the European Parliament in September 1985.1 In one of them, the
Resolution 'on action to combat drug abuse', the Parliament appeared to be 'deeply
concerned at the growth in the problem of drug abuse'. Moreover, the conviction
was expressed that 'there must be a high degree of international cooperation,
particularly at the European level, to tackle this scourge', as was the belief that 'the
Community as such has a particular role to play in ... co-ordination of police and
customs action to prevent illicit imports of drugs into the Community and to make
more effective the detection and prosecution of traffickers'."
This Resolution was complemented by the Resolution 'on measures to combat
drugs - taking'.4 The Parliament considered therein that 'it is within the European
Community's sphere of responsibility to take appropriate measures to combat the
illegal importation, trafficking and abuse of drugs in the Member States' and called
1 Resolutions 'on action to combat drug abuse'; 'on combating drug abuse'; 'on measures to combat
drugs-taking'; 'on measures to combat the spread of drug abuse'; and 'on measures to combat the
spread of drugs'. OJ C262, 14.10.1985, pp.119-123.
2 DOC. B2 801/85, OJ C262, 1985, p.l 19. Point A.
3 Ibid., points C and D.
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on the Council and the Member States to ensure that these efforts are focused on
'increasing measures to detect drug trafficking networks at Community frontiers',
and on the 'dismantling of these measures by stepping up measures against
traffickers'.5
However, it is in the Resolution 'on measures to combat the spread of drug
abuse'6 that the securitisation of drug trafficking and organised crime is the most
evident in the Parliament's discourse. The Parliament, acknowledging that 'drug
trafficking encourages the most dangerous forms of organized international crime',
confirmed 'the urgent need to harmonize legislation on narcotics, at Community
level and for co-ordinated Community action to combat drugs in the following
sectors in particular ... co-ordination of police measures for the prompt
identification of drug traffickers and stricter controls at the Community's external
frontiers' and 'much higher penalties for drug traffickers involving the confiscation
of all property connected with illegal trafficking'.7
The political pressure by the Parliament on the Community to step up action
against drug trafficking, through the securitisation of both drugs and organised
crime, gained further momentum in the 1986 Resolution 'on the drug problem'.8
In an unprecedented use of emotive discourse, the Parliament appeared 'alarmed at
the worrying increase of the drug problem' and 'appalled by the Member States'
reluctance to acknowledge the extent of the problem'.9 Furthermore, it identified
the threat noting that 'the illegal drug trafficking is carried on by criminal
organizations with immense resources and capital at their disposal', centering it on
the fact that the activities of these organisations 'extend far beyond drug
4 DOC. B2 803/85, OJ C262, 1985, p.121.
5 Ibid, points 1 and 3.
6 DOC. B2 806/85, OJ C262, 1985, p. 122.
7 Ibid, points 1 and 3
8 Amendment replacing documents B2 875, 884 and 887/86, in OJ C283, 1986, p.79.
9
Ibid, points E and C.
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trafficking, even influencing the political and economic system in many
countries'.10
The concerns of the European Parliament were reflected in the conclusions of the
European Council held in the Elague, on the 26 and 27 June 1986. The European
Council expressed itself 'gravely concerned about the serious problem of drug
abuse', and called for 'ad hoc collaboration between the Member States and the
European Commission to examine what initiatives could be taken in this area
without there being any duplication with the work carried out elsewhere'.11 In this
context, it was assessed that the contribution of the Community to the United
Nations 1987 Conference should also be examined.
This mobilisation led to the Commission's Recommendation for a Council
12Decision on Community participation in the United Nations conference. In its
Explanatory memorandum, the Commission noted that 'there has been an alarming
intensification and acceleration of illicit drug production, traffic and consumption
since the start of the 80s'.13 The extended analysis of this contention included a
reference to drugs not only as a social problem in the developed countries, but also
as 'a serious threat to society and the State in Third World countries'.14 Focusing
on the clandestine economy created in these countries by drug production, demand
and marketing, the Commission noted that such economy 'could imperil the
structures and very survival of the states in question to the advantage of other
interest groups, which have been multiplying their gains not only in the developed
consumer countries but also, albeit to a much lesser extent (10%), in the most
speculative sectors of the domestic economies of the producer countries, thanks to
the 'laundering' of illicit trafficking revenue, with numerous financial institutions -
10
Ibid, points F and G.
" Conclusions of the European Council, reproduced as annex IV in: Commission of the European
Communities, Recommendation for a Council Decision on Community participation in the
preparatory work and the International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking
(submitted to the Council by the Commission), COM (86)457 final, 5.8.1986.
12 Ibid.
13 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p. 1.
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having the most respectable credentials - collaborating, and sharing in the
profits'.15 This was the first time that an EC policy document had expressed
reference to money laundering, and one cannot but emphasise the securitisation of
the phenomenon and the powerful imagery of blurred boundaries, with apparently
'respectable' financial institutions held accountable for the demise of the
developing world through drug money laundering.
The Commission referred further to the United Nations Conference on Drug
Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, stating that its framework of measures involves the
Community in the following three main ways: ' stepping up of intra-Community
and intra-European cooperation, in accordance with the responsibility vested in the
Community in this matter; cooperation at bilateral and regional levels with
developing countries which produce drugs; participation in conventional
international instruments, with a view in particular to drawing up the new
International Convention'.16 On this basis, the Commission recommended the
17
Community's participation in the 1988 United Nations conference. This led to the
participation of the Community as an organisation in the Conference, and the
18
negotiation and conclusion on its behalf of the Vienna Convention. However, the
Community's involvement was not exhausted there, but was enhanced through the
adoption of a specific EC legislative measure aimed at preventing money
laundering.
n. THE EC MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE: RHETORIC AND
JUSTIFICATIONS
14 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p.3.
1 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., pp.3-4.
16 Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p.6.
17 See sole article of Recommendation, Commission of the European Communities, op. cit., p. 15.
18 Council Decision of 22 October 1990 concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the European
Economic Community, of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, OJ L 326, 24.11.1990, p.56. The Decision was accompanied by an
annexed Declaration, according to which EC competence regarding the approval of the Convention
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In the same year as the approval of the Vienna Convention on the behalf of the
Community, the Commission issued a Proposal for a 'Council Directive on
Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money
Laundering'.19 In its Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal, the Commission,
in line with previous international initiatives, depicted money laundering as 'an
activity becoming more and more widespread every day', having 'an evident
influence on the rise of organised crime in general and drug trafficking in
particular'.20
In view of the multitude, diversity and extended scope of previous or
simultaneous international initiatives to combat money laundering, the necessity of
an additional anti-laundering initiative at the European Community level,
especially taking into consideration the Community's conclusion of the Vienna
Convention and its members' participation in the Council of Europe Convention
and in the FATF, appears at first sight questionable. In assessing the necessity for
the measure, the Explanatory Memorandum - largely reflected in the Preamble of
the proposed directive- follows largely the familiar two-fold threat rationale: on the
one hand, money laundering is viewed as a threat to the financial system since, 'as
credit and financial institutions are frequently used to carry out these kinds of
activities, the soundness and stability of the particular institutions involved as well
as the prestige of the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised,
21
thereby losing the confidence of the public'; on the other hand, express reference
is made to 'the public demand throughout the Community for measures which can
99
help to reduce the scourge of drugs', picturing drugs as a threat to broadly
defined interests such as health, life or the social fabric. The Preamble of the
extends only to issues of commercial policy related to substances used in illicit drug manufacturing
and dealt with in Article 12.
I9OJC 106, 28.4.1990, p.6.
20
Explanatory Memorandum, in House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities,
Money Laundering, HL Paper 6, 1990-91, reproduced in W.C.Gilmore (ed.) (1992), International
Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Grotius publications Ltd., Cambridge.
21
Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit., 11,2.
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Directive Proposal emphasises furthermore the awareness that combating money
laundering is one of the most effective means of opposing organised crime and
drug trafficking, which constitute 'a particular threat to Member States'
societies'.23
However, the justifications for the adoption of EC anti-laundering legislation are
not exhausted here. An important factor necessitating such action is linked with the
construction of the Single Market. The Community is deemed responsible for
protecting the market from both its infiltration with criminal money - with
launderers taking advantage of the single market and the freedoms of capital
movements and supplying financial services that the area involves- and the
distortions of competition caused by uneven national anti-laundering measures.24
This rationale was explained at the time in detail by a Commission official as
follows:
'The coming into effect of the Single Banking Licence through the European Community
meant that supervisory authorities would have no scope for refusing authority to a bank
established in another Member State to set [up] a branch or to provide banking services. If
this system of home country licensing were to work effectively and maintain public
confidence it was essential that there should be legal certainty that Member States would
adopt the same approach to money laundering. In the absence of Community action against
money laundering Member States could adopt measures inconsistent with the completion
of the Single Market in an effort to protect their financial system from money laundering.
For the purpose of legal certainty it was essential that the Commission should be able to
take infraction proceedings against Member States before the European Court of Justice. A
resolution or code would not be sufficient to achieve this. Although all Member States had
signed the Vienna Convention only two Member States had ratified it. There was no
Community competence to require Member States to ratify: Community competence was
limited to the areas of precursor chemicals. The central objective of the commission's
proposal was therefore one of financial supervision to prevent the use of the financial
system for the alien purposes of money laundering. It also has an indirect- but also
22




Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit., II, 4. Commission Proposal, Preamble, recital 2.
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important objective: to make the financial system play a preventive- but effective-
contribution to the fight against this phenomenon.'25
The same analysis highlighted two further, political rather than legal,
justifications for Community action in the field: the existence of a practical need
for the Community 'to show the outside world that they were acting in a united
manner in the matter of money laundering', particularly following pressure from
the United States; 26and the need to complement the existing anti-money
laundering measures, as the need was acknowledged to go beyond the scope of the
Vienna Convention, covering not only criminalisation, but also prevention, and to
give legally binding force to the content of the 'soft law' FATF
Recommendations.27 In this manner, the EC Directive constituted an ambitious
legislative effort to embrace both the aspects of prevention and control.
III. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE LEGAL BASIS
The rationale and the objective of the Directive has been to cover aspects of both
prevention and control. However, in its justificatory realm, the Commission's
discourse has been marked by an emphasis on the functioning of the Single Market,
viewed as criminogenic, enabling criminals to freely move in its area, and at the
same time vulnerable to this very movement. In this manner, the justifications
25 Note of Informal Discussion in Brussels with Mr. Geoffrey Fitchew, Director General, D-G XV
(Financial Institutions and Company Law) as Agreed by the Commission for Publication, in House
of Lords, op. cit., p.28.
26 House of Lords, op. cit., p.29. In this context, the following have been stated in detail: 'Of
particular significance in this context was the United States legislation known as the Kerry
amendment which required United States branches of foreign banks to report to United States
authorities all transactions over $10,000. Banks having no subsidiary or branch in the United States
but dealing in dollars were required to maintain records of such transactions and to make them
available to US inspectors. Failure to comply would render foreign banks liable to sanctions which
would operate if they sought to do business within US territorial jurisdiction. The Us authorities
were pressing other States to comply with this legislation and introduce similar requirements
themselves. European Community States did not accept that the United States were entitled to
impose these requirements extraterritorially and regarded this kind of reporting requirement as
costly and ineffective. In order to continue effective dialogue with the US authorities it was




related to an anti-money laundering legislation as a means of attacking crime, were
largely overshadowed by justifications related to the protection not only of the
financial system, but also of the Single Market, meriting per se specific protection.
These considerations have been largely reflected in the assertion by Cullen that the
Directive 'can be seen as part of the Community's contribution to efforts to prevent
the spread of drug trafficking and organized crime in general, though it is not
overtly a security measure but one designed to protect the integrity of the
Community's financial market'.28
This balance in the rationale has been reflected in the choice of the legal basis of
the proposed directive. This was based on the third sentence of Article 57(2) of the
EEC Treaty, set within the framework of the right to establishment, stating that the
Council, in adopting measures in this respect, 'shall act by a qualified majority, in
cooperation with the European Parliament'. This choice remained in principle
unscathed in the European Parliament's first reading of the Proposal, which
however added to the legal basis reference to the first sentence of Article 57(2)
(now 47(2)).29 This sentence specifies that in order to make it easier for individuals
to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons, the Council shall 'issue
directives for the coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States concerning the taking up and pursuit of
activities as self-employed persons'. This amendment was adopted by the
Commission's amended Proposal, 'in line with other directives in the financial
services field'.30
28 P.J. Cullen (1993), 'The European Community Directive' in H.L.MacQueen (ed.), Money
Laundering, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, p.35. Emphasis added.
29
European Parliament, Legislative Resolution (Cooperation procedure: first reading) embodying
the opinion of the European parliament on the proposal from the Commission to the Council for a
directive on prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, DOC.
A3-273/90, p.4.. See also OJ C324, 24.12.1990, p.257.
30 Commission of the European Communities, Amendment to the proposal for a Council Directive
on Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose ofMoney Laundering, COM (90)593
final - SYN 254, Brussels, 30 November 1990 ,p.2. See also OJ C319, 19.12.1990, p.9.
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The proposed legal basis caused the reactions of the Community institutions in
the readings of the Directive. Most of these reactions emanated from the
controversy surrounding the actual scope and objective of the measure. The
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy stated in its
Opinion that the proposal, apart from the operating conditions of financial
institutions, 'also seeks to approximate the laws of the member States in the sphere
of criminal law and procedure'.31 It is interesting here that the Committee assessed
the 'criminal' nature of the Directive not only on the basis of the provision it
contained on the criminalisation of money laundering, but also on the provisions
placing credit and financial institutions under the duty to co-operate with law
enforcement authorities." For that reason, the Committee contended that 'the legal
basis should therefore also refer to Article 100a which deals with the adoption by
the Council of measures for the approximation of the laws of the Member States
having as their object the establishment and the operation of the single market and,
as it was noted by the Committee, in particular, the free movement of capital.33
The issues surrounding the choice of Article 57 as the legal basis for the directive
have been put forward in detail by the Economic and Social Committee, whose
Opinion on the draft directive referred explicitly to 'an uncertain legal basis'.34 The
Committee was of the view that 'in reality one of the proposal's aims is to
approximate the laws of the Member States in the field of criminal law and penal
o c
procedure'." Following the Opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs, the Economic and Social Committee included in the criminal scope of the
directive not only the provision rendering money laundering a criminal offence, but
also the reporting obligation imposed on credit and financial institutions, 'which
comes under penal procedure'.36 In view of this assertion, the Committee argued
31
Opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy for the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Rapporteur: De Donnea, DOC. A3/273/90, p.20.
32 Ibid.
33 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, op. cit., p.21.
34 OJ C332, 31.12.1990, p.86, at p.87.
35 Ibid.
36 OJ C332, 31.12.1990, p.88.
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that Article 57 would not be an adequate legal basis for the directive, and proposed
as alternative bases Articles 100 and 100a of the Treaty (now 94 and 95
respectively), dealing with Single Market measures, or the 'catch-all' provision of
Article 235 (now 308), providing that 'if action by the Community should prove
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures'.37 It
is interesting to note that both opinions in this manner indirectly acknowledged the
competence of the Community to adopt measures touching upon the sphere of
criminal law.
Similar issues were raised in the discussion of the draft directive in the House of
Lords. In the Memorandum submitted by a group of experts from Hull University,
it was initially stated that prima facie Article 57 appeared to have 'very little
formal link with a proposal for the establishment of common systems of criminal
controls over money laundering'.38 However, following the Commission's
prominent 'Single Market' rationale, in the end they accepted the adequacy of
57(2) as a legal basis for the Directive; their objection regarding the possibility of
using 57 to 'harmonise' rather than 'co-ordinate' national laws was overcome by
the fact that the Treaty was not consistent in its use of the terms. They added
however, that 'insofar [as] the proposal has as its object or effect the [proper]
functioning of the internal market then it would also seem to come within the ambit
of Article 100A'.39
The reasoning of the memorandum serves to illustrate the ambiguity surrounding
the 'legal basis' debate. The initial unconditional assertion, in line with some of the
37 Ibid. On the development of Community law through the use of 235, see J.A.Usher (1998), EC
Institutions and Legislation, Longman, London and New York, pp.82 et seq.
38 Memorandum by Raymond Smith, David Freestone and Patrick Birkinshaw, Law School, Hull
University, in House of Lords, op. cit., p.32 (30-35).
39 Memorandum by Smith et al., op. cit., pp.32-33.
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EC Committees, that the directive extends to covering criminal law matters, is in
less than one page virtually ignored in view of the emphasis placed to the Single
Market rationale of the proposed measure. The real two-fold character of the
directive is thus presented as one-sided, and is combined with a confusion
regarding the means and the end, or the 'object or effect' of the directive.
The above debate led to the adoption by the Council of the Parliament's
amendment, with the addition of Article 100A as a legal basis, thus taking into
account 'the fact that the scope of the Directive extends beyond credit and financial
institutions'.40 Although this formula was deemed satisfactory and was included in
the directive as finally adopted, the addition of 100A to embrace the 'criminal law'
character of the measure is far from unproblematic. This has been particularly
evident with regard to the parallel question which was raised in the preparation of
the directive: that of the attribution to the Community of a criminal law
competence.
IV. THE COMMUNITY AND CRIMINAL LAW IN THE MAKING OF THE
DIRECTIVE
'The criminal law is, in a very real sense, the 'law of the land'. Our conduct is ordered by
its precepts, our transgressions punished. The guilty cannot run from the 'long arm of the
law'. These are questions of criminal jurisdiction at a given place and time. They concern
the substantive content of the criminal law: the types of behaviour that are censured, the
types of punishment and the relationship that is constructed between the two. No matter
how abstract the formulation of the law, it can never be completely disembedded from
social space'.41
40
European Parliament, Recommendation of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights
on the COMMON POSITION established by the Council with a view to the adoption ofa directive
on prevention of use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering (C3-0062/9I -
SYN 254), Rapporteur: G. Hoon, DOC. A3-0082/91, 3 April 1991, Explanatory Statement, p.8.
41 L. Farmer (1997), Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order. Crime and the Genius ofScots Law,
1747 to the Present, Cambridge University Press, p. 16.
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Farmer's theorisation, as reflected in the above quotation, serves to illustrate the
inextricable link of criminal law with prevailing social values in a particular social
space, which the law is designed to protect. This renders criminal law a 'social,
historical phenomenon, developed and applied in a particular and contradictory
social world'.42 At the same time, it highlights the role of the State in protecting
these values through a mechanism of state coercion, maintaining the 'law of the
land'. This creates a prominent link between criminal law and justice and state
sovereignty. Through their reflection, protection and conservation of social values
within and by the state mechanism, criminal law and justice become 'symbols of
state sovereignty, so to speak its very core and centre-piece'.43
The traditional link between criminal law and state sovereignty is, as seen above,
challenged by the emergence of an international criminal law, largely dealing with
'transnational crimes'.44 One of the most serious challenges to 'national' criminal
law came from the draft money laundering directive, whose proposed Article 2
called on member states to 'ensure that money laundering of proceeds from any
serious crime is treated as a criminal offence according to their national
legislation'. 45 In this manner, the Community appeared competent to prescribe
criminal offences, harmonising the criminal laws of the member states, thus going
beyond principles of state sovereignty.
The controversy created by the proposed Article 2 regarding the legitimacy of the
Community to acquire a criminal law competence brought to the fore what has
been deemed the 'rather mysterious relationship' between the European treaty
framework and criminal law.46 The exploration of this mystery has started only
42 A. Norrie (1993), Crime, Reason and History, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, p.33.
43 H. Jung (1993), 'Criminal Justice - a European Perspective' in Criminal Law Review, p.237.
44 See the analysis in chapter 1.
45
Emphasis added.
46 P.-C. Mtiller-Graff (1998), 'The European Treaty Framework and the Criminal Law: EC
Competences in Criminal Law', in P.J.Cullen and W.C.Gilmore (eds.), Crime Sans Frontieres:
International and European Legal Approaches, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, p. 100.
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recently, but is constantly enriched by an increasing number of contributions. 47 A
useful systematisation of the relationship between criminal law and the European
Community is offered by Labayle, who affirms the construction of what he calls a
'community penal space'. The evolution of this space is associated with two
interrelated processes: the 'communitarisation of criminal law', that is of national
criminal law, implying the determination by the Community of a national
competence and not the exercise of a new, EC criminal law competence; in this
process, the state has to take all necessary measures to comply with the Community
imperatives, with possible phenomena being the 'neutralisation' of the internal
criminal norm contrary to a Community norm, or, on the contrary, the effective
criminalisation of Community law violations.49 And the 'criminalisation of
Community law', claiming the recognition of a Community criminal law
competence.50
47 In addition to the aforementioned contributions by Jung and Miiller- Graf, see inter alia : M.
Delmas - Marty (1998), 'The European Union and Penal Law' in European Law Journal, vol.4,
no.l, pp.87-115; M. Anderson et al. (1995), Policing the European Union, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, especially chapter 6; H.G.Sevenster (1992), ' Criminal law and EC Law' in Common
Market Law Review, vol. 29, pp.29-70; J. Dine (1993), 'European Community Criminal Law?' in
Criminal law Review, pp.246-254; E. Baker (1998), 'Taking European Criminal law Seriously' in
Criminal Law Review, pp. 361-380; H. Labayle (1995), 'L'Application du Titre VI du Traite sur
l'Union Europeenne et la Matiere Penale' in Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Penal
Compare, no.l, pp. 35-64; A. de Nauw (1996), 'Le Caractere Necessaire, Opportun ou Superflu de
l'Attribution de Competences Penales a la Communaute Europeenne' inF. Tulkens et H.D. Bosly
(dir.), La Justice Penale et I'Europe, Bruylant, Bruxelles, pp.221-230; G.Vernimmen (1996), 'La
Penalisation du Droit Communautaire et la Communautarisation du Droit Penal' in Tulkens and
Bosly, op. cit., pp.245-254; U. Sieber (1993), 'Union Europeenne et Droit Penal Europeen.
Proposition pour l'Avenir du Droit Penal Europeen' in Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit
Penal Compare, pp.249-264; G. Dannecker (1996), 'Strafrecht in der Europaischen Gemeinschaft.
Eine Herausforderung fur Strafrechtsdogmatik, Kriminologie und Verfassungsrecht' in
Juristenzeitung, 20.9., pp.869-880; K. Tiedemann (1993), 'Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und
Strafrecht' in Neae Juristische Wochenschrift, Heft 1, pp.23-31; and M. Bose (1996), Strafen und
Sanktionen im Europdischen Gemeinschafts Recht, Carl Heymanns Verlag, Koln, Berlin, Bonn,
Miinchen.
48
'Espace penal communautaire'. Labayle distinguishes it from what he calls a 'european penal
space' (espace penal europeen), perceived in its geographical sense. Labayle, op. cit., pp.37-39.
Emphasis added.
49
Labayle, op. cit., p.41. Emphasis added.
50 Ibid. On a similar distinction see Vernimmen, op. cit.
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Utilising a similar perspective, Delmas- Marty offers the distinction between
neutralisation and augmentation of national penal law.51 The augmentation of
national penal law, similar but not identical to Labayle's 'communitarisation', is
further distinguished in two calls: the call to treat Community interests in the same
way as national interests;52 and, with a more direct link to an express EC criminal
law competence, the call to integrate the Community norm into national penal
law.53 The latter is further analysed into integration by reference, 'based on a -
more or less broad - general clause inserted in the penal norm (the law itself or the
implementing texts), and intended to incorporate Community law into national
penal law'; 54 and direct integration, which occurs through an amendment of
national criminal law, 'thus converting the Community norm into domestic law'.55
The direct integration technique, largely associated with the existence of a
Community competence in criminal law,56 was clearly reflected in Article 2,
calling on Member States to treat money laundering as a criminal offence.
These doctrinal distinctions are largely influenced by the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice on the matter. The Court has repeatedly held that 'in
principle, criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for
which the Member States are still responsible'.57 However, this assertion is
complemented by the acknowledgement that Community law sets certain limits to
these powers. 8 A detailed discussion of the Court's case law falls outside the
scope of this analysis. Schematically, however, it can be argued that the limits that
51 Delmas - Marty, op. cit., pp.90 et seq. Emphasis added.
52 Delmas - Marty, op. cit., pp. 102 et seq. According to Delmas - Marty, this integration technique
does not seek to incorporate the Community norm into national penal law, but rather attempts to
extend the latter's sphere of application so as to protect Community as well as national interests'
(p. 102). It is further distinguished into spontaneous similar treatment and imposed assimilation.
53 Delmas - Marty, op. cit., pp.98 et seq.
54 Delmas - Marty, op. cit., p.98. Emphasis added.
55 Ibid.
56 Note here the distinction of Miiller - Graf between competence to define criminal conduct, and
competence to stipulate and impose criminal or administrative sanctions. Miiller - Graf, op. cit.
57 Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings against Guerrino Casati, [1981] ECR 2595, at p.2618, point
27. See also case 186/87, Cowan v. Tresor Public, [1989] ECR 95, pp.221-222, point 19.
58 Ibid.
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the Court has laid down on the Member States, either through judgements or
through the opinions of the Advocate General, concern:
Their duty to adopt legislative provisions which 'may not discriminate against
persons to whom Community law gives the right to equal treatment or restrict the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Community law'.59
Their duty on 'equivalent penalisation' established through the elaboration of the
'assimilation principle'. According to that, Member States 'must ensure in
particular that infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions,
both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any
event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive'.60
-. Their duty to respect the Community's exercise of powers 'to harmonize the
criminal laws of the Member States, if that were necessary to attain one of the
objectives of the Community'.61
It is the last, effet utile argument, that formed the basis for the Commission's
choice of including a criminalisation provision in the draft money laundering
directive. According to its Preamble, 'making money laundering a criminal offence
in the Member States, although it goes beyond the scope of the financial system,
constitutes a necessary condition for any action to combat this phenomenon and in
particular to permit cooperation between financial institutions or banking
supervisors and judicial authorities'.62 The Commission official justified this
choice in the House of Lords by asserting that 'the Community was competent to
impose obligations on Member States to carry out penal action, if it deemed that
59
Cowan, op. cit., referring to Casati, op. cit.
60 Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece, [1989] ECR 1-2965, pp.2984-85.
61
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, in case C-240/90, Commission v. Germany, [1992] ECR I-
5383, p.5408.The Court however judged that a decision on EC competence in the field of penal
sanctions was not necessary. For an overview of the effet utile argument in the context of the
imposition of sanctions by the Community, see M. Zuleeg (1999), 'Enforcement of Community
Law: Administrative and Criminal Sanctions in a European Setting' in J.A.E. Vervaele (ed.),




this was necessary to obtain the full effect of the measures which it adopted'.63 In
the case of the money laundering directive, it was added, 'it was essential that
Member States should adopt criminal sanctions against money laundering both to
provide a sufficient deterrent and also to allow the lifting of professional
confidentiality in money laundering investigations'.64
The granting to the Community here of an express competence to define criminal
behaviour would depend on the objective of the Directive to maintain the proper
functioning of the Single Market. Abetting in this context, is the argument in
favour of an EC criminal law competence on the basis of Article 100a of the
Treaty.65 At a second level, it has been argued that the draft directive was 'only
placing the Court's case law in legislative form', and that 'it did not seek to
prescribe the nature of the criminal offence to be created or the level of the penalty
which should be attached to it'.66
These arguments are not without objections. Regarding the second line of
argumentation, it seems difficult to assert from the general wording of the directive
regarding the nature or penalties of the offence that the Community did not
exercise, through Article 2, an express competence to define criminal conduct.
Moreover, the general reference to the placing of the Court's case law in a
legislative form, is too tenuous a link for legitimising such competence. This is
particularly the case should the effet utile argument be considered as the basis of
Article 2, since it should be remembered that it is clearly expressed in an Advocate
General's Opinion and not in the Court's judgement -where the Court stated that
'there is no ground ... to express a view on the Community's power in the general
penal sphere'.67 Even the authors themselves note that it is more uncertain whether
63 Note of Informal Discussion in Brussels with Mr. Geoffrey Fitchew in House of Lords, op. cit.,
p.29.
64 Ibid.
65 Bose, op. cit., p.68.
66 Anderson etal., op. cit., p. 198.
67 Commission v. Germany, p.1-5431.
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Community law 'may also require harmonization of national criminal laws of the
Member States in order to further the objectives of the European Community'.68
These arguments, viewing the glass as 'half-full', can moreover be opposed by
the general argument that nowhere in the Treaty, and nowhere expressly in the ECJ
case-law, is there a provision or interpretation granting to the Community an
express criminal law competence. This was the basis of vigorous national reactions
to the draft directive's Article 2. To the argument that 'there is nothing in the
Treaty of Rome or its amendments which excludes the criminal law from the ambit
of EC law'69, the answer from the United Kingdom Government was that 'such
matters are outside Community competence, being for individual Member States
to decide'.70 Similar was the reaction of the Bundesrat in Germany, which
suggested that the German Government reject Article 2 unreservedly, since the
11
Community did not enjoy any competence to enact criminal legislation.
Notwithstanding these conceptual, political and legal difficulties, a directive on
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering
was finally adopted in a rather short time frame, in 1991. The problems regarding
the competence and legal basis, and others revealed in the readings of the
Commission's draft, were surpassed through a series of compromises, leaving at
the same time unresolved issues that still remain open. These issues, which reflect
the tension between the political pressure for the adoption of an EC -wide anti-
laundering regime and inertia in political and legal integration in the Community,
will be explored through an analysis of the history, content, implementation and
future of the provisions of the directive.
68 Anderson et al., op. cit., p. 183.
69 Memorandum by Smith et al. in House of Lords, op. cit., p.30.
70
Supplementary Evidence by HM Treasury in House of Lords, op. cit., p. 11.
71 K. Magliveras (1994), 'Money Laundering and the European Communities' in J.J.Norton (ed.),
Banks: Fraud and Crime, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd., London, New York, Hamburg, Hong
Kong, p.179. See also Bundesrat, Drucksache 288/90 (Beschluss), 616th Sitting, 6.7.1990. For a
summary see (1990) Europaische Zeitschriftfur Wirtschaft, vol.1, p.368.
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2. THE EC MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE: THE CONTENT
I. RATIONALE/SECERYTISATION
The money laundering directive as finally adopted72 is accompanied by a lengthy
preamble which provides a detailed policy justification for the measure. In line
with the pre-existing international instruments in the field, the necessity for the
anti-money laundering legislation is justified through a process of securitisation,
perceiving money laundering as an eminent, multi-faceted threat.
Following the spirit of the Basle Declaration,73 the Preamble acknowledges that
'when credit and financial institutions are used to launder proceeds from criminal
activities..., the soundness and stability of the institution concerned and confidence
in the financial system as a whole could be seriously jeopardised, thereby losing
the trust of the public \74 Through the recourse to the emotionally charged concept
of public trust, coupled with the implication of banker's complicity in the money
laundering process,75 the latter is viewed as a threat to both individual institutions
and the financial system in general.
This threat discourse obtains a further dimension in view of the establishment of
the internal market as a key concept of European integration. The Preamble raises
the concern that lack of Community action in the field 'could lead Member States,
for the purpose of protecting their financial systems, to adopt measures which
7f\
could be inconsistent with completion of the Single Market'. In the EC context
money laundering is thus viewed as affecting not only the financial system as a
72 Council Directive of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose ofmoney laundering, OJ L166, 28.6.1991, p.77.
73 See chapter 2.
74 Recital 1. Emphasis added.




whole, but also the very establishment and functioning of the Single Market, thus
being elevated to an existential threat to European integration. Anti-money
laundering measures are justified because of this threat, which is at the same time
77
reinforced by the very characteristics of the Single market per se\ As the
Preamble then states, 'launderers could try to take advantage of the freedom of
capital movement to supply financial services which the integrated financial area
involves, if certain co-ordinating measures are not adopted at Community level'.
The directive is however not solely justified by reference to market
considerations. These are coupled with the acknowledgement of the influence of
money laundering on the rise of drug trafficking and organised crime. It is thus put
forward that combating money laundering 'is one of the most effective means of
opposing this form of criminal activity, which constitutes a particular threat to
78 79
Member States societies'. Echoing again previous international initiatives, the
securitisation discourse expands here dramatically to conceptualise money
laundering as a threat, through its linkage with organised crime, to an object as
80wide and undefinable as the social fabric, or society as a whole.
II. THE STRATEGY
In line with its justification on the basis of both criminal policy and market
considerations, the money laundering directive reflects the combination of both the
o 1
active and defensive strategies employed to counter the phenomenon. On the
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active front, the directive contains a provision prohibiting money laundering.
This follows the acknowledgement in the Preamble that money laundering must be
83combated mainly by penal means. ~ Following its market protection rationale, the
77 Ibid.
78 Recital 3.
79 See chapter 2.
80 On the perception of organised crime as a threat to the social fabric, see chapter 1.
81 On a general overview of the strategies see chapter 2.
82 Article 2. On the controversy over criminalisation see part 1.
83 Recital 4.
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Preamble further states that a penal approach should not be the only way to combat
o4
money laundering, 'since the financial system can play a highly effective role.'
Along with prohibition of money laundering, the directive thus contains a series of
provisions establishing duties that credit and financial institutions must undertake
in the fight against the phenomenon.
The combination of criminalisation and prevention policies in the money
laundering directive reflects the acknowledgment of the close interrelation of the
85
goals of penal deterrence and protection of the integrity of the financial system.
At the same time, it renders the directive a unique piece of legislative drafting in
relation to prior international instruments in the field, as they were focusing
primarily either to the criminal law sphere, like the UN and Council of Europe
Conventions, or in the preventive sphere, like the FATF and Basle Committee
initiatives.86
The directive draws substantially upon all these instruments in constructing an
anti-money laundering framework embracing both prevention and control. The
legal basis of the measure was finally stated to have been articles 57(2) first and
third indent, related to the freedom of establishment, and article 100A, related to
the internal market.87 While these provisions seem to provide an adequate legal
basis for the preventive part of the directive, the picture becomes more blurred in
84 Recital 5.
85 See chapter 2.
86
It must be noted however that the 40 FATF Recommendations also contained provisions on
money laundering criminalisation and confiscation. On an overview of these international initiatives,
see chapter 2. The commitment of the Community in applying the United Nations and Council of
Europe Conventions is reflected in the political statement by the representatives of the member
states governments meeting within the Council. As seen above, this statement serves to counter¬
balance the non-inclusion of a specific money laundering criminalisation clause in the directive, as
the governments undertook to take all necessary steps by 31.12.1992 at the latest to enact criminal
legislation enabling them to comply with their obligations under the Conventions. According to the
recent Commission Report on the implementation of the directive, all member states have signed
and ratified the Vienna Convention and implemented its relevant provisions. The situation is not as
uniform regarding its Strasbourg counterpart, as all member states are signatories, but some of them
had not yet ratified it at the time of the report. See Commission of the European Communities,
Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of
the Money Laundering Directive, COM(1998)401 final, Brussels, 1.7.1998, annex 3.
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relation to the inclusion of a provision with a deterrence/crime control logic in it.
As seen above,88 this mirrors thorny issues of EC competence, which, in the case of
the money laundering directive, have been addressed through a compromise:
namely, prohibiting but not criminalising the phenomenon.
m. THE PROHIBITION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
In view of stern resistance by a number of Member States, the final version of
article 2 states that Member States shall ensure that money laundering as defined in
the directive is prohibited. At the same time, the directive was accompanied by a
political statement by the representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, undertaking to take all necessary steps by 31 December 1992 at the latest to
enact criminal legislation enabling them to comply with their obligations under the
directive, and also the UN and Council of Europe Conventions. By non-legal
means, and notwithstanding the absence of express wording in the directive, money
laundering has been de facto criminalised in all EC member states.89
But how exactly is money laundering defined? According to article 1, third
indent of the directive, it means the following conduct when committed
intentionally:
the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity,
for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to
evade the legal consequences of his action
the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
87 On the controversy see part 1.
88 See part 1.
89 See Commission of the European Communities, First Commission's report on the implementation
of the Money Laundering Directive (91/308/EEC) to be submitted to the European Parliament and
to the Council, COM 95(54) final, p.4.
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property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity
the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of
receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of
participation in such activity
participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding,
abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions
mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs.
The directive thus reirerates in identical wording the money laundering definition
put forward by the Vienna Convention.90 This definition includes not only conduct
that conforms to the concept of money laundering as a process, but also conduct
that is similar to pre-existing receiving offences and participation, association and
attempt in relation to both forms of conduct. As the two last indents were not
included in the Commission's initial proposal,91 it is evident that the finally
adopted text constitutes an attempt to put forward a considerably broadened money
laundering definition.
In line with both the Vienna and Strasbourg Conventions, the directive
characterises money laundering as intentional. According to all three instruments,
the intentional element, along with the elements of knowledge and purpose, which
are central in the definition of money laundering, 'may be inferred from objective
factual circumstances'.92 The directive did not follow the choice of the Strasbourg
Convention to open up the possibility for the prohibition of negligent laundering.
It followed however the latter in extending the territorial scope of money
90 Articles 3(1 )b(i), 3(1 )b(ii), 3(l)c(i), 3(l)c(iv) respectively.
91 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on prevention of
use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering, COM(90)106 final-SYN 254. See
also note 19.
92 Article 1, indent 3 of the directive; article 3(3) of the Vienna Convention; and article 6(2)(c) of
the Strasbourg Convention.
93 Article 6(3)(a) of the Strasbourg Convention provides that each party to it may adopt such
measures as it considers necessary to establish also as offences under its domestic law cases, inter
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laundering to activities which generated the laundered property that were
perpetrated in the territory of another member state or in that of the third country.94
This is a welcome addition to the directive proposal, acknowledging the
transnational character of the money laundering process and essential in order to
ensure the effectiveness of the provision.
Another element which broadens considerably the scope of the money
laundering definition is the interpretation of the notion of property: following again
the Vienna Convention,95 the directive states that property means 'assets of every
kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or
intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interests in
such assets'.96 This all-encompassing definition has the potential, as will be seen
below, to be a source of great legal uncertainty and broaden the scope of money
97
laundering to include an overextended range of transactions.
The last, but vital, element in the definition of money laundering concerns the
delimitation of the offences from which the laundered property emanates. This has
been a matter of controversy in the drafting of the directive. The Commission
included in its initial proposal a reference to property from 'serious crime', further
elaborated as 'a crime specified in Article 3, paragraph 1(a) and (c) of the Vienna
Convention, terrorism and any other serious criminal offence (including in
particular organised crime), whether or not connected with drugs, as defined by the
Member States'. 98 The Commission's approach thus lay somewhere in the middle
of the road between the UN Convention, where money laundering is limited to
proceeds of drug trafficking, and the Council of Europe Convention, with the
potential to include 'any predicate offence'. The Commission tried to limit the
alia, where the offender ought to have assumed that the property was proceeds of crime. See chapter
2. For a detailed analysis on the criminalisation of negligent laundering, see chapter 4.
94 Article 1, indent 3 in fine.
95 Article lq.
96 Article 1, indent 4.
97 For a detailed analysis see chapter 4.
98 Article 1, indent 5.
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predicates in accordance with the seriousness of the offence, while leaving its
scope open to include a broad list of offences.
The recourse to the abstract notion of serious crime was heavily criticised in the
subsequent readings of the directive. The Economic and Social Committee in its
opinion criticised the term as too vague, asserting at the same time that 'it is not the
job of credit institutions to become auxiliaries of the police, the legal authorities or
the administrations responsible for dealing with such things as tax frauds, with all
the risks of error or diversion that this would involve'. In a similar vein, the
European Parliament rejected the Commission's wording and put forward instead
an exhaustive list of predicate offences including, along with drug offences under
articles 3(1 )(a) and 3(1 )(c) of the Vienna Convention, terrorism, organised crime,
illicit arms trading, counterfeiting, traffic in persons, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others, kidnapping and hostage taking, as defined by the member
states.100
These reactions resulted in the amendment of the Commission's proposal. In the
final text the reference to 'serious crime' has been replaced by the more objective
term of 'criminal activity'. According to the fifth indent of article 1, this means 'a
crime specified in Article 3(l)(a) of the Vienna Convention and any other criminal
activity designated as such for the purposes of this Directive by each Member
State'. The directive thus adopted a minimum standard approach, by confining
money laundering at least to the proceeds from drug offences as specified in the
Vienna Convention. Member states are however given the discretion to broaden the
scope of the legislation by adding further predicates to the offence. The limited and
compromising character of this approach has also been strongly criticised101 and
99 OJ C332, 31.12.1990, p.86 at p.88.
100 See note 29.
101 As Levi has pointed out, 'there is a certain irony in what is plainly a political compromise
between Member States, insofar as the Directive will apply mandatorily to the proceeds of drug
trafficking but not to the proceeds of fraud against the European Community', as 'the latter is surely
more central to Community competence than is the former'. M. Levi (1994), 'Money Laundering,
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has led in practice to considerable discrepancies in the implementation of the
directive as some states have opted for the inclusion of long, exhaustive lists of
predicate offences,102 while others have chosen to criminalise the laundering of
proceeds on an all-crime basis.103 A tendency to broaden the scope of the offence
can however be clearly discerned in national laws. Criminalisation solely of drug
money laundering has been gradually abolished, and an increasing number of states
have opted for the extension of the predicates to all crimes.104
IV. THE DUTIES OF CREDIT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Scope ratione personae
The preventive strategy in combating money laundering is reflected in the
establishment by the directive of a series of duties imposed on a wide range of
credit and financial institutions. The directive makes explicit reference to the two
general EC banking directives in order to define credit105 and financial106
107
institutions: according to the first indent of Article 1 of directive 77/780/EEC, as
amended by directive 89/646/EEC,108 a credit institution is 'an undertaking whose
business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant
Legislation and fraud' in J. Norton (ed.), op. cit., p.43. As will be seen below, the situation has been
changed by the new draft Commission money laundering directive amending the existing one.
102 See for instance Greece, where article 1 of law 2331/1995 on the prevention and control of
money laundering (24 August 1995, FEK 173), defines as criminal activity the following offences:
trafficking in drugs and weapon, robbery, blackmail, kidnapping, serious larceny, embezzlement or
fraud, illegal trade in antiquities, theft of cargo of a vessel, illegal trade in human tissue and organs,
smuggling, nuclear crime, prostitution and illegal gambling.
103 See for instance France, where law 96/392 of 13 May 1996 on the fight against money
laundering and drug trafficking and international co-operation in matters of seizure and confiscation
of products of crime, extends, in new article 324-1, the scope ofmoney laundering to cover the
proceeds of all crimes ('crimes' or delits').
104 For a detailed overview, see Commission, 1998, annex 4.
105 Article 1, indent 1.
106 Article 1, indent 2.
107 First Council Directive of December 12, 1977 on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions,
OJ L322, 17.12.1977, p.30 (First Banking Directive).
108 Second Council Directive of December 15, 1989, on the coordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of business of credit institutions and
amending Directive 77/780, OJ L386, 30.12.1989, p.l (Second Banking Directive).
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credits for its own account'. Financial institutions on the other hand are defined as
undertakings other than credit institutions whose principal activity is to carry out
one or more of the operations included in numbers 2 to 12 and 14 of the list
annexed to the Second Banking directive.109 The definition also includes insurance
companies duly authorised in accordance with the relevant directive110 in so far as
they carry out activities covered by that directive. The directive also applies to
branches of credit and financial institutions located in, but having their head offices
outside the Community.111 The establishment of such an extraterritorial reach is
essential for the uniform applicability of the directive provisions, as diverging
standards are avoided.
It is evident thus that the directive applies to an extensive range of institutions
engaged in a variety of financial activities. As was noted by the Commission, 'from
the point of view of comparative law, the Money Laundering Directive is
outstanding in this regard'."2 The provisions have been implemented in an
extensive manner by the member states, covering in principle the whole of the
financial system."3 Major problems appeared only in relation to the effective
application of the directive to bureaux de change,114 but, according to the
109 The list includes: lending; financial leasing; money transmission services; issuing and
administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers' cheques and bankers' drafts);
guarantees and commitments; trading for own account or for account of customers in: (a) money
market instruments, (b) foreign exchange, (c) financial futures and options, (d) exchange and
interest rate instruments, (e) transferable securities; participation in share issues and the provision of
services related to such issues; advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and
related questions and advice and services relating to mergers and the purchase of undertakings;
money broking; portfolio management and advice; safekeeping and administration of securities; safe
custody services.
110 Directive 79/267/EEC, First Council Directive 'on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of life assurance', OJ
L 63, 13.3.1979, p. 1, amended by directive 90/619/EEC, OJ L330, 29.11.1990, p.50.
111 Article 1, indents 1 and 2 in fine.
112 Commission of the European Communities, 1995, p.7.
113 Ibid.
114 The problems were related to the lack of effective supervision of these institutions. As the
Commission has noted, since the scope of the directive includes 'some kinds of financial institutions
which are not subject to supervision on prudential basis (i.e. bureaux de change) most Member
States have still to make arrangements in order to ensure effective application of the Directive to
these institutions'. 'It is clear', the report went on, 'that the simple inclusion of such institutions into
the scope of the legislation does not by itself suffice to secure the application of the money
laundering provisions'. Ibid.
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Commission's recent report they have been largely surpassed.115 The same report,
in line with FATF Recommendation no 8,116 called for member states to pay
careful attention and take similar action in cases of other financial activities which
are not adequately regulated.
B. The duties
i. The 'know your customer' principle: customer identification and record
keeping
A central element of the preventive anti-money laundering framework is the
knowledge by the institutions concerned of the identity of their customers and the
117transactions that were executed during their relationship. To achieve this level of
knowledge, the directive imposes on credit and financial institutions a dual set of
obligations: the duty to identify their customers and the corollary duty to keep
records of identification and transactions. These provisions were largely based on
relevant detailed FATF recommendations.118
The duty of credit and financial institutions to require identification of their
customers is established in article 3 of the directive, according to which
identification is required 'by means of supporting evidence' in the following cases:
115 Commission of the European Communities, 1998, pp.7-8. According to the report, virtually all
member states have subjected bureaux de change to some sort of official supervision.
116 Amended Recommendation no 8 (formerly no 9), includes a new indent stating that: 'Even for
those non-bank financial institutions which are not subject to a formal prudential supervisory regime
in all countries, for example, bureaux de change, governments should ensure that these institutions
are subject to the same anti-money laundering laws or regulations as all other financial institutions
and that these laws or regulations are implemented effectively'.
117 For more on the justification of the duty see chapter 5.
118
Especially recommendations 12 to 14 (now 10 to 12) 'on customer identification and record
keeping rules'.
Ill
i. When entering into business relations with the customer, particularly
when opening an account or savings accounts, or when offering safe
custody facilities."9
ii. With customers other than those referred to above (in 'one-off'
transactions), to any transaction involving a sum amounting to ECU 15000
or more, whether the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in
120
several operations which seem to be linked.
iii. Wherever there is suspicion of money laundering, regardless of the
121
amount of the transaction. "
iv. In the event of doubt as to whether the customers are acting on their
own behalf, or where it is certain that they are not acting on their own
behalf. In these cases, the institutions concerned shall take reasonable
measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on
122
whose behalf those customers are acting.
Such identification duties are however subject to a series of exceptions. According
to article 3, exceptions arise in cases of:
i. insurance policies written by insurance undertakings within the meaning
of Directive 79/267/EEC (life insurance undertakings), where they perform
activities which fall within the scope of that Directive, where the periodic
premium amount or amounts to be paid in any given year does or do not
exceed ECU 1000 or where a single premium is paid amounting to ECU
2500 or less.123
ii. (in the discretion of the member states): insurance policies in respect of
pension schemes taken out by virtue of a contract of employment or the
119 Article 3(1).
120 Article 3(2). The article also provides that, where the sum is not known at the time when the
transaction is undertaken, the institution concerned shall proceed with identification as soon as it is
apprised of the sum and establishes that the threshold has been reached.
121 Article 3(6).
122 Article 3(5).
123 Article 3(3). However, the provision continues, identification shall still be required if the
periodic premium amount or amounts to be paid in any given year is or are increased so as to exceed
the ECU 1000 threshold.
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insured's occupation, provided that such policies contain no surrender
clause and may not be used as collateral for a loan.124
iii. Credit and financial institutions, where the customer is also a credit and
1
financial institution covered by the directive.
It is thus evident that the directive imposes a broad identification duty, extending
beyond regular business relations and covering also one-off transactions, beneficial
ownership cases and any instance where there is suspicion of money laundering.
The exemptions to the rule refer to operations with a very low risk of money
laundering, in the case of insurance undertakings, or are based on equivalence
principles in the Single Market.126 The directive took particular care to include
identification in cases where several operations seem to be linked, a duty which, as
Gilmore notes, 'is specifically designed to discourage the structuring of
127
transactions, or "smurfing", in an effort to evade the identification obligation'.
While a broad identification duty is established, no reference is made to specific
identification methods, with the directive requiring in general customer
identification 'by means of supporting evidence'.128 Following the approach taken
by the FATF in the matter,129 the directive thus leaves a large margin of discretion
to the member states regarding the implementation of the measure, resulting in a
certain diversity130 in national legislation. According to Gilmore, this approach is
124 Article 3(4). In both the cases of paragraphs 3 and 4, member states may provide that the
identification requirements are fulfilled when it is established that the payment for the transaction is
to be debited from an account opened in the customer's name with a credit institution subject to the
directive according to the requirements of paragraph 1 (article 3(8)).
125 Article 3(7).
126 Commission, 1995, p. 10.
127 W.C. Gilmore (1999), Dirty Money: The Evolution ofMoney Laundering Countermeasures, 2nd
edition, Council of Europe Publishing, p. 161.
128 Article 3(1).
129
According to FATF recommendation 12 (now 10), identification is based 'on the basis of an
official or other reliable identifying document'.
130 On a detailed analysis of the issues surrounding the implementation of the identification duty, see
chapter 5.
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justified in view of the 'diverse range of factual situations which are presented in
practice'.131 His analysis of examples is worth quoting at length:
'For example identification procedures for personal customers when opening accounts may need to
be varied depending on whether the individual is resident or non-resident. Different considerations
may apply in relation to the opening of "trust" accounts. An even greater range of possibilities will
132
need to be catered for in the opening of accounts for legal persons.
In spite of its broad wording, the identification rule has proven to be much less
problematic than the provisions designed to extend and to qualify it. Article 3(5),
largely based on FATF Recommendation 13,133 establishes a duty to identify
beneficial owners. The directive offers minimal guidance through an abstract
reference to 'reasonable measures' to obtain identification in these cases. The
wording was identical in the Commission's draft and heavily criticised during its
the readings,134 since it has the potential to result in differences in the
implementation of the provision and to place a considerable burden for the
institutions concerned.135
While no particular problems appeared in relation to the exemption provisions, a
series of issues have been raised by the choice of a number of member states to
extend the application of article 3(7), exempting credit and financial institutions
from their identification duty when the customer is another institution of that kind
131 Gilmore, op. cit., p. 161.
132 Ibid.
133 Recommendation 13 (now 11), reads as follows: Financial institutions should take reasonable
measures to obtain information about the true identity of the persons on whose behalf an account is
opened or a transaction conducted if there are any doubts as to whether these clients or customers
are acting on their own behalf, for example, in the case of domiciliary companies (i.e. institutions,
corporations, foundations, trusts, etc. that do not conduct any commercial or manufacturing business
or any other form of commercial operation in the country where their registered office is located).
134 The Economic and Social Committee in its Opinion stated that 'establishing the real identity of
the persons on whose behalf an operation is carried out or an account is opened when customers are
not acting on their own behalf poses technical problems of application which the draft Directive
certainly set out' and emphasised the need to find a way 'to clear up this lack of precision which
opens the door to all sorts of disorder when the Member States apply the rules'. See note 99.
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covered by the directive, to include non-EC and EEA institutions. This has
happened in the case of the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, requiring the
institutions concerned to be subject to equivalent obligations to the directive, and
the Netherlands, where the Government is empowered to exonerate other
categories of institutions.136 This choice has been heavily criticised in view of its
potential to undermine the standards set out by the directive by creating a major
loophole to the identification requirements, especially in view of the difficulty in
137
assessing 'equivalence' of anti-money laundering standards.
The identification duty is complemented by the obligation of credit and financial
institutions to keep records of the following, in order to be used as evidence in any
money laundering investigation:
i. in the case of identification, a copy or the references of the evidence
required
ii. in the case of transactions, the supporting evidence and records,
consisting of the original documents or copies admissible in court
138
proceedings under the applicable national legislation. "
Following FATF Recommendation 14 (now 12), the directive states that records
must be maintained for a period of at least five years after the end of the
relationship with the customer and the execution of the transactions respectively.
135 It is interesting to note that neither of the Commission reports on the implementation of the
directive contains an extensive reference to the implementation of article 3(5). For a detailed
analysis of issues related to identification in cases of beneficial ownership, see chapter 5.
136 Commission, 1995, p.10.
137
Highly critical of this development, Gilmore, largely based on the 1995 Commission report,
notes: 'Leaving aside the question of the legal justification (if any) for such initiatives, the wisdom
of this approach is open to serious question. Take the issue of the identification of states with
"equivalent" countermeasures. Clearly the mere utilisation of the list of FATF members would
present considerable difficulties since not all of those countries have fully implemented the
recommended countermeasures. The possibility of the EU reaching agreement on a common list of
countries whose money laundering countermeasures could be regarded as being equivalent to those
contained in the directive has been regarded thus far as being remote. It has also been felt that, even
if such a consensus did emerge, it would have to be revisited with some frequency to take account of
developments in terms of
implementation in many countries around the globe'. Gilmore, op. cit., p. 163.
138 Article 4.
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Regarding the quality of the records, the text of the directive is not as general as the
FATF measure, which provides that 'such records must be sufficient to permit
reconstruction of individual transactions...so as to provide, if necessary, evidence
for prosecution of criminal behaviour'. The directive links the evidentiary value of
the files only to money laundering investigations. This, along with the clear
wording related to the nature of the files, render the provision one of the most
straightforward in the directive.
ii. The duties of co-operation: suspicious transaction reporting and related
duties
a. Suspicious transaction reporting
The cornerstone of the preventive anti-money laundering framework set out by the
directive is article 6, which establishes the duty of credit and financial institutions
to report to the authorities which are responsible for combating money laundering
in the territory where they are situated. This duty is analysed in a two-fold manner,
with the institutions concerned being under:
-. An 'active' duty to inform these authorities, on their own initiative, of any fact
which might be an indication of money laundering; and
-. A 'passive' duty to furnish those authorities, at their request, with all necessary
in formation, in accordance with the procedures established by the applicable
legislation.
While the 'passive' duty is similar to pre-existing national laws establishing an
exception to the duty of confidentiality on grounds of public policy and crime
prevention, the 'active' duty, which puts forward a system of proactive reporting of
suspicious transactions by credit and financial institutions is certainly a novelty.139
This duty is viewed as an essential part of the co-operation mechanisms set out
139 For a detailed analysis of this change and its implications, see chapter 5.
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between the public and private sector in the fight against money laundering.140 It is
important to note here that the directive was more daring in this respect than FATF
Recommendation 16, which provided that 'if financial institutions suspect that
funds stem from a criminal activity, they should be permitted or required to report
promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities'.141 The stricter option of the
directive to render reporting mandatory was subsequently followed by the FATF
and in 1996 the term 'permitted' was deleted from the text of the Recommendation
(now no 15).
Article 6 leaves a great margin of discretion to member states regarding the
modalities of the reporting of suspicions. This has led to a number of discrepancies
in subsequent national laws. The most notable of these has been the emergence of
two distinct reporting systems: a system, followed in the majority of the member
states, of suspicious transaction reporting, where the institutions concerned assess
transactions in a subjective manner; and a system, followed in the Netherlands, of
reporting not suspicious, but unusual transactions. The latter constitutes an attempt
to establish objective criteria, in the form of indicators, in the reporting process.142
Another potential source of implementation differences is the second paragraph
of article 6. Going a step further than the FATF, the paragraph provides inter alia
that 'information supplied to the authorities in accordance with the first paragraph
may be used only in connection with the combating of money laundering'. This
was a welcome addition to the Commission's draft which was put forward by both
the Economic and Social Committee143 and the European Parliament.144 It
140
According to recital 15 of the directive Preamble, 'preventing the financial system from being
used for money laundering is a task which cannot be carried out by the authorities responsible for




142 For a detailed analysis, see chapter 5.
143 The Committee proposed the inclusion of a new article stating that 'the information gathered by
the judicial or law enforcement authorities may not be used for any purposes other than those laid
down in this Directive'. See note 99.
144 In the first reading of the draft the Parliament added in what was then article 5 a new paragraph
2b, providing that 'information supplied to the authorities in accordance with paragraph 1 may be
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acknowledges the invasiveness of the reporting duty and the need to limit the use
of a torrent of data relating to every day transactions generated by article 6 only to
cases where it is absolutely necessary. In the final text of the directive, however,
such concerns are compromised by the push to broaden the scope of the provision:
its final indent states that member states 'may provide that such information may
also be used for other purposes'. In this manner, the door opens to the possibility
of an over-extensive use of suspicious transaction reports, in a far from harmonised
system of information exchange both in member states and at the EU level.145
b. Due diligence
A corollary of the duty to report suspicious transactions is the obligation of credit
and financial institutions to demonstrate due diligence in their transactions. Article
5 thus places the institutions concerned under the duty to 'examine with special
attention any transaction which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to
be related to money laundering'. According to the Explanatory Memorandum
accompanying the Commission's draft directive, this provision is a consequence,
expressed in a negative way, of the general co-operation principle, as well as 'an
exigency of the financial institutions' responsibility in order to preserve their own
soundness and integrity'.146 The duty extends the scope of co-operation beyond
suspicious transaction reporting: according to the Commission, it is a 'previous and
necessary' condition of reporting and therefore comes into play 'when there is not
yet specific suspicion ofmoney laundering'. 147
The due diligence duty reflects the considerations behind FATF
Recommendations 15 (now 14) and 21. According to the former, financial
used only in connection with preliminary judicial inquiries into serious crimes within the meaning of
this directive'. See note 29.
145 For a detailed analysis, see chapter 6.
146 Commission, op. cit. According to the Memorandum, this justification also applies to the duty to
refrain from executing transactions, which was included, in the draft directive, in the same provision
as the due diligence duty.
147 Commission, 1995, p. 12.
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institutions 'should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions,
and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or
visible lawful purpose'. Recommendation 21, on the other hand, calls for special
attention to business relations and transactions involving countries which do not or
insufficiently apply the FATF anti-money laundering standards.148
The wording of these Recommendations was largely reiterated in article 4 of the
draft directive, placing credit and financial institutions under the duty to 'examine
with special attention any unusual transaction not having an apparent economic or
visible lawful purpose'.149 In both cases, an attempt is made to establish an
'objective' model of due diligence, with the introduction of the concept of 'unusual
transactions'.150 However, the elliptical definition of what constitutes an unusual
transaction, coupled with the rather vague criterion of lack of 'an apparent
economic or visible lawful purpose', caused a series of reactions related to the
absence of legal certainty and the potential of the provision to impose a heavy
burden on the institutions concerned.151
This in turn led to the drastic revision of the provision, which, in the final
directive text establishes a subjective test by focusing on transactions which the
institutions themselves regard as related to money laundering, while the objective
element is maintained to some extent by the reference to the equally vague term of
the 'nature' of the transactions concerned. Any reference to unusual transactions
however has been omitted.
148 On the dual justification of the provision, see also Gilmore, op. cit., p. 165.
149
Commission, op. cit.
150 On the use of the term at the level of suspicious transaction reporting, see chapter 6.
151 In this context, the Economic and Social Committee called on banking practice to resolve the
issues created by the article, while the Parliament changed the wording slightly to include 'any




The 'open-textured' nature of the wording of the provision, along with the
153lack of further specifications regarding the content of the duty " have resulted in
considerable differences in implementation. While some member states require for
instance the recording of the characteristics of the obligation in writing, others, in
contrast with the FATF Recommendations, do not. At a more systematic level,
while the provision has been explicitly transposed through specific articles in some
member states, others have not explicitly done so, 'apparently because the principle
of enhanced diligence is implicitly encompassed in the implementation of other
provisions of the Directive'.154 According to the Commission, such differences
should not constitute a major difficulty provided there is proper supervision of the
adequacy of internal control procedures.1"55 However, major issues still remain with
regard to the exact delimitation of the role of credit and financial institutions in
exercising due diligence.156
c. Refraining from transactions
In Article 4 of the Commission's draft, the due diligence obligation was
accompanied by the duty of credit and financial institutions to refrain from entering
into any transaction which they have reason to suspect may have any relation to
money laundering. The two duties are closely related as they are both viewed, as
mentioned above, as the 'negative' side of the duties of co-operation set out by the
directive. Along with a broad duty of diligence, the Commission defined the duty
to refrain in an absolute manner.
This provision was substantially modified in the final text of the directive. The
basic outline of the duty is similar to the draft: article 7 places credit and financial
152
Gilmore, op. cit.
153 The directive has not followed FATF Recommendation 14 in this respect, which adds that 'the
background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings
established in writing, and be available to help supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies'.
154
Commission, 1995, p. 12.
155
Commission, 1995, p. 13.
155 For a detailed analysis, see chapter 5.
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institutions under the duty to refrain from carrying out transactions which they
know or suspect (rather than 'have reasons to suspect', as in the draft) to be related
to money laundering. However, the provision inserts a new and important element,
which is the co-operation of the institution concerned with the authorities
responsible for combating money laundering: the institution must refrain from the
transaction until they have apprised the competent authority which may give
instructions not to execute the operation.
The non-execution of the transaction is not however an absolute rule. In another
important addition to the draft, article 7 provides that, even in cases where a
transaction is suspected of giving rise to money laundering, the institution may not
refrain, but apprise the authorities immediately afterwards. This may happen when
refraining from such a transaction 'is impossible or likely to frustrate efforts to
pursue the beneficiaries of a suspected money laundering operation'. In this
manner, the directive, in contrast with the original proposal, provides a flexible
157
provision designed to accommodate investigative needs,
d. Tipping off
A duty which is closely associated with the reporting and refraining obligations is
the duty of credit and financial institution not to 'tip off. According to article 8,
the institutions concerned, but also their directors and employees, 'shall not
disclose to the customers concerned nor to other third persons that information has
been transmitted to the authorities in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 or that a
money laundering investigation is being carried out'. This broad provision is based
on FATF Recommendation 17, but it is more extensive in the sense of establishing
an absolute duty not to tip off, extending also to third persons.158
157 Gilmore, op. cit., p. 166.
158 Recommendation 17 reads as follows: Financial institutions, their directors, officers (term added
in the 1996 amendment) and employees should not, or, where appropriate, should not be allowed to,
warn their customers when information relating to them is being reported to the competent
authorities'.
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e. Facilitating factors: Exoneration from liability
Most of the aforementioned provisions impose on the institutions falling within the
scope of the directive extensive and completely novel duties in the realm of crime
prevention, which depart greatly from well established principles of banking and
finance law, such as bank secrecy.159 In order to soothe the fears of the private
sector in this respect and assure them that their compliance with the directive will
not lead to the breach of their duties to the customers, the directive includes a
provision establishing the exoneration of credit and financial institutions from
liability when they report or refrain from transactions. According to article 9:
The disclosure in good faith to the authorities responsible for combating money
laundering by an employee or director of a credit or financial institution of the information
referred to in Articles 6 and 7 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure
of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative
provision, and shall not involve the credit or financial institution, its directors or employees
in liability of any kind'.
The exoneration from liability, perceived by the Commission as 'a legal
consequence of the duty of cooperation established by the Directive',160 is largely
based on FATF Recommendation 16.161 In the case of the directive the exoneration
is absolute in the sense that it covers liability 'of any kind', rather than criminal or
civil liability. This places the protection of customers in cases of wrongful
disclosure under serious jeopardy, as the provision is silent on the delimitation of
159 For an extensive analysis, see chapter 5.
160
Commission, 1995, p. 14.
161 Which also contained, prior to its amendment, a call for suspicious transaction reporting and
whose second indent read as follows: '...there should be legal provisions to protect financial
institutions and their employees from criminal or civil liability for breach of any restriction on
disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative
provision, if they report in good faith, in disclosing suspected criminal activity to the competent
authorities, even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and
regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred'. In its amended version, Recommendation




liability in these cases. The image becomes more blurred in view of the use of
the abstract concept of 'good faith'. As no guidance is given in the directive, the
implementation of the provision has been far from uniform, with a number of
countries extending the application in cases of negligence163 and some having
amended the relevant national provisions in an effort to strike the right balance.164
In any case, the concept of good faith is an open-ended legal term being constantly
subject to a wide range of potential interpretations by the judiciary.
iii. Organisational duties: the establishment of internal control and
awareness mechanisms
The duties of credit and financial institutions are complemented by a general
organisational obligation to establish internal control and awareness mechanisms
within them. According to article 11, institutions must:
-. Establish adequate procedures of internal control and communication in order to
forestall and prevent operations related to money laundering; and
-. Take appropriate measures so that their employees are aware of the directive's
provisions, including participation of employees in special training programmes to
help them recognise operations which may be related to money laundering as well
as to instruct them as to how to proceed in such cases.
The establishment of this duty is deemed essential to ensure that the institutions
involved will exercise the unprecedented and highly invasive duties imposed by the
directive in an effective manner.165 Article 11 mirrors to a great extent FATF
162 For a detailed analysis, see chapter 5.
163
Commission, 1995, op. cit.
164 See for instance the example of Finland in chapter 5 below.
165 See also Gilmore, op. cit., p. 166.
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Recommendation 20 (now 19),166 being rightly more detailed regarding the content
of the training programmes. However, as Gilmore has noted, it is 'silent on such
fundamental practical issues as the type of system to be introduced and the
responsibilities of those within it'.167 This lack of precision along with the
sometimes draconian penalties for the non- or inadequate implementation of the
provision raise a series of important issues of legal certainty and compliance by the
institutions concerned.168
iv. Sanctions
The provisions imposing this wide range of duties on credit and financial
institutions are complemented by an article aiming at ensuring their effective
application. Article 14 calls on the member states to take appropriate measures to
ensure full application of its provisions and in particular to determine the penalties
to be applied for infringement of the measures adopted on the basis of them. In
view of the controversy regarding the existence of a Community competence in
criminal law matters, the directive is deliberately silent regarding the nature of the
sanctions to be imposed. This has led to considerable differences in member states:
while the majority of countries opted for administrative penalties in the form of
fines, others, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, opted for
the imposition of criminal law penalties for breach of the directive provisions.169
Along with the questionable effectiveness of such draconian measures in creating a
comprehensive anti-money laundering framework, important issues arise with
166 'Financial institutions should develop programs against money laundering. These programs
should include, as a minimum:
(i) the development of internal policies, procedures and controls, including the designation of
compliance officers at management level, and adequate screening procedures to ensure
high standards when hiring employees;
(ii) an ongoing employee training programme
(iii) an audit function to test the system
167 Gilmore, op. cit.
168 In the context of the implementation of the directive in the United Kingdom, see the analysis in
chapter 5.




regard to their proportionality to the infraction committed. Both principles of
effectiveness and proportionality, along with the principle of dissuasion, must,
according to the Commission, be respected in the imposition of sanctions under
article 14.171
3. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE OF THE
DIRECTIVE
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL ISSUES
As seen above, the text of the directive attempts to widen the scope of its
provisions to include activities perpetrated in the territory of another member state
or a third country.172 This, along with the extension of the scope to include
branches of institutions having their head office outside the Community,173 reflect
the acknowledgement of the transnational character of the money laundering
process and the need to adopt to the greatest extent possible, uniform counter-
measures, as loopholes have the potential to render the provisions meaningless in
view of market globalisation. These attempts to broaden the extraterritorial scope
of the directive are coupled by parallel efforts to impose its standards on a series of
non-EU countries. The character of this effort, as will be seen below, is greatly
influenced by the relationship of these countries with the European Union.
A. Extension to the countries of the European Free Trade
Association/European Economic Area
The signature in 1992 of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) by the
EFTA countries, extended inter alia the applicability of the money laundering
170 For a discussion see chapter 5.
171
Commission, 1995, p. 16.
172 Article 1, indent 3 in fine.
171 Article 1, indents 1 and 2.
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directive to the ratifying countries. After the accession of Austria, Finland and
Sweden to the European Union and the non-ratification of the EEA Agreement by
Switzerland, the extension of the directive's applicability on the basis of the
Agreement covers Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The three new EU members
have had to transpose the directive as part of their membership obligations, while
Switzerland continued with the implementation of the provisions of the directive,
which started prior to the referendum on the ratification of the Agreement,
notwithstanding its negative outcome.174
The application of the provisions of the directive in Iceland, Norway and
Liechtenstein has been assessed by the EFTA Surveillance Authority, which
issued, in 1995 and 1998, implementation reports in line with the relevant reports
by the Commission of the European Communities.175 According to the 1994 report,
all EFTA/EEA states had implemented its provisions, with no major legal or
practical difficulties having being identified.176 This positive assessment was
reiterated in the 1998 report, where the Authority considered the implementation of
the directive to be 'very satisfactory' in all three states, which, in some instances,
were deemed to have adopted more comprehensive anti-money measures than the
• 177directive.
174 See E.U. Savona (in co-operation with F. Manzoni) (1999), European Money Trails, Harwood
Academic Publishers: Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Luxembourg,
Malaysia, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, pp.137-138.
175 The Commission reports were prepared on the basis of article 17 of the directive, stating that
'one year after 1 January 1993, whenever necessary and at least at three yearly intervals thereafter
the Commission shall draw up a report on the implementation of this Directive and submit it to the
European Parliament and the Council'. According to Protocol 1 on Horizontal Adaptation of the
EEA Agreement, the EFTA Supervisory Authority is called in such cases to prepare concurrently a
'corresponding report or assesment or the like' regarding the EFTA states.
176
European Economic Area, Standing Committee of the EFTA States, Report under article 17 of
the money laundering directive 91/308/EEC, Doc. S/00/R/005, restricted, Brussels, 13.12.1994,
paragraphs 22 and 23.
177
Report of the EFTA Surveillance Authority on the implementation of the Money Laundering
Directive by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, summary and conclusions. All three states for
instance went beyond the directive minimum in covering money laundering from all criminal
activities (see paragraph 2.2.4).
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B. Extension to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
The need to extend the provisions of the directive to the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe in the context of enlargement could already be discerned in the
1995 Commission White Paper on Preparation of the Associated Countries of
Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the internal market of the Union.178
The document contains a recommendation to these states to establish suitable
standards against money laundering as soon as possible, 'in order to avoid their
financial sectors being used for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in
general and drug offences in particular'.179 Money laundering counter-measures are
placed here primarily within a market logic, as the overall purpose of the White
Paper was to provide a guide to the countries concerned regarding their alignment
with the internal market, rather than constituting a complete accession framework
180
involving the acceptance of the acquis communautaire as a whole.
This approach has been reflected in the 'Europe Agreements', which aimed at
achieving advanced association between the Central and Eastern European
countries and the European Union and have been characterised as 'the main vehicle
to prepare for accession'. 1 All these agreements, which aim to provide a
framework for the candidate countries' gradual integration in the Community
through the fulfillment of a series of necessary conditions, contain a specific and
similarly drafted 'money laundering' clause. For instance, article 86 of the
agreement with the Czech Republic182 reads as follows:
178 Commission of the European Communities (1995), White Paper- Preparation of the Associated
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1. The parties agree on the necessity of making every effort and co-operation in order to
prevent the use of their financial systems for laundering of proceeds from criminal
activities in general and drug offences in particular.
2. Co-operation in this area shall include administrative and technical assistance with the
purpose of establishing suitable standards against money laundering equivalent to those
adopted by the Community and international fora in this field including the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF).'183
The pressure for the adoption of the directive standards has been intensified by
the conclusion in 1998, in line with the provisions of the EU Action Plan to
Combat Organised Crime,184 of the 'Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime
between the member states of the European Union and the applicant countries of
Central and Eastern Europe and Cyprus'. 185 The scope of the Pact extends beyond
the framework of the internal market and covers a wide range of measures to
combat organised crime, which, due to the rapid developments in the field of
Justice and Home Affairs, are viewed now as part of the acquis communautaire
that the candidate countries must implement in order to accede to the EU. In this
context, principle 13 of the Pact contains a two-fold 'money laundering' clause: in
the policing field, candidate countries undertake to set up financial intelligence
units as defined by the Egmont Group;186 and at the legal regulation level, it is
183
Emphasis added.
184 OJ C251, 15.8.1997, p.l. Recommendation 3 of the Action Plan provides inter alia that: 'The
European Council encourages the Council and the Commission to define in common with the
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, a Pre-accession Pact
on cooperation against crime, which may include provisions for close cooperation between these
countries and Europol and undertakings for the rapid ratification and full implementation of the
Council of Europe instruments which are essential to the fight against organized crime...The Pact
should be based on the acquis of the Union in the field of organized crime and form part of the pre-
accession strategy in which the potential of the existing instruments such as the Phare programme
should be fully explored. In the discussions with the candidate countries, the need should be
underlined for them to reach a standard which is comparable to that of the Member States of the
Union...'.
185 OJ C220, 15.7.1998, p.l.
186 Defined as: 'A central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting),
analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information: (i)
concerning suspected proceeds of crime; (ii) required by national legislation or regulation, in order
to combat money laundering'. Principle 13(2). For an extensive analysis of the establishment and
functions of financial intelligence units, see chapter 7.
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agreed that there should be full implementation of the FATF Recommendations,
the Council of Europe Convention and the EC Directive.187
The wording of the Pre-Accession Pact leaves very little margin of discretion to
the candidate countries regarding the implementation of EC anti-money laundering
standards. The recourse to 'equivalent' standards in the Europe Agreements has
been replaced by the call for 'full implementation' of the directive. This choice
clearly reflects the recent Commission assertion that the directive 'is an integral
part of the acquis communautaire and all candidate countries will be required to
implement it', adding that 'efforts to assist in this process form part of the pre-
accession strategy'.188 In this manner, the directive constitutes an eloquent example
of what has been deemed to be a process of 'voluntary harmonisation', where
candidate countries have to adapt their legislation to Community laws which have
no binding force in relation to them and in whose framing they may have had no
real participation.189 This process constitutes undoubtedly a demanding challenge
for the candidate countries and raises a series of interrelated issues in the legal,
economic, social and human rights spheres.190
C. Extension to offshore jurisdictions
Principle 13(1).
188
Commission, 1998, p.6. According to the Commission, technical assistance in this respect is
provided within the framework of its PHARE multi-country progamme to combat drugs, covering
13 central and eastern European countries. A further initiative in that respect is the establishment of
the 'Octopus' project, under the auspices of which the Commission co-operates with the Council of
Europe in evaluating inter alia money laundering counter-measures: see V. Mitsilegas (1999)
'International and Regional Initiatives' in B. Rider and Ch. Nakajima (eds.), Anti-Money
Laundering Guide, CCH Editions, paragraph 82-175. For a detailed analysis of the implementation
of the directive provisions, along with the provisions of the United Nations and Council of Europe
Conventions and the FATF Recommendations, see Council of Europe/PHARE, European
Committee on Crime Problems, Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money
Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), Annual Report 1997-1998.
189 A. Evans (1997), 'Voluntary Harmonisation in Integration between the European Community
and Eastern Europe' in European Law Review, vol.22, p.202.
190 See also V. Mitsilegas (1998) 'Legal Transplants in the Construction of a "European Security
Space"-The Evolution of Money Laundering Countermeasures in Eastern Europe as a Challenge for
EU Enlargement' in L. Costa and S. Fromhart (eds.), East Meets West: The Challenge ofEnlarging
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One of the most prominent trends in money laundering techniques has been the use
by launderers of offshore jurisdictions. A recent definitional attempt perceives the
latter as jurisdictions 'elements of the legal system of which [are intended to]
encourage the introduction into and retention under that system of assets or
business activities which would, but for those elements (or some of them), have
fewer or no connections with the jurisdiction'. 91 In this manner, these jurisdictions
attract a large number of financial institutions and transactions, by offering a series
of incentives. According to a detailed study conducted by the United Nations:
' Offshore financial transactions have a precise meaning. Banks or other financial
institutions operating 'off-shore' are exempt from a wide range of regulations normally
imposed on 'onshore' institutions. Their transactions are tax-exempt, not encumbered by
reserve requirements, free of interest-rate restrictions and often, though not always, exempt
from regulatory scrutiny with respect to liquidity or capital adequacy. Dealing with non¬
resident clients, almost always other financial institutions, they usually transact a wholesale
banking business denominated in a foreign currency or currencies'.192
In the words of the Financial Action Task Force, offshore centres have the
following common characteristics facilitating money laundering: a series of
multiple financial transactions through the centre; use of nominees or other middle
men to manage these transactions; and an international network of shell
companies.193 These features help to move criminally generated funds rapidly
through several offshore locations, which then can be invested in an 'on-shore'
the European Union, Institute on Western Europe, Columbia University, New York, New York,
pp.31-46.
191 W. Hughes (1999)'Characteristics of Offshore Jurisdictions' in B.A.K. Rider and Ch. Nakajima
(eds.), op. cit., paragraph 84-000.
192 United Nations, Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (1998), Financial Havens,
Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering, New York, p.21.
193 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1998-1999, Annex C, 1998-
1999 Report on Money Laundering Typologies, paragraph 20. The UN Report adds to this list
factors such as the prevalence of unregulated bank-like institutions such as trust companies, strong
bank secrecy laws, the availability of mobile accounts and casinos, the availability of free trade
zones, the dissemination of information about available services, the willingness to provide false
documentation and the existence of a wide range of financial institutions, such as branches of 'on¬
shore' banks, indigenous banks or international business corporations. United Nations, op. cit.,
pp.24-26.
130
financial market.194 Acknowledging those trends, the FATF revised
Recommendations of 1996 include new Recommendation 25, which provides that
'countries should take notice of the potential for abuse of shell corporations by
money launderers and should consider whether additional measures are required to
prevent unlawful use of such entities'.
Many off-shore jurisdictions are closely associated, in one way or another, with
the European Union. Some of them are linked with EU countries by specific
historical, political or economic ties and enjoy special economic and financial
relations with them facilitating capital mobility, especially towards the European
Union.195 Examples of these are the Channel Islands and the Isle ofMan in the case
of the United Kingdom, and a number of the overseas territories associated with
European Union countries.196 Other jurisdictions, such as Andorra, Liechtenstein or
Cyprus are preferred for money laundering purposes due to their geographical
proximity to the European Union.197
194
FATF, op. cit., paragraph 21. The Report notes the difference in techniques when the offshore
jurisdiction is used for tax evasion. In that case, rather than having the funds moving between
jurisdictions, they usually move to a single offshore location where they are sheltered from the home
country's fiscal overview. On the process of currency smuggling and the use of shell corporations
for that purpose in a European context see Savona, op. cit., p. 155.
195
Savona, op. cit., p. 14.
196 Ibid. According to part four of the Amsterdam EC Treaty on 'association of the overseas
countries and territories' (articles 182-188- ex 131-136a), and annex II, Community law applies in a
very limited manner in the following countries and territories: Greenland; New Caledonia and
Dependencies; French Polynesia; French Southrn and Antarctic Territories; Wallis and Furtuna
Islands; Mayotte; Saint Pierre and Miquelon; Aruba; Netherlands Antilles; Anguilla; Cayman
Islands; Falkland Islands; South Georgia and the South Sandwich islands; Montserrat; Pitcairn;
Saint Helena and Dependencies; British Antarctic Territory; British Indian Ocean Territory; Turks
and Caicos Islands; British Virgin Islands; and Bermuda. Similar is the case regarding the Channel
Islands and the Isle ofMan, according to article 299 (ex 227) and Protocol no 3 annexed to the
UK/Denmark/Ireland accession act. For an analysis of money laundering counter-measures in the
case of the former Dutch colonies, see C.D. Schaap (1998), Fighting Money Laundering with
Comments on the Legislation of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, Kluwer Law International,
London, The Hague, Boston.
197
Savona, op. cit. On a detailed list of off-shore jurisdictions world-wide, see United Nations, op.
cit., p.29. The special position of Liechtenstein, being an EEA member, and Cyprus, being a
candidate country, must be noted in this respect. Due to its candidate country status, Cyprus has, at
the legal level, extensively implemented EC and international anti-money laundering standards. See
Council of Europe/PHARE Report, op. cit. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
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The need to apply equivalent anti-money laundering standards to these countries
and territories is reflected in the Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime,198 whose
Recommendation no 30 reads as follows:
'Member States should examine how to take action and provide adequate defenses against
the use by organized crime of financial centres and off-shore facilities, in particular where
these are located in places subject to their jurisdiction. With respect to those located
elsewhere, the Council should develop a common policy, consistent with the policy
conducted by Member States internally, with a view to prevent the use thereof by criminal
organizations operating within the Union...'.
In the specific money laundering context, similar arguments had been made by
the European Parliament as early as 1990, during its reading of the draft directive,
when an addition to the draft provided that the directive 'shall cover the entire
Community, including territories with no special control regulations governing
financial transactions, such as, for example, the Channel Islands, Monaco and
Campione d'ltalia'. 199 As these proposals were not included in the 1991 directive,
the Parliament expressed similar concerns in its report on the Second Commission
Report on the implementation of the directive.200 The Parliament put forward the
view that the application of anti-money laundering legislation to these countries
can be assured through a recourse to article 10 of the EC Treaty (ex article 5)
which places member states under a duty of 'genuine co-operation and assistance'
owed by them to the Community.201 Following this broad reasoning, the Parliament
Cyprus (1998), Measures taken by the Republic of Cyprus on Preventing and Combating Money
Laundering, Nicosia.
198 See note 184.
199 New article 8c. See note 29. A further addition regarding certain independent off-shore
jurisdictions was made by the insertion of article 8d, calling at member states to ensure that 'the
conveyance of cash across their frontiers toward Liechtenstein, Monaco or the Vatican State is
controlled'.
200
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights (1999i), Report on the
Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of
the Money Laundering Directive (COM(98)0401-C4-0396/98), Rapporteur: E. Newman,
Draftsman: I. Lambraki, DOC. A4-0093/99, 26.2.1999, p. 14.
201
European Parliament, 1999i, op. cit. Article 10 TEC reads as follows: 'Member States shall take
all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They
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called, in its motion for a Resolution on the Commission Report, for an extension
of the scope of the directive. According to paragraphs 6, 7 and 18, the Parliament:
'6. Calls upon the Member States, the Council and the Commission to take the necessary
measures in order to prevent the use of shell companies established in accordance with the
law of a Member State or of a third country for the purpose of money laundering wherever
such activity has a sufficiently close relationship to the European Union;
7. calls upon the Member States, the Council and the Commission to ensure the application
of anti-money laundering legislation to those territories of the Member States to which
Community law does not apply or does apply only in a restricted manner by means of
substantiation of the duty of genuine cooperation and assistance which Member States owe
the Community and which finds expression in the obligation laid down in Article 5 of the
EC-Treaty;
18. strongly recommends that, as part of the fight against money laundering in Europe,
Member States continue their efforts to bring "tax haven countries" into the regime
foreseen by the acquis communautaire'.
The concerns of the European Parliament obtained an increased political
significance at the recent summit of the European Council in Tampere. The
summit, which debated to a great extent issues related to the Amsterdam objective
of the establishment of the European Union as an 'area of freedom, security and
justice', emphasised the need to further anti-money laundering standards, in
particular regarding off-shore jurisdictions. Paragraph 57 of the Presidency
Conclusions reads as follows:
'Common standards should be developed in order to prevent the use of corporations and
entities registered outside the jurisdiction of the Union in the hiding of criminal proceeds
and in money laundering. The Union and Member States should make arrangements with
third country offshore-centres to ensure efficient and transparent cooperation in mutual
legal assistance following the recommendations made up in this area by the Financial
Action Task Force'.202
shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure
which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty'.
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In this statement, that to some extent reflects the Parliament's points 6 and 7, the
European Council prioritises the adoption of measures related to off-shore
companies. The wording of the Council is careful to avoid references to other
jurisdictions, by focusing rather on corporations and entities outside the
Community. In this manner, the ambiguity of the Parliament's reference to a
'sufficiently close relationship with the EU' is avoided, while at the same time the
potential of the provision is open-ended. Regarding the off-shore centres, the
Parliament's demand for the application of anti-money laundering standards is
watered down by the limitation of paragraph 57 to the field of mutual legal
assistance with third countries. No express reference is made either to territories or
countries enjoying special relations with EU member states, or to the issue of tax
havens. The Tampere initiative retains however its importance, as it constitutes the
first major political acknowledgment at EU level of the problems created by
offshore jurisdictions for the proper functioning of money laundering counter-
203
measures.
This acknowledgement is clearly reflected in the recent call by the Economic and
Social Committee for the drawing up of a charter or a code of good conduct in
money laundering matters. The code, which will be drawn up by the Commission
and institutions such as the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, the
European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development will include the basic FATF Recommendations, whose application
would be a condition for the granting of financial aid. In addition to that, offshore
centres that do not abide by the code or opposed to the openness of transactions
202 Text downloaded from http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm
203 The issue of the applicability of EU standards to offshore jurisdictions has also been addressed in
the more general field of taxation by the draft directive 'to ensure a minimum of effective taxation
of savings income in the form of interest payments within the Community' (DOC. 598PC0295,
downloaded from http://europa.eu.int). which is accompanied by a Decision to extend the
applicability of some provisions to dependent or associated territories of member states or territories
which have special responsibilities or taxation prerogatives in respect of other territories (article 2).
A similar extension is included in the Code of Conduct for Business taxation, which was adopted
during the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1.12.1997 (OJ C002, 6.1.1998, p. 1) (point M).
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should be cut off fro international funds transfer systems.204 The Committee's
proposals reflect the attempts of the Community to emerge as an international actor
in the field of money laundering and organised crime and is aligned with the
intensified pressure exercised by FATF to offshore centres to fight money
laundering in an effective manner.205
D. Other third countries
The attempts to broaden the extraterritorial effect of the EC money laundering
legislation are not only confined to candidate countries or offshore jurisdictions. In
a similar vein with the Europe Agreements, the Commission continuously seeks to
incorporate an anti-money laundering clause in all the agreements, 'of whatever
type', it concludes with non-member states.206 According to the Commission, 'the
standard clause refers to efforts and cooperation to avoid money laundering and to
the establishment of suitable standards against money laundering equivalent to
those adopted in the EU and in other international for a such as the FATF'.207 In
this manner, the adoption of equivalent anti-money laundering standards is
elevated to an external policy issue, with the European Union emerging as an
international actor in the field.
H. THE NEW DRAFT MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE
A. Introduction
204 Economic and Social Committee (2000), Opinion on the Proposal for a European Parliament
and Council Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of
the use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering, DOC. ECO/028, Brussels,
26.1.2000, paragraphs 12.10 and 12.11.
205 In this context see Financial Action Task Force (2000), Report on Non-Cooperative Countries
and Territories, 14.2.2000.
206 Commission, 1998, p.7.
207 Ibid.
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A great challenge to the effective operation of the anti-money laundering
framework set out by the 1991 directive has been posed by the speed with which
the money laundering process has evolved during the ensuing decade. Both the
unprecedented legal regulation in the field, urging launderers to find alternative
means of money laundering, and parallel developments in technology, drastically
changing the mode in which financial transactions are conducted, have the
potential to render a number of the directive provisions ineffective, if not outdated.
This fact has been acknowledged by the Contact Committee set up by the directive
to monitor its effectiveness and implementation,208 and also by the Commission
and the Parliament.209 Their discussions on the directive, following also parallel
developments in fora such as the FATF, led to an acknowledgement of the need to
revise the 1991 directive in order to take into account such developments. This
need, which was also reflected in the recent Commission Action Plan on Financial
Services,210 was addressed by the recent Commision's directive proposal,211 whose
article 1 seeks to amend directive 91/308 in two main respects: in extending the
scope of the money laundering offence; and in extending the ratione personae
scope of the duties imposed by it. Further amendments were proposed with regard
208 The Committee is established by article 13 of the directive, whose first paragraph entrusts it with
the following tasks: to facilitate harmonised implementation of the directive through regular
consultation on any practical problems arising from its application and on which exchanges of view
are deemed useful; to facilitate consultation between the member states on the more stringent or
additional conditions and obligations which they may lay down at national level; to advise the
Commission, if necessary, on any supplements or amendments to be made to the directive or on any
adjustments deemed necessary, in particular to harmonise the effects of article 12 (stating that
member states shall ensure that the directive provisions are extended in whole or in part to
professions and to categories of undertakings other than those covered by its scope, which engage in
activities which are particularly likely to be used for money laundering purposes); to examine
whether a profession or a category of undertaking should be included in the scope of article 12
where it has been established that such profession or category of undertaking has been used in a
member state for money laundering.
209
Commission, 1998; European Parliament, 1999i.
210 Commission of the European Communities (1999i), Financial Services: Implementing the
Framework for Financial markets: Action Plan, COM(1999)232, 11.5.1999.
211 Commission of the European Communities (1999ii), Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive amending Council Directive 9I/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering, COM(1999)352 final,
99/0152(COD), Brussels, 14.7.1999.
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the identification requirements, while a new provision has been inserted to regulate
aspects of information exchange on suspicious transactions.212
B. The extension of the list of predicate offences
As mentioned above, the major international initiatives to counter money
laundering -the United Nations Convention, the Council of Europe Convention,
the FATF Recommendations- initially criminalised only the laundering of proceeds
from drug offences. The Strasbourg Convention and the FATF however provide for
the optional extension of criminalisation to further categories of predicates. This
approach has been followed by the money laundering directive, which is largely
based on the wording of the Vienna Convention, but leaves to the member states
• 213
the possibility to extend the scope of prohibited money laundering.
The years following the adoption of these measures were marked by a series of
reactions against the limitation of the money laundering offence to drug crimes and
calls in favour of its extension to cover a wide range of offences, including
organised crime. This is a reflection of a shift in the policy agenda from the 'war on
drugs', which had largely served as a justification for the early money laundeirng
counter-measures to the fight against the multi-faceted threat of organised crime. It
also mirrors law enforcement and expert views asserting that the limitation of
money laundering to drug offences renders the legislation ineffective. As is argued
by the drafters of a recent United Nations Report:
212 The two other articles of the new draft deal largely with implementation issues. Article 2 assigns
to the Commission the task to carry out, three years after the adoption of the directive, and in the
context of the report provided for in article 17 of the 1991 directive, a particular examination of
aspects relating to the specific treatment of independent legal professionals, the identification of
clients in non-face to face transactions and possible implications for electronic commerce. Article 3
on the other hand imposes a series of technical obligations to the member states regarding the
implementation of the directive, with the most crucial one being the time-frame set out by paragraph
1, which demands national implementing legislation to be adopted by 31.12.2001 the latest.
213 See part 2 above.
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'The time may have come to end the artificial division of criminal money into categories
depending on the nature of the crime. As long as some criminal money can be laundered
legally, the financial system will argue that its financial centre arrangements to hide funds
have a legitimate purpose. Banks and brokers who are asked to launder money will argue
that they thought the money was legitimate because, although criminal in nature, it came
from a non-predicate crime'.214
This policy shift is clearly reflected in the revision of the FATF
Recommendations. The earlier combination of Recommendations 4 and 5 called
for the criminalisation of drug money laundering as set forth in the Vienna
Convention, while leaving in the consideration of countries the extension of the
offence to any other crimes for which there is a link to narcotics or to all or a
number of serious offences. This framework has been replaced by revamped
Recommendation 4, whose first part is identical in calling for drug money
laundering criminalisation, while the new second part reads as follows: 'Each
country should extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on
serious offences. Each country would determine which serious crimes would be
215
designated as money laundering predicate offences'. "
At the European Union level, the issue of the extension of the money laundering
predicates has partly been addressed in the specific context of third pillar measures
on fraud216 and confiscation.217 Recommendation 26(b) of the Action Plan on
Organised Crime, on the other hand, states inter alia that 'criminalization of
laundering of the proceeds of crime should be made as general as possible, and a
214 United Nations, op. cit., p.66.
215
Emphasis added.
216 The Second Protocol of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities'
Financial Interests (OJ C221, 19.7.1997, p.11), criminalises the laundering of proceeds of fraud, at
least in serious cases, and of active and passive corruption (articles 1(e) and 2).
217 The Joint Action on money laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of
the instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime (OJ L333, 9.12.1998, p.l) calls at member states
to ensure that no reservations are made to article 6 of the Council of Europe money laundering
Convention which inter alia establishes the offence of money laundering in so far as serious
offences are concerned (article 1(b)). On a more detailed analysis see chapter 4.
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legal basis should be created for as broad as possible a range of powers of
investigation into it'.218
Similar calls were made in the evaluation of the money laundering directive by
the EC institutions. In its report on the first Commission implementation report, the
European Parliament adopted a motion for a Resolution whose point 5 calls on the
member states, 'insofar as they have not already done so, to extend their legislation
on combating money laundering not only to money derived from drugs trafficking
219but to all money required from professional and organized crime'. Although this
call has been followed by the majority of the member states in their
implementation of the directive, the latter's minimalist approach has been criticised
also by the Commission, whose Second implementation report stated on the matter
that:
'Despite the progress made by the Member States in the coverage of their anti-money
laundering legislation the question nevertheless arises as to whether it is acceptable that the
Directive, which remains one of the basic international texts in this area, should fail so
clearly now to reflect the current reality'.220
The Commission draft amending the 1991 directive reflects these developments
in amending the definition of money laundering to include new predicate offences.
According to its Preamble, this change is an acknowledgment of international
trends, such as the revision of the FATF Recommendations, and is justified by the
need to facilitate suspicious transaction reporting and international co-operation in
this area.221 Rather than following an 'all-crime' prohibition of money laundering,
the directive, in amended article 1(E), opts for an extension to cover, along with the
218 On progress regarding the investigation aspect, see chapter 6.
219
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Report on the first
Commission's report to be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council on the
implementation of the Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose




221 Recitals 12 and 13.
139
drug offences of the 1991 text, the following conduct: participation in activities
linked to organised crime; and fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity
damaging or likely to damage the European Communities' financial interests. The
'minimum standard' approach is retained, as member states are provided with the
discretion to designate as a predicate any other criminal activity.
A detailed discussion of the justification and the issues surrounding this
222amendment will take place in a following chapter. Here it suffices to say that the
specific, but at the same time vague types of conduct listed as predicates are
another clear demonstration of political compromise in the drafting process. As the
pressure for an 'all-crime' prohibition meets concerns over the extent of EC
competence in the field of criminal law, the outcome has been to include predicates
legitimated by prior EC or EU action in the field, a choice that was greatly
criticised in subsequent readings of the draft.223 The problems are particularly
evident in view of the, almost simultaneous, adoption by the Council of a Joint
Position reflecting the EU views on the proposed United Nations Convention
against organised crime.224 Article 1(5) reflects the Council's stance that, in the
money laundering field, the convention 'should extend to a broad range of offences
See chapter 4.
223 In its first draft legislative proposal amending the Commission's draft, the European Parliament
deleted the reference to the predicates of fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting
the financial interests of the Communities. According to the Parliament, these predicates, 'despite
all laudable intentions, do not logically belong in this directive'. European Parliament, Committee
on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (1999ii), Draft Report on the proposal
for a European Parliament and Council directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10
June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering,
Rapporteur: K.-H. Lehne, DOC. PRELIMINARY 1999/0152(COD)-F1, 3.11.1999, p.24. Quite
surprisingly, in a subsequent reading by the Parliament, the reference to the predicates was
reinstated, now covering 'fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities to the detriment of the
public authorities and especially the financial interests of the European Communities', thus
broadening the offence further than the Commission's draft! See European Parliament, Committee
on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (1999iii), Draft Report on the
proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive amending Council Directive
91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of
money laundering, Rapporteur: K.-H. Lehne, Draftsman: D.R. Theato, DOC. PRELIMINARY
1999/0152(C0D)-F1 REV.l, 16.12.1999. Emphasis added.
224 Joint Position of 29.3.1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on
European Union, on the proposed United Nations convention against organised crime, OJ L87,
31.3.1999, p.l.
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and, in particular, should be consistent with the 40 Recommendations of the
Financial Action Task Force'. What cannot be achieved at the Community level,
the Council thus attempts to do through the 'back-door': that is, by way of the
ratification by member states of a UN Convention containing a broad
criminalisation of money laundering.225
C. The extension of the ratione personae scope
Another prevalent tendency in the years following the adoption of the directive has
been the increasing use of wider categories of financial and non-financial
institutions for money laundering purposes. This tendency reflects, according to
policy makers, the adoption of money laundering counter-measures and the
increased level of compliance by credit and financial institutions, leading
launderers to shift to non-regulated professions for their activities.226 On the other
hand, this tendency can also be associated with the increasing sophistication in
money laundering activities, which involve a wide range of intermediary
professions of a varied expertise. The growing role of professional services
providers in money laundering facilitation has been emphasised in a recent FATF
report on money laundering typologies, which is worth quoting at length:
'Accountants, solicitors, and company formation agents turn up even more frequently in
anti-money laundering investigations. In establishing and administering the foreign legal
entities which conceal money laundering schemes, it is these professionals that increasingly
provide the apparent sophistication and extra layer of respectability to some laundering
operations'.227
225 It is interesting to note here that the European Parliament put forward in the directive amendment
a definition of organised crime meaning 'the activities of persons, acting in concert with a view to
committing serious crime, involved in any criminal organisation which has a structure and is, or has
been, established for a certain period of time'. European Parliament, 1999iii. According to the
Parliament, the definition chosen conforms to the Council's Joint Position, on the basis of which it
can be assumed that there is currently agreement among the Member States in this respect.
226 See for instance Financial Action Task Force, Annual Report 1996-1997, paragraph 16.
227 FATF 1998/1999, paragraph 47.
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The FATF addressed these developments in the revision of the 40
Recommendations in 1996. Recommendation 8 (ex 9) was revised to include a
further indent calling on member states to ensure the application and effective
application of anti-money laundering standards equally also to non-bank financial
institutions which are not subject to a formal prudential supervisory regime in all
counties, such as bureaux de change. Recommendation 9 (ex 10) on the other hand
calls on national authorities to consider the extension of the applicability of the
Recommendations' duties to 'the conduct of financial activities as a commercial
undertaking by businesses or professions which are not financial institutions, where
such conduct is not allowed or not prohibited'.
The need to address this tendency has been highlighted by a number of EC
institutions. Notwithstanding the directive's extensive coverage of financial
institutions, considerable pressure has been exercised by the European Parliament
towards the amendment of the relevant provisions. The Parliament criticised the
Second Commission implementation report on the grounds that it neglected
competition-related aspects in the financial sector, in not demonstrating: whether
all activities in the financial sector are covered in practice; whether all relevant
actors have to face the same or at least comparable obligations; and whether, from
an economic point of view, these obligations affect their competitive position in an
equal way. The Parliament therefore called for an amendment containing
'measures aimed to ensure that legal requirements imposed on the financial sector
in the wide sense of the term are equal for all branches of that sector and that the
competitive position of economic actors in the financial sector is affected in an
equal way in practice'.229
In the same context, the Parliament proposed the extension of the ratione
personae scope of the directive to cover a wide range of professions at risk of
being involved in money laundering or abused by money launderers. The indicative
228
European Parliament, 1999i, p. 12.
229 Motion for a resolution, point 1(b).
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list includes both financial and non-financial professions such as estate agents, art
dealers, auctioneers, casinos, bureaux de change, transporters of funds, notaries,
accountants, advocates, tax advisors and auditors. The Parliament called for either
the full or partial application to them of the directive provisions, or the application
of new rules taking into account specific characteristics of the professions such as
the duty of discretion.230
The Parliament's proposal gives a concrete legislative form to the discussions
under the auspices of the Contact Committee with a view of extending the scope of
231the directive. It also reflects the political impetus in the European Union for the
need to extend the directive's scope. The conclusions of the 1996 Dublin European
Council contain a commitment to its full application and 'possible extension to
232
those relevant professions and bodies outside the classical financial sector'. ~ The
Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime one year later called for the extension of
the directive's reporting obligation to 'persons and professions other than the
233
financial institutions mentioned in this Directive . "
The new Commission's draft reflects these concerns in two respects: in
amending the list of financial institutions covered by the directive; and in adding to
its scope an extensive list of non-financial professions. With regard to financial
institutions, new articles 1(b) and 2a specifically include within the scope of the
directive the activities of currency exchange offices ('bureaux de change') and of
money transmission/remittance offices. It also adds to the list investment firms as
defined in article 1 of directive 93/22/EEC.234 In this manner, the Commission took
230 Point 1(a).
231 The Committee noted inter alia that member states should consider whether a series of
professions involved a demonstrable risk of money laundering. The list covered professions the
gambling industry and dealers in high-value items, as well as, under certain circumstances, the legal
profession. See Commission 1998, pp. 10-11.
232 Commission 1998, p.l 1. The Council conclusions can be found as annex 1 therein.
233 Recommendation 26(e).
234 It is interesting to note here that, while the new draft includes, as the 1991 directive, insurance
companies duly authorised in accordance with Directive 79/267/EEC, the text, unlike the 1991
directive, does not take into account subsequent amendments of this directive, in particular by
directive 92/96/EEC, which was adopted after the money laundering directive. The recent call of the
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into consideration the arguments of the Parliament casting doubts on whether these
activities were really covered by the 1991 directive." "
However, perhaps the most extensive amendment to the directive is made by the
insertion by new article 2a of an exhaustive list of the following legal and natural
persons, to whom the directive applies:
External accountants and auditors;
Real estate agents;
Notaries and other independent legal professionals when assisting or representing
clients in respect of the:
a. buying and selling of real property or business entities
b. handling of client money, securities or other assets
c. opening or managing bank, savings or securities accounts
d. creation, operation or management of companies, trusts or similar structures
e. execution of any other financial transactions
Dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or metals
Transporters of funds
The operators, owners and managers of casinos.
The Commission's list is an ambitious addition to the 1991 directive, which
largely follows the proposals of the European Parliament. The list is more
restricted than the latter to the extent that it does not include art dealers and
auctioneers, since the Commission believes that it is difficult both to define these
European Parliament to take these developments into consideration was not heard in this respect.
See European Parliament, 1999, p. 12.
235
Commission, 1999ii, p.7. Regarding bureaux de change and money remittance offices, potential
problems were generated by differences in the language versions of the annex to the Second
Banking Directive, which provided the basis for the definition of financial institutions for the
purposes of the money laundering directive. Investment firms on the other hand were expressly
included since the Investment Services Directive (IDS) was adopted in 1993 (OJ L141, 11.6.1993,
p.27), after the adoption of the money laundering directive.
236 The European Parliament amended the provision further to include also in the definition of credit
institutions 'an undertaking that issues prepaid cards for payment purposes or creates and manages
units of payment in computer networks'. European Parliament, 1999iii, p.8. Concerns to include
electronic money undertakings in the scope of the directive are also expressed in specific secondary
legislation related to their establishment and supervision: see chapter 5.
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activities and to provide an effective monitoring framework. As the Commission
notes, the inclusion of art dealers would have the potential of over-extending the
scope of the directive, as it 'would also raise the question of applying the same
obligations to any dealer in high value items, including for example luxury car
dealers, jewellery shops or stamp and coin dealers'.237
The main instance however where there is a danger of over-extension of the
directive's scope relates to the inclusion of legal professions. The draft attempts to
delimit their involvement by providing a list of corporate or financial transactions,
where there is the greatest money laundering risk, in the course of which the duties
of the directive are imposed.238 Taking into consideration the special nature of legal
professions, article 6 establishes a series of derogations from the obligation to
report to the national authorities responsible for combating money laundering.
According to paragraph 3, member states may designate as this authority the bar
association or appropriate self-regulatory body of the profession concerned.
The same paragraph further states, in an attempt to safeguard the well-
established principle of lawyer-client confidentiality, that member states shall not
be obliged to apply this duty to legal professionals 'with regard to information they
receive from a client in order to be able to represent him in legal proceedings'.
However, this derogation shall not cover any case in which there are grounds for
suspecting that advice is being sought for the purpose of facilitating money
laundering. These derogations, however, with their limited and vague scope, do not
suffice to address the important rule of law and human rights problems created by
the involvement of the legal professions in the fight against money laundering.
D. Revisions in the field of customer identification
237
Commission, 1999ii, p.9. On an analysis of the issues related to the Commission's choice in this
respect, see chapter 5.
238 See Preamble, recital 23.
239 For an extensive analysis, see chapter 5.
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Another significant challenge to the effective implementation of money laundering
counter-measures has been posed by technological advances which have the
potential to alter significantly the nature of financial transactions. This is
particularly the case with the evolution of new payment technology systems, such
as smart cards, on-line banking and electronic cash.240 The spread of these
technologies has been asserted by the Financial Action Task Force, whose recent
report identifies the following risks posed by these new developments:
-. Inability to identify and authenticate parties that use the new technologies;
-. Level of transparency of the transaction;
-. Lack or inadequacy of audit trails, record keeping, or suspicious transaction
reporting by the technology provider;
-. Use of higher levels of encryption (thus blocking out law enforcement agencies);
and
-. Transactions that fall outside current legislative or regulatory definition.241
The need to address the issues was brought about by the evolution of new
technologies has been addressed by the 1996 revision of the FATF
Recommendations. New Recommendation 13 provides that 'countries should pay
special attention to money laundering threats inherent in new or developing
technologies that might favour anonymity, and take measures, if needed, to prevent
their use in money laundering schemes'.
The difficulties caused by new technologies in respect to customer identification
had been highlighted by the European Parliament in 1996, in the first report on the
Commission's implementation report. In an eloquent passage, which is worth
240 On some aspects of these issues see inter alia: C.D. Hoffman (1998),'Encrypted Digital Cash
Transfers: Why Traditional Money Laundering Controls May Fail without Uniform Cryptography
Regulations' in Fordham International Law Journal, vol.21, pp.799-860; and T.H. Ehrlich
(1998),'To Regulate or Not? Managing the Risks of E-Money and Its Potential Application in
Money Laundering Schemes' in Harvard Journal ofLaw and Technology, vol. 1 l,no.3,pp.833-863.
241 FATF 1998-99, paragraph 27. The Report contains a detailed analysis of the status of new
payment technologies in paragraphs 28 to 34.
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quoting at length, the Parliament emphasised these issues in the context of direct
banking:
'An indispensable precondition for the recognition and prevention by credit and financial
institutions of transactions which may involve money laundering is the 'know your
customer' principle. It must always be possible to identify clients.
In the new forms of direct banking this has already become impossible. The client performs
his transactions by telephone or computer, and there is no longer any visual contact with
him. Even the identification of the client when entering into business relations is based on
the sending of a registered letter with advice of delivery; even a photocopy of a client's
passport or identity card is sufficient evidence of identity.
According to the experts, this approach is abused for money laundering purposes on a
massive scale, and is no longer acceptable. It is therefore proposed that, when a client
enters into business relations with a bank which operates a direct banking service, the
client should first be identified by a third bank through submission of identity
documents.'242
Addressing the issue, the new Commission draft contains an annex on customer
identification in non face-to-face financial operations. The annex establishes a
series of principles to be followed in identification procedures in these cases.
Principle (i) states as a general aim of the procedures 'appropriate customer
identification'. This is ensured by taking account of non face-to-face operations in
the internal control procedures established by article 11(1) of the directive
(principle (iv)); and, according to principle (v), on the basis of the establishment of
detailed procedures, requiring:
a.the use of the contracting institution's branch or representative office which is
nearest to the customer in order to carry out a face-to-face identification
b.in cases of non face-to-face identification:
242
European Parliament, 1996, p.l 1.
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A copy of the customer's official identification number or the official number of
the identification document, with special attention to be paid to the verification of
the customer's address.
The carrying out of the first payment through an account opened in the
customer's name with a credit institution located in the European Union or the
European Economic Area. In a reflection of the extraterritoriality logic, however,
member states may allow payments carried out through 'reputable credit
institutions established in third countries which apply equivalent anti-money
laundering standards'.
-. The verification by the contracting institution that the identities of the holder of
the account through which the payment is made and of the customer, as indicated
through the identification procedure, are identical. In the case of doubt, the
contracting institution should contact the institution where the account was opened
in order to confirm the customer's identity. Should doubts still remain, a certificate
should be required from this institution 'attesting to the identity of the account
holder and confirming that the identification was properly carried out and that the
particulars have been registered according to the Directive'.
These identification requirements are not applicable:
-. When there are reasonable grounds to believe that face-to-face contact is being
avoided in order to conceal the true identity of the customer and there is suspicion
ofmoney laundering (principle (ii)).
-. In operations involving the use of cash (principle iii).
-. In accordance with article 3(7) of the directive, when the counterpart of the
contracting institution is another institution acting on behalf of a customer, if the
counterpart is located in the European Union or in the European Economic Area
(principle (vi)(a)).243
243
According to principle (vi)(b), if the counterpart is located outside the European Union and the
European Economic Area, the institution should check the identity of its counterpart (unless it is
well known), by consulting a reliable financial directory. In the case of doubt, the institution should
seek confirmation of its counterpart's identity from the third country supervisory authorities. It
should also take 'reasonable measures to obtain information' on the customer of its counterpart
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(in the discretion of member states): in the case of certain insurance operations,
when the payment is, according to article 3(8), 'to be debited from an account
opened in the customer's name with a credit institution subject to this Directive'
(principle v(c)).
This list of identification requirements is neither exhaustive, nor exclusive.
Principle (vii) provides that they 'do not preclude the use of other ones which, in
the opinion of the competent authorities, may provide equivalent safety for the
identification in non-face-to-face financial operations'. Major issues thus arise
regarding the uniform implementation of the directive in this regard. This is
especially the case in view of the Parliament's amendment of the draft to extend
the scope of the annex also to the persons covered by the directive.244
E. The policing aspect
Article 6 of the directive contains a reference to the competent authorities
responsible at the national level for combating money laundering, which receive
the reports made by credit and financial institutions. As the Community lacks
competence in crime control aspects of this kind, the directive does not contain any
further specification on the nature, characteristics and operation of these authorities
and the system of information exchange established by it. As will be seen in a
following chapter,245 this has led to a considerable level of diversity regarding the
functioning of the co-operation duty at the national level.
In view of the issue of EC competence, new article 12 comes as some surprise in
providing, in its paragraph 2, that 'in case of fraud, corruption or any illegal
(beneficial owner of the operation- article 3(5) of the directive). These 'reasonable measures' could
go from simply requesting the name and address of the customer, when the country applies
equivalent identification requirements, to requesting a counterpart's certificate stating that the
customer's identity has been properly verified and registered, when in the country in question the
identification rerquirements are not equivalent'.
244
European Parliament, 1999iii, p. 15.
245 See chapter 6.
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activity damaging or likely to damage the European Communities' financial
interests, the anti-money laundering authorities referred to under article 6 and,
within its competences, the Commission, shall collaborate with each other for the
purpose of preventing and detecting money laundering', exchanging, to this end,
information on suspicious transactions. This avenue of information exchange is
qualified by the stipulation, in the same paragraph, that such exchange shall be
covered by rules of professional secrecy. Paragraph 3 of the same article further
provides member states with the discretion to exempt, in the case of legal
professions, bar associations and self-regulatory professional bodies from these
obligations.
The establishment of an open-textured duty of co-operation between national
financial intelligence units and the Commission, and in particular the exchange of
information on suspicious transactions, is a bold step which may face strong
reactions in the subsequent readings of the draft directive, probably under the same
'lack of competence' argumentation surrounding the criminalisation of money
laundering in the 1990 Commission's draft. The Commission acknowledged in its
Explanatory Memorandum that the stage of integration is such as to allow co¬
operation only in cases of illegal activities damaging the Community's financial
interests.246 However, the existence of EC competence at the information exchange
level with crime control units is contested and the lack of similar provisions
covering the level of co-operation between financial intelligence units themselves
and credit and financial institutions creates a fragmented and vague picture in a
field with high demands for the safeguard of human rights and civil liberties.247
F. Overview
The Commission's draft directive amending the 1991 provisions is a welcome
development addressing to a great extent policy issues arising in the 1990's. In line
246
Commission, 1999ii, p.l 1.
247 For an extensive analysis, see chapter 6.
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with parallel international initiatives in the field, such as action by the FATF, the
new directive extends, rather than contradicts, the provisions of directive 91/308.
This extension raises a series of legal issues which will be examined in detail in
the following chapters. Here it is important to note that, as in 1990-1991, and
notwithstanding the great progress in European integration with two Treaties- in
Maastricht and Amsterdam- which put crime control matters in the picture, the
drafting of the new directive is still confronted by thorny issues related to EC
competence in this field. It is in this light that one must view both the revisions put
forward by the Commission, some of them manifestly an outcome of compromise,
but also the matters that were finally excluded from the Commission draft such as
fiscal fraud or issues related to the introduction of the EURO to name but few.248
In view of the amendments already made by the European Parliament and the
increased powers it has under the co-decision procedure under which the directive
is to be adopted,249 it remains to be seen how these issues will be addressed in the
finally adopted version.
248 See European Parliament, 1999i, especially on the issues of the EURO, the extraterritorial
application of the directive and electronic money. The Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime, on
the other hand, contains Recommendation 29 calling for legislation to combat organised crime in
connection with fiscal fraud.
249
According to articles 47(2), first and third sentences (ex 57) and 95 (ex 100a) of the EC Treaty,
which constitute the legal basis of the directive, the procedure to be followed for the adoption of the
measure is the co-decision procedure of article 251 (ex 189b). This procedure was introduced by the
Maastricht Treaty, after the adoption of the 1991 directive. It enhances the role of the European
Parliament, in providing the latter with the opportunity, in case of disagreement, to assert its views
towards the adoption of a jointly approved text with the Council, and by ultimately giving to the
Parliament the power to veto the proposed legislation. A practical outcome of this change has been
that the new measure will be a 'European Parliament and Council' directive, rather than a 'Council'
directive as the 1991 one. On a detailed analysis of the co-decision procedure, see inter alia P.
Craig and G. de Burca (1998), European Union Law. Text, Cases andMaterials, 2nd edition,








A main component of the anti-money laundering policy has been the
criminalisation of the laundering process. The need to combat the laundering of
capital by penal means, reflected in both the UN and Council of Europe
Conventions, has been acknowledged in the Preamble of the EC directive.1
Following this assertion, article 2 of the latter establishes that member states shall
ensure that money laundering is prohibited. According to the third indent of article
1, money laundering is defined, largely on the basis of the aforementioned
Conventions,2 as consisting of the following conduct when committed
intentionally:
-. The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived
from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting
any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal
consequences of his action
1 Council Directive of 10.6.1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of
money laundering (91/308/EEC), OJ L166, 28.6.1991, p.77. Preamble, recital 4.
2 For an extensive analysis, see chapters 2 and 3.
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The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such
property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such
activity
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt,
that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of
participation in such activity
Participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting,
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the
foregoing paragraphs.
The aim of this chapter is to cast light to a series of issues arising from the
introduction of this new, and at first sight quite broad and complex offence. The
analysis aims at placing the challenges that the money laundering offence poses to
fundamental principles of criminal law in the light of the broader impact of a
security logic to criminal law policies. This will be done by beginning with an
analysis of issues related to the policy context and justification of the offence, prior
to examining problems arising in relation to its elements.
2. MONEY LAUNDERING AS AN ANCILLARY OLLENCE
A principal feature of the money laundering offence is its association with a former
predicate offence generating the proceeds which are placed in the laundering
process. On the basis of this feature, money laundering has been classified within
the category of the so-called 'ancillary offences', whose common characteristic is
that they bear some kind of auxiliary relationship to primary harm crimes.
According to Norman Abrams, who put forward the term, these offences are
marked 'by group activity or conduct leading up to, or involved generally in, the
3 N. Abrams (1989), 'The New Ancillary Offenses', in Criminal Law Forum, vol.1, no.l, pp. 1-39,
at p. 2.
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commission of substantive offenses, or they define as criminal, conduct practiced
in the aftermath of a primary harm crime'.4
Abrams provides a detailed analysis of the emergence and characteristics of
ancillary offences and the challenges they pose for U.S. criminal law. Money
laundering is categorised as a derivative, 'after-the-fact' offence, as it does not
involve the commission of primary criminal harm.5 This renders liability for
money laundering comparable to accomplice liability, with the following important
difference: whereas traditional liability of this kind encompasses aid before, or at
the time of the predicate offence, money laundering involves conduct taking place
after the commission of the crime. As Abrams concludes, money laundering can
thus be viewed as 'a special form of accessory-after-the-fact offense, but with
heavier penalties than we traditionally assign to that form of complicitous
liability'.6
The commission of money laundering 'after-the-fact' brings forward the
conceptual similarities of the offence with the crime of receiving, or handling
stolen goods. Central to both offences is the commission of a predicate offence and
the attempt to safeguard its proceeds. The money laundering offence however is
broader in two respects. First of all, it extends beyond the narrow scope of stolen
goods, covering proceeds from a wide range of crimes, constituting thus a model
'adaptable to any crime committed for gain'.7 Furthermore, and rather than
focusing solely on handling, the money laundering process is centered on the
concealment of the true origin of the criminal proceeds and their appearance as licit
funds.
4 Ibid.
5 For a categorisation and extensive analysis of the ancillary offences, see chapter 1.
6
Abrams, op. cit., p.7.
7
Abrams, op. cit., p. 10. A similar view has been expressed in the discussion of the money
laundering offence in the German Parliament, which highlighted the limitations of the handling
offence to cover all kinds of criminal proceeds. Deutsche Bundestag, 'Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur
Bekampfung des illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten
Kriminalitat (OrgKG) in Drucksache 12/989, p.26.
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The 'after-the-fact' character of the money laundering offence raises also
important issues associated with the question of whether the offence generates a
Q
discrete harm or not. The answer to this question is linked with the necessity of
this new offence to protect a specific legal interest, and whether the latter is
identical to the one of the primary harm offence. Further issues are raised by the
broad delimitation of the scope of money laundering.9 As the latter is committed
through a series of everyday transactions, further challenges are posed to
traditional criminal law principles related to the elements of the offence.
3. INTEREST PROTECTED BY LAW
In justifying the necessity for a separate money laundering offence, the directive,
in line with prior international instruments, refers to money laundering as a
multifaceted threat, closely associated with the threat of transnational organised
crime.10 This process of securitisation can be translated at the legal level as
justifying the criminalisation of money laundering on the grounds of protecting
interests ranging from individual ones such as property to collective ones such as
state security. Such overarching justification raises significant tensions in view of
the debate about whether the actual money laundering offence involves a separate
harm from its predicate, and whether it is conceptually different from its model
offence of receiving.
The controversy surrounding the demarcation of the protected interests by the
money laundering offence has been particularly visible in German policy and legal
discourse. According to the justification of the legislation in the German
Parliament, the introduction of the money laundering offence serves the task of
8 See Abrams, op. cit., p.8, who argues that the discrete harm element in the money laundering
offence lies in the enormity of the sums laundered and the regularity and professionalisation in the
financial transactions involved.
9 As Abrams notes, the money laundering offences were created 'by breaking into subparts the total
transaction involved in the commission of a traditional primary harm offense and creating new,
separate crimes out of a part of the transaction that was not heretofore generally punishable as a
separate crime'. Abrams, op. cit., p.8.
10 See chapter 3.
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maintaining the rule of law in the state by eliminating the commission of crimes.11
This view is associated to the rationale of the evolution of money laundering
counter-measures as a means of depriving the criminals of their profits and thus
providing a major disincentive for the commission of the primary harm offence. In
this manner, the money laundering offence serves to protect the interest of society
in the maintenance of law and order.
The broad view linking the money laundering offence with the maintenance of
the rule of law is inextricably linked with arguments related to the protection of
specific further interests. It has thus been argued that, along with the rule of law,
1 9
what is protected is also all the interests protected by the predicate offences. The
criminalisation of money laundering is deemed thus essential in order to protect
interests as diverse as human life, property, the social fabric and public order.
In a parallel line of argumentation, it has been put forward that the protection
lies not so much in the prosecution of already committed crimes, but in the
elimination of future crimes.13 While the temporal orientation of the protection
differs to some extent, this view also associates the money laundering offence with
the protection of diverse legal interests and brings into the fore the broad
conceptualisation of security, which is considered as a separate interest meriting
protection by the criminal law.
In a similar preventive logic, another view has put forward that the purpose of
the money laundering offence is not to permit the offender to take part in the licit
economic life.14 Along with general rule of law protection considerations, this view
11 Deutsche Bundestag, op. cit., p.27.
12 See K. Oswald (1997i), Die Implementation gesetzlicher Massnahmen zur Bekampfung der
Geldwasche in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine empirische Untersuchung des para. 261
StGB i. V. m. dem Geldwaschegesetz, Iuscrim, Freiburg I. Br., p. 63. Oswald provides an excellent
overview of the doctrinal views regarding the rationale of the money laundering offence.
13 Oswald, op. cit., p.61, referring to Barton, StV 3/1993, p.160.
14
Oswald, op. cit., citing Salditt, StV- Forum 4/1992, p.121.
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highlights the need to protect the soundness of the financial system,15 bringing thus
into the fore the 'economic' single market considerations of the money laundering
directive.
Money laundering is thus viewed as a security threat, its criminalisation deemed
necessary in order to counter it. Placed within this broad security logic, its rationale
transcends the 'property' justification of receiving: the money laundering offence
serves to counter a much more extended and varied range of threats, and is
considered as protecting interests as wide as security per se. At first sight, this
stands in contrast with the choice of many national legislatures not to create a
separate money laundering offence, but to include it in the receiving offence,16 or
to place it as a variant of receiving in the same systematic section of the criminal
code under 'property crimes'.17
In addition to that, further objections can be raised on the actual link of the
money laundering offence with the wide range of interests at stake. Money
laundering is a means of retaining criminal proceeds, and its criminalisation forms
part of a strategy to deprive the offender of their enjoyment, while possibly
deterring her from the commission of further offences. In this light, the threat of
money laundering to the interests protected by the predicate offences, and going
beyond a property logic, such as human life or public order, appears only indirect,
if not tenuous. This is especially the case in view of the separation between the
predicate and money laundering and the professionalisation of the latter. The only
concrete link that can be established is that of protection of the financial system
15 E.-J. Lampe (1994), 'Der neue Tatbestand der Geldwasche (para. 261 StGB)' in Juristenzeitung,
vol.48, no.3, p. 125.
16 In this context, see the cases of Denmark and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands however, the
legislation is being amended to include a separate money laundering offence to be inserted by new
article 420bis of the Penal Code, expected to take effect by mid 2000. This amendment has been
incited by parallel developments in other countries and the acknowledgment that the existing
fencing provisions are not adequate in combating money laundering, especially in cases where the
same person has committed both the predicate offence and money laundering. See MOT,
Newsletter no.12, July 1999 and Annual Report 1999, Ministry of Justice.
17 See for instance the case of Greece. For an overview of the situation in the member states, see
Commission of the European Communities, Second Commission Report to the European
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and thus of economic life, should this be elevated to an equivalent status with
interests such as human life.
The association of the money laundering offence with the protection of a
multitude of interests placed together under the security banner is problematic to a
further extent: through the emotionally charged discourse of imminent threat and
the absolute equation of money laundering with organised crime in this respect, the
criminalisation of the former is justified to protect not so much specifically
delimited interests, but rather abstract, collective values such as the social fabric
and, in its all-encompassing form, security itself. This shift is particularly
dangerous in that legal certainty and the strict protective limits of the criminal law
are challenged, and has the potential to lead in what has been called the
'dynamisation' of legally protected interests, a phenomenon marked by the
production of such interests 'from above'.18 As will be seen in the context of the
money laundering offence, this phenomenon has a significant impact on traditional
criminal law principles that have to be bent in view of the perceived urgency in
protecting these interests.
A. ACTUS REUS
According to the directive, the conduct that is described as money laundering
consists of: the conversion or transfer of property; the concealment or disguise of
its origin; its acquisition, possession or use; and the participation in, association to
commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the
commission of any of these acts.19 In their vast majority, these acts constitute at
first sight commonplace behaviour which takes place in everyday, ordinary
commercial transactions. Viewed on its own, the actus reus of the offence is thus
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive,
COM( 1998)401 final, Brussels, 1.7.1998, annex 4.
18
'Dynamisation des biens juridiquesterm used by A. Baratta (1991), 'Les Fonctions
Instrumentales et les Fonctions Symboliques du Droit Penal' in Deviance et Societe, vol.15, no.l,
p.9. See also chapter 1.
19 Article 1, indent 3.
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not only commonplace, but also, as Abrams notes, 'outwardly innocent behavior-
20
engaging in an ordinary bank transaction'. What renders this behaviour
punishable is purely the mental state of the offender.
This extension of criminalisation is also reflected in the all-embracing
terminology of the provision with regard to acts constituting money laundering. No
interpretative guidance is given regarding the exact meaning and delimitation of
terms such as the transfer, acquisition, possession or use of property, or assistance
and participation. This silence has led to expansive interpretations: in England and
Wales, the Criminal Justice Act 1988, as amended by Criminal Justice Act 1993,
criminalises the following conduct as, or related to money laundering: assisting
another to retain the benefit of criminal conduct (section 93A); the acquisition,
possession or use of proceeds of criminal conduct (section 93B); concealing or
transferring proceeds of criminal conduct (section 93C); and tipping off (section
93D).21
Section 93A(l)(a) focuses on assistance when the retention or control by or on
behalf of another ('A') of A's proceeds of criminal conduct is facilitated (whether
by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or
otherwise).22 This wording is used in identical manner in the 1994 Drug
Trafficking Act, covering proceeds of drug trafficking only and has the potential to
broaden considerably the scope of the money laundering offence, as the term
'facilitation' is open-ended and subject to a wide range of interpretations. The
20
Abrams, op. cit., p.35.
21 This Act is not the only one containing provisions on money laundering offences. Parallel
enactments are: the Drug Trafficking Act 1994; the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act 1989; and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991. All three Acts
introduce a further offence of failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion ofmoney laundering,
related only to drug trafficking and terrorism (sections 52, 18A and 54A respectively). In Scotland,
the Act in force is the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, sections 38-40. For a
detailed analysis of the content and interplay between these pieces of legislation see: B.A.K. Rider,
'Taking the Profit Out of Crime', G. Bhattacharyya and E. Radmore, "Fighting Money Laundering-
A United Kingdom Perspective'and N. Clark, 'The Impact of Recent Money Laundering
Legislation on Financial Intermediaries', all in B. Rider and M. Ashe (eds.) (1996), Money





interpretative attempt provided in the parenthesis does not achieve much in terms
of legal clarity, as the same open-ended character applies to the terms used therein,
and the list is non-exhaustive.
These issues have been addressed in a recent Court of Appeal case, involving
the change of money at a bureau de change. ' The appelant, convicted under the
aforementioned section of the Drug Trafficking Act in the first instance, appealed
against his conviction arguing that the word 'facilitated' was given a particular
meaning by the words in the parenthesis, and essentially meant 'concealment', not
being able thus to cover the exchange of small sums of money at a bureau de
change. The argument was rejected by the Court, as it was held that the reason or
purpose behind the conversion of proceeds in that case are not relevant, as the
offence is committed if there is facilitation of retention or control with no further
reference to purpose. In this resolute attempt to broaden the meaning of
facilitation, the Court acknowledged the all-embracing potential of the 'assisting'
offence. The outcome is, on the one hand, the criminalisation, subject to the
appropriate mens rea requirements, of a series of small sum every day financial
transactions. The abandonment of the requirement of 'purpose' of conversion
furthermore departs from the view of money laundering as a process of
transforming the nature of criminal proceeds and extends 'assisting' to a general
receiving offence, only with stricter penalties.
Similar issues arise regarding the definition of criminal proceeds, with the
directive adopting the broadest possible approach in including 'assets of every
kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or
intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interests in
such assets'.24 The broad character of the provision and the lack of any limits in
time or otherwise, has the potential to lead to an over-extension of the offence to
23 R. v. MacMaster, reported in Criminal Law Review {1999), pp.310-311.
24 Article 1, indent 8.
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cover a never ending chain of acts,25 and, at the same time, a never ending chain of
offences.26
A further matter that has proved to be controversial is the criminalisation of own
funds money laundering. The directive is silent in this respect, as is the Vienna
Convention. In a commentary drafted ten years after the signature of the latter, it
was stated that whereas its language, and in particular the reference to the transfer
of property, can be applied to the person who commits the predicate offence, some
take the contrary view perceiving money laundering as a distinct offence
97
committed in aid of the predicate. Acknowledging this assertion, the Strasbourg
Convention states, in article 6(2)(a), that it may be provided that the money
laundering offences set forth in paragraph 1 of the same article do not apply to the
9R
persons who committed the predicate offence. The controversy is visible in EU
member states. While in England and Wales own funds money laundering is
9Q
explicitly criminalised, in other countries this is not possible as it is contrary to
25
G.Arzt(1993), 'Geldwiische und rechtsstaatlicher Verfall' in Juristenzeitung, vol.48, no.19, p.914
and Oswald, op. cit., p.65.
26 On a criticism of the broadness of the offence in Belgian law, see F.Verbruggen (1997),
'Proceeds-oriented Criminal Justice in Belgium: Backbone or Wishbone of a Modern Approach to
Organised Crime?' in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol.5, no.3,
pp.314-341. Verbruggen refers to interviews with a series of money laundering specialists in
academia and the legal profession. Their concerns are worthy of being quoting at length: 'The
broad criminalization will, in their opinion, inevitably lead to arbitrary decisions. They also point
out that, since the prescription of the predicate offence is irrelevant to the 'derivative' laundering
offence, 505 P.C.[the Belgian Penal Code provision establishing the money laundering offence] is
actually retroactively 'contaminating' goods or fortunes. It does not take a cynic to realise that
almost all major fortunes have at least partially a criminal origin, be it tax fraud, corruption, the
violation of economic or social legislation. Any offence anywhere in the world at any time in the
past can be the predicate crime for a 505P.C. offence'. Page 328, at note 61.
27 United Nations (1998), Commentary on the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, New York, paragraph 3.42.
28
According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Convention, paragraph 2.b takes into account
that in some states the person who committed the predicate offence will not, according to basic
principles of domestic penal law, commit a further offence when laundering the proceeds.
9 See section 93C(1) of the 1988 Criminal Justice Act, which treats as an offence concealing or
transferring proceeds of one's own criminal conduct. As this conduct is punishable if done for the
purpose of avoiding prosecution, it can be argued that the interest protected by criminalisation here
is the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system and the maintenance of the rule of law,
rather than interests linked with the dangers from the predicate offences or the protection of the
financial system. In a similar vein, Brown argues that if the purpose of the offender is solely
commercial in nature, he falls outside the scope of the provision. A. Brown (1996), Proceeds of
Crime. Money Laundering, Confiscation and Forfeiture, W.Green/Sweet and Maxwell, Edinburgh,
p. 130.
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fundamental criminal law systematisations and principles, such as the principle of
ne bis in idem: money laundering is viewed as an activity so closely linked to the




The directive prohibits money laundering under two general conditions: that it is
intentional and that there is knowledge that the property is derived from criminal
activity or from an act of participation in such activity.31 The directive, following
the United Nations and Council of Europe Conventions,32 further provides that
intent and knowledge may be inferred from 'objective factual circumstances'.
Although this reference constitutes an interpretative tool of limited assistance in its
broadness, the express wording of the directive, along with the choice not to
follow the Strasbourg Convention in giving the opportunity to member states to
extend the mens rea into negligent behaviour, provides an indication of the
delimitation of the mens rea requirement to knowledge.
At the same time however, the directive, in a general clause, allows the member
states to adopt or retain stricter provisions than those set out by it to prevent money
30 Such concerns have been repeatedly raised for instance in Greece: see C. Stefanou and H.
Xanthaki (1999), 'Greece: Money Laundering', in Journal ofMoney Laundering Control, vol.3,
no.2, p. 163. On an extensive analysis on the other hand of the situation in the Netherlands, see C.D.
Schaap (1998), Fighting Money Laundering with Comments on the Legislation of the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba, Kluwer Law International, London, The Hague, Boston, pp.63-66. The author
provides an overview of the doctrinal and jurisprudential evolution of the principle that 'the thief
cannot receive stolen property' and examines its applicability in the money laundering offence,
moulded under the receiving model. It is interesting to note, however, that the Dutch legislation is
being revised and new article 420 bis to be inserted in the criminal code sometime in 2000 will
provide for separate criminalisation of money laundering: see supra, note 17.
31 Article 1, indent 3. In addition to these requirements, the directive establishes that, in the case of
conversion or transfer of property, this must occur 'for the purpose of concealing or disguising the
illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such
activity to evade the legal consequences of his action'.
32 Articles 3(3) and 6(2)(c) respectively.
33 Article 6(3)(a) of the Convention allows for the extension of the money laundering offence in
cases where the offender 'ought to have assumed' that the property was criminal proceeds.
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laundering.34 An example of application of this article concerning the mens rea
element of the offence is the case of Germany: article 261(5) of the criminal code
criminalises money laundering also in cases where somebody does not recognise
the criminal origin of the proceeds due to a high degree of negligence
(,leichtfertigkeit). According to the interpretation put forward in the German
Parliament, negligence is viewed as equivalent to the 'gross carelesness' in civil
law, where subjective criteria such as personal knowledge and abilities are used to
assess the foreseeability of the harm that was caused. The test for this degree of
negligence is satisfied when somebody leaves out of attention the possibility of the
commission of an offence due to particular carelessness or indifference on their
behalf.35
The extension of the mens rea requirement to cover cases of negligence was
deemed indispensable by the German legislator in order to overcome obstacles in
34 Article 15.
35
Drucksache, op. cit., p.28. See also a commentary on the German Penal Code: K. Lachner
(herausg.) (1995), Strafgesetzbuch, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich, paragraphs
15/55 and 261/9. In German criminal law, where there is no intermediate stage between intention
and negligence, the concept of leichtfertigkeit is classified as a high degree of negligence. This
element brings into the fore conceptual similarities with the concept of gross negligence in English
criminal law, as both cases are marked by a substantial departure from a degree of care. However,
the implicit indifference in leichtfertigkeit to protected interests that is implied by the interpretation
put forward in the German Parliament, highlights also conceptual similarities with the concept of
recklessness. Notwithstanding the controversy regarding the analytical clarity of objective and
subjective criteria for distinguishing between negligence and recklessness, the prominent use of
subjective criteria in assessing leichtfertigkeit brings into mind subjective assesments of reckless
behaviour (For excellent critical analyses on the concepts, see inter alia R.A. Duff (1990),
Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, MA, USA; J. Horder (1997), "Gross Negligence and
Criminal Culpability' in University of Toronto Law Journal, vol.XLVII, no.4, pp.495-521). It is
interesting to note here that German commentators have not translated leichtfertigkeit in a uniform
manner: while Oswald makes a catchall reference to negligence (K. Oswald (1997), 'Money-
Laundering Legislation in Germany: Selected Results from a Recent Research Project' in European
Journal ofCrime, Criminal law and Criminal Justice, p. 197), Lipp avoids specification by referring
to criminal liability where someone 'ought to have realised that the property was the proceeds of a
predicate crime' (V. Lipp (1999), 'Germany' in B. Rider and Ch. Nakajima (eds.), Anti Money
Laundering Guide, CCH Editions, paragraph 91,000). Ernesto Savona on the other hand translates
leichtfertigkeit borrowing the civil law concept of 'gross carelessness', meaning 'a very high degree
of negligence, comparable with recklessness': E. Savona (in co-operation with F. Manzoni) (1999),
European Money Trails, Harwood Academic Publishers, Australia, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland,
p.60. The thin line between negligence and recklessness, along with the express inclusion of
leichtfertigkeit as a higher form of negligence in the systematic framework of the German Penal
Code (see article 15) dictate the use of the generic term of negligence in this chapter.
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the production of evidence of money laundering and to achieve thus the effective
or
prosecution of the offender." The production of evidence is also linked with the
general difficulty in proving the intent of offenders in money laundering cases,
especially in view of the increasing professionalisation of money laundering,
leading in many cases to the absence of direct involvement of launderers in the
commission of the predicate offence.
The extension of mens rea to negligent money laundering has been strongly
criticised. It has been observed that while such an approach was traditionally an
exceptional phenomenon, it has increasingly become common in the fight against
economic crime. The criminalisation of negligence is viewed as contrary to the
constitutional principle of nullum crimen sine culpa (Strafschuldprinzip) and calls
have been made to the addition to the money laundering offence of precise
37circumstances which ground suspicion (Verdacht)."
The unconstitutionality argument was tested in the German Constitutional Court
on two grounds: the opposition of the negligent money laundering offence to the
principle of nullum crimen sine culpa (Schuldprinzip); and its opposition to the
principle of legal certainty. In its ruling, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the provision as to the first challenge by reiterating the overarching need to
overcome evidentiary difficulties; in this context, the extension of the money
laundering offence to include negligence was deemed indispensable to achieve the
goals set by the legislation. On the second ground, it was held that the legal
certainty principle was not affected, as the money laundering offence is to be
interpreted to include a form of culpability which lies close to intentional conduct.
38 In an attempt to reconcile the reactions to the extension of the offence to
negligent behaviour with the policy need for draconian legislation, the Court thus
attempted to limit the applicability of the law, in a strong contrast with the
systematic distinction between intention and negligence.
36
Drucksache, op. cit., p.27.
37
Lampe, op. cit., p. 129.
38 See Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1997), vol. 49, pp. 3323-3326.
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The debate on the extension of liability for money laundering is prevalent also
in cases where only intentional conduct is criminalised. In such cases, the debate
lies in delicate distinctions between levels of knowledge. In Italy, for instance,
academic opinion is divided on whether reckless knowledge is punishable under
the money laundering offence. While one view asserts that uncertainty as to the
origin of the proceeds along with intention to perform the conduct is punishable as
a laundering offence, the opposing view puts forward the element of 'constructive
intention' rather than reckless knowledge: it is argued that since money laundering
is a conduct crime, the mens rea is linked to the mere intention to perform the
designed conduct. The mental state of uncertainty can thus simply indicate
negligent conduct. This argumentation was followed by the Tribunal of Florence
which held that:
'The prospect of the illicit provenance from crime as a mere possibility...colours the
conduct, at the most, with the connotation of negligence with particular reference to the
transgression of the duty to report suspicious transactions; in this case the mens rea of
money laundering does not appear correctly conceivable because it requires that the
accused intends to operate on money deriving from crime; it implies the actual knowledge
and not the simple doubt with respect of the origin of the assets'.39
The difficulties in the exact delimitation of the knowledge element are evident
also in the law of England and Wales. An attempt at definition and contrast with
the element of suspicion has been made in the context of interpreting handling of
stolen goods in section 22(1) of the Theft Act 1968. In the leading case of R. v.
Hall in the Court of Appeal, the following were noted by Boreham J.:
'A man may be said to know that goods are stolen when he is told by someone with first
hand knowledge (someone such as the thief or the burglar) that such is the case. Belief, of
course, is something short of knowledge. It may be said to be the state of mind of a person
who says to himself: "I cannot say I know for certain that these goods are stolen, but there
39 Decision 894/95 of 10.10.1995, cited in Zaccagnini, op. cit. The author provides an extensive
analysis of the issue in Italian law.
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can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the circumstances, in the light of
all that I have heard and seen." Either of those two states of mind is enough to satisfy the
words of the statute. The second is enough (that is, belief) even if the defendant says to
himself: "Despite all that I have seen and all that I have heard, I refuse to believe what my
brain tells me is obvious". What is not enough, of course, is mere suspicion. "I suspect that
these goods may be stolen, but it may be on the other hand that they are not." That state of
mind, of course, does not fall within the words "knowing or believing".40
The definitional difficulties regarding the element of knowledge have led to
calls for its interpretation in a broad manner, in order to facilitate the task of the
prosecution in money laundering cases. According to a recent analysis, such steps
could include: the requirement that knowledge is inferred from objective
circumstances; the inclusion in the definition of knowledge of the concept of
'wilful blindness'; and the delimitation of the mens rea not solely by the subjective
intent of the defendant, but also of the objective circumstances surrounding the
case. Money laundering is thus established in cases where the defendant either
knew or reasonably ought to have known that the money in question was the
proceeds of crime.41 This approach mirrors to a great extent parallel calls to
transplant interpretations of knowledge on the basis of the case-law on constructive
trusts in the criminal law sphere in order to include a broadly defined concept of
wilful blindness. 42
40
(1985) 81 Cr. App. Rep. 260, at 264. The extract is cited and further analysed in W.C. Gilmore,
'The New U.K. Anti-Money Laundering Laws: Impact and Concerns', unpublished paper presented
in the First British Virgin Islands Due Diligence and Compliance Conference, Tortola, 9-11 March
1998.
41 R.E. Bell (1999), 'Prosecuting the Money Launderers Who Act for Organised Crime' in Journal
ofMoney Laundering Control, vol.3, no.2, p. 107. The author is of the Department of the Director of
Public Prosecutions, Royal Courts of lustice, Belfast.
42 C. Howard (1998), 'The Mens Rea Tests for Money Laundering Offences-1' in New Law
Journal, December 4, pp.1818-1819. The article distinguishes the following categories of mental
states that constitute knowledge:(a) actual knowledge, (b) wilfully shutting one's eyes to the
obvious, (c) wilfully and recklessly filing to make such enquiries an honest and reasonable man
would make, (d) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the fact to an honest and
reasonable man, and (e) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable
man on enquiry. On the basis of the case Baden Delvaux v. Societe Generate (1992) and two other
cases on constructive trusts, the author argues that knowledge in money laundering can be
extensively interpreted to include all five stages. This view is supported notwithstanding the
existence of subsequent case-law, such as the case Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan (1995): in that
constructive trust case, which involved 'dishonest assistance in breach of trust', the Court opted for
the seemingly more limited test of 'conscious impropriety', and called for the imputation of
knowledge on the basis of an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the case and the personal
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The efforts to adopt a broad anti-money laundering framework have also led to
the addition of the element of suspicion in the mens rea of a number of offences
constituting or related to money laundering. This has happened in the cases of
assisting another to retain the benefit of criminal conduct and tipping off.43 The
requirement is more stringent in the offences of concealing or transferring proceeds
of drug trafficking of a third person, and of assisting another to retain proceeds of
terrorist-related activities: there, the element of knowledge is accompanied by the
defendant having 'reasonable grounds to suspect' the origin of the property from
drug trafficking in the first case and engagement in terrorist activities in the
second.44 In view of the aforementioned reservations in extending the knowledge
element to cover forms of negligence, the inclusion of the broad element of
suspicion comes as a sharp contrast to the attempts of achieving legal certainty in
the delimitation of the money laundering offence and has been heavily criticised.45
An attempt to interpret the context and inclusion of suspicion has been made by
Rider, who stated that the latter was included in the money laundering legislation
'to cover the situation where a person deliberately chooses not to carry out an investigation
into the source of the funds. Obviously, it must be proved that he was suspicious in the
first place as to the status of the person whom he is dealing. Where he is suspicious that
this person has carried on [criminal conduct] or has benefited from doing so, then to
characteristics of the individual concerned. The necessity and conceptual clarity of transplanting
concepts of trusts to the distinct field of criminal law is however dubious and can prove detrimental
in protecting fundamental principles which must be guaranteed in the criminal law process. For
similar reactions regarding the use of criminal law concepts in interpreting money laundering in
cases of equity and trusts, see S. Gleeson (1995), 'The Involuntary Launderer: the Banker's
Liability for Deposits of the Proceeds of Crime' in P. Birks, Laundering and Tracing, Clarendon
Press: Oxford, pp. 115-133, especially pp. 132-133.
43 Sections 93A and 93D of Criminal Justice Act 1988 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act
1993.
44 Section 14(2) of Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 and section 53(1 )(b)
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991.
45 On an analysis of the inclusion of suspicion in the Criminal Justice Act see Ch. Howard (1999),
'The Mens Rea Test for Money Laundering Offence-2' in New Law Journal, January 8, p.28. Both
parts have also appeared as C. Howard (1998), 'The Mens Rea of the Money Laundering Offences
in Part VI of the Criminal Justice Act 1988' in Butterworths Journal of International Banking and
Financial Law, December, pp.514-517. On criticisms of this option see J. Wadsley (1994), 'Money
Laundering: Professionals as Policemen' in The Conveyancer, pp.275-288.
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escape liability he will have to prove that the funds do not come from such a crime or that
he has the benefit of a statutory defence'.45
The element of 'deliberately choosing' not to investigate the origin of the money
strongly resembles conceptions of reckless money laundering and the inclusion of
suspicion may thus counter-balance a strict interpretation of the knowledge
element. The potential of an over-extension of the money laundering offence thus
still remains. At the same time, Rider's analysis brings into the fore a parallel
challenge to principles of procedure in criminal law: the reversal of the burden of
proof.
6. BURDEN OF PROOF
A further pressure towards the enhancement of prosecutorial powers in money
laundering trials is reflected in calls arguing in favour of the reversal of the burden
of proof in these cases. These calls are justified on the premises that information
related to the origin of the proceeds falls within the defendant's knowledge, which
renders the proof of their illegal origin too onerous a task for the prosecution.47
Issues of burden of proof in money laundering cases were raised in the United
Kingdom for the first time prior to the adoption of the directive. In a leading case
in England, the Court of Appeal ruled on section 24 of the Drug Trafficking
Offences Act 1986, which criminalised forms of money laundering from drug
trafficking. Subsection 4 stated that
'in proceedings against a person for an offence under this section, it is for the defence to
prove-(a) that he did not know or suspect that the arrangement related to any person's
proceeds from drug trafficking, or (b) that he did not know or suspect that by the
arrangement the retention or control by or on behalf of A of any property was facilitated
or, as the case may be, that by the arrangement any property was used as mentioned in
subsection (1) above [which described the offence]'.
45 B. Rider (1992), 'Fei Ch'ien Laundries-the Pursuit of Flying Money (part II)' in Journal of
International Planning, vol.1, no.3, p.144, cited in Howard, 1999, op. cit.
47 Bell, op. cit., p. 108.
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Against the heavy burden of proof that this provision places on the defendant,
the appelant argued that the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the
defence only in limited cases and such shift requires, in the case of statutes, clear
language. The first instance judge, on the other hand, interpreted the provision as
leaving the prosecution to disprove the matters alleged in section 24(4), rather than
for the defendant to prove them.
The Court did not accept either argument. In a balancing attempt, a distinction
was made between section 24(1), which establishes the mens rea of the offence,
and section 24(4) on defences. It was held that while it is for the prosecution to
prove the state of knowledge required in accordance with the normal standard of
proof, it is for the defendant, should he wish to use the defence of subsection 4, to
48 • • •
prove, on the balance of probabilities, the matters set out therein. This distinction
was reiterated in another common law case in Hong Kong, which centred on the
compatibility of the local drug trafficking legislation with the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights. It was held that the defences were not included in the substance of the
offence and that the onus of proof was on the defendant. The shift of the onus was
judged 'manifestly reasonable' in the context of the war against drug trafficking.49
This distinction was upheld in a post-money laundering directive case. The
Court of Appeal ruled on section 93A of the 1988 Criminal Justice Act, which
reiterated the wording and structure of the 1986 Drug Trafficking Offences Act on
defences. It was held on the one hand that the mens rea of the offence was
knowing or suspecting that the other was a person who was or had been engaged in
or had benefited from criminal conduct, and the onus of proof remained on the
prosecution to prove that state of mind. The Court however acknowledged that in
48 Case Valerie Anne Colle, Court of Appeal, July 22-25 1991, (1992) 95 Cr. App. R., p. 68.
49 Cases Attorney General ofHong Kong v. Lee Kwong-kut and Attorney General ofHong Kong v.
Lo Chak-man and another, Privy Council 22-25.3/19.5.1993, (1993) 3 All.E.R., p.953. It is
interesting to note here that the case distinguished the burden of proof in cases of drug trafficking
from cases of receiving, with the former having an additional legitimacy weight in the balance with
human rights.
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the particular case, 'that which the prosecution had to prove to establish the mens
rea of the offence was the same as B would have had to prove to establish the
statutory defence'.50
This statement is the most vivid illustration of the deterioration of the
defendant's position in money laundering trials, caused by the distinction between
substantive and procedural elements of the offence. As the distinction is- in many
money laundering cases- virtually impossible to make,51 the reversal of the burden
of proof extends in reality beyond strictly delimited defences, to cover the
substantive elements of the money laundering offence. This tendency is
inextricably linked with the broadening of the mens rea to include suspicion, an
element which is both vague and difficult to prove. The difficult mission to prove
knowledge or suspicion of criminal activity or illicit origin is thus transferred from
the prosecution to the defendant, who, far from presumed innocent, is under the
obligation to prove the absence of knowledge or suspicion. In this manner,
fundamental defence rights are violated in order to facilitate the prosecution's task
^2in the war against organised crime.
7. PREDICATE OFFENCES
As seen above, the directive followed a minimum standard approach in
prohibiting money laundering of proceeds only from drug trafficking, as defined in
article 3(1 )(a) of the UN Vienna Convention, but at the same time leaving to
50 Case R. v. Butt, reported in Criminal Law Review (1999), pp.414-415, p.415.
51 To take the example of R. v. Butt, the Court stated that 'substantial' elements were the knowledge
or suspicion that one is engaged in criminal conduct, whereas defences were the knowledge or
suspicion that the arrangement related to any person's proceeds of criminal conduct.
52 Similar objections on the reversal of the burden of proof, focusing on its unconstitutionality with
respect of the principles of presumption of innocence and protection of property were raised in
Germany, where similar 'reversal' calls were made at the Parliamentary level. See Oswald,(1997ii),
p.201. See also SPD-Gesetzentwurf, 'Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Bekampfung des
Illegalen Rauschgifthandels und anderer Erscheinungsformen der Organisierten Kriminalitat (2.
OrgKG), in Drucksache 12/6784, 4.2.1994.
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member states the discretion to include in the scope of the offence proceeds from
any other criminal activity.54 This choice resulted in considerable divergencies in
national definitions of money laundering. While in a number of states money
laundering covers proceeds from a specific and restrictively enumerated list of
offences, differing from state to state, others, such as the United Kingdom, have
opted for the criminalisation of the laundering of proceeds from 'all serious
, 55
crime .
These discrepancies cause a series of legal certainty issues, especially in view of
the extension of the directive to cover money laundering 'even where the activities
which generated the property to be laundered were perpetrated in the territory of
another Member State or in that of a third country'.56 Along with the inherent
difficulties with regard to the diverging definitions of the same crime in the various
EU member states, further issues arise here regarding to the choice of national
standards in defining the money laundering offence. Would for instance the
laundering of proceeds from a serious crime committed and punished as such in the
United Kingdom, be also punishable if prosecuted in another state where this
offence is not included in the money laundering scope? These issues have
important implications for the national and international exchange of financial
information, as there is no common definition of money laundering. In this
context, the European Parliament called recently for special attention to be paid in
preventing the emergence of a 'variable geometry version of European criminal
law', in particular regarding the definition and nature of the money laundering
C7
predicate offences.
53 See chapter 3.
54 Article 1, indent 5.
55 For a discussion on the implementation of the directive in this respect, see chapter 3. For a recent
overview of the situation in member states, see Commission of the European Communities, 1998,
op. cit.
6 Article 1, indent 3 in fine.
57
European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, Report on Criminal
Procedures in the European Union (Corpus Juris), rapporteur: J.-K. Wiebenga, DOC. A4-0091/99,
8.3.1999, p. 12.
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These issues have partly been addressed at the European Union level by means
of legislation adopted under the auspices of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. A
prime example is the Second Protocol of the EU fraud Convention, known as the
'money laundering' protocol.58 According to articles 1(e) and 2, member states are
called to establish as a criminal offence money laundering related to the proceeds
of fraud, at least in serious cases, and of active and passive corruption. This
initiative is an outcome of the recognition of all three offences, de jure or de facto,
as EU crimes, and the first step in acknowledging and addressing their
interdependence.59
A further extension to the scope of the money laundering offence was brought
into the fore by the Joint Action on money laundering, the identification, tracing,
freezing and confiscation of the instrumentalities and the proceeds from crime.60
Article 1(b) calls upon member states to ensure that no reservations are made to
article 6 of the Council of Europe Convention, which establishes and delimits the
money laundering offence, 'in so far as serious offences are concerned'. In this
indirect manner, the Joint Action ensures the criminalisation of money laundering
from all serious crime.
Such initiatives were coupled with rapid developments in the EU policies aimed
at countering organised crime. In this effort, the link between organised crime and
money laundering was established and calls were made for the extension of the
scope of the money laundering offence. In this context, Recommendation 26(b) of
the Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime calls for criminalisation of money
laundering to be made as general as possible. 51 The European Parliament on the
^ Second Protocol of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial
Interests, OJC221, 19.7.1997, p.l 1.
59 For an analysis of the interdependence between fraud, money laundering and corruption, see E.U.
Savona (1998), La Criminalita Economica in Europa. Le Interdipendenze tra Frodi, Riciclaggio e
Corruzione, TRANSCRIME Working Paper no.28, October 1998.
60
OJL333, 9.12.1998, p.l.
61 OJ C251, 15.8.1997, p.l atp.15.
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other hand, called for the extension of money laundering to all proceeds from
professional and organised crime.62
These developments are reflected to a certain extent in the recent Commission
proposal for a new money laundering directive.63 Wary of the controversy relating
to the Community's competence in the field of criminal law, the Commission
retains the clause on the prohibition, rather that the criminalisation of money
laundering. New draft article 1(e) however provides that the offence includes,
along with drug trafficking, proceeds from at least: fraud, corruption or any other
illegal activity damaging or likely to damage the EC's financial interests; and
participation in activities linked to organised crime. The provision also includes
any other criminal activity designated as such for the purposes of the directive by
the member states.
It is interesting to note here that the directive has not followed the example of
the Joint Action on confiscation which indirectly obliges member states to
criminalise money laundering from serious crime. According to the Commission,
such an extension of the scope of the offence would be too burdensome for the
institutions and persons which are under the duty to report suspicious transactions,
especially in view of the inclusion of a series of non-financial activities in the draft
directive. On the other hand, it was deemed easier, in practical terms, for these
persons and institutions to link their suspicions to organised crime activities, rather
than to assess the seriousness of the underlying offence.64 It must be noted
however that in this case the difficulties in providing a coherent legal definition of
organised crime and the mystification surrounding the use of the term may lead to
reports based on a wide range of behaviour not necessarily constituting an
62
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, Report on the first
Commission's report to be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council on the
implementation of the Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose
ofmoney laundering (91/308/EEC), rapporteur: K.-H. Lehne, DOC. A4-0187/96, 6.6.1996, p.5.
63 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the
financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering, COM( 1999)352 final, Brussels, 14.7.1999.
64 Commission, 1999, p.7.
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organised crime activity. At the expense of legal certainty, this may potentially
lead to the disassociation of the reporting obligation from legally prescribed
predicate offences.
In view of the increasing obligations incumbent on the private sector under the
directive, the Commission's choice to avoid a catch-all definition of predicates is
to be welcomed. Its soundness however can be easily undermined by the choice of
member states to add further predicates to the offence, while maintaining a more
restricted approach with regard to reporting duties. The issue was recently
highlighted in England and Wales, where money laundering covers the proceeds of
all crime, but the reporting obligations extend only to proceeds from drug
trafficking and terrorism.65 it was put forward that this discrepancy creates a gap
in the anti-money laundering defences and calls have been made for the creation of
an all-crime 'failure to disclose' offence.66
Discrepancies between the money laundering offence and the definition of
laundering for reporting purposes have also serious implications for information
gathering and exchange, as the information provided may be used to investigate
and prosecute ultimately a different predicate offence than the one initially
reported. This is very probable in cases of controversial predicate offences, such as
those related to tax matters. These offences are not included in the catalogue of
predicate offences in any of the aforementioned international or EC/EU legal
instruments, with the situation remaining the same in the Commission's draft. At
the same time however, pressure has been exercised by the Financial Action Task
Force for tax offences to be taken into account by financial institutions at the
reporting stage.67
65 See supra in the part on actus reus.
66 Home Office, Organised and International Crime Directorate, Working Group on Confiscation,
Third Report: Criminal Assets, November 1998, paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4.
67 See interpretative note to Recommendation 15, of 2.7.1999, stating that, in the implementation of
the Recommendation, suspicious transactions should be reported by financial institutions regardless
of whether they are also thought to involve tax matters.
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Problems may also arise in cases when the institutions and persons involved are
under the duty to report suspicions based on a limited category of predicate
offences, while money laundering per se is criminalised on an 'all-crime' basis.
This problem is exacerbated by the different definitions of money laundering in
/TO
EU policing instruments, that is the Europol Convention and the Convention on
the use of information technology for customs purposes (CIS Convention).69 The
scope of the latter, which was initially centered to property or proceeds derived
from drug trafficking,70 has been recently extended by a Protocol to include a list
of broad and diverse predicates within and beyond the customs sphere.71 The broad
79
scope of the Europol Convention on the other hand, is to be extended further after
the calls by the recent European Council at Tampere to extend its competence to
68 OJ C316, 27.11.1995, p.l.
69 OJ C316, 27.11.1995, p.33.
70 Article 1(1), indent 2.
71 See Protocol drawn up on the basis of article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the scope
of the laundering of proceeds in the Convention on the use of information technology for customs
purposes and the inclusion of the registration number of the means of transport in the Convention,
(OJ C91, 31.3.1999, p.2). Article I adds to the scope of the Convention the laundering of proceeds
derived from any infringement of: '(i).. all laws, regulations and administrative provisions of a
Member State the application of which comes wholly or partly within the jurisdiction of the
customs administration of the Member State concerning cross-border traffic in goods subject to
bans, restrictions or controls, in particular pursuant to Articles 36 and 223 of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, and non-harmonised excise duties, or (ii) the body of Community
provisions and associated implementing provisions governing the import, export, transit and
presence of goods traded between Member States and third countries, and between Member States
in the case of goods that do not have Community status within the meaning of Article 9(2) of the
Treaty establishing the European Community or goods subject to additional controls or
investigations for the purpose of establishing their Community status, or (iii) the body of provisions
adopted at Community level under the common agricultural policy and the specific provisions
adopted with regard to goods resulting from the processing of agricultural products, or (iv) the body
of provisions adopted at Community level for harmonised excise duties and for value-added tax on
importation together with the national provisions implementing them'. The numbering of the Treaty
articles refers to the Maastricht Treaty.
72 Article 2 of the Convention includes: terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms
of international crime where there are factual indicators that an organised criminal structure is
involved and two or more member states are affected by the form of crime in question; (initially)
unlawful drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, illegal immigrant
smuggling, trade in human beings and motor vehicle crime; (within two years from function)
crimes committed or likely to be committed in the course of terrorist activities against life, limb,
personal freedom and property; and illegal money laundering in connection with these forms of
crime. Council Decision of 29.4.1999 (OJ C149, 28.5.1999), extended Europol's mandate to deal
also with forgery of money and means of payment.
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money laundering in general, regardless of the type of the offence from which the
laundered proceeds originate.73
It thus appears that the delimitation of the money laundering offence in terms of
its predicates is far from harmonised. This is largely due to attempts to reconcile
national sovereignty claims related to criminal law competence on the one hand,
and policy pressures towards an ever-broader definition of money laundering on
the other.74 As the directive has, even in its revision, adopted a minimum standard
policy, discrepancies in national legislation remain acute. This is not alleviated by
the tendency of member states to extend the offence to cover proceeds from all
serious crime,75 as the very definition of serious crime is a contested and vague
concept, differing from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In a similar manner, the European Union initiatives contain a mosaic of money
laundering definitions, tailored to serve different purposes.76 The lack of clarity is
reinforced in the draft new directive. Although the easy solution to refer to the
73
Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, paragraph 56.
Downloaded from http://europa.eu.int/off/conclu/oct99/oct99_en.htm
74 Revised Recommendation 4 of the Financial Action Task Force provides that each country
'should extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious offences'.
75 See the notable example of France, where law 96-392 of 13.5.1996 extended the scope of the
money laundering offence to cover proceeds from all 'crimes' or 'delits'. For an overview of the
situation in other member states, see Commission of the European Communities, 1998, op. cit.
16 A further example is the list of predicates included in the draft Joint Action on Combatting Fraud
and Counterfeiting of Non-Cash Means of Payment, downloaded from http://ue.eu.int. According to
articles 3(1) and(5) and 2, reference is made to money laundering from: a. misappropriation of a
payment instrument; b. counterfeiting or falsification of a payment instrument; c. knowingly
handling, unauthorised by the holder, of a payment instrument; d. knowingly possessing a
misappropriated, counterfeited or falsified payment instrument; e. knowingly using a
misappropriated, counterfeited or falsified payment instrument; f. knowingly accepting a payment
made under the circumstances covered by the previous indent; g. knowingly unauthorised use of
identification data for initiating or processing a payment transaction; h. knowingly using fictitious
identification data for initiating or processing a payment transaction; i. manipulation of relevant
data including account information, or other identification data, for initiating or processing a
payment transaction; j. unauthorised transmission of identification data for initiating or processing a
payment transaction; k. unauthorised making, handling, possession or use of device making
equipment for the purpose of:-.manufacturing or altering any payment instrument or part thereof-
initiating or processing payment transaction, or - changing or altering any information or data
carried on, or in, any payment instrument or transaction; 1. knowingly unauthorised possession of an
element or part of a payment instrument; m. involvement as accessory or instigator in, or knowingly
obtaining of value or pecuniary advantage derived from any of the behaviours described above
involving a criminal intention.
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broad, over-extending concept of 'all serious crime' has been avoided, the new
predicates included remain extremely broad and vague: the directive is not limited
to fraud and corruption, but aims at covering also 'any other activity damaging or
likely to damage the European Communities' financial interests'. The other new
predicate, on the other hand, is the participation not in a criminal organisation, but,
more generally, in 'activities linked to organised crime'.
The inconsistencies in the EU policy in the field of predicate offences is further
highlighted by the pressure posed by the European Union towards the adoption of
a broad definition of money laundering in the currently negotiated United Nations
Convention against Organised Crime. In the relevant Joint Position, it is put
forward that the Convention 'should extend to a broad range of offences and, in
particular, should be consistent with the 40 recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force'.77 The latter, as seen in chapter 3 above, were revised in 1996
78
to call for the criminalisation of money laundering from serious offences. At the
same time, at the European Council level, the recent Tampere summit called for
criminal law approximation and the establishment of broad money laundering
predicates.79
It is interesting to see thus that, while at the political level, including its role as
an international actor, the European Union pushes for a broad money laundering
criminalisation, at EC level the Commission, wary of acute legal problems related
to national criminal laws and EC competence in the field, ended up with a more
limited and compromising draft. Legal certainty and consistency can thus be easily
be undermined from the 'back-door', with member states ratifying the forthcoming
77 Joint Position of 29 March 1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty
on European Union, on the proposed United Nations convention against organised crime, OJ L87,
31.3.1999, p.l. Article 1(5).





UN Convention potentially containing a broad money laundering definition, which
will be possibly reiterated in forthcoming EU initiatives after the Tampere calls.80
In any case, the margin of discretion left in the member states regarding the
interpretation and implementation of the draft directive provisions is broad. This is
especially the case since, unlike drug trafficking, and in the case of the new
directive, fraud and corruption, no guidance is offered regarding the delimitation of
activities which damage EC financial interests or are linked to organised crime.
The money laundering/organised crime nexus however brings furthermore a new
conceptualisation of the money laundering offence, as money laundering from
organised crime can be examined along with money laundering as organised
crime. This is especially the case in view of the recent Joint Action on organised
81 ....
crime, which criminalises participation in a criminal organisation established in
oo
view of committing, inter alia, money laundering offences. This move may prove
beneficial in view of the separation between the predicate offence and money
laundering activities and the professionalisation of the latter. At the same time
however, it brings to the debate on the money laundering offence the heavy burden
of the criminalisation of organised crime, and the serious challenges to
oi
fundamental rule of law principles-such as nullum crimen sine actu- it entails.
80 The latest draft of the UN Convention calls, at article 4,paragraph 1 bis, for the applicability of
the laundering offence to the proceeds 'of those crimes associated with organized criminal groups
and also to the proceeds of other serious crimes'. The same paragraph calls for the periodical
review of domestic legislation implementing this article to ensure its application to 'an
appropriately broad range of offences'. United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on
the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Revised draft United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, DOC. A/AC.254/4/Rev.5, 16.11.1999
81 Joint Action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation
in the Member States of the European Union, OJ L351, 29.12.1998, p.l.
82 Article 1, indent 2, referring to offences mentioned in article 2 of the Europol Convention and in
the annex thereto and are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of
at least four years or a more serious penalty.
83 Article 2 of the Joint Action is an eloquent example of such challenges. It criminalises conduct
rather than act, in the present case the participation in an organisation. Such participation ranges
from involvement in criminal activities, or the organisation's other activities in order to achieve the
criminal aims, to just an agreement to pursue an activity amounting to the commission of an
offence. The detachment of such crimes from the act requirement is even more obvious in view of
the fact that, in the first and third aforementioned cases, the conduct is punished even if the person
involved does not take part in the actual execution of the offences/activities concerned, while in the
first case conduct is punished even when the offence is not actually committed. This definition
179
8. LIABILITY OF LEGAL PERSONS
A heated issue related to the applicability of the money laundering offence
concerns the imposition of liability to legal persons in this respect. Neither the
Vienna nor the Strasbourg Conventions contained provisions on such liability.
However, the recent commentary on the Vienna Convention acknowledged the
advantages of imposing a system of liability for legal persons, as distinct from
natural person liability, in cases where money laundering is pursued through them.
It is stated that:
'For example, complex management structures can render the identification of the person or
persons responsible for the commission of the offence difficult or impossible. In such cases the
imposition of liability on the legal person may be the only option if the activity in question is not to
go unpunished. Similarly a sanction imposed on an institution rather than an individual can act as a
catalyst for the reorganization of management and supervisory structures to ensure that similar
conduct is deterred'.84
Notwithstanding these justifications, the money laundering directive, even in its
amended version, does not contain any provisions establishing liability of legal
persons for money laundering. The latter however has been provided for, in
relation to a limited number of cases, in the Second Fraud Protocol,85 whose article
3(1) states that
'Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons
can be held liable for fraud, active corruption and money laundering committed for
their benefit by any person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the
legal person, who has a leading position within the legal person, based on
largely reflects the offence of conspiracy and association to commit offences, as delineated in
article 3 of the EU Extradition Convention (Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the
Treaty on European Union, relating to extradition between the Member States of the European
Union, OJ C313, 23.10.1996, p.12). The offences covered in paragraph 4 of this article are
mentioned, along with those set out by the Joint Action, in article 2(2) of the latter ensuring
comprehensive mutual assistance between member states in respect of them.
84 United Nations, op. cit., paragraph 3.54.
85 See note 59.
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a power of representation of the legal person, or
an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person, or
an authority to exercise control within the legal person
as well as for involvement as accessories or instigators in such fraud, active
OiT
corruption or money laundering or the attempted commission of such fraud'.
Liability is thus imposed on the basis of two criteria: the existence of a link
between the offence and the legal person, since the former must have been
committed for the latter's benefit, financial or other; and the existence of a link
between the physical offender and the legal person, in this case a leading position
ascertained through a series of formal and substantial criteria. The abstract
reference to the exercise of control as a substantial criterion to ascertain a leading
position has been interpreted to include 'responsibility for internal financial control
and auditing or ...membership of a controlling or supervisory body internal to the
legal person, to the extent that these positions correspond to a leading position
07
which implies a possibility of influencing the legal person's management'.
Paragraph 2 of the same article extends liability to cover cases where offences
were committed by a person subordinate to the person in a leading position.
86 The imposition of liability to legal persons in respect of fraud reflects the proposals made in the
Corpus Juris, a study prepared on the request of the European Parliament and under the aegis of the
Commission, reflecting the views of researchers from the Association of European lawyers fort he
protection of the Financial Interests of the Community. See M. Delmas-Marty (dir.)( 1997), Corpus
Juris introducing penal provisionsfor the purpose of the financial interests of the European Union,
Economica, Paris. Article 14 establishes criminal liability of corporations and other organisations
which are recognised by law as competent to hold property, for a series of offences including
money laundering, 'provided the offence is committed for the benefit of the organisation, or any
person acting in its name and having power, whether by law or merely in fact, to make decisions'.
Article 7 on the other hand establishes the offence of money laundering as: a. the conversion or
transfer of goods resulting from any of the criminal activities mentioned in articles 1 to 6 (fraud in
the Community budget, market-rigging, corruption, abuse of office, misappropriation of funds,
disclosure of secrets pertaining to one's office) or participation in such activity with the aim of
concealing or disguising the illicit origins of such goods or of helping any person involved in this
activity to escape the legal consequences of his acts; and b. the concealing or disguising of the
nature, origin, site, placing, disposal, movements or the real ownership of goods or rights resulting
form any criminal activity mentioned in the previous paragraph, or participation in such an
activity'.
87
Explanatory Report on the Second protocol to the Convention on the protection of the European
Communities' financial interests, OJ C91, 31.3.1999, p.8, including an analysis of the liability
criteria.
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Liability is thus imposed on the legal person when fraud, corruption or money
laundering have been possible due to lack of supervision and control. As stated in
the Protocol's Explanatory Memorandum, this paragraph does not necessarily
imply an objective responsibility on the part of the legal person, but may be
interpreted in being limited to cases where the legal person as such may be blamed
for culpable behaviour of persons acting on its behalf.88 The imposition of liability
to legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 do not exclude criminal proceedings
against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators or accessories in the fraud,
active corruption and money laundering.89
In addition to the introduction of liability for legal persons, the Protocol
innovates to a further extent with regard to the imposition of sanctions. According
to article 4, sanctions for legal persons held liable pursuant to article 3(1) must be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive, may include criminal and non-criminal
fines, and may also include a series of alternative sanctions such as: (a) exclusion
from entitlement to public benefits or aid; (b) temporary or permanent
disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; (c) placing under
judicial supervision; and (d) a judicial winding-up order. Such alternative sanctions
are not available in cases of an offence caused by a subordinate person due to the
lack of supervision or control. In the latter case however, it has been ascertained
that civil and administrative sanctions beyond the criminal law should, where
appropriate, retain their punitive character in going beyond mere reparation of
damages or restitution of wrongful enrichment.90
The imposition of liability to legal persons under the Second fraud protocol has
been influential in that an equivalent, albeit not as detailed, provision has been
included in the Joint Action on participation in a criminal organisation.91 Article 3
establishes criminal or non-criminal liability for legal persons committing offences




Explanatory Report, op. cit.
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include, as seen above, money laundering. In alignment with the fraud protocol,
liability is established without prejudice to criminal liability of natural persons and
is penalised in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner with the
possibility of imposing material or economic sanctions.
Following the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force,93 liability
of legal persons for money laundering has thus been introduced in EU law. As
such liability refers to the laundering of proceeds from restrictively enumerated
predicates, the aforementioned concerns about lack of uniformity and legal
certainty in their implementation remain acute. At the criminal law theory level,
further concerns arise from the multiplication of criminal liability, its imposition
to 'soulless' organisations with the potential to undermine the principle of moral
culpability and blame,94 and the broadening of the punishment of corporations in
cases when employees commit offences in breach of their duties or company
guidelines.95 These concerns remain acute in view of the tendency to extend
liability of legal persons, as reflected in establishment of corporate criminal
liability inter alia for money laundering in the recent Council of Europe Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption.96
91 See note 82.
92 Ibid
93 Recommendation 6 states that, where possible, corporations themselves, and not only their
employees, should be subject to criminal liability.
94 On a discussion of whether 'corporations are persons', see inter alia C. Wells (1993),
Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, Clarendon Press, Oxford, chapter 5. Wells provides an
excellent theoretical framework on the imposition of liability to corporations. See also Coffee
(1981) "No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick' : an Unscandalised Inquiry into the problem of
Corporate Punishment' in Michigan Law Review, vol.79, p.386. On a contrary view, asserting that
both recklessness and intention, whch require a subjective evaluation, can be found in corporate
policy, see C.M.V. Clarkson (1998), 'Corporate Culpability' in Web Journal ofCurrent Legal
Issues, vol.2.
95 In the view of Lynch, 'not only does a corporation, as an artificial entity, lack any mens of its
own, but the standard of vicarious liability for corporations has broadened in ways that make even a
metaphorical corporate 'mens rea' elusive: when corporations are held liable for the acts of
relatively low-level managers, even acting in violation of express corporate policy, it becomes
difficult to sustain the idea that 'the corporation' as an entity is blameworthy in any way that is
easily analogized to the intentional actions of a natural person'. G.E. Lynch (1997),'The Role of
Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct' in Law and Contemporary Problems, vol.60,
no.3, p.39.
96 grpg ^ 27.1.1999. Article 18 of the Convention establishes corporate liability for the
offences of active bribery, trading in influence and money laundering from these offences and
passive bribery, as they are defined in articles 2-12 (the money laundering offence per se is
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The multiplication of criminal liability in this context is an uncontested fact.
Liability is imposed not only on legal persons, but also on the natural persons
perpetrating the offences. In order to soothe the rest of the concerns however, the
fraud protocol rightly limits punishment in cases where offences are committed
from people in a leading position able to influence the management of the legal
person, or where they are committed by lower level employees due to lack of
supervision or control. At the same time, punishment extends at certain cases to
alternative sanctions which take into account the special position of legal persons
Q7
and the potential of dissuasive economic measures in this respect. In cases of
money laundering, this may, notwithstanding the silence of the directive, be a
useful model for punishing both the money laundering offence and the breach of
the duties incumbent on a series of organisations and professions.
9. CONCLUSION
The perception of money laundering as a security threat, closely associated with
activities of organised crime groups, have led to the establishment of a new offence
which was deemed to be essential to counter this threat. This process of
'securitisation' has led to transferring the vagueness and all-embracing character of
threat discourse- assuming that organised crime and money laundering threaten
everything from human life to the stability of the financial system and the very
established in article 13). Furthermore, liability of legal persons in the context of environmental
offences is established in the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Environment
through Criminal Law (ETS No. 172, 4.11.1998), in article 9. Both Conventions translate in a
legally binding form to a great extent the efforts made by the Council of Europe in the
Recommendation No. R(88) 18 on 'liability of enterprises for offences'. On the series of criminal
alw isues related to liabiltiy of legal persons, see Council of Europe (1990), Liability ofEnterprises
for Offences: Recommendation No. R(88)18 adopted by the Committee ofMinisters of the Council
ofEurope on 20 October 1988 and explanatory memorandum, Strasbourg.
97 In this context, article 24 of the United Nations Model Law on Money Laundering, which
establishes criminal liability for corporate entities, provides the following additional sanctions to
fines or convictions: the permanent or temporary ban on the corporation involved from directly or
indirectly carrying on certain business activities; the order of permanent or temporary closure of
premises which were used for the commission of the offence; and the requirement from
corporations to publicise the judgment in the press or by radio or television.
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substance of the state - to the justification of the offence in criminal law and the
delimitation of the interests it is set out to protect.
In this process, such interests have been 'dynamitised':99 rather than being
produced through social processes, they have largely been imposed 'from above',
through a securitisation discourse. This has led to the substitution of classical
individual interests by emotionally charged and abstract 'collective interests': the
soundness of the financial system, the effectiveness of criminal justice, the rule of
law.100 In this manner, the guaranteeing principles requiring a concrete and
perceptible attack to a specifically defined interest in imposing a criminal offence
are greatly undermined.101
The invocation of broadly defined collective interests in need of protection
raises further issues with regard to the actual link of the criminalised conduct with
the harm that is produced. Is the process of money laundering, which is
perpetuated through a series of everyday, outwardly ordinary transactions, a threat
to interests such as human life or societal or state security? In answering in a
positive way, one may be tempted to use the theory of remote harm and classify
money laundering as a type of conduct which 'might create an opportunity for
serious harm to be caused subsequently'.102 In this case however, even this is too
tenuous a link: money laundering does not cause the commission of organised
crime offences; it might, at a prior stage, encourage their commission but this is far
from a causal link capable of justifying the, in any case controversial,103 remote
98 See chapters 1 and 2.
99 Term put forward by Baratta. See note 19.
100 For an extensive analysis of such issues in the money laundering context, see J. Vogel
(1997),'Geldwasche-ein europaweit harmonisierter Straftatbestand?' in Zeitschriftfiir
Strafrechtliche Wissenschaft, vol.107, no.2, pp.335-356. For a more general analysis, see P.-A.
Albrecht (1997),'La Politique Criminelle dans l'Etat de Prevention' in Deviance et Societe, vol.21,
no.2, pp. 123-136. See also chapter 1.
101 In the context of organised crime legislation in Italy, see S. Moccia (1997), 'Aspects Regressifs
du Systeme Penal Italien' in Deviance et Societe, vol.21, no.2, p. 138.
102 A. Ashworth (1999), Principles of Criminal Law, 3,d edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford
and New York, p.52.
103 The objections to the remote harm theory lie first of all in the assertion that there is no causal
link between criminalised conduct and crime. Secondly, it is argued that conduct that is not harmful
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harm argument. The only protracted interest that may be deemed as directly linked
with money laundering is the integrity and normal function of the financial system.
It should be reminded however that this interest is very vague and its protection
under criminal law can be contested.104
The discourse of danger leads at the same time to an extensive broadening of
punishability: since the offence is introduced in order to counter a clear and present
danger against the collectivity, it must be extended to counter everything that may
put the protected interest at risk. In the case of money laundering, a wide range of
everyday conduct has been criminalised, resulting in an open-ended, vague actus
reus for the money laundering offence. The situation is far from remedied in view
of the patchwork implementation of the directive in the member states and the
tendency to extend the catalogue of predicates to proceeds from the all-embracing
category of 'all serious crime'.
Moreover, through the increasing recourse to liability on the basis of
negligence and the interpretation of mens rea requirements through a recourse to
the different logic of civil law, such conduct may be punished even in cases when
the criteria of culpability are not fulfilled. Such extension has been proposed at EU
level in the Action Plan to combat organised crime105 and has been rightly rejected
by the European Parliament106 as it signifies a shift from the punishment of acts
I 07
towards the punishment of behaviour, resulting in the breach of fundamental
criminalisation requirements of act and guilt. In the case ofmoney laundering these
in itself should not attract liability 'at least not unless it is accompanied by an intention to commit a
substantive offence'. Ashworth, op. cit.
104 In line with objections to the criminalisation of insider dealing, criminalising money laundering
in order to protect financial markets can be criticised on two grounds: the establishment, in this
manner, of a remote harm of accumulative nature, in need for the same conduct by a large number
of persons for the harm to be possible; and the possibility to attain the objective through the
adoption of non-criminal forms of regulation. Ashworth, op. cit., pp.53-54, citing relevant literature
on insider dealing.
105 Recommendation 26(b) provides that the opportunity of extending money laundering to
negligent behaviour should be examined.
106 Resolution of the European Parliament on the action plan to combat organized crime (7421/97-
C4-0199/97) in Opinion of the European Parliament on the Action Plan to combat organized crime,
DOC. 5858/98, LIMITE, CRIMORG 17, Brussels, 18.2.1998.
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concerns obtain further dimensions, in view of the fact that, through the
criminalisation of negligence, there is a danger of punishing everyday ordinary
behaviour in cases where there is no intention and no knowledge of money
laundering: in view of the thin line between the legitimate and the illegitimate
world, the observance of 'appropriate standards' appears too heavy a burden in
these cases. This burden appears even heavier in view of the increasing tendency to
reverse the burden of proof. The criminalisation of money laundering may thus
lead to an omni-potent means of social control, through the extra-legal, ideological
infiltration of criminal law by politically formed and imposed concepts of security
which lead to an unlimited power of prosecution and punishment.
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Securitisation through responsibilisation: the imposition of




The main body of the money laundering directive consists of provisions
establishing a series of duties to be followed by credit and financial institutions.
These duties, largely based on the FATF Recommendations, reflect the preventive
aspect of the anti-money laundering strategy. At the same time, their adoption
marked a swift departure from well-established legal principles of commercial
regulation. In order to demarcate the changes brought about by the directive in this
field, the first part of the analysis will focus on examining the relationship of credit
institutions, the principal sector of the economy to be first placed under the
obligations of the directive, with their customers prior to the adoption of money
laundering counter-measures. The analysis of the directive's provisions will thus
be viewed in the light of these changes and will be complemented by an overview
of potential further changes in every day life, brought about by proposals to amend
the directive in extending its scope ratione personae. The examination of the legal
impact of these developments will then be accompanied by a broader theorisation
of the duties imposed on individuals as a new model of governance and social
control.
189
2. THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THE MONEY
LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE: THE ROLE OF BANK CONFIDENTIALITY
I. THE BANKER-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP
In English law, the banker-customer relationship is based on contract.1 While the
limitation of the relationship to the maintenance of an account brought forward the
conceptualisation of the contract as one of borrower and creditor, the multitude of
services offered by banks beyond simple account maintenance have led to the
abandonment of this view, in favour of the perception of the contract as a sui
generis one 'incorporating elements of specific, well-defined contracts, such as
that of debtor and creditor'.
The doctrinal reference to a sui generis contract reflects the distinctive element
of proximity in the banker-customer relationship. Such proximity gives rise to the
establishment of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. According to a
leading case, such a relationship exists 'where someone relies on the guidance or
advice of another, where the other is aware of that reliance and where the person
upon whom reliance is placed obtains, or may well obtain, a benefit from the
transaction or has some other interest in it being concluded.'3 This is indeed the
case between the banker and her customer, especially in view of the expertise and
range of services offered by the former.
Similar issues reflecting the complexity of the banker-customer relationships are
also reflected in civil law jurisdictions. An eloquent illustration can be encountered
in the German banking law doctrine. There, the foundation of the relationship on a
'general banking contract'4 departing from traditional contractual principles
1 See inter alia E. P. Ellinger and E. Lomnicka (1994), Modern Banking Law, 2nd ed., Clarendon
Press, Oxford p. 107.
2
Ellinger and Lomnicka, op. cit., p.l 10.
3
Lloyd's Bank Ltd. V. Bundy (1975) QB 326, cited in Ellinger and Lomnicka, op. cit., pp.116-117.
4 On the general banking contract ('algemeinesbankvertrag'), see Canaris (1988),
Bankvertragsrecht, Munich, Anm. 2-3
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competes with the 'transaction bond approach'. The latter focuses on the
transaction bond between banker and customer which creates, on the basis of good
faith as enshrined in law, an 'obligation without supply', and a relationship of trust
giving rise to obligations of protection of the customer's interests, which exist
irrespective of any contract and before their foundation.5 Going beyond the
restrictions inherent in the contractual approach, this theory takes into
consideration extra-contractual aspects of good faith and trust in establishing the
banker's 'trust liability founded on the transaction bond'.6
II. THE BANKER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY: THE FOUNDATION
The prevalent element of trust in the banker-customer relationship, which is
acknowledged in one form or the other in both common and civil law jurisdictions,
is inextricably linked with the duty of confidentiality owed by the former. In the
aforementioned Lloyd's case, it was held that the features of the fiduciary
n
relationship include 'a vital element...referred to as confidentiality'. In a similar
vein, it is also accepted in English doctrine that the duty emanates from the
elements of agency existing in the banker-customer contract, as an agent owes
duties of loyalty and confidentiality to her principal .8 According to Ellinger and
Lomnicka, the agent's duty of confidentiality is based on both economic and
historical considerations: the economic aspect lies in the need to rely on the
discretion of the person who is called upon to undertake confidential work;
historically, on the other hand, the agent has been regarded as in a position of trust,
safeguarding the principal's interests and confidences.9 In the case of Parry Jones
v. Law Society,10 it was noted by Diplock LJ that a duty of confidentiality exists in
various categories of agency relationships such as solicitor and client, banker and
customer, doctor and patient and accountant and client.
5
Canaris, op. cit., p. 10
6
Canaris, op. cit., p.8.
7 See note 3.
8
Ellinger and Lomnicka, op. cit., p. 134.
9
Ellinger and Lomnicka, op. cit.
10
(1969) 1 Ch. 1,9.
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In a similar vein, the prevalent view in German doctrine bases the duty of
confidentiality on the relationship of mutual trust between the parties.11 The
contractual approach views secrecy as a secondary duty resulting from the bank
contract. In line with the transaction bond theory, it is argued on the other hand that
when no contract exists, the duty stems from a special trust relationship established
at the inception of the business relationship.12
The view basing confidentiality on trust stands in the middle ground between
two diametrically divergent approaches to the issue. According to the first, which
constitutes rather a minority view in Germany and is also encountered in other civil
law jurisdictions, confidentiality is viewed as a customary right stemming from
commercial usage,13 reflecting the absence of a specific statutory recognition of the
principle in some jurisdictions.
On the other hand, bank confidentiality is deemed to emanate from the
constitutionally enshrined principle of protection of personhood, which includes
both freedom of personal development and economic freedom,14 the former
encompassing the right to privacy. The protection of confidentiality through
personality rights has led to arguments in favour of the assertion of a similar
protection under the personality provisions of civil law,15 while also included in
the scope of the wider principle of professional secrecy protected by criminal
law.16
11
H. Jung (1992), 'Germany' in D. Campbell (ed.), International Bank Secrecy, Sweet and
Maxwell, London, p.214. See also O. Sandrock and E. Klausing (1993), 'Germany', in R. Cranston
(ed.), European Banking Law: The Banker-Customer Relationship, Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.,
London, New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong, pp. 92-93.
12 Ibid.
13
Jung, op. cit., p.213. See also 'Italy', by C. Vento and R. Betti Berutto in Campbell, op. cit.,
pp.387-388. In Italy, however, the theory of commercial usage is concurrent with a theory linking
the protection of banking secrecy to the principle of fairness provided in the Civil Code. See S.
Cotterli, 'Italy', in Cranston, op. cit., pp.113-114.
14
Canaris, op. cit., pp.25 et seq.; Jung, op. cit., pp.213-214.
15
Canaris, op. cit., p.29, who refers to a 'subjective right of personal/home sphere'.
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III. THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY: THE LIMITS
In English law, the banker's duty of confidentiality was specifically established
and delineated in 1924, in the leading Tournier case,17 where it was held that the
duty of confidentiality is symbiotical with the banker-customer relationship,
stemming from contract. At the same time, it was asserted that this legal duty was
not absolute, but subject to a series of qualifications. According to Bankes LJ, such
qualifications can be classified under four heads: a. where disclosure is under
compulsion by law; b. where there is a duty to the public to disclose; c. where the
interests of the bank require disclosure; and d. where the disclosure is made with
the express or implied consent of the customer.18
The exceptions to the banker's duty of confidentiality can thus be grouped into
two broad categories: those centered on the interests of the parties in the banker-
customer relationship; and those going beyond this relationship, in order to address
broader public interest considerations. The latter present a great challenge to the
predominantly private relationship between banker and customer, which is based
on the parties' contractual and wider economic freedom. They can also be viewed
to threaten the corollary of such freedom, i. e. the right to privacy. This led the
authors of the Jack Report on Banking Services19 to react to what was deemed a
'torrent of new legislation', which was viewed as unclear and ultimately 'a serious
20inroad into the whole principle of customer confidentiality'.
As noted by the Jack Report, the major application of the 'compulsion of law'
qualification is achieved though compulsion by statute. The Report refers to
nineteen such statutes. Most of them deal with financial regulation, centered on
16 On the protection of bank confidentiality by criminal law, see S. N. Deverakis, 'Greece' in
Campbell, op. cit., pp.273-274.
17 Tournier v. National Provincial Bank ofEngland (1924) 1 KB 461.
18 For an extensive analysis of the scope and interpretation of these qualifications, see Ellinger and
Lomnicka, op. cit.
19
Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee, chairman: Professor RB
Jack CBE, (1989) Cm 622.
20 Jack Report, op. cit., p.31 (paragraphs 5.07 and 5.08).
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investigations by supervisory authorities, where bankers may be required to answer
questions or produce documents. On the other hand, criminal law statutes such as
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, allow access to documents for the
purposes of a criminal investigation. The compatibility of the latter with bank
confidentiality was examined in the Barclays case21 , where it was held that there is
no implied term in the banker-customer contract obliging the bank to inform the
customer of any application of section 9 of the Act in furtherance of its duty of
confidentiality. The Court rejected the claim by asserting the public interest in
assisting the police in the investigation of crime.
The criminal law exception, along with exceptions in financial regulation
measures are also encountered in civil law jurisdictions. Most of the criminal law
exceptions are encountered in Codes of Criminal Procedure, requiring bankers to
testify and permitting access to the bank's documents.22 However, as in most of the
cases in English law,23 the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality are specifically
enumerated, restrictively interpreted and require a reactive duty from the bank to
provide assistance when called upon by the authorities to do so.
IV. PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENTIALITY IN BANK SUPERVISION: THE EC
FRAMEWORK
The restrictive and 'reactive' interpretation of exceptions to bank confidentiality is
also reflected in the field of disclosure in banking supervision. While the impact of
such rules to the banker-customer relationship is not of central importance, as
interference with the customer's records will happen only in cases where
customer's information is disclosed together with information relating to the
bank,24 the development of European Community law through the case-law of the
21
Barclays Bank PLC v. Taylor, Trustee Savings Bank ofWales and Border Counties andAnother
v. Taylor and Another (1989) 3 All E.R. 563.
22 For an overview, see Campbell, op. cit.
23 With the exception of the Drug Trafficking Offences Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act.
24 F. Randolph, 'European Community', in Campbell, op. cit., p.740.
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European Court of Justice provides important conceptual insights regarding the
recognition and protection of confidentiality in the banking sector.
The Court has ruled on the scope of article 12 of the First Banking Directive25,
whose first paragraph imposed on all persons employed by banking supervisory
and authorisation authorities an obligation of professional secrecy providing that
'any confidential information which they may receive in the course of their duties
may not be divulged to any person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid
down by law'.
According to the European Court of Justice, this provision includes 'general
provisions not specifically intended to lay down exceptions to the ban on
disclosing the kind of information covered by the directive, but establishing the
limits which the maintenance of professional secrecy places on the obligation to
9 f\
give evidence as a witness'." The Court however avoided establishing an
unequivocal limitation to the provision, in a judgment reflecting the considerable
differences between member states in the field of professional secrecy.27
Article 12 has been subsequently amended by article 16 of the Second Banking
9R
Directive. This provision limits the exception to confidentiality. Paragraph 1
provides that no confidential information that the competent authorities may
receive in the course of their duties 'may be divulged to any person or authority
whatsoever, except in summary or collective form, such that individual institutions
cannot be identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law'. The only
instance when information may be divulged in civil or commercial proceedings is,
75 Directive 77/780/EEC of 12.12.1977 'on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions', OJ L322,
17.12.1977, p.30.
26 Case 110/84, Municipality ofHillegom v. Hillenius, [1989] ECR 39, paragraph 34.
27 M. Dassesse, S. Isaacs and G. Penn (1994), EC Banking Law, 2nd edition, Lloyd's of London
Press ltd., London, New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong, paragraph 17.3, pp.211-212
28 Directive 89/646/EEC of 15.12.1989 (OJ 1989, L 386, 30.12.1989, p. 1) 'on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business
of credit institutions and amending directive 77/780/EEC as corrected'.
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following the judgment of the European Court of Justice,29 when a credit
institution has been declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up and the
information does not concern third parties involved in attempts to rescue that credit
institution.
In contrast, the obligation of professional secrecy is considerably relaxed in new
article 12(5), which authorises the exchange of information within one member
state or with another member state between the competent authorities and the
following institutions: the authorities responsible for the supervision of other
financial institutions, insurance companies, and financial markets, bodies involved
in the liquidation and bankruptcy of credit institutions, persons responsible for
carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of credit institutions and other
financial institutions, in the discharge of their supervisory functions and bodies
which administer deposit-guarantee schemes to the extent necessary for the
30exercise of their functions." According to article 12(7) on the other hand, member
states may authorise the disclosure of certain information to other departments of
their central government administrations responsible for legislation on the
supervision of credit institutions, financial institutions, investment services and
insurance companies and to inspectors acting on their behalf. Such disclosure is
made only where it is necessary for prudential control reasons.
This list has been extended by subsequent legislative action: directive 95/26
added to it the following institutions:
-. the authorities responsible for overseeing the bodies involved in the liquidation
and bankruptcy of financial undertakings and other similar procedures, or the
authorities responsible for overseeing persons charged with carrying out statutory
audits of the accounts of insurance undertakings, credit institutions, investment
firms and other financial institutions
29 J.A. Usher (1994), The Law ofMoney and Financial Services in the European Community,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.l 10.
30
According to article 12(2) however, information exchanged once is subject to the obligation of
secrecy.
196
the authorities or bodies responsible under the law for the detection and
investigation of breaches of company law
central banks and other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as
monetary authorities and, where appropriate, other public authorities responsible
for overseeing payment systems, when the information is intended for the
performance of their tasks
clearing houses or other similar bodies recognised under national law for the
provision of clearing or settlement services for one of the member states'
markets.3132
Directive 98/33 on the other hand amended article 12(3) to enable member states
to conclude co-operation agreements providing for the exchange of information
'even with non-banking supervisory authorities of third countries'33 subject to
guarantees of professional secrecy which are at least equivalent to those applied in
the Community.34
31
European Parliament and Council Directive 95/26/EC of 29.6.1995 amending Directives
77/80/EEC and 89/646/EEC in the field of credit institutions, Directives 73/239/EEC and
92/49/EEC in the field of non-life insurance, Directive 93/22/EEC in the field of investment firms
and Directive 85/611/EEC in the field of undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities (Ucits), with a view to reinforcing prudential supervision, OJ L168, 18.7.1995, p.7. New
articles 12(5a), 12(5b), 12(6) and 12(8) respectively, inserted by article 3. While in the first two
cases reference is made to information exchange, 12(6) and (8) refer respectively to the more one¬
sided terms of 'transmission' and 'communication' of information by the competent authorities to
the institutions involved.
32 Article 5 of Directive 95/26/EC on the other hand inserts new article 12a which imposes a series
of disclosure obligations. Company auditors, as defined in Directive 84/253/EEC (OJ L126,
12.5.1984, p.20), who perform defined auditing functions or any other statutory task, have a duty to
report promptly to the competent authorities any fact or decision concerning that undertaking of
which they have become aware while carrying out a task which is liable to: constitute a material
breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions
governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of financial
undertakings; affect the continuous functioning of the financial undertaking; or lead to refusal to
certify the accounts or to the expression of reservations.
33 J.A. Usher (2000), The Law ofMoney and Financial Services in the European Community, 2nd
edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, forthcoming, p. 139 (in draft).
34 Directive 98/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22.6.1998 amending
Article 12 of Council Directive 77/80/EEC on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit
institutions, Articles 2,5,6,7,8 of and Annexes II and III to Council Directive 89/647/EEC on a
solvency ration for credit institutions and Article 2 of and Annex II to Council Directive 93/66/EEC
on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, OJ L204, 21.7.1998, p.29,
article 1.
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Both directives 95/26 and 98/33 were adopted after the money laundering
directive, reflecting calls for the intensification of prudential supervision. They
resulted in a long list of derogations to the obligation professional secrecy. These
derogations are particularly extensive when information is transmitted to other
competent authorities, but still strictly limited when information is transmitted to
judicial authorities. Prior to the money laundering directive, exceptions to the
obligation of professional secrecy in the field of banking supervision were thus
limited and clearly delineated.
3. THE DUTIES OF CREDIT AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE
MONEY LAUNDERING DIRECTIVE
I. JUSTIFICATION
The money laundering directive introduced a series of extensive obligations for
credit and financial institutions. In terms of the banker-customer relationship, the
changes brought about by these provisions were so radical, that they were
characterised as the 'death of bank secrecy'.35 Prior to examining in detail the
scope and content of these duties, it is essential to begin with an overview of their
justification in the discourse of the Community institutions.
The Commission, in its explanatory memorandum on the initial directive
proposal, called for preventive action in combating money laundering. It was
assessed that credit institutions are frequently used to carry out money laundering
activities and in this manner their soundness and stability as well as the prestige of
the financial system as a whole is jeopardised.36 The securitisation elements of this
approach, centering on money laundering as a threat to financial stability, was
followed by the appeal of the Economic and Social Committee for participation in
the fight against drug trafficking. In its Opinion on the Commission's draft,
35 M. Levi (1991), 'Regulating Money Laundering: The Death of Bank Secrecy in the UK', in




reference is made to the moral obligation everyone has to 'join in the fight against
a scourge which undermines human dignity and the physical and moral integrity of
its victims, many of whom are young people'.37
Along with presenting the fight against money laundering as essential to counter
a multifaceted threat, this kind of discourse creates a potent imagery of the
community united against danger. The participation in the fight against crime is put
forward as a moral imperative that everybody has to follow. The attention is
shifted specifically to credit institutions, which, according to the Committee,
'cannot remain insensitive to the risk of the whole financial system being
destabilized or of the loss of public confidence which could result if financial
channels were used for laundering money gained from serious crimes condemned
by the international community'.38
Not only is it thus immoral to launder money, but it is equally immoral not to
participate in efforts at countering the threat. In this moralisation crusade, the
targeting of banks is notable: according to the Commission's explanatory
memorandum, the Community cannot 'remain indifferent to the involvement of
-3Q #
credit and financial institutions in money laundering'. The 'innocence' of the
latter is thus far from presumed: according to the Commission, 'in a similar way to
that in which the Community directives in the financial sector try to guarantee that
persons who effectively direct the business of credit institutions have 'good
repute', as well as that the shareholders are 'suitable', Community legislation must
ensure the integrity and 'cleanliness' of the financial system'.40
The quest for 'cleanliness' is in this manner sharply contrasted with the world of
'dirty' money and the potential involvement of banks in it. In order to remedy this
situation, credit and financial institutions are called to actively join in the fight
against money laundering. This is reflected in the preamble of the finally adopted
37 OJ C332, 31.12.1990,p.86, at point 1.2.
38 Ibid.
39 See note 28.
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directive, which acknowledges that such institutions have to play 'a highly
effective role in combating money laundering'41, as the latter constitutes 'a
particular threat to Member States societies'.42 The preamble further reiterates the
assertion that the use of credit and financial institutions in laundering money
jeopardises not only their soundness and stability, but also confidence in the
financial system as a whole, 'thereby losing the trust of the public'.43 It is an irony
to note that the notion of trust upon which the banker-customer relationship is
based is here used for its erosion.
II. THE CONTENT
A. The 'know your customer' principle: identification and record keeping duties
Article 3(1) of the directive establishes the duty of credit and financial institutions
to require identification of their customers when entering into business relations.
Article 4 further imposes the duty to keep a series of documents for use as
evidence in any investigation into money laundering. Such requirements reflect the
'know your customer' principle, which constitutes one of the leading strategies in
money laundering prevention. The rationale for this strategy has been eloquently
explained in the UK money laundering Guidance Notes for the financial sector as
follows:
'The need for banks and building societies to 'know your customer' is vital for the
prevention of money laundering and underpins all other activities. If a customer has
established an account under a false identity, s/he may be doing so for the purpose of
defrauding the bank or building society itself or merely to ensure that s/he cannot be traced
or linked to the proceeds of crime that the institution is being used to launder. A false
40 Ibid.






name, address or date of birth will usually mean that the law enforcement agencies cannot
trace the customer if s/he is needed for interview in connection with an investigation'.44
The directive does not contain any provisions on identification procedures and
methods. This has led to a series of issues in its implementation, notably with
regard to the different general identification systems in the member states. In
Germany, the 1993 Act on the Detection of Proceeds from Serious Crimes, equates
identification with 'the establishment of a person's name by means of an identity
card or passport as well as the date of birth and the address to the extent that they
are contained therein, and the determination of the type, number and issuing
authority of the official identity document'.45
As is noted by Gilmore, the situation becomes less straightforward in countries
such as the United Kingdom, where there is no official identity card.46 This leads
to a considerable degree of flexibility and vagueness with regard to identification
requirements. The money laundering Regulations of 1993 require in general
'satisfactory evidence of identity'.47 This requirement is met if the evidence is
'reasonably capable of establishing that the applicant is the person he claims to be';
and if the person obtaining the evidence is satisfied that the evidence does establish
that fact.48 The vagueness of this provision and its considerable invasiveness
regarding the prospective customer's private sphere is hardly remedied by the
money laundering Guidance Notes, which provide that ideal face-to-face
identification requires an official document accompanied by a photograph, and that
the information provided by the customer must be verified to prove the correctness
of the facts.49
44 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, Money Laundering: Guidance Notesfor the Financial
Sector, revised and consolidated June 1997, point 4.01.
45 Section 1(5), cited in W.C. Gilmore (1999), Dirty Money: The Evolution ofMoney Laundering
Counter-Measures, 2nd edition, Council of Europe Press, p. 161. See also G. Werner (1996),
Bekdmpfung der Geldwasche in der Kreditwirtschaft, Iuscrim, Freiburg im Breisgau, pp.117 et seq.
46




Regulation 11(1). Along with Regulation 7(1), cited in Gilmore, op. cit., pp.165-166.
49 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, op. cit., point 4.05.
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The identification requirements may also clash with long-standing traditions in
member states. This is most clearly illustrated in the case of Austria, where the
possibility of opening anonymous passbooks by Austrian residents still exists. This
has led to the issue of a warning by the Financial Action Task Force50 and the
initiation by the Commission of proceedings in the European Court of Justice for
incorrect implementation of the directive by Austria.51 In view of such pressure,
which was intensified by the prospective suspension of Austria as a FATF
member,52 the Austrian Government recently announced that it will be taking
measures to abolish anonymous accounts.53 Developments in the field, in view of
the scheduled hearing of the case in the Court for 15 May 2000, are eagerly
awaited.
Further issues arise from the directive's requirement for identification of
beneficial ownership. Article 3(5) provides that in the event of doubt as to whether
the customers are acting on their own behalf, or in cases when it is certain that they
are not acting on their own behalf, credit and financial institutions shall take
reasonable measures to obtain information as to the real identity of the persons on
whose behalf those customers are acting. The use of the 'reasonable measures'
terminology has been criticised for its vagueness and openness to a wide range of
differing interpretations.54 An illustration of the issue is provided by the UK
money laundering Regulation 9(3), which defines as a reasonable measure 'best
practice which, for the time being, is followed in the relevant field of business and
50 Financial Action Task Force, Warning about Austrian Anonymous Savings Passbooks, Paris,
11.2.1999. It is stated in the warning that 28 million such accounts exist in Austria, where at present
any resident can hold an anonymous 'passbook' savings account.
51 'Commission takes Austria to Court over money laundering' in European Report, No.2260, 18
October 1997.
52 OECD News Release, 'Austria suspended as a member of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering in June 2000 unless action taken on anonymous passbooks', Paris, 3.2.2000.
53 Bulletin Quotidien Europe, 'Austria to abolish anonymous savings accounts', No 7662,
24.2.2000, p. 14.
54 R. Bosworth-Davies and G. Saltmarsh (1994), Money Laundering: A Practical Guide to the New
Legislation,Chapman & Hall, London, Glasgow, Weinheim, New York, Tokyo, Melbourne,
Madras, p. 181.
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which is applicable to those circumstances', and adds thus to the inherent
vagueness of the directive provision.55
The identification of beneficial ownership becomes a difficult task in cases
where the intermediary person is in a special relationship of trust with the owner.
This is due to the enhanced legal obligation of secrecy in most of these
relationships. The special nature of trust relationships has been acknowledged by
the FATF evaluation of customer identification measures, where it was further
ascertained that in almost all members, it is not mandatory to identify the name of
each beneficiary of a trust.56 The Report further raised the issue of the difficulty of
identifying the parties for whom the trustee or nominee is acting and 'to seek
confirmation that the source of funds or assets under the trustee's control can be
vouched for'.57
Further issues are raised in the case of beneficial ownership identification in
solicitor-client relationships. The difficult position of credit and financial
institutions when faced with conflicting principles of legal confidentiality has been
highlighted by the British Bankers' Association in their memorandum to the Flouse
of Lords, an extract of which is worth quoting at length:
'Further thought needs to be given to the requirement that credit and financial institutions should
take reasonable measures to establish the real identity of persons on whose behalf a transaction is
carried out. On the face of it this imposes an obligation on a bank to enquire of a solicitor customer
about the beneficial ownership of the proceeds of payments into or out of its client account, thus
producing a conflict with the doctrine of legal confidentiality. Such irreconcilable conflict arises
from the incorrect formulation of the thrust of the Directive, as it effectively singles out, and places
the burden on, financial and credit institutions to act as policemen in respect of the activities of
55 Ibid.
56 Financial Action Task Force, Evaluation ofMeasures Taken by FATF Members Dealing with




intermediaries. The correct approach, it is submitted, should be to place that burden on the
intermediary responsible for the transaction in the first place'.58
The directive does not contain any provision on customer identification in non
face- to-face transactions. As the latter form an increasingly common practice,59
this lack of regulation has the potential to create a major loophole in the system,
especially in view of the difficulties in the establishment of true identity inherent in
such transactions. The recent Commission proposal amending the money
laundering directive addresses the issue by including an annex of principles for
customer identification in non face-to-face transactions.60
The identification procedures under these principles aim at ensuring 'appropriate
identification' of the customer61 and require: official identification documents and
address verification; the carrying out of the first payment of the operation through
an account opened in the EU, the EEA and, if the member states allow, in
reputable credit institutions established in third countries applying equivalent anti
money laundering standards; and verification of whether the identities of the holder
of the
account through which the payment is made and of the customer are one and the
62
same.
It is thus evident that the wording is considerably more detailed than the
standard identification requirement of the directive. Problems however continue to
exist: the implementation of the 'official identification' requirement is still
problematic in countries with no formal compulsory identification documents,
58 British Bankers' Association Memorandum to HM Treasury in House of Lords Select Committee
on the European Communities, Money Laundering, Session 1990-91, 1st Report (HL Paper 6).
59 The FATF customer identification evaluation refers to direct banking, direct issue of credit cards,
direct insurance writing and nominee securities accounts as prime examples of non-face to face
transactions. See note 43, paragraphs 64-77.
60 Commission of the European Communities, Proposalfor a European Parliament and Council
Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the




Principle (v)(b). This principle applies in cases of non face-to-face transactions with the customer
and not with another institution acting on her behalf.
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while address verification, by sending documents concerning the operation by
registered mail with advice of receipt of the customer's address, adds to the
policing logic of the identification measures, widens the net of surveillance and
raises issues of protection of the private sphere.
A corollary of the identification duty is the obligation of credit and financial
institutions to keep records of their customers, as it is essential that the information
that the former obtain through the identification procedures and their transactions
with the customers can be used as evidence in money laundering investigations. As
is noted in the UK money laundering Guidance Notes, 'often the only valid role a
financial institution can play in a money laundering investigation is through the
provision of relevant records, particularly where the money launderer has used a
complex web of transactions specifically for the purpose of confusing the money
trail'.63
The directive is thus opening the door for a wide range of documents to be used
in money laundering investigations. It is unclear whether such records can be used
in the pre-trial stage, or only in court proceedings. While the reference to their use
as evidence in 'any investigation into money laundering' may lead to an extensive
interpretation, it is submitted that the second indent of the article, calling for
transaction records consisting of the original documents or 'copies admissible in
court proceedings', may restrict use only to pre-trial investigations.
It is interesting to note that, according to the UK money laundering Guidance
Notes, records kept under article 4 of the directive should be such that: a.
requirements of the legislation are fully met; b. competent third parties will be able
to assess the institution's observance of money laundering policies and procedures;
c. any transactions effected via the institution can be reconstructed; and d. the
institution can satisfy within a reasonable time any enquiries or court orders from
63 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, op. cit., point 5.01.
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the appropriate authorities as to disclosure of information'.64 In addition to its
evidentiary use, record keeping thus also serves as a means to evaluate the
performance of the institution itself in the fight against money laundering.
B. The duties of co-operation: suspicious transaction reporting and associated
obligations
i. Suspicious transaction reporting
a. General
The cornerstone of the directive's preventive framework is the imposition on credit
and financial institutions of a broad duty of co-operation with the authorities
responsible for combating money laundering. Article 6 defines the duty in a two¬
fold manner, placing the institutions concerned, their directors and employees,
under the obligation to: inform the competent authorities, on their own initiative, of
any fact which might be an indication of money laundering; and furnish those
authorities, at their request, with all necessary information. 65
The duty of credit and financial institutions to furnish the authorities, upon their
request, with information, appears to be another exception to the banker's duty of
confidentiality, similar to reactive communication duties in cases where the banker
is called to testify or provide documentation in criminal proceedings. The directive
however goes a significant step further, by imposing at the same time an
unprecedented proactive duty on the institutions concerned to report, on their own
initiative, money laundering indications to the authorities.66
In this manner, the directive has largely adopted what has been called the
'subjective' model for fighting money laundering, where transactions are reported
64
Ibid., point 5.02.
65 Article 6(1). Emphasis added.
66 On the proactive/reactive distinction, see Levi, op. cit.
206
on the basis of a subjective evaluation on behalf of the institution concerned,
taking into account the customer's general transaction profile. This system is
contrasted with the 'objective' model, which requires the institutions concerned to
report all transactions exceeding a certain threshold.67
The directive is however laconic as to the exact formulation of the reporting
duty, leaving member states with a considerable margin of discretion. This has led
to two major methods of implementation: cases where the institutions concerned
are placed under the obligation to report suspicious transactions to the authorities, a
system that has been followed, albeit with slight differences,68 in the majority of
the member states; and cases where they are under the duty to report not
suspicious, but unusual transactions, which was first formulated in the
Netherlands.
b. Suspicious transaction reporting: the case of the United Kingdom
In one of the most draconian implementations of the directive, the laws of England
and Wales establish as an offence the failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of
money laundering from drug trafficking and terrorism.69 The provision is extended
beyond the scope of the directive in covering any person in the course of their
70
trade, profession, business or employment. In view of the vagueness of the
concept of suspicion, especially in criminal law, the final version of the section
does not include the initially proposed test of 'knowing, suspecting or having
reasonable grounds to suspect',71 as the latter is too abstract a criterion to satisfy
67 For a detailed analysis and evaluation of the models, see R.K. Noble and C.E. Golumbic (1997-
1998), 'A New Anti-Crime Framework for The World: Merging The Objective and Subjective
Models for Fighting Money Laundering' in New York Journal of International Law and Politics,
vol.30, pp.79-144.
68 For an overview of differences in national suspicion reporting systems, notably with regard to
what constitutes suspicion, see J. Riffault (1999), 'Le Blanchiment des Capitaux Illicites: Le
Blanchiment des Capitaux en Droit Compare', in Revue de Science Criminelle, pp.238-239.
69 See chapter 4.
70 Home Office, Organised and International Crime Directorate, Working Group on Confiscation,
Third Report: Criminal Assets, November 1998, p.20, paragraph 3.2.
71 British Bankers' Association, op. cit., p.25. The Association was fiercely opposed to the inclusion
of this clause.
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legal certainty requirements. Reporting is based predominantly on the concept of
suspicion, which, according to the UK money laundering Guidance Notes is
'personal and subjective and falls short of proof based on firm evidence'.7
The Guidance Notes attempt to limit this lack of objectivity by providing that
suspicion is still 'more than the absence of certainty that someone is innocent'.73
They further provide an attempt at definition, by stating that where there is a
business relationship, a suspicious transaction is often one which is 'inconsistent
with a customer's known, legitimate business or personal activities or with the
normal businessfor that type ofaccount'. 74 As is noted further, it thus appears that
the primary key to ascertain whether a transaction is suspicious is to know enough
about the customer and her business. To this end, credit and financial institutions
are called upon to consider the transaction in relation to the normal activities of the
customer and examine whether the former is consistent and rational or whether the
general pattern of transactions has changed.75
It is evident that, in ascertaining whether a transaction is suspicious or not, the
personnel of credit and financial institutions act in a quasi-policing manner,
examining in great detail the customer's otherwise private affairs. This assertion
has been validated by empirical research conducted as early as 1994. As Gold and
Levi have noted, money laundering suspicions follow 'the normal pro-active
policing mode: conduct that is, or seems to be, 'out of place' and/or meets the
criteria for 'methodic suspicion' for which the banker has been taught to look...is
picked up and reported upwards as suspected proceeds of crime'.76
72 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, op. cit., paragraph 6.01.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid, point 6.02. Emphasis added.
75 Ibid, paragraph 6.03.
76 M. Gold and M. Levi (1994), Money Laundering in the UK: An Appraisal ofSuspicion-Based
Reporting, The Police Foundation/University of Wales, pp.88-89. On a more concise overview of
this project and a critique of the suspicious transaction reporting system, see M.Levi (1995),
'Incriminating Disclosures: An Evaluation ofMoney Laundering Regulation in England and Wales'
in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol.2, pp.202-217. See also in
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It is interesting to note here that, as is noted in the Guidance Notes, there is no
duty on the institutions concerned to examine the criminal law of any other country
where the offence may have occurred. Similarly, they are expected to know neither
the exact nature of the criminal activity, nor that the funds are definitely those
arising from an offence.77 This is seemingly at odds with the Interpol definition of
a suspicious transaction, as conduct which has reached 'a level of suspicion
sufficient to identify a criminal offence'.78 It also facilitates an increased flow of
information to be disclosed to the competent authorities.
The use of the term 'suspicious' has been criticised by some commentators who
advocate the term 'suspected'79 transactions instead. The basis of this argument
lies in the fact that, while 'suspicious' transactions refer to objective characteristics
of the transactions themselves, which may never be revealed or may be proven to
be mistaken, the term 'suspected' transactions focuses rather on 'a state of mind
evaluating what we see'.80 This view is useful in highlighting the subjectivity in
the reporting mechanisms, while at the same time emphasising that the term
'suspicious' pre-supposes to a great extent that a conduct is worthy of trial
investigation. At the more practical level, a division is put forward of disclosures
being 'highly likely' and 'moderately likely' to be related to money laundering.
Such division would approximate to the one made in the Dutch system between
unusual and suspicious transactions, largely based on the level of certainty of the
81institution concerned.
c. Unusual transaction reporting: the case of the Netherlands
French: M.Levi (1995), 'Reglementation sur le Blanchiment de l'Argent au Royaume-Uni: Une
Evaluation' in Deviance et Societe, vol.19, no.4, pp.379-385.
77 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, op. cit., paragraph 2.04.
78 Cited in Gold and Levi, op. cit., p.89.
79 Ibid.
80 M. Levi (1997), 'Money Laundering and Regulatory Policies' in E.U. Savona, Responding to
Money Laundering. International Perspectives, Harwood Academic Publishers, Australia, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Russia, Singapore,
Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, p.274.
81 Gold and Levi, op. cit., p. 106.
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The inherent difficulties for credit and financial institutions to link a transaction
with the commission of a criminal offence and to ascertain an 'objective'
suspicion, have been addressed in the Netherlands by the establishment of a system
of unusual transaction reporting. This is done by section 9 of the 1993 Disclosure
of Unusual Transactions Financial Services Act, which extends the obligation also
to intended transactions. The following passage justifies in the most eloquent
manner this choice:
'As it is impossible for the staff of financial institutions to guess the kind of crime from which a
customer's money may have been derived, disclosure in the Netherlands is not linked to particular
crimes. In fact, the staff of financial institutions cannot usually say with any degree of certainty
whether the money they are being offered was acquired legally or illegally. What they can assess,
however, is whether or not a particular transaction, given its nature and the customer and amount
involved, is normal. In other words, if it is a regular or an irregular transaction'.82
At first sight, the situation appears to be quite similar to that in the United
Kingdom. The Dutch legislation is however different in requiring the disclosure of
unusual transactions on the basis of a list of indicators, which are established, on
the basis of the Disclosures Act, by the Ministries of Justice and Finance on a
regular basis.83 According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the Act, the aim of
the system of indicators is 'to create criteria for identifying an 'unusual'
84transaction which are as objective as possible'.
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to distinguish between two categories of
transactions: manifestly unusual and other unusual transactions.85 This leads to the
further distinction between objective and subjective indicators. The former are
used to define manifestly unusual transactions and consist of facts which can be
82 J.C. Westerweel and J.L.S.M. Hillen (1994), Measures to Combat Money Laundering in the
Netherlands, p.5.
83 Section 8 of Disclosures Act.
84 Lower House of the States General, 1992-1993 Session, 23 009, No 3, Disclosure of unusual
transactions relating to financial services [Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services)
Act], Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 5.2 in MOT, Legislation Concerning Money
Laundering in the Netherlands, Ministry of Justice.
85 Ibid, paragraph 5.3.
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established objectively and whose presence lead to compulsory disclosure.
Subjective indicators on the other hand are of a more qualitative nature and, in a
similar vein to a suspicious transactions reporting system, require a subjective
evaluation on behalf of the credit or financial institution.86
The list of indicators includes both a mandatory reporting system of transactions
exceeding a certain amount and a reporting system in specific circumstances
related to factors such as the mode of payment. Their detailed enumeration appears
at first sight to assist objectivity and relieve credit and financial institutions from
the heavy burden to ascertain suspicions. However, problems still remain: as the
Public Prosecutor's Department has noted, some of the indicators are not really
objectively assessable, with transactions 'atypical of the customer' and 'in unusual
package' constituting characteristic examples.87
The inherent subjectivity in these examples brings to the fore arguments such as
the one put forward by the Association of Dutch Banks (NVB), which opposed the
unusual transactions terminology, arguing that the difference with suspicious
oo
transaction reports is 'mainly a question of semantics'. This point is reinforced
by the recent addition to the list of indicators of 'suspected money laundering
transactions'.89 The latter are defined, in a striking example of terminological
resemblance with the suspicious transaction reporting system, as 'transactions
where there is reason to believe that they may be related to money laundering'.
ii. Due diligence
85 Ibid. See also Westerweel and Hillen, op. cit.,p. 12. The Explanatory Memorandum states as
examples of objective indicators cash transactions in foreign currency, cash transactions in which
the money is handed over uncounted and transactions involving identification problems, and as an
example of a subjective indicator transactions which are atypical of a particular client, not being a
part of the usual pattern of transactions, or a cash transaction in which money is provided in
unusual packaging.
87 Public Prosecutor's Department, Advisory Report to the Bill, in MOT, op. cit., p. 16.
88 Association of Dutch Banks, Advisory Report to the Bill, in MOT, op. cit., p. 18.
89
MOT, Annual Report 1999, Ministry of Justice, p.55.
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The 'due diligence' duty is closely associated with both the identification and the
reporting element of the directive. According to article 5, credit and financial
institutions are under the obligation to examine 'with special attention' any
transaction which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, to be related to
money laundering. The focus is shifted here to the examination of transactions,
which have to be assessed on the basis of subjective criteria. After a heated debate
in the drafting process,90 the final version of the directive includes the vague
reference to the 'nature' of the transaction, which causes great problems of legal
certainty, while at the same time being of limited practical help. Similar problems
arise from the inherent ambiguity in defining what constitutes 'special attention'.
The interpretative fluidity of the provision was illustrated by the Commission in
its 1995 Report, where it was stated that while some member states implemented
the 'due diligence' duty by establishing a number of specifically defined,
additional obligations for the institutions concerned, others have not explicitly
transposed it in their national legislation, as it is believed that the principle is
implicitly encompassed in the implementation of other directive provisions, such
as article 11(1) establishing internal control procedures.91 The latter option has the
potential to transform article 5, from a provision requiring explicit implementing
measures, to a general, catch-all interpretative clause to the other directive duties,
thus imposing an enhanced burden of compliance on the institutions concerned.
The sole reflection of explicit interpretative guidance is found in the preamble of
the directive, which calls, following the spirit of the FATF Recommendations and
92
partly a series of proposals at the drafting stage, " on the institutions concerned to
pay special attention to transactions with third countries which do not apply
comparable anti-money laundering standards to those established by the
Community or other international /bra.
90 See chapter 3.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid. For an extensive overview of the drafting process in this respect see A.J. Ewing (1991),
'The Draft EEC Money Laundering Directive: An Overview' in Journal of International Banking




iii. Refraining from transactions
Closely related to the due diligence duty is the obligation of credit and financial
institutions to refrain from carrying out transactions which they know or suspect to
be related to money laundering until they have appraised the competent authorities.
According to article 7 of the directive, those authorities may give instructions for
the non-execution of the operation. In view of the difficulty of implementing this
duty in every day commercial transactions without harming the institutions public
image and without raising suspicions on the part of the customer, the article
provides that the institutions concerned may carry on with the suspected
transaction where to refrain 'is impossible or is likely to frustrate efforts to pursue
the beneficiaries of a suspected money-laundering operation'. In the latter case, the
institutions shall apprise the authorities immediately afterwards.
As the boundaries between when to refrain from and when to execute a
transaction are in many cases blurred, the margin of discretion in the
implementation of this provision remains extended, especially in cases of
suspected money laundering. In cases when an institution refrains from the
execution of a transaction which was wrongfully suspected, major issues of
concern arise regarding the liability of the institution concerned, and/or the
competent authorities, towards the customer. As the former are exonerated from
liability when acting in good faith, on the basis of article 9 of the directive, there is
a danger, in cases when they wrongfully refrain from transactions, of the customer
being subjected to a considerable loss. The danger is more acute in cases of non-
execution of the transaction, should the competent authorities ordering it remain
exempt from liability as well. Such exoneration would be regrettable, especially in
view of the intervention, in this case, of a public, or ^Mast-public authority in an
otherwise private contractual relationship. 94
94 See also the comments of Ewing, referring to contradictory statements by the Commission in this




A further duty related to the reporting mechanisms is established by the 'tipping
off provision of article 8. Here, credit and financial institutions and their directors
and employees shall not disclose to the customers concerned nor to other third
persons that information has been transmitted to the authorities on the basis of the
reporting duties of article 6 and the duty to refrain of article 7. They should also
not disclose that a money laundering investigation is being carried out.
The general character of the provision, along with its lack of explicit
demarcation of the circumstances in which the banker is under the duty not to 'tip
off, have led to the need for further elaboration at the national level. This is
evident in the UK Guidance Notes, where the need for interpretative guidelines
was more acute in view of the establishment of 'tipping off as a criminal
offence!95 These reflect a noteworthy attempt to narrow the scope of the duty only
to cases expressly referred to in the directive. In a paragraph that is worth quoting
at length, it is stated that:
'...a tipping off offence cannot arise unless the person concerned knows or suspects that a
suspicious transaction report has been made either internally, or to the National Criminal
Intelligence Service (NCIS), or alternatively knows or suspects that police or customs are
carrying out or intending to carry out a money laundering investigation. Therefore
preliminary enquiries of a prospective customer by financial sector staff, either to obtain
additional information to confirm the true identity, or to ascertain the source of funds or
the precise nature of the transaction being undertaken, will not trigger a tipping off offence
before a suspicious transaction report has been submitted in respect of that customer unless
the enquirer has prior knowledge or suspicion of a current or impending investigation.
Tipping off a suspect must be undertaken knowing or suspecting the consequences of the
disclosure for an offence to be committed. Enquiries to check whether an unusual
transaction has a genuine commercial purpose will not be regarded as tipping off.
95 See chapter 4.
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However, if the enquiries lead to a subsequent report being made then the customer must
not be informed or alerted.'96
Such detailed guidance is however not sufficient to resolve the sensitive position
of the institutions or persons under the duty to comply with the 'tipping-off'
provision. Here again the former are placed within a quasi-po\ic\r\g role, aligning
with the authorities against a suspect customer. A series of human rights issues
arise in this context, in particular in view of the fact that the customer concerned is
at the stage of being suspected and not proven guilty of an offence. Such issues
Q7
were clearly illustrated in the recent case of C v. S and others, which involved an
institution which had already submitted suspicious transaction reports to the NCIS
and subsequently was placed under a High Court order to produce information and
documentation about accounts or customers which could reveal money laundering.
As was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal, in this case the institution
concerned was placed in an 'invidious' position, as: compliance with the Court
Order signified a risk of being prosecuted under the 'tipping-off provision, as the
production of documents could reveal the existence of a money laundering
investigation; and compliance with the money laundering legislation, which would
lead to the institution not producing the requested documents, placed them in
contempt of Court.98 The Court went on to state that the NCIS investigation in this
context created a three-fold conflict between the interests of the state in combating
crime on behalf of the public and:
-. The entitlement of a private body to obtain redress from the court;
-. Fair trial principles, namely that justice should be administered in public, that a
party should know the case which is being advanced by another party and should
have the opportunity to reply to it; and
-. The principle that a party who comes before the courts is entitled to know the
reasons for the courts' decisions.99
96 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, op. cit., paragraph 2.07.
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In addressing this conflict, the Court, which, as seen above viewed the
institutions duty not to tip-off within a public interest context of the fight against
crime, asserted that the importance of these principles cannot always be paramount
facing the public interest and proceeded to give extensive guidance as to how such
conflicts are to be reconciled in similar cases. As will be seen extensively below,
the Court's guidance is a manifest attempt to safeguard at least a minimum
standard of rights, while at the same time acknowledging the predominance of the
investigative aims of NCIS.100 As the guidance principles largely depend, at the
initial stage, on the initiative of the NCIS, which receives in the first instance the
institution's request for clarification,101 the position of the institutions concerned is
far from clear and the possibility for the existence of conflicting duties still present.
Guidance has however been welcome by legal circles representing institutions in
102
these cases as a pragmatic way of dealing with the situation.
The conflict created by the 'tipping-off provision was recently acknowledged
by the European Parliament in its reading of the Commission's draft money
laundering directive.103 The Parliament acknowledged that, along with a statutory
obligation of secrecy, there is also a statutory duty to warn clients with a view of
protecting them from harm. On the basis of this justification, the Parliament
amended article 8 to establish a duty not to 'tip-off' 'unless the person or
institution concerned is required to do so by legislation relating to the profession
concerned'This qualification to the duty takes into account the particularities of
100 See chapter 6.
101
According to the Court, as soon as a financial institution is aware that a party to legal
proceedings intends to apply for, or has obtained, an order for discovery which might involve
disclosure of information which could prejudice the investigation, it should inform the NCIS of the
position and the material which it is required to disclose. The latter will then have the opportunity
to identify the material which it does not wish to be disclosed and indicate any preference regarding
how an application or order is handled.
102 Lovells (2000), Money Laundering: A Dilemma Resolved?, Client note: A guide for banks and
financial institutions.
103 See part 4.
104
European Parliament, Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs
(1999i), Draft Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive amending
Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for
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the new professions which will be included in the scope of the directive,105 while
acknowledging similar situations in the banking and financial sector.
v. Reporting by supervisory authorities
Article 10 of the directive extends the duty to report to supervisory authorities.
They are placed under the obligation to report any fact that could constitute
evidence of money laundering if they discover it in the course of inspections
carried out in credit and financial institutions or in any other way. 106 This broad
reporting obligation entails far-reaching implications for the duty of confidentiality
107of bank supervisory authorities as put forward in EC law. Beyond the reactive
breach of confidentiality in a specifically enumerated number of cases, supervisors
are here placed under an extensive proactive duty to cooperate with the anti-money
laundering authorities by reporting a wide range of facts which they subjectively
ascertain 'could constitute evidence of money laundering'. The duty extends far
beyond the analogous duties of credit and financial institutions in a two-fold
manner: by the broad reference to 'any fact', rather than suspicions from specific
transactions; and by the discovery of facts not only in the course of inspections, but
'in any other way', thus placing supervisors not only in a policeman's, but rather in
a detective's shoes.
C. Organisational duties
Article 11 places credit and financial institutions under the duty to establish
procedures of internal control and communication in order to forestall and prevent
money laundering operations. At the same time, they are obliged to adopt
awareness measures, such as training programmes for the employees, to ensure the
correct implementation of the directive. This constitutes a significant attempt
the purpose ofmoney laundering, Repporteur: K.-H. Lehne, Drafsman: D.R. Theato, DOC.
PRELIMINARY 1999/0152(COD)-Fl REV.l, 16.12.1999, p.14.
105 See part 4.
106
Emphasis added.
107 See supra, part III(2)(e).
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towards self-regulation and the creation of an anti-money laundering ethos in the
institutions concerned. It seems surprising in this light that some member states,
such as the United Kingdom, have opted for the criminalisation of the breach of
this obligation. Not only is criminalisation manifestly incompatible with any
concept of self-regulation, but it may also lead to the creation of a broad, strict
liability offence.108
4. THE EXTENSION OF THE DUTIES TO OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND
PERSONS
I. GENERAL
The preventive anti-money laundering framework was initially confined to a series
of credit and financial institutions. Subsequent developments in the field have
however demonstrated an increasing tendency for the use of other sectors of
production for the purposes of money laundering.109 As seen above, these
developments led to an awareness of the necessity to revise money laundering
counter-measures and the revision to a great extent of the FATF
Recommendations. At the same time, a series of calls were made by EC
institutions and the Contact Committee established by the 1991 directive, for a
revision of the EC money laundering legislation to take into account these new
developments.110 This policy impetus has been clearly reflected in the recent
Commission's proposal for a draft money laundering directive amending directive
91/308.111
108 J. Dine (1995), Criminal Law in the Company Context, Dartmouth, Aldershot, Brookfield USA,
Singapore, Sidney, p.l 16.
109 See chapter 3.
110 For a detailed analysis see chapter 3.
111 Commission of the European Communities (1999), Proposalfor a European Parliament and
Council Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose ofmoney laundering, COM (1999)352 final, Brussels,
14.7.1999.
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The draft directive extends the scope ratione personae of its predecessor in two
ways: by adding to the list a number of additional financial institutions; and, most
significantly, by extending the list to legal and natural persons outside the financial
sector. The financial institutions list is to be amended to include an express
reference to bureaux de change and money transmission/remittance offices and to
investment firms as defined in Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services.112 The
amendment was deemed necessary in view of the doubts as to whether these
113
institutions were already covered by the money laundering directive.
New article 2a on the other hand, would extend the scope of the directive to a
wide range of non-financial professions, when acting in the exercise of their
professional activities. The list includes accountants and auditors; real estate
agents; notaries and other independent legal professionals in a series of activities;
dealers in high-value goods and transporters of funds; and persons related through
operation, ownership or management, with the casino industry.
The proposal is far from clear regarding the exact definition of professions in
several instances, the most notable one being the broad reference to dealers in high
value goods. The catch-all character of the term, along with the non-exhaustive
enumeration of examples in the directive, has the potential to over-extend its scope
and to render the Commission's reservations on including professions such as art
dealers meaningless, as they can be caught under the 'high-value' dealer heading.
The greatest challenges, however, are linked with the inclusion of legal
professions.
II. THE SPECIAL CASE OF LEGAL PROFESSIONS
Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects in the anti-money laundering
legislation is the imposition of the preventive obligations on lawyers. The
challenges surrounding the imposition of these duties on credit and financial
112 New article 1(B).
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institutions bound by confidentiality emanating from their trust relationship with
the customer, become magnified in this case. The lawyer-client relationship is one
with an increased level of trust, and professional confidentiality is essential to
protect fundamental human rights and rule of law principles, such as guaranteeing
a fair trial and safeguarding defence rights. This has been eloquently put forward at
the Belgian Senate during discussions on introducing analogous duties in Belgian
legislation. It was noted that:
'The fundamental right of the accused to be judged under an equitable process implies the right to
be defended appropriately. It cannot be guaranteed that the accused has the possibility to
communicate to her lawyer all the information necessary for her defence. Would the client do this
unreservedly to the extent that she knows that her lawyer is obliged to provide to the authorities
information which could be prejudicial to her? Does this not place at stake the principle of fair trial
(proces equitable)?'114
In view of the enhanced trust between lawyer and client and the particular
significance of confidentiality in their transactions, the imposition of money
laundering duties on lawyers has the potential to create a conflict of interest for a
lawyer between concerns to ensure the effective administration of justice on the
one hand, and protecting the client's interests on the other, with a further parameter
being the protection of the lawyer's interests per sc.115
The imposition on lawyers of duties under the money laundering legislation thus
challenges a well-established principle of professional confidentiality permeating
the lawyer-client relationship.116 Although it has been acknowledged that there are
significant differences between Western European countries as to its protection,
with some using criminal law and others civil law, it has been acknowledged that:
113 Commission of the European Communities, 1999, p.7.
114 Senate of Belgium, Parliamentary Archives, Session of 2.7.1998, DOC. 1-202, downloaded from
www.senate.be
115 Council of Europe, Lawyers and Money laundering: The combat against money laundering and
the fundamental rights of the defence, DOC. DIR/JUR (95) 9, Strasbourg, 20.4.1995, p.15.
116 On an overview of the situation in England and Wales, see A. Campbell (1999), 'Solicitors and
the Prevention ofMoney Laundering' in Journal ofMoney Laundering Control, vol.3, no.2,
pp. 135-142.
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all countries afford some degree of protection to the confidential relationship
between lawyer and client; and that this protection is primarily achieved through a
lawyer's duty not to disclose matters discussed with a client.117
The same considerations were reiterated by the European Court of Justice, in a
judgment concerning the Commission's investigatory powers under a competition
law regulation.118 Judging on the applicability of the protection of confidentiality
in Community law, it was stated that:
'Community law, which derives from not only the economic but also the legal
interpenetration of the Member States, must take into account the principles and concepts
common to the laws of those States concerning the observance of confidentiality, in
particular, as regards certain communications between lawyer and client. That
confidentiality serves the requirements, the importance of which is recognized in all of the
Member States, that any person must be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer
whose profession entails the giving of independent legal advice to all those in need of
it'.119
These considerations led the Court to interpret the competition legislation as
protecting the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client
under two conditions: that such communications are made for the purposes and in
the interests of the client's rights of defence; and that they emanate from
independent lawyers, that is to say lawyers who are not bound to the client by a
relationship of employment.
Notwithstanding its limited concern with the Commission's powers in the
specific realm of competition law and the limitation of the protection of legal
privilege to a specific kind of communication and specific lawyer-client
relationships, the importance of the judgment cannot be underestimated in
117 Council of Europe, op. cit., p.5.
118 Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1984] ECR
1575.
119 Ihid, paragraph 18.
120 Ibid, paragraphs 21,22.
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acknowledging both the need to protect the principle of confidentiality and its
association with rule of law issues. At the same time, however, and in spite of the
acknowledgement of lawyer-client confidentiality as a general principle, it is
evident that no common criteria exist with regard its protection and its scope.
Such delimitation issues were prominent in the conclusions of the Contact
Committee regarding the inclusion of legal professions in the revised money
laundering directive. It was noted that, while the majority of national delegations
considered that legal professions could be made subject to the directive provisions
when they carry out some kind of financial intermediation in financial transactions,
there was a number of delegations which felt unable to make any distinction
between the different services which members of the legal professions might
provide to their clients and pointed out that discretion and client confidentiality in
these cases is absolute. Other member states opted for the exploration of
possibilities of self-regulation prior to thinking of subjecting legal professions to
121
the anti-money laundering legislation.
The response of the Commission has been to place legal professions in the scope
of the directive only in specific circumstances and to differentiate them from the
other persons or institutions covered by the directive with respect to their reporting
requirement. Article 2a thus refers to notaries and other independent legal
professionals in respect of the execution of a non-exhaustive list of financial
activities. According to revised article 6(3), member states shall not be obliged to
apply the directive's duties to these professionals with regard to information they
receive from a client in order to be able to represent him in legal proceedings.
This differentiation also extends to reporting modalities. Article 6(3) empowers
member states to provide in that case that the competent authority receiving the
reports by these professionals is, exceptionally, the bar association or appropriate
self-regulatory body of the profession concerned. These bodies may in addition be
121 Commission of the European Communities, 1998, p.l 1.
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exempted from the new obligation to exchange information on suspicious
transactions with the Commission in case of fraud, corruption or any other illegal
activity damaging or likely to damage EC financial interests.122
The tensions in the Commission's effort to reconcile deeply rooted
confidentiality traditions with the perceived need to involve legal professions in the
fight against money laundering are evident. In pursuing the latter, the Commission
opted for a familiar 'minimum standard' strategy, by confining the legislation to
specific categories of professions and circumstances, while leaving possibilities for
extension open. In the case of legal professions, however, this has resulted in
considerable vagueness and uncertainty as to the scope of the proposed legislation.
While the enumeration of financial transactions in the course of which legal
professions will be bound by the directive is welcome, the abstract and catch-all
reference to the 'execution of any other financial transactions' opens the provision
to a wide range of interpretations.
In the same way, the derogation from the duties with regard to information
received in order to represent a client in legal proceedings is substantially limited,
as it does not cover 'any case in which there are grounds for suspecting that advice
is being sought for the purpose of facilitating money laundering'. 23 The element of
suspicion is further broadened here with the reference to more general 'grounds for
suspecting', potentially bringing into the fore already criticised tests of
'reasonableness'.124
5. THE EMERGENCE OF 'RESPONSIBILISED' CITIZENS: MONEY




124 See part 3B.
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A core element of the strategy to counter criminality which occurs due to and
through every day transactions has been to mobilise organisations and individuals
situated outside the state apparatus and to ensure their participation in the fight
against crime. This call for active citizenship has been pertinently named as the
1 9 S
'responsibilisation strategy'. The term was put forward by Garland, who noted
that the recurring message is the displacement of the state's responsibility for
preventing and controlling crime. The state cannot fulfill these tasks alone and thus
requires the active cooperation of citizens: the latter 'must be made to recognize
that they too have a responsibility in this regard, and must be persuaded to change
their practices in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase informal
controls'.126
The money laundering directive constitutes one of the most striking examples of
responsibilisation. An increasing number of institutions and individuals are called
to cooperate with state authorities in the fight against money laundering. This call
is justified in a two-fold manner. First of all, money laundering counter-measures
are viewed as essential in order to combat transnational criminality, which is
projected by the EC institutions as a serious security threat. At a parallel level, this
securitisation process is inextricably linked with emotionally charged discourses of
demonisation and moralization. On the one hand, many of the institutions and
individuals concerned are deemed to take part, in an active or passive way, in
money laundering activities, thus enforcing the threat of transnational crime. On
the other, and partly exactly because of this fact, their participation in the fight
against money laundering is deemed essential because the state cannot counter the
problem alone. Citizens have to cooperate with the authorities because of their
moral obligation to safeguard society from the threat of money laundering and
organised crime.
125 As seen in chapter 1, the term was introduced by Garland in: D. Garland (1996), 'The Limits of
the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society' in British Journal of
Criminology, vol.36, no.4, pp.452 et seq.
126
Garland, op. cit., p.453.
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This securitisation/moralisation crusade has led to the imposition of an
unprecedented set of duties on credit and financial institutions, and most probably
to an extended range of non-financial professions. The repercussions of these
duties cannot be disregarded: first of all, the institutions and individuals involved
are under the obligation to 'know' in the most complete possible way the people
with whom they transact in every day life. In stark contrast with well-established
bonds of confidence and trust, they have to conduct checks, investigate and gather
information on their customer's private affairs. In a predominant climate of
suspicion, they then have to evaluate and report a wide range of every day,
personal information to the authorities responsible for countering money
laundering. Citizens are thus placed under the heavy duty to cooperate in a
proactive manner with the authorities, by providing, on their own initiative,
information about other citizens. This process, characterised by commentators as
the 'new policing',127 alters significantly every day social interaction, and has the
potential to challenge fundamental principles of human rights and the rule of law.
Compliance with this new set of duties has been aimed through two mechanisms.
First of all, in order to soothe the fears of credit and financial institutions that they
would be liable to their customers in cases of wrongful disclosure, article 9 of the
directive provides that the disclosure in good faith to the authorities of information
under the reporting and refraining duties shall not constitute a breach of any
restriction or disclosure of information and shall not involve the institution, its
directors or employees in liability of any kind. The vagueness of the provision-
inherent in the very use of the term 'good faith'- aside, such exoneration of liability
weakens considerably the position of customers and opens the door to a maximum
disclosure policy. In view of this danger, the recent proposal by the European
Parliament to replace the term of 'good faith' by establishing exoneration from
liability 'unless the disclosure is deliberate or the information disclosed is untrue
owing to gross negligence' is an interesting development in the field. According to
the Parliament, the 'good faith' terminology is no longer adequate, especially in
127 M. Levi (1997), 'Evaluating the 'New Policing': Attacking the Money Trail of Organized
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view of the extension of the ratione personae scope of the directive. It should be
replaced with more precise wording in order to prevent abuse and ensure the
exercise of a degree of care.128
Similar terminological problems in the application of the provision in the
banking sector were encountered in Finland. There, customer protection
considerations led to the replacement of section 97 of the 1994 Act on Credit
Institutions establishing a general exoneration from liability, with the new section
15 of the 1998 money laundering Act. It provides that:
'a party under obligation to report shall be liable to damages for financial loss caused to a
customer due to clearing a transaction, reporting of a suspicious transaction or suspension
or refusal of effecting a transaction only if a party under obligation to report has failed to
exercise due diligence in a manner that, considering the circumstances, could have been
expected from it'.129
It is evident that the absolute exoneration from liability has been significantly
watered down with the express reference to liability for damages. This, along with
the uncertainty caused by the abstract reference to 'expected due diligence' has
caused concern in the banking sector.130 The conflict between the banker's duties
to the customer on the one hand, and the money laundering authorities on the
i o 1
other, may end up as a double burden for the institution concerned. ~ This conflict
highlights the paradox in the current anti-money laundering legislation: on the one
hand, through he duties of the institutions and persons concerned and their
exoneration from liability, the position of the customers is significantly weakened
and their rights undermined; on the other hand, exoneration from liability, though
detrimental to the customers' interests, is one of the principal incentives for
Crime' in The Australian and New Zealand Journal ofCriminology, vol.30, pp.1-25.
128
European Parliament, 1999i, p. 14.
129 For a version of the Act in English, see (1998) Commercial Laws ofEurope, vol.1, pp.537-544.
i3° officials of the Finnish Bankers Association and a principal Finnish credit institution, personal
communication, Helsinki, 24.3.1998.
131 On a recent general comment on the relationship between criminal and civil law in the
development of money laundering counter-measures, see Ch. Nakajima (1999), 'Countering Money
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compliance, and non-compliance results in the imposition of draconian
penalties.132
The directive is silent as to the nature of these penalties. This has led to
considerable diversity in its implementation. The majority of the member states
have opted for administrative penalties in case of breach of the duties by credit and
financial institutions.133 Other countries, however, with the notable example of
England and Wales, opted for sanctioning the breach of some duties by means of
criminal law penalties.134 The situation has not changed in the new draft directive,
in spite of the noteworthy reference of the Action Plan on organised crime to
making the failure to report suspicious transactions liable to dissuasive
sanctions.135
Rather than opting for the creation of 'internal moralities' through mechanisms
of self-regulation,136 compliance is attempted through the threat of legal sanctions,
which is magnified by the recourse to criminal law measures. Even the attempt to
establish internal training programmes is accompanied by the threat of sanctions,
with the extreme example of England and Wales, where the failure to establish
mechanisms in view of achieving an 'internal morality' is treated as a criminal
offence!137 Such an approach may have a quantitative impact in terms of an
increase in reports by the institutions concerned, but does little to promote a
Laundering Needs More Than Criminal Measures' in Money Laundering Monitor, Issue 6,
November, pp.2-3.
132 Article 14 of the directive calls at member states to take appropriate measures to ensure full
application of all the directive provisions and to determine the penalties to be applied for
infringement of the measures adopted pursuant the directive.
133 For an overview, see Commission of the European Communities, First Commission's Report on
the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive (91/308/EEC) to be submitted to the
European Parliament and to the Council, COM (95) 54 final, Brussels, 3.3.1995, pp.15-16.
134 See the analysis on 'tipping-off supra and chapter 3.
135 Recommendation 26.
136 P.Selznik (1994), 'Self-Regulation and the Theory of Institutions' in G. Teubner, L. Farmer and
D. Murphy (eds.), Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of
Ecological Self-Organization, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto,
Singapore, p.400.
137 See part 3C.
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qualitative change in the attitude of institutions and individuals towards the
'criminogenic situation'.
In the cold language of numbers, the results of this unprecedented mobilisation
are rather disappointing. In countries with already developed anti-money
laundering mechanisms, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a
considerable number of suspicious transaction reports has been recorded over the
past five years. However there, as in all other member states, the number of
1 "3R
convictions on the basis of these reports has been minimal. This has been
acknowledged recently in a report by the European Parliament, stating that:
'While the picture regarding convictions for money laundering is still incomplete, it is
impossible to draw reliable conclusions as to whether criminal law provisions in the EU
are making for effective punishment. However, the statistics available appear to indicate
that only very few people are convicted for money laundering. The explanation
undoubtedly lies in part in the difficulty of marshalling corroborative evidence, but a
further consideration to take into account is the fact that money laundering has to some
extent shifted to activities which are not as tightly supervised as the financial sector.'139
This assertion certainly does not explain the discrepancy between the number of
reports by the tightly regulated financial sector and the resulting convictions. What
it does reflect, however, is the argument that the value of the directive duties also
lies in its deterrent effect:140 launderers now take advantage of the regulated
138 See the data provided in Commission of the European Communities, 1999, pp.43-44. An
eloquent example is that of the United Kingdom, where suspicion transaction reports ranged from
13,710 to 16,125 between 1995 and 1998 (see National Criminal Intelligence Service, Disclosures
99, DOC 09/99, downloaded from www.ncis.co.uk). At the same time, the Commission notes, there
were only 25 convictions for money laundering between 1993 and 1996. What is most impressive,
is that only one prosecution for money laundering resulted form a suspicious transaction report!
However, there were over 200 known prosecutions for other offences in 1996 as a result of reports
passed on to police or investigative authorities. This raises in its turn serious concerns about the
protection of individuals in cases where information is used for purposes other that the combating
of money laundering.
139
European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights (1999ii), Report on the
Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of
the Money Laundering Directive, Rapporteur: E. Newman, Draftsman: E. Lambraki, DOC. A4-
0093/99, 26.2.1999, p.23.
140 On the deterrent or 'criminal exposure' effect of money laundering counter-measures see also
Gold and Levi, op. cit., p.63.
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institutions to a much lesser extent, as they tend to use other sectors of the
economy not covered by the legislation. This leads to a call for the extension of the
scope of the anti-money laundering duties beyond the financial sector, to cover a
wide range of organisations and individuals deemed as vulnerable for money
laundering abuse.
This 'hide and seek' approach reflects the tendency to involve the broadest
possible section of society in the fight against money laundering and organised
crime.141 This development mirrors the emergence of a new form of governance,
and is accompanied by serious challenges to fundamental social and legal norms,
the rule of law and human rights. The money laundering duties constitute perhaps
the leading paradigm of these new structures in EU law.142 It remains to be see
n how these duties will influence or will in their turn be influenced by the
emerging tendency to involve citizens in the fight against organised crime.
141 A further extension, linked to the 'financial institutions' aspect, is the one put forward by the
draft European Parliament and Council Directive 'on the taking up, the pursuit and the prudential
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions' (COM(1998)461 final, Brussels,
21.9.1998), whose article 2(3) provides that directive 91/308 shall apply to electronic money
institutions.
142 A parallel development in this field has been the imposition of cooperation duties to private
enterprises in the EC precursors legislation, that is the Regulations and Directives adopted in order
to discourage the diversion of certain substances to the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances (Regulation 900/92 of 31.3.1992) and to regulate the manufacture and
placing on the market of these substances (Directive 92/109/EEC of 14.12.1992). Both laws impose
to natural and legal persons involved in the manufacture, production, trade or distribution of
precursors a duty to notify the competent authorities of any circumstances which may demonstrate
links with the use of the substances for the manufacture of illicit drugs. See W.C. Gilmore and A.
Brown (1996), Drug Trafficking and the Chemical Industry, Hume Papers on Public Policy, vol.4,
No.l, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.
143 The involvement of civil society in the prevention of organised crime is one of the leading issues
in the EU Tampere Summit of October 1999. A background paper on the Summit urges the
adoption of basic prevention guiding principles, which should encourage 'partnerships between the
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authorities and local community organizations, the business community and other sectors of civil
society'. DOC Tampere: Serious Cross-Border Crime, Luonnos 1 (7), 17.6.1999.
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Securitisation through the administration of knowledge: the




The establishment of comprehensive anti-money laundering structures brought to
the fore the central role of information exchange and analysis. The duties of
customer identification, record keeping, and suspicious transactions reporting,
imposed on credit and financial institutions by the money laundering directive,1
signal the beginning of the accumulation of a wide range of information on every
day commercial transactions by citizens. Information which has been gathered in
this manner is channeled through various investigation mechanisms, aiming at
rendering it a useful policing tool in the fight against money laundering. This
chapter will focus on this 'information journey' in the European Union by
examining in turn: the establishment and function of novel 'competent authorities'
responsible for receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports; the
establishment of communication networks between them, facilitating international
cooperation; and their interaction with the EU authorities competent for combating
transnational criminality. The analysis will then be complemented by an overview
of the challenges posed by the establishment of such networks and their highly
invasive character to the protection of fundamental human rights and the capacity
of existing legislative measures to face them.
' OJ CI06, 28.4.1990, p.6, articles 3,4 and 6.
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2. THE FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS
I. GENERAL
As seen above,2 article 6 of the EC money laundering directive places credit and
financial institutions under the duty to report, on their own initiative, 'any fact
which might be an indication of money laundering', to the competent authorities.
However, the text does not contain any further specification regarding the nature
and function of such authorities, leaving the matter to the discretion of the Member
States. This has resulted in the establishment of a diversity of units responsible for
gathering and processing suspicious transaction reports in the European Union.
This analysis will examine such units under a three-fold distinction between
independent/administrative, police and judicial units." Facing a plethora of similar,
but not identical, distinctions, the choice has been made to focus on what the
prominent nature of the unit is. Rather than attempting a mosaic of 15 different
systems, the analysis will attempt an in depth view of one national unit as a
characteristic example of a model, while adding some comments on similar units in
other Member States.
2
Chapters 3 and 5.
3 The distinction is similar with that used by J.-F. Thony, who distinguishes between a police, a
judicial and an ad hoc (administrative) option. See 'Processing Financial Informaton in Money
Laundering Matters: The Financial Intelligence Units' in European Journal of Crime, Criminal
Law and Criminal Justice, 1996, no.3, pp.257-282. The article was also published in French: 'Les
Mecanismes de Traitement de l'lnformation Financiere en Matiere de Blanchiment de l'Argent', in
Revue de Droit Penal et de Criminologie, 1996, vol.11, pp. 1031-1062. The Commission of the
European Communities on the other hand, follows a slightly different categorisation between:
intermediary bodies (such as those in Belgium, Finland (FSA), France, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain); police authorities (in Austria, Finland (MLID), Germany, Ireland, Sweden,
the United Kingdom); judicial authorities (in Luxembourg and Portugal); and a mixed
police/judicial authority in Denmark. See Commission of the European Communities, Second
Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the
Money Laundering Directive, COM (1998)401 final, Brussels, 1.7.1998. In the Danish system, the
Money Laundering Secretariat is based within the Office of Public Prosecutor for Serious
Economic Crime (Mr. Jens Madsen, Assistant Public Prosecutor, personal communication (letter),
9.4.1999). A similar distinction is made by B. Verhelst, deputy director of the Belgian FIU
(CTIF/CFI) in his paper 'The Organisation of a Financial Intelligence Unit', presented in the
Mercosur Seminar on Money Laundering, Buenos Aires, 26-28.5.1998 (unpublished manuscript).
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II. CATEGORISATION
Al. The independent model: the Netherlands (with notes on Greece)
In the Netherlands one of the laws implementing the EC money laundering
Directive, the 'Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Financial Services Act' of 16
December 1993, established an independent Disclosures Office responsible for
receiving unusual transaction reports from credit and financial institutions.4 The
establishment of the Office (MOT as it is called in Dutch) was a sharp break from
the previous years, replacing an informal system based on the banks' initiative,
which employed former policemen to work in their security departments.5 Since
1992, Banks reported suspicious transactions on a voluntary basis to the Financial
Police Desk (FINPOL) of the Dutch criminal intelligence service (CRI).6
A prominent feature of the Dutch policy has been the persistence on the
independence of the Disclosures agency. Rather than being directly connected with
the police, MOT acts as a filter between financial institutions on the one hand and
the police and judiciary on the other.7 MOT is deemed an 'interpreter', speaking
both language of the private sector and that of law enforcement.8 This choice is
closely associated with the establishment of an unusual, rather than suspicious,
transaction reporting system in the Netherlands. The rationale behind this system
lies in the fact that the staff of credit and financial institutions are not qualified -
and should not be required - to assess with certainty whether a transaction is
4 Section 2 of the Act. Unlike most EU countries, whose anti-money laundering framework is based
on the reporting of suspicious transactions to financial intelligence units, the Dutch system places
credit and financial institutions under the duty to report unusual transactions. A stage prior to
suspicion, the assessment on whether a transaction is unusual is based on a series of indicators. The
latter can be objective, consisting of a series of facts, such as deposits over a certain amount, or
subjective, which depend on the judgment of the institution. For a list of indicators, see J.C.
Westerweel and J.L.S.M. Hillen (1996), Measures to Combat Money Laundering in the
Netherlands, pp. 19-20.
5 Ms. T. Peeman, personal communication, Zoetermeer, 24.6.1998.
6 H. A. C. Smid, National Public Prosecutor, 'Ways to Improve Suspicious Transaction Reporting',
unpublished manuscript, Buenos Aires, 16 April 1997.
7 Lower House of the States General, 1992-1993 Session, Explanatory Memorandum on the
'MOT' Act, supra note 1 (93-1627).
8 Mr. H. Koppe, Director of MOT, personal communication, Zoetermeer, 24.6.1998.
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suspicious or not.9 In a similar manner, the establishment of an independent unit to
'filter' these reports, is aimed at preventing the 'unnecessary violation of the
privacy of citizens and the disruption of relations between financial institutions and
their clients'.10
The establishment of an independent disclosures agency caused a series of
reactions. Major opposition was put forward by banks, whose objections were
primarily centered on the 'unusual transaction' reports system. The Association of
Dutch Banks (NVB) explicitly stated its preference for an internal selection of
suspicious transactions within the institution, believing that the difference of
opinion was 'mainly a question of semantics'.11 The opposition to the interference
of MOT was further reflected in the NVB's suggestion that the Disclosures Office
forms part of the national intelligence service (CRI), stemming from the belief that
this matter 'should be organised within the government apparatus and that external
19
advisers should not be too heavily involved'. " In a similar spirit of distrust, the
Public Prosecutions Department pointed out that 'the Disclosures Office itself is
not a criminal intelligence service and does not have the authority to make policy
choices concerning the provision of information to the police."13
Notwithstanding the negative reactions surrounding its establishment, the
independent Dutch Disclosures Office14 has been entrusted with a wide range of
tasks, delineated by Section 2 of the Act to encompass: the 'filtering' and exchange
of information; the provision of feedback to the reporting institution; money
laundering research; and a consultative role to the industry. The agency is also
under the duty to report to the Ministers of Justice and Finance.15
9 Westerweel and Hillen, op. cit., p.5.
10
Ministry of Justice/MOT (1997), The Fight Against Money Laundering, p.10.
11
Advisory Report of the Association of Dutch Banks, in Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit.
12 Ibid.
13
Advisory Report of the Public Prosecutions Department, in Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit.
14 It should be noted here that, according to Section 5 of the Act, responsibility for the general
management, organization and administration of the Office shall rest with the Minister of Justice.
15 The full tasks of MOT according to Section 2 are as follows: a. to collect, register, process and
analyse the data it obtains to establish if such data could be relevant to the prevention and
investigation of felonies; b. to supply personal particulars and other information in accordance with
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The powers of MOT regarding the 'filtering' of unusual transactions expand to
the collection, registration, processing and analysis of the data obtained by it, if
such data is relevant to crime prevention and detection (Section 2(a)). These data
are not limited to reports by credit and financial institutions; they also embrace
information provided by Dutch and foreign police registers and foreign disclosure
bodies, as well as data accessible to the public.16 Furthermore, in accordance with
Section 10 of the Act, MOT is empowered to request further data or information
from disclosing parties or those conducting a financial service as defined in
Section 1(a)(7) of the Act 17and are involved in a transaction on which MOT has
information. The explanatory memorandum of the Act defines data processing and
analysis as 'establishing connections between items of information which have
been received, thus increasing their value in relation to the items of information
originally supplied by the financial institutions and making it possible to trace
information that might be of relevance to the task of supplying information to other
1 8
authorities responsible for fighting money laundering. Upon the evaluation of a
transaction as suspicious, MOT transmits it directly to the police regions, also on
behalf of the National Public Prosecutor. This is a new system, in force since
November 1997, which replaces the transmission of the MOT reports to the Public
this Act and under and in pursuance of the Police Registers' Act; c. to inform the disclosing
institution how the transaction disclosed has been dealt with in order to improve correct compliance
with the disclosure requirement; d. to conduct research into developments in the field ofmoney
laundering and into improved ways of preventing and detecting the offence; e. to make
recommendations to the relevant branches of industry concerning the introduction of appropriate
internal control and communication procedures and other measures to prevent these branches from
being used for money laundering; f. to provide information on preventing and detecting money
laundering to the relevant branches of industry, the Public Prosecutor's Department and other
public servants with similar functions and the public; g. to maintain contact with foreign law
enforcement or non-law enforcement government-designated agencies that have a task similar to
that ofMOT; and h. to forward an annual report of activities and plans to the Ministers of Justice
and Finance.
1
Explanatory memorandum, op. cit. On the international exchange of information, see part 3
below.
17 This section includes in the list of financial services 'the crediting or debiting of an account in
which monies, securities, precious metals or other valuables may be held'.
18
Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit.
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Prosecutor, who relied on the Financial Police Desk (FINPOL) for their further
refinement and physical dispatch.19
A vital condition for the effective processing and analysis of data is their
20
registration, or their storage in 'an accessible and systematic manner'. Section 4
of the MOT Act stipulates that the agency is to maintain a register, which is
deemed as a register in the sense of the Police Registers' Act and lies within the
responsibility of the Minister of Justice. According to the Explanatory
Memorandum, the decision to opt for this Act and not for the Data Protection Act
emanated from the consideration that 'the Office's tasks form part of police duties,
namely the collection and provision of data for the purpose of the prevention and
detection of criminal offences and are closely connected with the performance of
police duties'.21
There has been an attempt to place such extensive powers within strict statutory
limits. Section 4 of the MOT Act is supplemented by a second paragraph, stating
that 'information from the register will be provided under the Police Registers' Act
22
only to prevent and investigate felonies'. In the same manner, the Police
Registers' Act in Sections 14 and 15 makes the supply of data to police officers
and the Public Prosecutor obligatory only to the extent that it is necessary in the
23
performance of their duties. ' Furthermore, Section 18 of the MOT Act places all
persons who perform tasks furthering the application of the Act or of resolutions
taken in its pursuance under a strict confidentiality duty. No further or other use
and no disclosure of any data or information supplied or received in accordance
with the Act can be made for any purpose other than what is required by the
performance of their duties or by the Act.
19
MOT, Annual Report 1998, p. 18. The direct transmission of the reports to the regional crime
squads, rather than to FINPOL was deemed necessary after research on MOT showing that:a.a lot
of MOT information were lost in the process, and b. that the image of the information at the end
was frequently completely different from the initial report, due to the addition of a lot of new data.
Mr. H. Nelen, Ministry of Justice, personal communication, the Hague, 26.6.1998.
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However, these guarantees are not absolute. Article 12(d) of the Police Registers'
Act provides that MOT data can be issued also when relating to a different purpose
than that for which the file has been created when:
1. the issue takes place for the sake of inclusion in a CID file or a 'grey field' file;
2. it is reasonable to assume from the data that a certain person has committed an
offence;
3. the issue takes place pursuant to article 15, section 1, ad a of the Act,24 and these
data can in reason be of importance for the prevention or investigation of offences
as referred to in article 1, ad b;
4. the issue takes place pursuant to article 13, section 3 and refers to data which are
necessary for investigating a crime by which the legal order in the country making
the request is seriously undermined.
Further light on these exceptions is shed by Article 1 of the Act, where both the
context of a CID and of a 'grey field' file are delineated. In accordance with
Article 1(b), a CID file (or a file of the Criminal Investigations Department) means
'a file that has been created with a view to preventing or investigating offences
which represent a serious contravention of the legal order in view of their gravity,
frequency or the organised way in which they have been committed'. This
definition is also of use for the delimitation of the scope of the 12(d)(3) exception.
Article 1(d) adds that a 'grey field' file means 'a file which has been created with a
view to establishing whether, in conjunction with other data, the data subject can
be regarded as a CID subject'. A 'CID subject', according to Article 1(c) of the Act
is 'a person involved as a suspect or who may reasonably be assumed will be
involved as a suspect in relation to offences, on whom a CID file has been
complied'.
The potential of MOT information being used for purposes other than the fight
against money laundering is evident. Information may not only be procured for
23 For an extensive analysis, see Explanatory Memorandum, op. cit.
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issues related to criminal intelligence files, but also for 'grey field' files matters,
occupying a stage prior to the official criminal investigation. It is important to note
here that these files contain personal particulars which cannot immediately be
'JC
connected with a CID subject and are based on 'tips and police surveillance'. On
the other hand, it is noted that the CID file ' serious contravention of the legal
order' criterion is broader than the mere suspicion of having committed a criminal
offence, since it also extends to future offences. This has as a consequence the
obligation ofMOT to disclose, in addition to data on existing CID subjects, data on
27
a person which are 'sufficiently reliable for inclusion in a CID file'.
Further issues are raised regarding the continuous and increasing communication
of MOT with other agencies in the Netherlands, both at the level of the 'filtering'
of information by MOT and at the level of information exchange. According to the
1998 MOT Report, the agency, in order to assess the suspicious character of a
transaction, matches data to a series of sources as diverse as: the Criminal
Intelligence Department Subject Index (CIDSI); the Central Reference Index
(HKS); the Municipal Personal Records database (GBA); the Legal persons
database (VENNOOT); the Central Driving Licences Register (RDW); the
Criminal Records Office (CJD); and the Verification and Information System for
90
stolen or forged documents (VD). On the other hand, the MOT has received
requests not only from the police, but also from bodies such as the Royal
Netherlands Military Police (KMAR), the Industrial Insurance Administration
Office (GAK) and the Tax Information and Investigation Service (FIOD).29
The co-operation framework between the MOT and the FIOD is of particular
interest. The two bodies co-operate on the basis of an Integrity Memorandum,
which extended MOT's task to the identification of substantial fiscal fraud and
24 That is in cases of requests by the National Public Prosecutor.
25




MOT, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
29
MOT, op. cit., p. 14.
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provided for a FIOD employee to work within the MOT in identifying relevant
30
cases. Along with the legal regulation of the limits of such co-operation, what is
also of interest is the new elements brought by FIOD's work on an 'object
detection' project, whose philosophy is 'to focus on suspect capital or goods (the
object) although there is at that time no immediate connection to known crime or
suspects'.31 The extent of the influence of such methods to the 'subject-oriented'
financial investigations approach remains to be assessed.
Similar issues arise regarding information exchange at the international level.
According to Article 13 of the Police Files Decree, data from a police file within
MOT may be issued to 'administrative or police reporting desks in other countries,
designated by the authorities for that purpose, which have a task comparable to that
of the reporting desk'.32 The exchange is exempted from the procedure envisaged
in paragraph 7 of the Article, which involves intermediary action by the National
Police Agency or by the Ministers of Justice or the Interior.33 The communication
of data to foreign authorities is subject to the existence of guarantees for the correct
use of the data and the protection of privacy,34 and to the general condition, albeit
with a broad exception, that they shall be used exclusively for the purpose for
it
which they were issued.
Further legal challenges related to MOT's powers are posed by technological
advancements. As was mentioned before, MOT ascertains that an unusual
transaction is suspicious and then transmits suspicious transaction reports directly
to police regions in the Netherlands. The 'suspicious character' assessment is now
abetted by MOTION, an automated system of typologies helping the faster
30
MOT, op. cit., p.4.
31 M. Pheijffer (1998), 'Financial Investigations and Criminal Money', in Journal ofMoney




35 Article 13(5). The article provides that in special cases, at the request of foreign police
authorities, the controller may agree to the use of the issued data for a different purpose as
necessitated to enable the police in that country to carry out their duties.
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detection of suspicious transactions.36 While the latter are still passed in writing to
the police, the complementary PROMOTION system facilitates exchange through
the creation of a suspicious transaction database and an on-line query system.
While unusual transactions still remain invisible, the suspicious transactions
database has the character of a police register, which is operational and may be
consulted for investigation purposes."7 This is linked to an effort to replace the
written transmission of suspicious transactions to the police by a system of
electronic submission.38
Notwithstanding a persisting number of objections,39 the establishment of MOT
as an independent agency responsible for 'filtering' financial information not only
is praised by the FATF for operating effectively in most respects,40 but also
appears to be a choice securing to a great extent private and public co-operation on
the one hand, and respect for principles of data protection and privacy on the other.
The importance of an independent unit in this respect is also highlighted in the
choice of the Greek legislature to establish a Committee for the prevention and
control of money laundering.41 According to the Presidential decree which set its
terms of reference, the Committee is an 'independent administrative authority,
whose members enjoy in the course of their duties functional and institutional
independence, and act and decide in accordance with the Law and their conscience,
36 MOT, op. cit., p.4.
37
MOT, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
3S
MOT, op. cit., p.4.
39 See for instance a Public Prosecutor's viewpoint, against both the 'unusual transaction' reports
system and the existence ofMOT and in favour of the reporting of suspicious transactions to a
central disclosure office under the supervision of the public prosecutors office: C.D. Schaap (1997),
'Money Laundering: A Public Prosecutor's Viewpoint', in Journal ofMoney Laundering Control,
vol.1, no.3, p.211.
40 See FATF, Annual Report 1997-1998, paragraph 56. The Report notes however the need to
address the risks of non-cash money laundering and to pay attention to the lack of reports from the
securities and insurance sectors. Comments are also made regarding the extension of the reporting
requirement to other categories of professionals as well as regarding the refinement of the feedback
and the exceptions available to reporting institutions.
41
According to a member of the Committee, its establishment as an independent inter-ministerial
body is set to ensure data protection and confidentiality. Mr. Leivadas, personal communication,
Athens, 14.7.1999.
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within the legal limits of confidentiality'.42 The Committee, presided over by an
appeal judge and comprising of representatives from the Greek Bankers
Association, the stock market supervision committee and the economic crimes unit
of the Ministry of Public Order,43 is, according to the FATF, a 'unique structure for
the receipt, investigation and analysis of suspicious transaction reports'.44
In some respects, developments in the MOT system may serve as test-cases for
subsequent developmets at the EU level, this being particularly the case regarding
the co-operation of MOT with fiscal authorities. However, weak points continue to
exist: a broad margin is left for MOT information to be used for purposes other
than the fight against money laundering; this is exacerbated by the concurrence of
a multitude of bodies of a diverse legal nature in the information exchange
mechanism43 and by technological advancements in data analysis and
communication. The existence of the detailed MOT and Police Registers' Acts,
though an asset, needs to be complemented by new, comprehensive legal texts
taking such parameters into account.
A2. The Administrative Model: France
France is one of the pioneering countries in the adoption of anti-money laundering
legislation and the establishment of financial intelligence units. One year prior to
the adoption of the EC money laundering directive, law 90-614 of 12.7.1990
established TRACFIN46, a service responsible for receiving suspicious transaction
42 Presidential decree 401 of 26.11/10.12.1996, Article 1(2). The call for the establishment of the
Committee was made in the main Greek anti-money laundering statute, law 2331/1995 (Article 7).
43 V. G. Lambropoulos, 'Money Laundering has trebled in 1998', To Vima newspaper, 7.2.1999.
44 FATF Report 1997-1998, paragraph 92.
45 The issue has already been highlighted in the 'Two years MOT' report, asserting that 'too many
organizations are involved, which at their own discretion, add and/or remove data to/from the
transaction-information" G.J. Terlouw and U. Aron (1996), Twee Jaar MOT. Een Evaluatie van de
WetMelding Ongebruikelijke Transacties, p. 1 12.
46 TRACFIN: Traitement du Renseignement et Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins.
On the history and functions of the unit, see: P. Fond (1995), 'TRACFIN: Un Premier Bilan', in Les
Cahiers de la Securite Interieure,pp. 133-136; D. Gaillardot (1995) 'TRACFIN et la Lutte contre le
Blanchiment d'Argent', in Le Nouveau Pouvoir Judiciaire, no.334, pp.17-18.
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reports from the competent persons in financial institutions.47 According to Article
5 of the law, the unit is placed under the authority of the Ministry of Finance,
France thus adopting an administrative model of FIU. The provision continues
attributing to TRACFIN the task of gathering all suitable information for
establishing the origin of the sums or the nature of the operations involved in the
report. Where the collected information, the provision continues, are evidence of
facts possibly constituting a drug trafficking offence, TRACFIN refers the case to
48the Public Prosecutor.
Crucial in the performance of the TRACFIN functions is the attribution to the
unit of a special legal 'right of communication' with the financial sector.49 This
right has been analysed in the unit's powers to:
a. gather suspicious transaction reports;
b. communicate relevant elements of the report, if the transaction has already
taken place;
c. gather all useful information from credit institutions, when the transaction has
not taken place and there are no accessible data;
d. collect the written reports by credit institutions in cases of complex operations
with no economic justification;
e. communicate the identity documents of clients, in order to reconstruct the
whole of the operated transactions by a person who is the subject of a
suspicious transaction report.50
47 This person is known as the TRACFIN correspondent' ('correspondent TRACFIN'): J.L. Herail
and P. Ramael (1996), Blanchiment d'Argent et Crime Organise. La Dimension Juridique, Presses
Universitaires de France, p.72. Law 93-122 of 29.1.1993 facilitates transaction reports by
permitting oral as well as written suspicious transaction declarations (Article 73, inserting Article
6bis).
48 Law 96-32 of 13.5.1996 extended the scope of the money laundering offence to all 'crimes' or
'delits'.
49 'Droit de communicationsee Article 15. For an analysis see the TRACFIN Report of 1996
("www.finances.gouv.fr/DGDDI/activites/1996/tracfin.htm): and M. Vasseur, 'La loi du 12 juillet
1990 relative a la participation des organismes financiers a la lutte contre le blanchiment des
capitaux provenant du trafic des stupefiants analysee du point de vue de ses repercussions sur le
droit bancaire', in Banque et Droit, 'Le blanchiment de l'argent, la participation des banques a la
lutte contre le blanchiment des capitaux provenant du trafic des stupefiants',Numero Special- Hors
Serie, 25.10.1990, p.36. Vasseur is of the view that the law invests TRACFIN actually, and without
saying so, with the powers of the judicial police.
50 Herail and Ramael, op. cit.
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At the same time, TRACFIN forms part of a network of bodies responsible for
fighting money laundering and organised crime. In this framework, the role of the
Central Office for the Repression of Serious Financial Delinquency (OCRGDF)51is
crucial. That Office was established by the Interministerial decree of 9.5.1990 and
its competence covers offences of an economic, commercial and financial nature
connected with professional or organized crime, more particularly those relating to
serious crime, terrorism or drug trafficking. Within the duties to promote,
coordinate and study police action against serious financial delinquency, OCRGDF
has the power, inter alia, to 'enter into relations and to correspond directly, for
purposes of cooperation and exchanging information, with the central departments
of other states carrying out similar assignments as well as with any other body
having the repression of serious financial delinquency within its competence'. At
the level of international co-operation, law 96-392 extends the TRACFIN
communication right to services of other States exercising analogous
competences.53 International co-operation is to be facilitated through the
conclusion of a series of co-operation agreements with other FIUs.54
The extended powers and communication rights of TRACFIN are balanced by a
series of data protection guarantees specifically enshrined in law. Article 16 of
Law 90-614 limits the use of information gathered by TRACFIN only for the
purposes of this law, sanctioning their further dissemination with criminal
penalties. The 1996 provision enabling international co-operation in its turn,
51 Office Central de Repression de la Grande Delinquance Financiere. Other police services with
anti- money laundering tasks are: specialised services of the central Direction of general
information and of the Prefecture of the Paris Police, such as the brigade for financial research and
investigation (BRIF); the Service for international technical police cooperation (SCTIP); the
ORCTIS (Central Office for the Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking) antennas in the Carribbean;
the Interministerial Centre for Anti-Drug Education (CIFAD); and the sub-direction of financial
and economic affairs in the Ministry of Justice. See Herail and Ramael, op. cit., pp.71-77.
12 R. Wack (1992), 'The Laundering of Capital', in Action Against Transnational Criminality,




According to the TRACFIN Report 1997, agreements are concluded with units in Australia, Italy,
U.S.A., Belgium, Monaco, Spain, the United Kingdom, Argentina and Mexico (report downloaded
from:www.finances.gouv.fr/DGDDI/activites/1997/tracfin.htm).
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subjects it to the conditions of Article 22 of the 1990 law. These conditions are the
respect of legal provisions and international conventions on the protection of
privacy and data protection, and, under a reciprocity clause, the existence in the
other contracting State of an equivalent strict obligation of professional secrecy.
The administrative model is appealing in combining the existence of a relatively
independent-at least from the law enforcement authorities- authority responsible
for directly communicating with reporting institutions with the existing
infrastructure of organised administration. In the case of France, this independence
is reinforced by a clearly defined protection of privacy. While the guarantees of
independence of the agency contributed towards the co-operation of the initially
reluctant French financial institutions, at the same time, however, they have
created difficulties in finding a common 'field of understanding' with police
institutions such as the OCRGDF.55
B. The Police Model: The United Kingdom (with notes on Finland)
The United Kingdom system of financial information exchange is based on the
reporting of suspicious transactions.56 In the case of credit and financial
institutions, such transactions are reported at a first stage to what the 1993 Money
cn
Laundering Regulations call 'an appropriate person'. The Money Laundering
Reporting Officer, as such a person is referred to in practice, is under a duty to
report the transaction, if she decides that 'there are no facts that would negate the
suspicion'.58 Following a 'police' model of information exchange and analysis, the
transaction is then reported to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS),
whose specialist Economic Crimes Unit is responsible for 'filtering' the report.
55 'terrain d'entente'. Herail and Ramael, op. cit.,p.86.
56 The failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering from certain offences
constitutes a criminal offence. See chapter 4.
51 Section 14.
58 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, Money Laundering, Guidance Notes for the Financial
Sector (Revised and Consolidated June 1997), point 6.10. Records of suspicion that are not
disclosed further are retained for five years from the date of the transaction. Ibid, point 6.4.
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The National Criminal Intelligence Service was established without a specific
statutory basis under the auspices of the Home Office in 1992 as a common police
service. Its establishment reflected increasing calls for 'proactive' models of
policing, focusing on: the identification of particular categories of offences or
offenders; and the use of strategic initiatives against these.59 The seemingly
antithetical concerns regarding the lack of guarantees resulting from the lack of
statutory basis on the one hand, and the need to intensify policing against
organised crime,60 led to the Police Act 1997, which established NCIS as a
statutory body. Section 2 of the Act states that the NCIS Service Authority shall
maintain a body to be known as the National Criminal Intelligence Service, whose
functions shall be:
a. to gather, store and analyse information in order to provide criminal
intelligence,
b. to provide criminal intelligence to police forces in Great Britain, the Royal
Ulster Constabulary, the National Crime Squad and other law enforcement
agencies, and
c. to act in support of such police forces, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the
National Crime Squad and other law enforcement agencies carrying out their
criminal intelligence activities.61
The suspicious transaction reports from the private sector are referred to the
Economic Crimes Unit (ECU), one of the specialised units in the NCIS UK
Division Strategic and Specialist Intelligence Branch.62 This unit brings together
59 S. Uglow and V. Telford (1997), The Police Act 1997, Jordans, p.2.
60 The following comment by Baroness Blatch, Minister of State, in the House of Lords, is
indicative: The National Criminal Intelligence Service and the regional crime squads have already
achieved some impressive results...But we need to strengthen our capacity to tackle organised
crime. We must harness the intelligence, the technology and the resources of the police, Customs
and other agencies in a carefully co-ordinated national approach. We need a national response, in
harmony with the local basis of policing in this country, to threats on a national scale'. In House of
Lords Parliamentary Debates, No.1680, 11 to 14.11.1996, col.789.
61 Section 2(1)(2).
62 The other units are: the Drugs Unit; the Organised Crime Unit; the Specialist Crimes Unit; the
Strategic Research and Development Unit; the Intelligence Co-ordination Unit; the Turkish
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personnel from a range of law enforcement and government departments co¬
operating in combating money laundering. According to the NCIS 1997-1998
Annual Report, the functions of the unit are the following:
a. as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) for the United Kingdom, it is the
central national unit responsible for receiving and analysing financial
disclosures in the UK, which are then forwarded to law enforcement for
investigation
b. it provides a central advice, educational and consultancy services to United
Kingdom law enforcement agencies, government departments and others on
matters relating to financial intelligence and money laundering issues
c. it liaises with financial institutions, trade associations, and regulatory bodies
regarding the education and training of Money Laundering Reporting Officers
(MLROs)
d. it exchanges financial intelligence and participates in training with foreign
FIUs, and provides assistance to other countries seeking to establish FIUs and
draft appropriate anti money laundering legislation
e. it provides input to money laundering policy formation by close liaison with
government departments through such bodies as the Joint Money Laundering
Steering Group and the Home Office Working Group on Asset Confiscation.
At an international policy level, the ECU plays a significant role as part of the
UK delegation to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).63
In its role as the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, the ECU establishes extended
communication streams both with the Money Laundering Reporting Officers, and
various national bodies competent for issues such as fraud prevention. The
acknowledgment of the vital role of feedback to financial institutions for the
effective functioning of an anti-laundering system, led to the creation during 1997-
98 by the ECU of 'an electronic bulletin board on the European Police Information
Centre (Epi-Centre) Bulletin Board System', enabling MLROs to browse an on-
Intelligence Unit; and the Branch Support Unit. On a detailed structure of the NCIS,see Appendix B
in NCIS, Annual Report 1997-1998.
63
NCIS, op. cit., p.20.
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line library of information related to money laundering and the system of
disclosures.64 This step has been complemented by the installation of a new
computer database, which holds records of all the disclosures made to NCIS and
contains links to other intelligence databases and which has the ability to receive
financial disclosures electronically, undertake database searches automatically and
disseminate data, and provide improved strategic and operational analysis.65 On the
other hand, the ECU also contributes to the Financial Fraud Information Network
(FFIN) chaired by the Bank of England, offering a forum for City regulators and
law enforcement agencies to discuss these matters.66
The communication networks between various units of different nature, along
with the increasing computerisation of intelligence have led to serious concerns
about phenomena such as the matching of data with information, in whole or part,
included in a series of public and private databases. In the context of fraud
67
prevention, such concerns were recently raised by the Data Protection Registrar,
stating that:
'Exercises of this sort (data matching) raise privacy concerns in that although the majority of
applicants for benefits, goods or services are honest and there is no prior indication of any
wrongdoing on their part, data relating to them is to be shared and scrutinised by a range of other
organisations. This loss of privacy has led some commentators to warn of the capacity of data
matching exercises to reverse the normal rules of evidence and the presumption of innocence and to
raise fears of the use of computer technology to conduct mass surveillance of the population'.68
The Registrar went on to call, in view of the growing interagency co-operation
in collecting data aimed at fraud prevention, for any databases developed for
criminal intelligence purposes to be operated to 'at least the standard required by
the Association of Chief Police Officers' Code of Practice on Data Protection'.69
64
NCIS, op. cit., p.21.
65 NCIS, Annual Report 1998/99, p.21.
66
NCIS, Annual Report 1996/97, text downloaded from www.ncis.co.uk
67 The Data protection Act 1998 changed the title into Data Protection Commissioner.




Similar concerns are accentuated by the adoption of laws such as the recent
Security Administration (Fraud) Act 1996, which allows the matching of tax and
immigration records with claims for social security, housing and other welfare
benefits.70 In the context of money laundering intelligence sharing, significant
developments are to be expected as a result of the implementation in 1998/99 of a
new ECU computer database enabling the unit to receive financial disclosures
electronically and to disseminate them to law enforcement by secure electronic
communications, allowing also for the undertaking of improved strategic
analysis.71
The adoption of the Data Protection Act 1998, implementing the 1995 EC Data
Protection Directive,72 does little to alleviate these concerns. Section 29 of the Act
stipulates a broad exemption from its principles for crime and taxation purposes,
namely:
a. the prevention and detection of crime
b. the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, and
c. the assessment or collection of any tax or duty or of any imposition of a similar
nature.
Bearing in mind the widely defined ambit of NCIS and the policing nature of the
ECU as the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, it seems highly improbable that its
functions will not fall within the 'crime' exemption of the Act. This is
notwithstanding the narrowing of the scope of the exemption by the Data
Protection Commissioner, proclaiming that 'for any of these three exemptions to
apply, there would have to be a substantial chance rather than a mere risk that in a
-70
particular case the [crime and taxation] purposes would be noticeably damaged'. "
70 M. Maguire (1998), 'Restraining Big Brother? The Regulation of Surveillance in England and
Wales', in C. Norris, J.Moran and G.Armstrong (eds.), Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and
Social Control, Ashgate, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sidney, p.233.
71
NCIS, 1997/98, p.21.
72 For an extended analysis, see part 4B below.
73
Commentary on the Data Protection Act, chapter 5, downloaded from
www.open.gov.uk/dpr/chpt5.htm
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Similar issues of control and accountability arise from the Police Act 1997. In
spite of strong Parliamentary opposition, asking for the addition to the NCIS task
of gathering, storing and analysing information in order to provide criminal
intelligence of the rider 'for the prevention and detection of crime', the final text
does not include any specification of the kind.74 This creates a considerable
inconsistency in the framework of the relations of NCIS with the National Crime
Squad (NCS), which was also been established by the Police Act and is entrusted
1c
with the main function is 'to prevent and detect serious crime'. Along with
issues of co-ordination and competence at the national level, the catch-all powers
of NCIS raise a series of concerns due to the fact that NCIS is the liaison body for
the purposes of the Schengen and Europol Conventions, which limit intelligence
exchange to cases of serious or extremely serious offences.76
Notwithstanding the aforementioned ambiguities, and problems related to its
every day function,77 the UK anti-money laundering system has been highly
praised in the FATF mutual evaluation, which stated that NCIS has an important
role in this system and that 'it is important that it has the human and technological
78
resources which are necessary for it to operate effectively'. The obvious
advantages of a police FIU system, which functions on a 'low-cost', 'low-
bureaucracy' basis79 and facilitates the gathering, exchange and analysis of
74 See Uglow and Telford, op. cit., p. 13.
75 Section 48(2).
76 Article 2(1) of the Europol Convention and 8(2)(a) of the Schengen Convention. See Uglow and
Telford, op. cit.
77 On problems related to the work of Money Laundering Reporting Officers, in particular
concerning compliance, training and legislation awareness, see R. Bosworth-Davies (1997), 'Living
with the Law: A Survey ofMoney laundering Reporting Officers and their Attitudes towards the
Money -Laundering Regulations' in Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol.1, no.3, pp.245-
254. As regards the policing aspect, the Association of Chief Police Officers Crime Committee
highlighted in 1995 the following problems: the increased volume of disclosures outstripping the
ability of forces to be effective; the difference in dealing with disclosures between police forces; the
low prioritisation of disclosures; the lack ofmanagement information in forces; and the lack of
feedback to disclosing institutions. The Committee called further for a model structure for a police
unit dealing with financial disclosures. See ACPO Crime Committee-Joint Working Group on
Financial Disclosures, 'Financial Disclosures'.
78 FATF Annual Report 1996/97, paragraph 47.
79 On this point see Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC),
Committee of Experts in Criminal Law and Criminological Aspects of Organised Crime, Money
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information within a specialised police framework functioning to a great extent
beyond data protection guarantees, have led other EU countries to adopt a similar
model. Of great interest in this respect is the case of Finland, where the Act on
Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering (68/98),80 replaced the pre-existing
system of suspicious transaction reports being made to the financial supervision
authority (FSA), by the creation of a Money Laundering Clearing House, assuming
o 1
the role of a Financial Intelligence Unit. The transition from a system of reports
to the Financial Services Authority to a body within the National Bureau of
Investigation was greeted with enthusiasm by both authorities, as it was
acknowledged that the task of 'clearing' money laundering reports was too
burdensome for a financial supervision body. The removal of a 'buffer zone' was
also approved by banks and the Finnish Bankers Association.83 The concerns
regarding the 'police' nature of the Clearing House are confronted with an express
limitation of its right to record, use and disclose information 'only for the purposes
of preventing and clearing money laundering'. The reports are recorded in a
personal data file intended for the use of a police unit referred to in section 7 of the
Police Personal Data File Act, with access permitted only to the Clearing House
personnel.84
Laundering: Counter-measures in the United Kingdom, (author: M. Levi), DOC. PC-CO (97)14,
restricted, Strasbourg, 23.6.1997, p.5.
80 For a version of the Act in English, see (1998) Commercial Laws ofEurope, vol.1, pp.537-544.
81 Section 4 of the Act reads as follows: For conducting the duties relating to the clearing of money
laundering, there is the Money Laundering Clearing House, hereafter the Clearing House,
established at the National Bureau of Investigation. It is also a duty of the Clearing House to
promote co-operation between various authorities in prevention of money laundering as well as
promote co-operation and exchange of information with authorities of foreign States and
international organizations responsible for clearing money laundering. The National Bureau of
Investigation shall give annual reports on the activities of the Clearing House and on the progress of
anti-money-laundering activities in general to the Ministry responsible for police functions.
(Unofficial translation). Note that the unit is referred to as 'Centre for investigation of money
laundering' in the C.L.E. translation.
82 Personal communications with: Mr. M. Ryymin, Director, Money Laundering Clearing House,
Helsinki, 18.3.1998; and Ms. T. Nevalainen, Banking Supervisor, Financial Supervision Authority,
Helsinki, 25.3.1998.
83 Personal communication with Mr. Reijo Lahde, Senior Management Head of Security, and Mr.
Juhani Saarento, Chief of Security, Finnish Bankers Association, Helsinki, 24.3.1998.
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C. The Judicial Model: Luxembourg (with notes on Portugal)
Luxembourg has adopted a mixed model in 'filtering' suspicious transaction
reports, touching upon both the police and the judiciary. The country's financial
intelligence unit is the 'Money Laundering Service' (Service Anti-Blanchiment),
situated in the Public Prosecution Office (PPO), to which suspicious transaction
RS
reports are made. The PPO is a judicial criminal authority which, 'aside from its
role of handling suspect transaction declarations, has legal authority to identify and
prosecute offences'.86
The Service Anti-Blanchiment, like its aforementioned counterparts, is bound by
the principles of confidentiality and international co-operation. The latter is
facilitated by the new Article 26(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which states
that the Prosecutor 'may communicate information on money laundering activities
to authorities of another State responsible for detecting or prosecuting acts of
money laundering'. In terms of confidentiality, Article 4 of the Regulation of 6
January 1995 authorises the PPO to set up and operate a data bank on suspect
transactions, stipulating that 'recorded, processed details can only be accessed by
members of the Public Prosecution Office and cannot be communicated to third
parties'.87
However, even this limitation has the potential to go beyond the strict 'for the
purposes of combating money laundering' barrier of confidentiality, bearing in
mind the diversity of the Public Prosecutor's tasks. This concern is reinforced by
the perceived conflict between the Prosecutor's role as judicial criminal authority
with the imposed 'speciality rule' restricting the use of information obtained solely
to countering money laundering and drug trafficking. The speciality rule is
84 Section 12 of Act 68/98 and Set of Regulations and Rules given by the Ministry of the Interior
(Unofficial translation), point 6.2.2.
85 Act of 5.4.1993.




undermined however by the power of the Prosecutor to use information for
prosecuting all related, appropriate offences.88
The success of the Luxembourg model, based on the trust placed in judicial
on
authorities, is sought by combining the facilities on information access and
analysis that the police model provides, combined with the speed of action both in
receiving suspicions and prosecuting offences that the judicial authorities offer.
This is also reflected in the choice by Portugal to place relevant institutions under
an obligation to report suspicious transactions to the 'competent judicial
authority',90 thus reflecting the multiple functions of the Public Prosecutor related
to penal action or the representation of State in the judiciary.91 On the other hand,
the human rights concerns connected with the invasiveness of the police model
appear here as well, but at a different level: as judicial authorities are closely
associated with investigative and prosecutorial functions, it is possible that
financial intelligence will be used by them for a variety of purposes beyond
'filtering' and analysis. In such cases, the boundaries between 'filtering' of
information, pre-trial investigation and prosecution may appear to be blurred.
III. An Attempt at Synthesis
In view of the recent establishment of financial intelligence units in most of the EU
countries, it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions on their function in
a systematic manner. The annual reports of all units mentioned in the above
analysis pride themselves on the increasing number of received reports from credit
88 Ibid.
89
According to Thony, preference for the judicial system is rooted in the special nature of the
functions of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the constitutional guarantees of independence and the
public confidence enjoyed by these authorities. Thony, op. cit., p.267/1044 respectively.
90 Decree-Law 313/93, article 10.
91 On an overview of the Portuguese framework against drugs, see M. P. Machado (1999),
'Portugal', in N. Dorn (ed.), Regulating European Drug Problems. Administrative Measures and
Civil Law in the Control ofDrug Trafficking, Nuisance and Use, Kluwer Law International, the
Hague, London, Boston, pp. 227 et seq.
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and financial institutions.92 Furthermore, and notwithstanding the considerable
diversity between the nature of units in different States, they all possess extended
powers of information gathering, analysis and communication.
Such developments pose acute challenges in view of the uneveness in the legal
regulation of the units concerned. It can be discerned from the analysis that options
such as the Dutch one in favour of an extensive legal framework consisting of a
multitude of wide ranging statutes coexist with systems like the United Kingdom,
where with the exception of a framework statute on the National Criminal
Intelligence Service, there is no specific statutory provision on the extent of the
powers of the Economic Crimes Unit. These differences, which can be attributed to
factors such as diversity in legal cultures and lack of harmonisation in the field,
raise important issues with regard to international co-operation between units at the
bilateral and EU level, having the potential to undermine effective co-operation on
the one hand and the protection of individuals from this highly invasive legal
framework on the other.
3. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
I. MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING (MoUs)
The need for international co-operation between financial intelligence units has
been addressed, as seen in the previous section, by the insertion of provisions at the
national level which enable the exchange of information with units of other
countries exercising similar duties.93 These channels of co-operation are formalised
1,2 With the exception of United Kingdom and Finland, where, after a steep increase in the reports in
the first years of the units' function the number has been fluctuating the past three or four years
(until 1998), the number of reports to the rest of the units has been constantly increasing. According
to a recent press release by the Dutch Ministry of Justice, the number of reports received by MOT
rose from 16,974 in 1997 to 19,303 in 1998, largely due to the How of reports concerning unusual
money transfers, a new form of disclosure which came into effect on 1 August 1998. Press release
of 26.4.1999, downloaded from http://www.minjust.nl/
93 See for instance the provisions of Dutch law, part 2(I)(a) above.
254
by the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between financial
intelligence units at the bilateral level.94 Notwithstanding the impetus of MoUs for
the sharing of information between FIUs, their harmonious functioning is hindered
by a series of factors. Apart from the controversial legal nature of MoUs in
international law95, such factors are:
-. The considerable differences relating to the legal nature of FIUs. It is extremely
difficult for an independent or administrative unit to share information with a unit
that constitutes part of the police of another State. Such an exchange, without
sufficient guarantees, would undermine one of the fundamental missions of
independent units, that is to avoid to the greatest possible degree the
communication of sensitive every day information to law enforcement authorities.
On the other hand, independent units face problems in consulting foreign police
data, as they 'do not fit' in the international police communication system;96 at the
same time, it is impossible sometimes even unconstitutional for many police units,
as State units to exchange information with independent, 'non-state' bodies in
other countries.97
-. Differences concerning the reporting systems, influencing the nature of the work
of the units. An eloquent example is the case of MOT and CTIF/CFI in Belgium,
both independent units.98 While the considerable obstacles imposed by differences
in the nature of the units are avoided here, there is a fundamental difference
between the reporting of unusual transactions in the Dutch system, with the
94 On the possibilities of bilateral information exchange between units of EU Member States, see
Annex 7 of Second Commission Report, op. cit. The Report distinguishes between general and
limited possibility of information exchange, with the general option being categorised into
exchange for intelligence purposes (units in Italy, Portugal and Sweden) and exchange for
intelligence and criminal investigation or prosecution purposes (units in Belgium, France,
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom).
95 For an extensive analysis, see A. Aust (1986),'The Theory and Practice of Informal International
Instruments', in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol.35, pp.787-812.
96 B. Verhelst, The Organisation of a Financial Intelligence Unit', unpublished paper for the
MERCOSUR Seminar on Money Laundering, Buenos Aires, 26-28 May 1998.
97 Such unconstitutionality problems, in particular in the case of Germany, were highlighted by the
Deputy Director of CTIF/CFI, the Belgian FIU, Mr. B. Verhelst, personal communication, Brussels,
23.6.1998.
98
ctip/CFL established by the law of 11.1.1993, is characterised as an 'independent administrative
authority with legal personality', placed under the supervision of the Ministers of Justice and
Finance and headed by a magistrate or her deputy detailed from the Public Prosecutor's Office.
CTIF/CFI, Excerpts from the 3rd Annual Report, 1995/1996, p.8.
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reporting of suspicious transactions in Belgium. While the work of MOT focuses
on assessing whether an unusual transaction is suspicious, the personnel of
CTIF/CFI have the task to determine the predicate offence prior to reporting the
case further."
-. Differences in the definition of the money laundering offence, in particular
relating to the predicate offences. Notwithstanding the tendency towards the
inclusion of proceeds from 'all serious crime' in the offence,100 considerable
differences still exist in the definition of money laundering. Hence, while for some
units the offence is related to the proceeds of all serious crimes, others work with a
specific list of offences, with particular issues arising in cases such as tax evasion.
Even in the case of extensive harmonisation, problems still exist relating to the
definition of predicate offences, such as organised crime, in different jurisdictions.
II. THE EGMONT GROUP
The first attempt to address the complex issues emanating from the establishment
of financial intelligence units at the international level took place at the Egmont-
Arenberg Palace in Brussels. There, on June 9, 1995, representatives of 24 nations
and 8 international organisations established an informal organisation known as the
Egmont Group.101 The goals of the group are twofold:102 to improve the
functioning of the units at the national level, by supporting the expansion and
systematisation of financial information exchange and the improvement of
personnel skills; and to improve international co-operation between FIUs,
anticipating that 'the organizations represented in the Egmont Group will work
together to become the first nodes in an expanding international communication
network for sharing information on money laundering and financial crime'.103
99 B. Verhelst, personal communication, op. cit.
100 See the Second Commission Report, op. cit. See also MOT, Annual Report 1999, p.34.
101 S. Morris, foreword, in unpublished manuscript on the Egmont Group (date not given).





The cornerstone in the work of the Egmont Group is the adoption of a common
definition of Financial Intelligence Unit, adopted at the plenary meeting in Rome
in November 1996 and perceiving as a FIU:
' A central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted,
requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures
of financial information
(i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or
(ii) required by national legislation or regulation
in order to counter money laundering'.
It has been noted that the definition 'was meant to be specific enough to describe
these apparently distinct agencies from other types of government authorities, yet it
had to be generic enough to include the many variations as found in the countries
establishing such units'.104 It is further evident that the definition is broad enough
to encompass all types or models of FIUs (independent, administrative, police,
judicial) and aims to serve as a standard 'against which newly forming units are
being measured'.105
The adherence to this FIU definition was reaffirmed by the Egmont Group
Statement of Purpose, adopted in Madrid, on 24.7.1997. The Statement further
prioritised, inter alia, the 'determination of appropriate consequences that attend to
an Egmont Group Participant's status with respect to the definition of FIU adopted
in Rome' and the 'articulation of more formal procedures by which decisions as to
particular agencies' status vis-a-vis the FIU definition are to be taken'. Such
prioritisation reflects what has been deemed as a series of 'important existential





agencies as meeting the Group FIU definition;106 and the examination of the
consequences of such designation.107
The procedural part is planned through the submission of a completed
questionnaire to the Egmont Legal Working Group (LWG), empowered with
recommending or not the candidate FIU to the meeting of the FIU heads where the
final decision is made. With respect to the 'substantive' aspect, the LWG reached
the conclusion that the Group should focus on the 'benefits' of recognition rather
than potential negative consequences. These benefits are as follows:
a. FIUs are the decision-makers within the Egmont Group;
b. FIUs participate in the activities of the working groups;
c. FIUs have access to the Egmont Secure Web; and
d. FIUs may participate in the Egmont Group sponsored training (such as
operational workshops).108
The establishment of the Egmont Secure Web is of particular interest here. It is a
'secure website with FIU information, relevant laws and regulations, and general
analytical information, all of which would be shared by and [be] accessible to
FIUs', permitting them also to communicate in this environment.109 Access to the
Secure Web, which is endorsed by the Egmont Group Statement of Purpose, is
restricted to Egmont recognised FIUs. This is in order to ensure that 'all those units
connected to the site have some common or shared responsibility for the
information contained in it and for information exchanged through the secure e-
mail system'.110
106 As of 24.7.1997, 28 operational units were found to meet the Egmont definition, with some 25
other being in the planning or development stage.
107 The Egmont Group (Chairmen of the EgmontWorking Groups), 'Memorandum- Egmont
Group of Financial Intelligence Units'. Subject: Issues discussed in the Working Group Meetings
since Madrid (Ljubljana, 27-28.10.1997 and Amsterdam, 11-12 March 1998), unpublished
manuscript.
108 Ibid.
109 The Egmont Group, 'Report on the Third Conference', San Francisco, 22-23 April 1996.
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III. THE UNITED NATIONS
The information exchange aspect of the fight against money laundering was
highlighted by the United Nations in 1990: then, the Global Programme of Action,
focusing on drug money laundering, [...] called for the Division of Narcotic
Drugs, in cooperation with the Customs Cooperation Council and Interpol to
'promote bilateral or regional exchanges of information between governmental
regulatory or investigative agencies concerning the financial flow of illicit drug
proceeds'.
The establishment of FIUs in many jurisdictions and the work of the Egmont
Group had as a consequence the intensification of UN calls for information
exchange. In the preparations for the 20th Special Session of the UN General
Assembly on countering the drug problem, it was recognised that the effective
fight against money laundering is possible 'only through international cooperation
and the establishment of bilateral and multilateral information networks such as the
Egmont Group, which will enable States to exchange information between
competent authorities'.111 The formal acknowledgment of the work of the Egmont
Group was reflected in the UN Action Plan against money laundering, adopted in
New York on 10.6.1998, which called for the implementation of law enforcement
measures to provide tools for, inter alia, information-sharing mechanisms.112 The
UN Global Programme against money laundering (1997-99), implemented by the
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP), calls on the other hand
for technical cooperation, consisting inter alia of transfer of know-how for the
establishment of FIUs.
However, no UN initiative reflects the move towards the establishment of FIUs
in a more clear-cut manner than the 1995 UN Model Law on 'Money Laundering,
110 The Egmont Group, 'Memorandum', op. cit.





Confiscation and International Cooperation in relation to Drugs'.113 The first
variant of provisions on the reporting procedure establishes in Article 15 a' drug
money laundering control service' which shall receive the reports from financial
organisations. The Article leaves open the legal form of the unit, which is deemed
as a 'purpose-made agency, an intermediary between the world of justice and the
world of finance', with the sole task being to 'help financial organizations clarify
the suspicions aroused by questionable transactions and to assist the work of the
judicial authorities by providing them with dossiers containing substantiated
financial analyses'.114
The Model law is complemented by a Model decree 'on the Drug Money
Laundering Control Service', applying Article 15 of the law. Along with
modalities related to the composition and duties of the personnel and their
communication with the financial sector, the decree contains a specific reference to
the analysis of reports. The latter shall be analysed by the unit on the basis of the
information at its disposal. The unit shall also gather 'any additional information
that may help to establish the origin of the funds or the nature of the transactions
referred to in the reports' from the financial institutions, as well as from
administrations involved in combating illicit drug trafficking.115
In a similar, but more precise, vein the 1998 UN Model Money Laundering and
Proceeds of Crime Bill116, drafted for common law jurisdictions, contains a
provision establishing an 'anti-money laundering authority'. According to Article
11(2), the authority:
a. shall receive reports of suspicious transactions;
113 United Nations, International Drug Control Programme, Legal Advisory Programme,
Novemberl995.
114 Introduction to the Model law, p. 12. Article 14 of this variant, referring to non-financial entities
under an obligation to report, provides for the communication of reports to the authorities
competent to institute criminal proceedings. The second variant (Articles 14 and 15) provides for all
reports to reach the aforementioned authorities.
11 Article 3.
116 Downloaded from www.imolin.org/poc98.htm.
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b. shall send any report to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, if having
considered the report, it also has reasonable grounds to suspect that the
transaction is suspicious;
c. may enter the premises of any financial institution or cash dealer to inspect
records, ask related questions, make notes and take copies of the whole or part
of the records;
d. shall send to the appropriate law enforcement authorities, any information
derived from the 11 (2)(c) inspection, if it gives reasonable grounds to suspect
that a transaction involves proceeds of crime;
e. may instruct any financial institution or cash dealer to take such steps as may
be appropriate to facilitate any investigation anticipated by the authority;
f. may compile statistics and records, disseminate information within the state or
elsewhere, make recommendations arising out of any information received,
issue guidelines to financial institutions and advise the Minister of Finance;
g. shall create training requirements and provide record-keeping and transaction
reporting training to financial institutions;
h. may consult with any relevant person, institution or organisation for the
purpose of exercising its powers or duties under subsections 2(e),(f) or (g); and
i. shall not conduct any investigation into money laundering, other than for the
purpose of ensuring compliance by a financial institution with the provisions of
this Part.
The use of the term FIU and the need for the establishment of such units is
further reflected in the draft UN Convention against Transnational Organised
117Crime. Article 4bis, entitled 'measures to combat money laundering', contains a
paragraph stating that:
' States Parties should enhance their ability to exchange information collected pursuant to this
article. This shall, where possible, include measures to enhance domestic and international
exchange of information between law enforcement and regulatory authorities. Towards this
end, States Parties should consider the establishment of financial intelligence units to serve as
117
CICP/CONVAVP19. Unofficial text, provided for information purposes only.
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national centres for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding
potential money laundering and other financial crimes'."8
4. THE EUROPEAN UNION
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As mentioned above,119 the EC money laundering directive did not contain any
express provision on the establishment and functioning of financial intelligence
units. The need for a co-ordinated approach on the matter was however addressed
in the first Commission's report on the implementation of the directive, where calls
were made for 'the establishment of Central Reporting Units by all the Member
States, the setting up of procedures to permit the exchange of information among
these Units... and the enhancement of cooperation among Member States' judicial,
1 90
police, customs and other competent authorities'.
Steps towards such cooperation have been attempted through a series of third
pillar measures. The Convention 'on the use of information technology for customs
purposes'121 provides for direct access to data included in the EU Customs
Information System, apart from national customs administrations, to 'other
authorities competent, according to the laws, regulations or procedures of the
Member State in question, to act in order to achieve the aim stated in Article
118 4bis (4). The impetus towards the formalisation of financial intelligence units is also reflected in
regional efforts to counter money laundering. Hence, the Commonwealth Model law for the
Prohibition ofMoney Laundering contains a part specifically devoted to the appointment, powers
and duties of a Money Laundering Authority, responsible for receiving and filtering reports by
financial institutions. The principal anti-money laundering instrument of the Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), its Model money laundering regulations, on the other hand,
were revised in 1997 to include a specific provision on financial intelligence units. Article 8bis,
entitled 'financial (intelligence/investigation/information/analysis) units, calls at the CICAD
Member States to establish 'a central agency responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating
to the competent authorities, disclosures of information relating to financial transactions that are
required to be reported pursuant to these Model Regulations'.
119 See part 2 above.
120
COM(95)54 final, Brussels 3.3.1995, p. 14.
121 OJ C316, 27.11.1995, p.34.
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I
2(2)'. This aim is broad enough to include assistance in 'preventing,
investigating and prosecuting serious contraventions of national laws', and is
narrowed to the extent that the Convention applies only to drug money
laundering.123 A significant extension of its scope is however expected after the
adoption by the Council of an additional Protocol to the Convention, aiming at
broadening the scope of money laundering, strengthening the fight against
organised crime.124
Another decisive step was taken by the Second Protocol of the Convention on the
protection of the EC financial interests.125 The Convention, which applies only to
money laundering related to proceeds of fraud - at least in serious cases- and of
active and passive corruption,126 calls, along with the criminalisation of money
laundering,127 for cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member States
with the Commission 'so as to make it easier to establish the facts and to ensure
effective action against fraud, active and passive corruption and money
laundering'.128 Notwithstanding the vague wording of the provision, it has been
used by the Commission as a possible legal basis for the exchange of information
between financial intelligence units at EU level.129 Although no specific reference
to anti-money laundering authorities is made, it was felt that the provision could
perhaps be used to overcome the difficulties of including a provision on FIUs in a
first pillar instrument such as the money laundering directive.130 This does not
however appear to be the case in the recent Commission draft amending the 1991
directive, which contains only a provision on the exchange of information between
122 Article 7(1).
123 Article l(l)(b).
124 See International Enforcement Law Reporter, vol. 15, issue 4, April 1999, p. 167.




129 Second Commission report, op. cit., p. 16.
130 The inclusion of an FIU provision in an amended draft money laundering directive (to be issued
by autumn 1999), and the attribution thus of an EC competence on the issue is still a matter of
controversy and one of the major problems of the Commission's legal team. Mr. A.B. Beverly,
Head, Commission DG 15, personal communication, (e-mail), 6.5.1999.
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financial intelligence units and the Commission.131 Major issues thus continue to
arise with regard to the channeling of money laundering information to the
multitude of EU fraud databases.132
Similar developments in inter-agency co-operation may arise on the basis of the
conclusions of the G7 Finance Ministers and the representative of the Commission
at their meeting in London on 8.5.1998, calling for international action to enhance
the capacity of anti- money laundering systems to deal effectively with tax related
crimes. Such action shall further the following objectives: the extension of
suspicious transactions reporting to money laundering related to tax offences; and
the power to money laundering authorities to the greatest extent possible to pass
information to their tax authorities to support the investigation of tax related
crimes, and the communication of such information to other jurisdictions in ways
which would allow its use by their tax authorities.133 In spite of the difficulties
surrounding the regulation of taxation matters at the EC/EU level, it is not unlikely
that consideration will be given for similar measures within the ambit of the Justice
and Home Affairs pillar.
Major impetus towards the establishment of information exchange channels in
the European Union is given by the Council Action Plan to combat organized
crime.134 It is asserted there that the Union and its Member States must be 'totally
rigorous.. .in ensuring the maximum level of cooperation and two-way information
exchange between its financial and fiscal institutions and its law enforcement and
131 Commission of the European Communities (1999), Proposal for a European Parliament and
Council Directive amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, COM (1999)352 final,
99/0152(COD), Brussels, 14.7.1999. See in article 1 the new article 12(2). For an extensive
analysis, see part 5.
132 For an overview of the EU anti-fraud intelligence framework, see: W. A. Tupman (1998),
'Supranational Investigation after Amsterdam, The Corpus Juris and Agenda 2000', in Information
and Communications Technology Law, vol.7, no.2, pp.85-102; and U. Sieber (1998), 'Euro-Fraud:
Organised Fraud against the Financial Interests of the European Union', in Crime, Law and Social
Change, vol.30, pp. 1-42.
133 Point 16.
134 OJ no C251, 15.8.1997, p. 1.
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judicial authorities'. One of the Plan's recommendations calls for the setting up
of a system for exchanging information concerning 'suspected' money laundering
at the European level, in conformity with the relevant data protection rules.136 To
that end, a feasibility study into an EU-wide system of information exchange for
combating money laundering has been conducted.137 The recommendations of the
study favour the establishment of an EU-wide computerised data exchange system
for the detection of money laundering criminal actions, whereby 'subject- oriented
information is exchanged by means of a reference index'; and calls for a study into
'the desired (basic) contents of the reference index and which could apply to
suspect transactions regarding criminal money flows of subjects which can be
138
matched to available information relevant for investigation departments'.
Further study was recommended on the desirability of a separate legal basis for the
data exchange system, examining whether this is feasible within the Europol
framework, and on the provision of data protection guarantees.139
In this regard, a possible legal basis for the establishment of an EU-wide money
laundering data exchange system is provided by the Treaty of Amsterdam and its
revamped Justice and Home Affairs pillar. New Article 30 (ex K.2), provides for
common action in the field of police cooperation, including 'the collection,
storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including
information held by law enforcement services on reports of suspicious financial
transactions, in particular through Europol, subject to appropriate provisions on the
protection of personal data'.140 Article 34 (ex K.6) provides for measures to be
135 Point 6g.
136 Recommendation 26(a).
137 See Doc. 6050/97, LIMITE, ENFOPOL 33, Brussels, 19.2.1997; Doc. 6277/2/97, REV2
LIMITE, ENFOPOL 39, Brussels, 18.4.1997; Doc. 10539/97, LIMITE, ENFOPOL 179, Brussels,
10.9.1997.
138 Doc. 6050/97, op. cit. According to the same document, three types of computerised systems of
information exchange were examined in the study: option 1 puts forward a database in which much
data is recorded and from where the Member States can draw freely; option 2, preferred by the
majority of the respondents, favours a reference index with very limited personal data, whereby the
system indicates which country can be contacted in case of a 'hit'; and option 3 proposes a
combination of 1 and 2, running from a reference index with several entered data to a database
generously filled with information.
139 Ibid.
140 Article 30(1 )(b)
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taken in the legal form of: common positions defining the EU approach to a
particular matter,141 framework decisions for the purpose of approximation of the
laws and regulations of the Member States,142 decisions for any other purpose
consistent with the objectives of the Title, excluding approximation,143 or
conventions to be adopted in accordance with the constitutional requirements of
the Member States.144
In all the above mentioned initiatives related to the exchange of money
laundering information, Europol plays a pivotal role. Recognised by the Maastricht
EU Treaty145 and officially operational since October 1998, the European Police
Office (Europol) has a wide ambit of action delineated by the Europol
Convention.146 Article 2(1) states as its objective to improve the effectiveness and
cooperation of the competent authorities in the Member States in eliminating and
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of
international crime when there is an organised crime and a transnational crime
element in the case. The third paragraph of the same Article provides Europol with
competence in respect of 'illegal money laundering activities in connection with
these forms of crime and specific manifestations thereof.
Article 3 further states the principal tasks of Europol. According to its first
paragraph, these are:
a. to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States;
141 Article 34(2)(a)
142 Article 34(2)(b), providing that such decisions shall be binding upon the Member States as to the
result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods and
that they shall not entail direct effect.
143 Article 34(2)(c), providing that these decisions shall be binding and not entail direct effect.
144 Article 34(2)(d).
145 Article K(l)(9), providing for police cooperation between the Member States 'for the purposes
of preventing and combatting terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of
international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection
with the organisation of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police
Office (Europol).
146 OJ no. C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 1. Europol replaced the European Drugs Unit (EDU), which was
granted a legal basis under Article K.3(2) of the Maastricht Treaty through a 1995 Joint Action (OJ
L62, 20.3.1995, p. 1).
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b. to obtain, collate and analyse information and intelligence;147
c. to notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay via the
national units referred to in Article 4 of information concerning them and of
any connections between criminal offences;
d. to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant
information to the national units; and
e. to maintain a computerized system of collected information containing data in
accordance with Articles 8, 10 and 11.
Paragraph 2 provides for the development of specialist investigative knowledge,
the provision of strategic intelligence and the preparation of reports, while
paragraph 3 provides for assistance to the Member States.
These powers have been enhanced by the Amsterdam EU Treaty, granting
Europol operational powers.148 The second paragraph of new Article 30 (ex K.2);
calls on the Council, within a period of five years after the date of entry into force
of the Treaty, to:
a. enable Europol to facilitate and support the preparation and to encourage the
co-ordination and carrying out, of specific investigative actions by the
competent authorities of the Member States, including operational actions of
joint teams comprising representatives of Europol in a support capacity;
b. adopt measures allowing Europol to ask the competent authorities of the
Member States to conduct and coordinate their investigations in specific cases
to develop specific expertise which may be put at the disposal of Member
States to assist them in investigating cases of organised crime;
147
According to the Europol Rules applicable to analysis files (Europol 10), analysis means the
'assembly, processing or utilisation of data with the aim of helping a criminal investigation (in
accordance with Article 10(2) of the Convention)', while processing of personal data means 'any
operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data, whether or not by automated
means, such as collection, recording, organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction'. The text of Europol 10 can be found
in: House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, 'Europol: Confidentiality
Regulations', HL Paper 9, Session 1997-98, 1st Report, 17.6.1997.
148 On a discussion-prediction, see A. Klip (1997), 'Europol, Who is Watching You?', in H. Meijers
et al. (Standing Committee of experts in international immigration, refugee and criminal law),
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c. promote liaison arrangements between prosecuting/investigating officials
specialising in the fight against organised crime in close cooperation with
Europol;
d. establish a research, documentation and statistical network on cross-border
crime.
The powers of Europol are thus far-reaching, both in respect to access to a wide
range of data and in respect to their processing and analysis. Regarding money
laundering information, concerns are raised by the inclusion in the Europol
information system of data relating not only to persons who are suspected of
committing or taking part in an offence within the ambit of Europol, but also of
persons 'who there are serious grounds under national law for believing will
commit criminal offences'.149 These concerns become acute bearing in mind that
the communication channels between financial intelligence units and the National
Europol Liaison Units and Officers, responsible for providing information to
Europol under Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention, can be quite extended in
practice.150
This is particularly the case in systems like that of the United Kingdom, where
both the Europol National Unit and the FIU are within the National Criminal
Intelligence Service.151 The tensions surrounding such issues are further
highlighted when discussed within the framework of the protection of data,
fundamental rights and issues of accountability and justiciability.




According to J. Storbeck, then coordinator of the European Drugs Unit, Liaison Officers have
access to extensive national databases, intelligence and sensitive data. The national databases
contain 'the results of law enforcement investigations and other information such as data on
offenders and offender groups, addresses, telephone numbers, suspicious acts, and other data
pertaining to drug-related crime and other forms of organized crime', with some of it being 'soft'
information, 'which has yet to be verified and requires further assessment before it can be used for
police purposes'. J. Storbeck (1997), 'Coordinating the Flow of European Intelligence: Europol's
Accountability Mechanisms', in M. den Boer (ed.), Undercover Policing andAccountability from
an International Perspective, EIPA, Maastricht, p.l 19.
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II. THE CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
As has been demonstrated, the effectiveness of anti-money laundering legislation is
based on the provision, communication, analysis and processing of information on
an increasing number of every day transactions with a wide range of financial and
non-financial entities. Such legislation can be thus quite invasive, not only due to
the great number, diversity and every day character of the information provided,
but also due to their 'journey' through a complicated inter-agency network of
bodies entrusted with a wide array of powers of analysis, processing and
'matching' with other categories of data. This part of the analysis will focus on the
challenges that these networks pose for fundamental human rights, such as the
right to privacy and the right to a fair trial, at the European Union level, examining
whether the existing EC/EU measures offer appropriate guarantees.
A. The EC data protection directives
The cornerstone of the EC data protection legal framework is Directive 95/46 of
the European Parliament and the Council 'on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data',152 which has since been complemented by the Directive on data processing
and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector.153 The data
protection directive serves the two-fold aim to protect natural persons'
fundamental rights, in particular privacy, with respect to personal data processing,
while at the same time eliminating prohibitions to the free flow of data connected
with this kind of protection.154 To this end, the directive-which applies to
automated data and to manual data only if the latter form,or intend to form, part of
151 NCIS Report, op. cit.
152 OJ L281, 23.11.1995, p.31.
153 OJ L24, 30.1.1998, p.l.
154 Article 1.
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a filing system155- contains a series of provisions on, inter alia, the lawfulness of
processing of personal data, judicial remedies, liability and sanctions and transfer
of personal data to third countries.156 Some of its principles, in particular those
relating to lawful processing, are also adopted by the more specialised
telecommunications directive.157 The Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens'
Rights of the European Parliament recently made explicit reference to both texts,
maintaining that 'wherever fighting money laundering implies the collection of
personal data, the right to privacy must be protected by a full and correct
application of Directives 95/46/EC and 97/66/EC.'158
However, such protection is limited by a series of exceptions to the scope of the
directives. Article 3(2) of the data protection directive expressly stipulates that it
shall not apply to the processing of personal data:
'in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, such
as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the European Union and in any case to
processing operations concerning public security, defence, State security
(including the economic well-being of the State when the processing operation
relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal
law.'
In addition, Member States may restrict many of the obligations and rights related
to the lawful processing of data when this is a necessary measure to safeguard,
inter alia
Article 3(1).
156 An extensive analysis of the directive provisions falls outside the scope of this paper. For an
extensive analysis of various aspects of the law, see inter alia: I. Vassilaki (1994), 'The
Constitutional Background of Privacy Protection within the European Communities', in Revue
Europeenne du Droit Public,vol.6, no.l pp. 109-130; S. Simitis (1995), 'From the Market to the
Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data', in Iowa Law Review, vol.80, part 3,
pp.445-469; C.J. Bennett (1998),'Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policy for the
Protection of Personal Data?', in P.E. Agre and M. Rotenberg, Technology and Privacy: The New
Landscape, MIT Press, Cambridge,MA and London, pp.99-123; G. Pearce and N. Patten
(1998),'Achieving Personal Data Protection in the European Union', in Journal of Common Market
Studies, vol.36, no.4, pp.529-547.
157 See Article 14.
158 Motion for a Resolution, Resolution on the 'Second Commission Report to the European




The prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or
of breaches of ethics for regulated professions
An important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the
European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters.159
The applicability of the data protection directives to the processing of money
laundering information is thus far from clear. Beginning with the first stage of
information gathering and analysis, still within the reporting institutions, it could
be argued that the directives are applicable, since the identification and reporting
duties are imposed by the EC money laundering directive, a Community, first
pillar measure. This interpretation is reinforced by the Preamble of the data
protection directive, stating that the exceptions to its scope are 'without prejudice
to the obligations incumbent upon Member States under Article 56(2), Article 57
or Article 100a of the EC Treaty',160 the two latter forming also161 the legal basis
of the money laundering directive. However, it is still not evident how the balance
will be struck between the 'Single Market' objective of the money laundering
directive with its aim of combating crime. Even if the Article 3 exception is
surpassed, the crime prevention exception to fundamental provisions of the data
protection directives seems difficult to avoid.
The situation becomes even more complex at the stage where information has
reached financial intelligence units. Although the Commission asserted that the
money laundering directive implicitly contained a legal basis for their creation,162
there is no explicit EC law reference to their establishment and functions, which
falls largely outside the scope of Community law. The Commission's further
assessment that a legal basis is offered by the third pillar Second fraud protocol,
159 Article 13(1 )(c),(d) and (e). Both provisions are repeated in almost identical wording in the
telecommunications directive: see Articles 1(3) and 14(1); the latter does not contain a reference to





162 Commission Second Report, op. cit., p. 13.
16 See above, part 4a.
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seemingly excludes an explicit EC competence. Even in the case of overstretching
the realm of the money laundering directive to embrace the work of FIUs, further
issues will be raised due to the diversity of the legal nature of the units in the
various Member States. Unlike the Commission proposal,164 the data protection
directive does not include specifically public sector bodies, with the public/private
distinction being completely removed in the final text.165 This lack of distinction
alleviates the unevenness between independent units on the one hand, and
police/judicial units, which are more linked with the State, on the other. At the
same time however, one cannot but focus on the data protection directive's
adoption of a 'purpose' or 'activities', rather than of a 'nature', criterion in order to
establish exceptions to its ambit. In this light, FIUs are unlikely to escape the
'criminal law' exception of the directives.
Similar lacunae are encountered in the exchange of information sphere at the EU
level. The Second fraud protocol refers explicitly to the observation with regard to
data processing of 'a level of protection equivalent to the level of protection set out
in Directive 95/46/EC'.166 However, this provision refers only to the Commission,
and not to the competent national authorities exchanging information. The
protection is also potentially weakened by the exception relating to the
safeguarding of an important 'economic and financial interest', particularly the
case with fraud against the European Union. Data protection at the EC level,
notwithstanding the third pillar nature of the measure, is ensured by the granting of
jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice, albeit only in disputes between
Member States, or the latter and the Commission, and subject to a series of
limitations.167
164 Commission proposal, OJ C277, 5.11.1990, p.3, article 3.
165
Bennett, op. cit., pp.106-107. Simitis criticises the Council for their refusal 'to share the
Commission's policy to aspire to a regulation based on the close connection between the data
subjects' fundamental rights and the use of their data irrespective of whether Community law is still
applicable'. Op. dr.,p.455.
Article 8.
167 See Article 13 of the Protocol.
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In this context, the fraud protocol is the only third pillar text with a direct
1 hR
reference to the data protection directive. The CIS Convention, along with
specific provisions related to the use of data only for Convention purposes and the
right to access, contains a reference to data protection at a level 'at least equal' to
that resulting from the principles of the 1981 Council of Europe data protection
Convention.169 The Action Plan to combat organised crime, on the other hand,
refers vaguely to money laundering information exchange in conformity with the
170'relevant rules relating to data protection'.
B. The Council of Europe initiatives, with emphasis on the European Convention
on Human Rights
The Council of Europe has promulgated specialised data protection legislation, in
the form of the 1981 Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to
automatic processing of personal data.171 The Convention has been ratified by all
EU Member States172 and provides an extensive basis for legislative harmonisation
on data protection standards. It contains a series of basic principles for data
protection and calls for well-established principles of protection, such as fairness
and lawfulness in processing and lawfulness and proportionality in storage.173
However, the impact of the Convention is limited by its restriction to automated
data and its wide range of exceptions, covering inter alia the protection of 'State
security, public safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression of
criminal offences'.174 Notwithstanding the broader reference to criminal law
purposes, the discussion on the exceptions to the data protection directive can be
extended here.
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In this context, interesting interpretative guidance is provided by the Council of
Europe Recommendation 87(15) regulating the use of personal data in the police
sector. The Recommendation, which reiterates to a great extent the principles of
the 1981 Convention, states that 'regardless of nomenclature, the principles should
apply to any body with police functions involved in the collection, storage, use and
transfer of personal data' for the purposes set out in it.175 A further point of interest
is the exception permitting the communication of data to public as well as private
bodies inter alia if it is necessary so as to prevent a serious and imminent danger.
176 The extent to which financial intelligence units fall within the scope of the
Recommendation and the fight against money laundering can be equated with the
prevention of a serious and imminent danger is debatable and a pivotal issue
meriting judicial, if not express statutory, intervention.
Both the Convention and the Recommendation constitute intergovernmental
initiatives, outside the scope of Community or EU law, unless expressly stipulated
by EU legislation. They can, however, have an indirect influence on the law of the
European Union, as their principles are taken into account in the development of
the interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights.177 Article 8 of the
latter, establishes a right to respect privacy, stating that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
175
Explanatory Memorandum, paragraph 23, cited in: W. Bruggeman (1998), 'Data Protection
Issues in Interinstitutional Information Exchange: The Case of Criminal and Administrative
Intelligence', in M. den Boer (ed.), Schengen's Final Days? The Incorporation ofSchengen into the
New TEU, External Borders and Information Systems, EIPA, Maastricht, p. 120.
176
Emphasis added. Principles 5.2 and 5.3 of the Recommendation. For a detailed analysis, see
Bruggeman, op. cit., pp. 125-128.
177 The following comment by the former president of the European Court of Human Rights, Mr.
Ryssdal, is indicative: 'For our part, we in Strasbourg should not ignore the basic principles laid
down in the Data Protection Convention in addressing ourselves to those issues which do come
before us. Those basic principles are a sectoral implementation of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights in the context of automatic data processing and may therefore [be
employed] in aid in interpreting that provision'. Cited in L.A. Bygrave (1998), 'Data Protection
Pursuant to the Right to Privacy in Human Rights Treaties', in International Journal ofLaw and
Information Technology, vol.6, no.3, p.256.
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democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others'.
The applicability of this provision to the law of the European Union is, however,
contested. Commenting on the Convention in general, the Committee on Civil
Liberties and Internal Affairs of the European Parliament, recently took the view
that 'it is clear that a European public order composed by the Convention rules and
the case-law developed by the Strasbourg Court must impose itself in the European
Union'.178 This view however comes to balance the fact that there is no express
incorporation of the Convention in the EU Treaty, and neither has the Union yet
incorporated an equivalent bill of rights. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union
introduced a provision on the respect of fundamental human rights as guaranteed
by the European Convention of Human Rights and resulting from the
constitutional traditions of the Member States as general principles of Community
law.179 This protection has been enhanced in the Amsterdam Treaty by the
assertion that one of the Union's founding principles is the respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms,180 and the European Court of Justice has
declared their observance.181 However, human rights protection remains
piecemeal: no comprehensive bill of rights has been included in the Treaty;
according to the Court, accession to the Strasbourg Convention falls at the moment
outside Community competence; and the protection of rights is limited to the
1 R9
provisions and boundaries of EC and not EU law.
178 'doit s'imposer'. In 'Rapport sur le Plan d'action du Conseil et de la Commission concernant les
modalites optimales dc mise en oeuvre des dispositions du Traite d'Amsterdam relatives a
l'etablissement d'un espace de liberte, de securite et de justice', Doc. A4-0133/99/PARTIE A,
18.3.1999, p.24.
179 Article F (2).
180 Article 6(1) (ex F).
181 See the leading Nold case, 4/73, (1974) E.C.R. 491.
182 An extensive analysis of the protection of human rights by the European Union falls outside the
scope of this paper. From the plethora of extensive overviews, see: P. Twomey (1994), 'The
European Union: Three Pillars without a Human Rights Foundation', in D. O'Keefe and P.
Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, London: Chancery. For a post-Amsterdam
analysis, see P. Alston and J.H.H. Weiler (1998),'An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human
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Even in the case of maximum observance of the Convention by the European
Union, the extent of the protection afforded by Article 8 is questionable. This is
mainly due to the wide range of exceptions to its scope. The European Court of
Human Rights has so far accepted as justified exceptions cases of, inter alia, secret
surveillance of telephone calls in the interests of national security and public
safety;184 information collection and secret dossier maintenance on candidates for
employment in sensitive jobs in view of national security threats;185 and the
monitoring of telephone communications by the police, being in accordance with
the law and 'aiming at the prevention of crime, undoubtedly necessary in a
democratic society'.186
It is interesting to see how the crime prevention aspect in the exchange and
processing of money laundering information will be balanced with the privacy
considerations of Article 8. This is especially the case with the establishment and
networking of Financial Intelligence Units, as some of them-as in the case of the
United Kingdom- at the national level, and co-operation at the international level
may fall foul of the 'in accordance with the law' condition of 8(2). In the stage of
information collection from the banking industry, an important test for data
protection is currently evolving in Sweden. There, the Country Administrative
Court, in a judgment of 28.11.1996, upheld a decision by the Swedish Data
Rights Policy', in European Journal of International Law, vol.9, pp.658-723. On the Opinion by
the European Court of Justice on the lack of Community competence to accede to the European
Convention of Human Rights ,(1996) ECR 1-1759, see the note by G. Gaja (1996), in Common
Market Law Review, vol.33, pp.973-989.
183 For an extensive analysis see D.J. Harris, M. O'Boyle and C. Warbrick (1995) Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Butterworths, London, Edinburgh, Dublin, pp.335-353.
On the scope of Article 8 more broadly, see D. Feldman (1997), 'The Developing Scope of Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights', in European Human Rights Law Review, vol.3,
pp.265-274. And Bygrave, op. cit., pp.247-284.
184 Case Klass v. ERG, (1978) A 28.
185 Case Leander v. Sweden (1987) A 116.
186 Case Liidi v. Switzerland (1991) (17/1991/269/340), A238. The Court did not take the same
approach in a case of undercover policing in Portugal, where there was no Court permission and it
was held that the police officers 'exercised an influence such as to incite the commission of the
offence'. The Court asserted that there was a violation of the 'fair trial' Article 6(1) of the
Convention and considered unnecessary to consider the applicant's Article 8 claim. Case Teixeira
de Castro v. Portugal, found in European Court of Human Rights homepage, www.dhcour.coe.fr/
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Supervisory Board (DSB), rejecting a joint application from six major banks for
permission to keep 'a special central computer-based personal register consisting
of information regarding individuals who have been reported to the financial
crimes authorities for suspected violation of the Swedish Money Laundering
Act'.187 The banks, supported by the Financial Supervisory Board, argued that such
a data base was necessary for the fulfillment of the extensive duties imposed by the
money laundering legislation. The Court however, taking into account the
'exceptional cases' restrictions to the Swedish Data Act, balanced the conflicting
188interests in favour of 'personal integrity'.
Privacy considerations are not the only ones at stake in money laundering
information exchange. Further concerns in the context of the European Convention
of Human Rights are raised regarding the right to a fair trial, established by Article
6. A facet of this right lies in the interrelated principles of the presumption of
innocence and defence rights.189 In the context of money laundering investigations,
the emphasis on data concerning 'suspicious' transactions- potentially extending,
through various channels of communication and matching techniques- to
'suspicious' individuals raises major issues regarding the presumption of
innocence. The rationale behind the 'tipping-off' duty of reporting institutions on
the other hand- consisting of not informing the money laundering suspect of the
existence of a report/investigation- raises additional concerns with regard to
defence rights.
Defence rights, centering on the rationale that the accused is informed and able
to present her objections from the beginning of the process, including
investigation,190 were recently challenged in a case before English courts. The
Court of Appeal had to judge on a conflict created by an Economic Crimes Unit
187 Case Nordbanken ABfpubl.) and others v. Swedish State. See note by J. Bryme, (1997)2 CTLR,
pp.T 43-44, at p.43.
188
Ibid, at p.44.
189 See C. Teitgen-Colly (1996), 'Fair Trial Guarantees and Administrative Enforcement', in M.
Delmas-Marty, M. Summers and G. Mongin, What Kind of Criminal Policy for Europe?, Kluwer,
London, pp.281-301, at pp.296-297.
190 Case Sanchez-Reisse v. Switzerland, 1986, A 107. See also Teitgen-Colly, op. cit.
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investigation between the State interest in combating crime and a series of rights
and principles concerning private parties and their trial position. The latter
consisted in: the entitlement of a private body to obtain redress from the courts; the
principle that justice should be administered in public, that a party should know the
case which was being advanced by another party and should have the opportunity
to reply; and the principle that a party who came before the courts was entitled to
know the reasons for the courts' decisions.191
The guidance given by the Court was based on the premise that those principles,
designed to protect the interests of the individual, could not always be paramount.
The Court then went to give NCIS a great array of powers at the stage when a party
to legal proceedings intended to apply or had obtained an order for discovery or
disclosure of information by the financial institution involved. NCIS should then
be informed and given the opportunity to identify the material which it did not
wish to be disclosed and indicate any preference as to haw the handling of an order
or an application should be handled. The Court then went on to suggest partial
disclosure. If the latter is not accepted by the applicant, then the directions of the
Court should be sought. The Court was rather vague in outlining such directions,
saying that both to inform the applicant on the reason of reference to the court and
to involve her in an open trial 'would depend on the circumstances'. The Court
then, in an attempt to safeguard, even at that last stage, a minimum standard of
defence rights, called for the need to comply with the ordinary trial principles to
the extent that that was possible and imposed on NCIS the burden of proof of the
192need for non-disclosure.
C. The Europol Convention
In terms of data protection, Article 14 the Europol Convention contains a reference
to both the 1981 Council of Europe Convention and Recommendation (87)15.
191 Case C v. S and others, (1999) 2 All ER, pp.343-351. For an analysis from the perspective of the
financial institutions' duties, see chapter 6.
192 Ibid, pp.349-350.
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There are however considerable divergencies in the application of these measures:
while Member States shall take the necessary measures in relation to data
processing to ensure a standard of protection 'which at least corresponds' to the
Council of Europe standards,193 Europol shall only 'take into account' those
standards in the collection, processing and untilization of personal data.194 At the
same time, problems are created by the fact that both Council of Europe
instruments cover only automated data, leaving the processing and exchange of
non-automated data unregulated.195
Moreover, the Convention departs from these provisions in various instances.
Hence Article 10 permits the collection, storage and processing of sensitive data in
Article 6 of the 1981 Convention196 where it is strictly necessary for the purposes
of the file concerned and such data supplement other personal data already entered
in that file.197 According to the Council of Europe instrument, the automatic
processing of such data is prohibited 'unless domestic law provides appropriate
safeguards'198 and unless it falls under one of the Article 9 exceptions.199 In a
similar vein, Article 10(1) of the Europol Convention, allowing the collection,
processing and use of data in order to achieve the Office's broad objective as
delineated in Article 2(1),200 is more extensive than principle 2.1 of the Police Data




Klip, op. cit., p.66.
196 Article 6 states as special categories of data those revealing racial origin, political opinions or
religious or other beliefs, personal data concerning health or sexual life and data relating to criminal
convictions.
197 Similar problems in relation to sensitive data arise from the Europol rules applicable to analysis
files. Article 5(2), rather than establishing a general prohibition on storage unless sensitive data
supplement other information and are 'absolutely necessary', it is left open to Europol to specify
that sensitive data are 'strictly necessary' for the purpose of analysis work. The scope is extended
also to non-suspect categories of victims, contacts, associates and informers. According to the
human rights organisation JUSTICE, this new wording is more permissive than both the Council of
Europe data protection instruments. See Memorandum from JUSTICE, in House ofLords, Select
Committee on the European Communities, op. cit., p.24.
198 Article 6.
199 The aforementioned public order-criminal law ones are complemented by exceptions relating the
protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others.
200 See part 4a above.
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prevention of real danger or the suppression of a specific criminal offence'.201 Such




Following the increased pressure towards the establishment of an EU-wide system
of exchange of information on suspicious transactions, the recent initiative of the
Republic of Finland in view of the adoption of a Council Decision concerning
arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the EU
203
member states in respect of exchanging information is of particular significance.
Article 1 of the draft decision sets out its general principle, which is that financial
intelligence units shall cooperate to assemble, analyse and investigate relevant
information, adding in paragraph 2 that cooperation shall take place in the form of
the exchange of a wide range of information.204 Such exchange may take place:
either spontaneously or upon request; and either on the basis of this Decision or on
the basis of existing or future memoranda of understanding. These co-operation
mechanisms are complemented by the observance by FIUs of the member state
one
obligations regarding the Europol Convention.
In line with the principle of cooperation which is being put forward in article 1,
the draft decision contains two important definitional attempts at EU level. First of
all, article 2, in an almost identical wording to that of the Egmont Group initiative,
establishes a definition of a financial intelligence unit as:
201
Klip, op. cit., p.67.
202 On the lack of EU judicial and parliamentary control, see inter alia: Klip, op. cit.; Walker
(1998),'European Policing and the Politics of Regulation' in P.J. Cullen and W.C. Gilmore (eds.),
Crime Sans Frontieres: International and European Legal Approaches, Edinburgh University
Press, Edinburgh, p. 141; European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs,
Proposal for a Recommendation on Europol: Reinforcing Parliamentary Controls and Extending
Powers Rapporteur: H. Nassauer, Doc. A4-0064/99, 23.2.1999.
203 OJ C362, 16.12.1999, p.6.
204 The provision refers to 'any available information that may be relevant to the processing or
analysis of information or to investigation by the FIU regarding financial transactions related to
money laundering and the natural and legal persons involved'.
205 Article 8.
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'A central, national agency which in order to combat money laundering is
responsible for receiving and to the extent permitted, requesting, analysing and
disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information
concerning suspected proceeds of crime and required by national legislation or
regulation'.
Exercising a parallel function, article 3 calls on member states to ensure that the
performance of the functions of the units under the decision 'shall not be affected
by their internal structures, regardless of whether they are administrative, law
enforcement or judicial authorities'. 206
The draft decision contains an attempt to counter-balance this impetus towards
cooperation, which is also enhanced by provisions aiming at eliminating
bureaucratic
obstacles,207 by including a series of data protection clauses. Article 5 thus
provides that:
1. Information or documents obtained under the provisions of this Decision may
only be used for the purposes of processing and analysing data within FIUs.
2. The use of information or documents referred to in paragraph 1 for criminal
investigations or prosecutions shall be subject to the prior consent of the FIU
which submitted the information or documents in question.
3. FIUs shall undertake all necessary measures, including security measures to
ensure that the information submitted under this Decision is not accessible by
any other authorities, agencies or departments.
206
Emphasis added.
207 Article 4 (2) provides that, when a request for information is made in accordance with the
Decision, information shall be provided without the need for a formal letter of request under
applicable conventions or agreements between member states. Article 6(1) on the other hand
establishes a spontaneous mechanism of co-operation by providing that FIUs may, within the limits
of the applicable national law and without a request to that effect, exchange relevant information.
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4. The information submitted will be protected by at least the same rules of
confidentiality and protection of personal data as those that apply under the
national legislation applicable to the requesting FIU.
5. The requesting FIU shall comply with any conditions on the use of information
laid down by the requested FIU.
It is evident that the protection offered by these provisions is information-
centred, rather than human-centred. The safeguards put forward by article 5 serve
primarily the goal of facilitating the exchange of information, by prioritising the
sensitivities and demands of the unit which provides the information, especially in
paragraph 5. Paragraphs 1 and 3 are welcome reiterations of the principle set out
in the money laundering directive that the information provided must be used only
for money laundering purposes. A significant inroad into these guarantees is
however the possibility of the use of such information, according to paragraph 2, in
criminal investigations or prosecutions. The danger of data provided to an
independent or administrative unit being used in a criminal investigation in another
country is prominent and the discretion of the requested unit to allow such use
places it under an important public policy role. Finally paragraph 4 constitutes an
attempt to provide a minimum standard of data protection. This provision adds
little to the effective and harmonised protection of information in this respect, as it
is strictly confined to largely divergent national standards. The adoption of
standards applicable to FIUs has the potential to broaden, rather than minimise,
such discrepancies, in view of the considerable differences in the nature of FIUs in
different member states. The absence of any sort of reference to the EC data
protection directive or the relevant Council of Europe Convention is striking.
The reluctance to establish a consistent EU, if not EC-wide data protection
framework in the field of information exchange for money laundering purposes is
also evident in another parallel development in the field, this time at the EC-level.
Article 12(2) of the new Commission draft amending the EC money laundering
282
directive provides, as seen above,208 for the exchange of information on suspicious
transactions between financial intelligence units, and potentially bar associations
and self-regulatory professional bodies,209 and the Commission. Such co-operation
is established only in cases of fraud, corruption or 'any illegal activity damaging or
likely to damage the European Communities' financial interests' and has a far-
reaching potential of multiplying the exchange of data. In this respect, particular
concerns arise regarding the ambiguities surrounding the nature, function and role
of the Commission under this provision and the extension of control and
accountability in this respect. These concerns remain acute in view of the vague
reference of the draft that the exchanged information shall be covered by 'rules of
professional secrecy'. As no further specification is given in this respect, it is
hoped that the provision will raise, along with EC competence issues, considerable
reactions during the reading of the draft by the institutions.
5. CONCLUSION
The journey of financial information for the purposes of combating money
laundering goes through various levels of communication and analysis: national
and supranational, private and public, in the regulatory sphere or within the
policing realm.210 It can thus be asserted that the anti-money laundering
information exchange mechanisms constitute prominent examples of the
emergence of what has been deemed 'transnational policing networks'.211 The
development of these networks is marked by two features: the increasing number
209 The latter may, according to amended article 6, be designated as authorities competent to receive
suspicious transaction reports by legal professionals included in the extended scope of the draft
directive. For an extensive analysis, see chapter 5.
210 On the interface between administrative and criminal measures in the EU fight against drugs, see
N. Dorn and S. White (1999), 'Drug Trafficking, Nuisance and Use: Opportunities for a Regulatory
Space', in N. Dorn (ed.), op. cit., pp.263-289; see also N. Dorn (1998), 'Les Nouvelles Formes de
Renseignement Policier', in Les Cahiers de la Securite Interieure, vol.32, pp. 137-150.
211 B. Hebenton and T. Thomas (1998), 'Transnational Policing Networks', in International Journal
ofRisk, Security and Crime Prevention, pp.99-110. See also D. Bigo (1996), Polices en Reseaux.
L'Experience Europeenne, Presses de Sciences Politiques, Paris. On the term of 'transnational
policing', see J.W.E. Sheptycki (1995), 'Transnational Policing and the Makings of a Postmodern
State', in The British Journal ofCriminology, vol.35, no.4, pp.613-635.
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and diversity of every day information gathered and analysed; and the creation of
new institutions with increased policing powers in this respect.
The concerns relating to data protection and wider human rights issues
emanating from such policing structures are manifold. Notwithstanding the attempt
in various EU Member States to provide Financial Intelligence Units with a solid
legal basis, a great number of aspects of their function remain unregulated. Vivid
examples are issues related to the powers of the units, such as data matching; their
communication with other public and private channels of information at the
national level; and their communication structures with institutions in other
countries and in the European Union. These issues are exacerbated by the lack of
uniformity regarding the nature and functions of financial intelligence units in the
EU member states. The existing models form a colorful mosaic of different
attitudes towards information gathering and exchange, which seem, at least in
certain instances, difficult to reconcile. The changes in models in a number of
member states do not reflect any common tendency towards the adoption of one
model. On the contrary, they have been rather contradictory reflecting national
212
cultural, political and legal particularities, as well as practical considerations." "
The situation may become more complex by the inclusion in the remit of financial
intelligence units of institutions as diverse as bar associations and self-regulatory
professional bodies, as envisaged by the new Commission draft amending the EC
money laundering directive.
Similar lacunae exist in the analogous EU structures, characterised by
fragmentation and diversity in scope and guarantees. The move of the EU towards
212 In Finland, for instance, the role of the financial intelligence unit has been transferred from the
Financial Supervision Authority to a body within the National Bureau of Investigation (part 2 II). In
sharp contrast, in Italy the system changed and suspicious transactions, which used to be reported to
the local Head of Police (Questore), are now, according to Decree No. 153/1997, reproted to the
Italian Foreign Exchange Office (Ufficio Italiano Cambi-UIC), a public law institution endowed
with legal personality and independent management. See C. Zaccagnini (1998), 'Italy: Suspicious
Transaction Reporting: Recent Developments in Legislation' in Journal ofMoney Laundering
Control, vol.2, no.2, pp.181-185; and A. Jamieson (2000), The Antimafia. Italy's Fight against
Organized Crime, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke and London and St Martin's Press, New
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the adoption of a decision on information exchange between FIUs is not
accompanied by a comprehensive attempt to address the issues arising from the
diverse nature of the units and fails to provide adequate data protection guarantees.
The proposed involvement, under the EC pillar, of the Commission in information
exchange is at the moment equally ambiguous and raises a series of issues
regarding the interaction of EC, EU and national measures in the field. Such
concerns are accentuated in the light of the limited scope of protection offered by
the EC data protection directive and the ambivalent attitude of the European Union
toward the protection of human rights and the status of third pillar measures. This
is especially the case in the post-Amsterdam landscape where third pillar police
cooperation is enhanced and even the EC pillar provides for the adoption of police
213
cooperation measures for the prevention and combating of crime.
York, pp. 118-119. See also the unpublished and undated paper by and entitled 'Italian Foreign
Exchanges Office- Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi (U.I.C.).
213 See Article 61 (ex 731 of the Treaty). Similar concerns have been put forward by the European
Commission, calling for special attention to the respect of privacy and data protection in particular,
especially when, 'in support of the development of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters, data exchange networks are set up'. Commission Communication, 'Towards an Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice', COM (1998) 459 final, Brussels, 14.7.1998, p.5.
285
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The evolution of money laundering counter-measures in the European Union was
the outcome of a process of securitisation which has marked international policy
discourse since the mid-1980's. In the course of this process, which is a clear
example of the reconcepualisation of traditional state/military models of security,
money laundering was perceived as a manifold transnational threat: Through its
association with transnational organised crime, it was perceived to threaten
interests ranging from human life to the social fabric per se and state stability and
sovereignty. The use of credit and financial institutions for money laundering
purposes on the other hand, added to these categories the threat to the soundness
and stability of the financial system as a whole. The perception of money
laundering as a multifaceted and imminent threat led to a series of calls at the
international level for the adoption of appropriate counter-measures as emergency
measures to counter this threat. Such initiatives reflected a two-fold strategy of
prevention and control, in combining regulatory measures aiming at the co¬
operation of the financial system with criminal law and law enforcement ones.
In line with the international consensus regarding the need for the adoption of
money laundering counter-measures, the European Community adopted in 1991
directive 91/308 'on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose
of money laundering'.1 Its adoption, shortly after the launch of influential
international initiatives, signified the establishment of the European Community as
a transnational security actor in the field of money laundering. At the stage of
European integration at the time, the legitimacy of the Community assuming this
role was however highly contested: the directive was adopted prior to the entry into
force of the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced for the first time a EU- and still




This legitimacy deficit did not stop the Community including in the directive,
which was adopted on the basis of freedom of movement and internal market
considerations, which fell within Community competence, both regulatory and,
beyond that, substantially criminal law provisions. This process does justice to the
argument that the effective functioning of the market is used as a new legal
concept attempting to 'legitimise the concept of 'European Criminal Law".2 The
directive provisions were complemented by subsequent EU third pillar and
national implementing measures in areas falling outside EC competence but
closely related to the fulfillment of the directive mandate. In this manner the EU
anti-money laundering framework constitutes the first comprehensive paradigm of
security governance in the field in the international arena. This paradigm is based
on three main pillars: criminalisation; responsibilisation; and the centrality of the
administration of knowledge. All three reflect new tendencies emanating from the
character of money laundering counter-measures as emergency measures and pose
significant challenges to fundamental legal principles.
The trend towards criminalisation is linked with the increase of the punishability
level through the creation of a number of new criminal offences. The money
laundering offence, which was introduced through a combination of legal and
political means at the EC level, represents an eloquent example in this respect.
Money laundering is an ancillary offence, punishing conduct which occurs after
the commission of a primary harm offence. The trend, unlike the similar offence of
receiving, to punish own funds money laundering renders the offence draconian
and creates an obvious and dangerous tension with the ne bis in idem principle.
The actus reus of the offence is over-extended to cover ordinary and to a great
extent legitimate every day behaviour; far from providing legal certainty, the
catch-all wording of the provisions on the other hand may cover behaviour which
is not even remotely connected to the predicate offence. In the light of such a broad
actus reus, the tendency to extend the offence to negligent behaviour raises a series
of concerns, in having the potential to undermine the principle of the dependence
2 P.-A. Albrecht and S. Braum (1999), 'Deficiencies in the Development of European Criminal
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of criminal liability on guilt. Similar concerns arise in relation to the attribution of
liability to legal persons. From the procedural point of view, the presumption of
innocence is threatened by the tendency to reverse the burden of proof so that
knowledge or suspicion ofmoney laundering is proven by the defendant.
In the case of responsibilisation, the challenges to the law are coupled with
challenges to well-established social relations. Credit and financial institutions are
placed under extensive duties of data gathering and proactive co-operation with the
national authorities responsible for combating money laundering. This sits uneasily
with well-established principles of professional secrecy and more general duties of
care towards the customer, leading potentially to the breach of the right to fair trial.
At the same time the duties result in an invasion, especially through the collection
of a broad range of information on ordinary transactions in order to establish
suspicion, of the private sphere. In this manner, the legislation signifies a sharp
change in the structure of every day human relationships: the enhanced bond of
trust emanating from the special relationship between a credit institution and their
customers is loosened in order for the institutions concerned to become active
partners with the state in the fight against crime.
The responsibilisation duties give rise to the need for the administration of
knowledge related to financial transactions. The flow of an increased quantity of
information on every day behaviour in the form of suspicious transaction reports
led to the establishment, at national level, of new instances of security governance
supplementing those of the state. These are the financial intelligence units, which
are specialised agencies responsible for the gathering and analysis of such data.
These agencies have been established within a very short period of time in all EU
member states and are entrusted with a wide range of powers to collect, analyse
and disseminate information, coupled with an extended right to communicate and
request information from private and public institutions. In many cases, these
powers are not clearly delimited by law and data protection guarantees are not
Law' in European Law Journal, vol.5, no.3, pp.304-306.
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expressly provided. The situation is not ameliorated by the push for international
co-operation between these units, in view of their different legal nature and
structure, which signifies different levels of regulation and data protection.
The challenges posed by this tripartite paradigm to fundamental legal principles
are multiplied in view of two interrelated factors: the calls for the extension of the
scope of money laundering counter-measures; and their development within the
constantly evolving process of European integration. In the field of
criminalization, pressure has been directed towards the extension of the money
laundering offence on an 'all crimes' basis. The money laundering directive, which
provides for a minimum standard of drug trafficking predicates, is currently being
revised in view of subsequent first and third pillar developments to include
organised crime, fraud and corruption. The offence has also been redefined by
subsequent third pillar measures adopted for very specific and yet diverging
purposes. Member state implementation on the other hand varies, ranging from an
'all crimes' offence to the laundering of proceeds of specific crimes. This mosaic
of definitions does little for the achievement of legal certainty, especially in view
of the inclusion in the definition of the legally - and conceptually- elusive and all-
embracing concept of organised crime.
The situation is similar regarding responsibilisation measures as to the extension
of the legislation. A further amendment to the directive aims at extending its scope
to a wide range of professions and individuals, including sensitive sectors such as
the legal profession. This development has the potential of bringing an end to
social relations of trust as we know them, challenging at the same time
fundamental principles such as legal confidentiality, which are intrinsically related
to fair trial rights. The extension of the scope is problematic here in view of the
fact that the directive duties remain amorphous, with no specific protective
provisions for the customer in cases of wrongful disclosure. Regarding the
mechanisms responsible for the administration of knowledge, pressure towards
EU-wide co-operation has led to the following paradox: financial intelligence units
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of considerably different status are called, on the basis of a post-Amsterdam
proposed third pillar measure, to exchange information regardless of their nature.
More room for developments exists on the basis of article 30(1 )(b) (ex K.2) of the
Amsterdam Treaty the specific reference to common action in police co-operation
on the administration, in particular through Europol, of suspicious transaction
reports. Legal certainty and potentially data protection interests are thus
undermined in the name of international co-operation.
The justification of the expanding EU anti-money laundering framework and its
prevalence over the legal principles at stake are still, nearly a decade after the
adoption of directive 91/308, far from clear-cut. The emotive securitisation
discourse which served to ensure the legitimacy of the measures was not followed
by any credible measurement of the scale of the problem. Estimates of sums of
laundered money were put forward only recently, are still too vague, and have been
strongly criticised.3 On the other hand, the adverse macroeconomic impact of
money laundering is still not directly ascertained. The attempt to justify money
laundering counter-measures even on the basis of limited concrete data is evident
in the following passage of a Report adopted by the Commission of the European
Communities as recently as 1998:
'It is concluded that although difficult to measure, the magnitude of the sums involved and
the extent of the criminal activities that generate [criminal] income have implications for
both the domestic and the international allocation of resources and macroeconomic
stability. Although, the IMF reports, there is currently no theoretical literature on the
macroeconomic effects of money laundering, indirect macro-based empirical research and
related studies of crime and the underground economy, coupled with the pervasive role of
3
According to the International Monetary Fund, the aggregate size ofmoney laundering in the
world could be 'somewhere between two and five percent of the world's gross domestic product':
FATF/OECD Policy Brief, Money Laundering, July 1999. A criticism of such an approach, and of
the over-reliance on numerical statistics in measuring the size of organised crime and money
laundering is found in Law Commission of Canada (1999), Major Issues Relating to Organized
Crime: within the Context ofEconomic Relationships (prepared by M.E. Beare and R.T. Naylor),
pp.7-8.
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money laundering in illegal activity, suggest that money laundering may be sufficiently
widespread to exert an independent impact on the macroeconomy'.4
Another contested issue in the 'balancing act' between money laundering
counter-measures and the legal principles they challenge is the delimitation of the
actual interests that are threatened by the money laundering phenomenon. All
relevant international initiatives, including the directive, equate the threat of money
laundering with that of organised crime. It is clear however that the phenomena are
not identical, but bear a relationship of a means to an end: money laundering
results in facilitating the work of criminals, rather than attacking the interests
threatened by organised crime per se. Money laundering counter-measures must
thus be balanced as protecting only in an indirect way the interests which are
perceived to be threatened by organised crime. The perception of money
laundering as a direct security threat may be substantiated only with reference to
the sound functioning of the financial system. This interest however cannot be
elevated to the same status with interests protected by the criminal law and the
constitution, such as the maintenance of human life or state organisation.
These considerations must be taken into account in order to 'de-securitise' to a
certain extent the money laundering phenomenon. This process is essential in order
to place limits to the challenges posed by EU money laundering counter-measures,
which are constantly being extended both materially, to cover broader categories of
offences, people and policing structures, and territorially, to apply for instance in
Eastern European countries, which are trying to consolidate the same legal
principles that are being challenged here. From the perspective of legislative
drafting, efforts in this respect must focus on the achievement of the highest level
of legal certainty and respect for fundamental legal principles: the money
laundering offence must be strictly delimited and the extension to negligent
laundering rejected; guarantees must be provided for the protection of the special
4 Commission of the European Communities (1998), Second Commission Report to the European
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, COM
(1998) final, Brussels, 1.7.1998, p. 18. On an overview of the potential, according to the
International Monetary Fund, macroeconomic effects of money laundering see chapter 3.
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relationship of trust in every day transactions, in particular between lawyers and
their clients; and more extensive and harmonised legislation must be adopted
placing the action and networking structures of financial intelligence units under
clear-cut guarantees of data protection and accountability.
The quest for legal certainty and respect for fundamental legal principles is
particularly needed in view of the current stage of European integration, which is
marked by the evolution of the Union to an area of 'freedom, security and justice'.
The constitutionalisation of security, which is viewed as one of the central
objectives of the Union, may lead to pressure for the adoption of a multitude of
measures in the fields of money laundering and organised crime, under both the
first and third pillars. The imposition of such security logic in money laundering
counter-measures can be dangerous, if a parallel protection of fundamental legal
principles is not achieved at EU level. In this context, the drafting of a Charter of
Fundamental Rights within the Treaty, which currently includes specific rights of
data protection and privacy,5 must be welcomed. However, if effective protection
is to be achieved, constitutionalisation in the law of the European Union must be
extended to expressly provide and protect fundamental legal principles which are
challenged by the drive towards more 'security'.
5 Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, DOC. CHARTE 4102/00,
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